The Ups and Downs of Irredentism: The Case of Turkey

JACOB M. LANDAU

According to a document I discovered in Istanbul[1] (to be published elsewhere), the Ottoman Sultan Mahmut I issued an important imperial order on December 20, 1745, commanding cavalry officers to ready their troops to proceed to Kars for a war against Persia. The reasons given for the decision to fight Persia were as follows: (1) to defend the true faith from heresy; (2) to protect the Ottoman Empire from the evil designs of Persia's ruler, Nadir Shah; and (3) to redeem Azerbayjan. Although the redeeming of Azerbayjan was only third on the list, following the religious and military arguments, it is noteworthy. Not surprisingly, Azerbayjan had been part of the Ottoman Empire, and the majority of its inhabitants spoke Turkish (as they still do). Although Mahmut I could hardly have reasoned in irredentist terms 240 years ago (if he had, he would probably have argued that the Azerbayjanis were Turks!), one may perceive the seeds of future irredentist thinking in the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey insofar as redeeming territories was concerned.

I would tentatively define irredentism as "an ideological or organizational expression of passionate interest in the well-being of an ethnic or cultural minority living outside the boundaries of the states inhabited by the same group." However, moderate expressions of interest or defending a group from discrimination or assimilation may not be irredentist phenomena at all; hence a more adequate definition of irredentism may be "extreme expressions, ideological or organizational, aiming at joining or uniting (i.e., annexing) territories that the ethnic or cultural minority group inhabits or has inhabited at some historical date." Nevertheless, one ought also to accord brief attention to the moderate expressions (for example, in the cultural domain), as they may well lead to the extreme ones. This is certainly true of the Turkish case and applies to several others as well.

This chapter is a brief exposé of Turkish irredentism, highlighting its main stages and characteristics and enabling, perhaps, profitable comparison with other types of irredentism prevailing elsewhere. With the exception of a perceptive article by Myron Weiner,[2] such comparisons seem rarely to have been attempted.

First, we shall consider the preparatory stage: in our case, developments among the Tatars in Czarist Russia, one of the Turkic groups that, as part of a cultural revival in the late nineteenth century, became increasingly aware of common historical and linguistic ties with other Turkic groups and most particularly with the Turks in the Ottoman Empire. To comprehend the nature of this revival properly, one should realize that it was largely a response to the official Czarist policy of Russification, often accompanied by Christianization, during the latter part of the nineteenth century. This policy, intensified by Izvolsky's support of Pan-Slavism, provoked the minority groups in the Czarist empire, of which the Turkic groups numbered 13,600,000 out of a total population of 125,600,000 (about 10.82 percent), according to the 1897 census. The response of these Turkic groups, which extended over vast territories, could be expressed within two parameters—religious and nationalist. Islam (later Pan-Islam) came first and was more easily understood by the masses as a unifying bond against external dangers. Turkism (later Pan-Turkism) was adopted as a bond by some members of the elite soon afterward. This chapter is concerned with the latter phenomenon alone.

The Tatars had been under Russian domination longer than any Turkic group; by the late nineteenth century they were heavily subjected to the pressures of Russification.[3] The Crimean Tatars, in particular, were surrounded by non-Turks, and their only chance for national survival lay in the development of relations with other Turkic groups, particularly those in the relatively nearby Ottoman Empire. An active bourgeoisie arose, rivaling its Russian counterparts in business[4] and capable of initiating and leading a cultural revival. The key figure in this revival was Ismail Gasprinsky (1851–1914)—also known by his Turkish name, Gaspirali—who was most active in education, journalism, and language reform. In 1884, as mayor of the Tatar town of Bahçesaray, he devised a new school curriculum for the six-year local schools, introducing (among other reforms) the Turkish language as well as the previously taught Arabic. By 1883, he had already founded a newspaper, too, the *Tercüman* ("Interpreter"), in which he advocated secular nationalism with a definite Pan-Turk cultural inclination. Having attained a circulation of 5,000 in the 1880s and 6,000 in the early 1900s[5] (quite an achievement for that time), *Tercüman* increasingly preached union of all Turkish people in Russia, thus arousing the suspicions of the Okhrana, the Russian secret police.[6]

Gasprinsky also devised a lingua franca for Turkish groups in Russia and abroad. Well aware that the main differences among the Turkish languages and dialects were not variations in syntax or accidence but rather in vocabulary, Gasprinsky strove to "purify" this new language of foreign words, employed only in certain areas, substituting others of

Turkish or Turkic origins and comprehensible to the elites (a parallel effort attempted, somewhat less successfully, to minimize phonological diversity). The result was a language easily understood by Turks in the Ottoman Empire, including Tatars.[7] Schools in Bahçesaray taught this language and *Tercüman* propagated it elsewhere. The theme of language reform was soon taken up by local newspapers in Azerbayjan and Bukhara as well. This was of some significance, as no fewer than 250 newspapers (some ephemeral indeed) were published by Turkic groups between 1905 and 1917.[8]

Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate Gasprinsky's impact precisely,[9] one may safely say that despite its primarily cultural nature, it laid the groundwork for political Pan-Turkism of an irredentist character. Political demands with clear Pan-Turk leanings predominated at the three all-Muslim congresses that met at Nidzhni-Novgorod in August 1905, St. Petersburg in January 1906, and near Nidzhni-Novgorod in August 1906. Representatives of Turkic groups—especially those of the Tatars—were in a definite majority at all three congresses.[10] Subsequently, in 1907, Ali Hüseyinzade (1864–1941), a Caucasus Tatar, defined the objectives of Turkic nationalism in his journal *Füyuzat* ("Enlightenment") as "Turkism, Islamism, and Europeanism," with the first value considered as the most important.[11] Another Tatar, Yusuf Akçura, or Akçuraoğlu (1870–1935), was even more explicit: in his journal *Kazan Muhbiri* ("The Kazan Correspondent"), published since 1906, he expressed deep commitment to the Pan-Turk cause. In 1904, he had determined the bases for political Pan-Turkism in a long article prudently printed abroad in the Cairo newspaper *Türk*. The article, entitled "Üç tarz-i siyaset" ("Three Systems of Government"), and later issued as a pamphlet, lauded Turkism as the only realistic means of effecting a national union of all Turks, with Turkey at its center.[12] For the first time, Pan-Turkism was preached as a political doctrine and was suggested as the only viable category of nationalism capable of saving the Ottoman Empire. Irredentism had come into its own as the central political element in the Pan-Turk ideology.

Antigovernment agitation by Turkic groups in Czarist Russia during World War I, their various revolts, and their continued resistance to Soviet rule during the first decade of the new regime have been variously interpreted by Soviet, Turkish, and other analysts; most agree about the nationalist Pan-Turk character of all this.[13] However, active Pan-Turkism was subsequently relegated to isolated cases alone, after the Soviets pitted minority groups against one another and set up allegedly autonomous subdistricts emphasizing the small ethnocultural subdivisions among the Turkic groups.[14] The center of Pan-Turk political activity had moved, even during World War I, to the Ottoman

Empire, where its irredentist character soon became prominent.

THE FLOURISHING OF IRREDENTISM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The propagation of Pan-Turkism in the late Ottoman Empire was largely due, on the one hand, to the activity of Tatar intellectuals who had immigrated from Russia and, on the other hand, to the writings of several Ottoman thinkers. Its penetration of small but influential elitist circles was due in no small degree to the political fortunes and intellectual makeup of the empire.[15]

Immediately before and during World War I, leading Tatars like Hüseyinzade and Akçura and prominent Azeri journalists such as Ahmet Agayev (Agaoğlu) (1860–1939), all of whom had displayed marked interest in Pan-Turkism, left Russia and settled in Istanbul. There, they contributed their share to the public debate on the nature and fortunes of Turkish nationalism. Prominent among the Ottoman intellectuals then busily engaged in the debate were Ziya Gökalp and Tekin Alp. Although neither was a Turk (the first was a Kurd, the second a Jew), both played a key role in the formation of early twentieth-century nationalist thinking among Ottoman Turks. Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924), although a prolific writer,[16] exerted an impact on Pan-Turkism only via a few poems and articles and several pages of his last book. Nevertheless, he may be credited with systematizing Turkish thinking on Pan-Turkism and using his immense prestige to encourage its consideration and acceptance as a point of departure for public debate. Among his poems, "Turan," written in 1911, refers to a huge, undefined land in Central Asia, the common birthplace of all Turkic groups. It was an unequivocal call for an irredentist Pan-Turkism: "For the Turks, Fatherland means neither Turkey, nor Turkestan, Fatherland is a large and eternal country—Turan!" When World War I broke out, Gökalp composed another fiery poem, "Kizil Destan" ("Red Epic"), calling in no uncertain Pan-Turk terms for the destruction of Russia and the liberation of Turks there. The impact of Gökalp's poems on the Turkish population was far-reaching, but his articles had a more lasting influence on several intellectuals. Using the sociological tools of the day (Gökalp was himself a lecturer in sociology at Istanbul University), Gökalp examined the meaning of the concept of nation. Defining it in cultural terms, he concluded that the Turkish nation had three circles: the Turks in Turkey; the Turkmens in Azerbayjan, Iran, and Khwarizm; and the more distant Turkic-speaking peoples in Central Asia (Turan). The first were united, the second would be at some future date, and union with the third was envisioned for the distant future. This was a

three-stage political program for irredentists, with debate centering not on the aims but only on the timing and methods.[17]

Tekin Alp (1883–1961) was less well known but nonetheless highly influential. Born as Moïse Cohen at Serres, in Macedonia, he lived in Salonica until 1912. There he met Gökalp, who left an indelible impression on the younger Tekin Alp. He then moved to Istanbul and became a major advocate of irredentist Pan-Turkism, as reflected in his newspaper articles and books. Two of his most outstanding works were published in the fateful year 1914. The first, in Turkish, was entitled *What Can the Turks Gain in This War*?; it was translated a year later into German as *Türkismus und Pantürkismus*.[18] In it he argued that the new Turkish nationalism, or Turkism, could be equated with its strongest component, Pan-Turkism. He called on the movement to become as irredentist as its Italian or Romanian counterparts and wished it as large a measure of success. This appears to be the first explicit public appeal in the Ottoman Empire for an irredentist, politically minded Pan-Turkism.

Tekin Alp elaborated this theme in another Turkish book, a lengthy essay on the Pan-Turk ideology, focusing on the happy lands of Turan. Assuming that Turks had common origins, history, language, traditions, customs, social institutions, literature, and sentiments, he maintained that Turan was a living reality of 10,800,000 square kilometers and 43,000,000 Turks, many of them governed by Russia and China, against whom the thrust of this work is aimed. For winning Turan, Tekin Alp formulated maximum and minimum plans resembling those of Gökalp and called on Turks everywhere to unite against Russia and China in order to establish a large "Golden Fatherland" with Istanbul as its capital.[19]

The works of Gökalp and Tekin Alp were merely the most prominent of a spate of books, pamphlets, and newspaper articles, all of which sought definitions of the Turkish identity and emerged with irredentist formulas applicable to the salvation of the hard-pressed Ottoman Empire. The greatest success of these Pan-Turk circles, highly vocal but small in numbers, was the adoption of the Pan-Turk ideology by several top political leaders; in fact, Pan-Turkism, with its irredentist overtones, became the official ideology of the Ottoman Empire for a while. In 1908, the Young Turks revolted against Sultan Abdülhamid II, and a year later they deposed him. In effect, they ruled the empire for a decade, until its defeat and dismemberment in 1918. At first, they had substituted their own Ottomanist views for Abdülhamid's Pan-Islamic ideology, enjoining on all inhabitants to exert a joint effort to save the hard-pressed empire. But the separatist movements continued to gather momentum, some with their own irredentist character (Greek, Montenegrin, and Romanian, for example). Consequently, the increas-

ingly desperate quest for identity impelled its ruling elites to search for another solution to save the empire. Pan-Turkism was the obvious choice; although Pan-Islam and Ottomanism were not entirely abandoned, some government officials and many intellectuals indeed opted for Pan-Turkism.[20] Various popular organizations in Istanbul and elsewhere supported the ideas of Turkish nationalism, such as the Türk Ocaği ("Turkish Hearths"), established in 1911, which dispatched trusted members during World War I to recruit support abroad for Pan-Turkism.[21]

Although the Committee of Union and Progress, as the organization of the Young Turks was called, placed considerable emphasis on the Turkification of language, education, and business, some of its attention was devoted to absorbing immigrant Turks for provinces lost in the Balkan wars and organizing those remaining there to cement their ties with the Ottoman Empire. Pan-Turk sentiment increased in the committee, particularly after Ali Hüseyinzade, who had migrated to Turkey, joined the committee's Central Council in 1911.[22] Pan-Turk propaganda campaigns were conducted by the committee's agents in Azerbayjan, the Caucasus, Turkestan, Iran, and Afghanistan, as well as among the Volga Tatars.[23] The main proponent of the committee's Pan-Turk policies was Enver, who became minister of war. The Ottoman Empire's declaration of war in 1914 included the following phrases: "The ideal of our nation and our people leads us to the destruction of our Muscovite enemy, obtaining thereby a natural frontier for our Empire, which should include and unite all branches of our race."[24] The commitment to Pan-Turkism explains the undertaking of the abortive Ottoman offensive in the Caucasus in late 1914 and early 1915, the strong-handed exile of the Armenians some time later (as they were considered a barrier to Pan-Turk unity), the transfer in 1917 and 1918 of units badly needed on the Syrian and Mesopotamian fronts for a thrust into southern Russia up to Baku, and, obviously, the intense Pan-Turk propaganda throughout the war. Last, Enver himself, dreaming of a Turkish-Turkic state even after the Ottoman Empire's defeat, turned up in Central Asia in 1921 and raised the banners of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islam against the Soviets, only to die there in battle a year later.[25]

THE FORTUNES OF IRREDENTISM IN THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

Thus ended the Pan-Turk plan of the Young Turks; but the dream lived on, nourished by irredentist dreams. However, since irredentism appears to require full-scale war as the only feasible means of changing frontiers, Pan-Turkism had to lie low during peacetime. Among the

Turkic groups abroad, it appeared to die a natural death under such authoritarian regimes as that of the Soviet Union and to lead a precarious existence in such countries as Cyprus and Romania or among émigrés in Western and Central Europe. Turkey itself, however, was to be the key to the survival of the movement and the ideology it fostered. Constituted as a republic and impelled by its founder and president, Mustafa Kemal, toward speedy modernization[26] and Westernization, the new state and its leadership had little if any use for Pan-Turkism. Well aware that Pan-Turkism's irredentist factor could endanger the new republic's relations with the Soviet Union, Mustafa Kemal drove this ideology to the periphery of public life. Instead, he promoted his own brand of nonirredentist nationalism, focusing on Turkey itself. The glorifying of the Turks' ancient past was stripped, indeed, of its political content and presented in strictly cultural and social terms—as the official state ideology of the republic.

Latent Pan-Turkism lingered on, however, throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Kemal died in 1938). Irredentist sentiment found expression in several pamphlets and periodicals published by small Pan-Turk groups. These journals were generally short-lived, primarily because official censorship closed them down in Turkey and banned the import of similarly minded works published in Europe by Turkic émigrés from the Soviet Union. In Turkey itself, immigrants set up their own separate *Landsmannschaften*, each with its own bulletin promoting the particular brand of irredentism espoused—evidently focused on the *Diş Türkler* ("Outside Turks") in their country of origin. Such particularist attitudes only served to foster the divisiveness that further enfeebled the Pan-Turk movement in Turkey between the world wars. The movement became noticeable, although still small in numbers and restricted in activity, only after several local Turks joined in the 1930s. Its best-known exponent was Hüseyin Nihal Atsiz.

Atsiz (1905–1975),[27] a schoolteacher, journalist, and novelist, devoted most of his adult life to organizing and leading the Pan-Turk movement in the Republic of Turkey; together with his brother, Nejdet Sançar (1910–1975), he worked on reshaping its ideology in an even more irredentist direction than before. Atsiz set up a clandestine association, and in 1931–1932 was the first to publish and edit a Pan-Turk periodical in the Republic of Turkey, followed by another in 1933–1934. Initially, these generally resembled other Pan-Turk publications, writing and commenting on the history, language, literature, and present circumstances of Turkic peoples. Soon, however, the periodicals assumed a more militant stance, not only in their strong anticommunist propaganda line but also in their attempt to preach Pan-Turkism as contrasted with "Anatolianism" (a semiderogatory term by which they referred to Mustafa Kemal's Turkey-centered brand of

nationalism). A distinct trait was added to Pan-Turk ideology by Atsiz, Sançar, and several others of the same persuasion: racism. Although the cultural and geographical perspectives were not abandoned, the Pan-Turkism of the 1930s emphasized the racial bond. As its exponents phrased it, blood was the best and possibly the sole meaningful bond of the Turkish race,[28] a great and superb one, surpassing all others.[29] Consequently, the minorities in the Republic of Turkey were not part of the Turkish nation, whereas the "Outside Turks" were. Ideologically, Atsiz would label himself "a racist and a Pan-Turkist"; he considered himself a popular leader and even affected some of Hitler's mannerisms.

World War II witnessed a resurgence of irredentist sentiment in the Republic of Turkey. Extreme Pan-Turks, although still modest in overall number, considerably intensified the content and tone of their propaganda—in direct proportion to their hopes for a radical change in the status quo of the "Turkish world." Turkey's situation in World War II was basically different from conditions prevailing in World War I. A large empire no more, the Republic of Turkey remained neutral until February 22, 1945, shortly before the war ended. Its government proclaimed martial law and insisted on strict maintenance of its neutral stand. This, however, mattered little to Pan-Turks. Their irredentist hopes for the downfall of the Soviet Union and the consequent "liberation" of the "Outside Turks" were fanned by the German advance since June 1941. Pan-Turks in Turkey then believed in and increasingly preached the approaching defeat and dismemberment of the Soviet Union. Their journalistic activity focused on convincing Turkey's president, Ismet Inönü, to enter the war: "O Inönü, selected by history for this great day! We are ready to shed our blood for the sacred independence of Turkdom! All Turkdom is anticipating your signal!"[30] The call for an aggressive war soon became louder: "The right which is not granted should be taken. By war?—Yes, when necessary, by war!"[31]

Pan-Turk activity during World War II extended beyond journalism. Nazi Germany had displayed some interest in the Turkic groups of the Soviet Union even before the outbreak of the war.[32] During the war, the Germans attempted to exploit Pan-Turk feelings to their own advantage—both in Europe and in Turkey. Appropriate Pan-Turk propaganda was directed toward Turkic groups in the Soviet Union,[33] and Turkic prisoners of war in German camps—numbering about 55,000—were drafted into fighting units with promises of liberation phrased in irredentist terms.[34] These units, constantly reinforced, eventually numbered hundreds of thousands.[35] In Turkey itself, the government remained cool toward German inducements. Therefore, Turkic immigrants in Ankara and Istanbul were used as intermediaries between

German Ambassador Franz von Papen and leading Pan-Turk activists. The latter stepped up their anticommunist and anti-Soviet propaganda as well as their demand for Turkey to join the Axis powers. A clash was inevitable, and on May 3, 1944, in open defiance of martial law, the Pan-Turk activists organized major anticommunist demonstrations in Ankara and Istanbul, with Atsiz, Sancar, and other leaders in the forefront. Pan-Turk slogans were abundantly in evidence.[36] The government reacted swiftly and vigorously by arresting the ringleaders and bringing them to trial, while banning the Pan-Turk organizations.

Public Pan-Turk activity thus failed again, but the trials afforded an excellent opportunity for irredentist propaganda within Turkey, as they enjoyed extensive and fully detailed press coverage. The Pan-Turkists, convicted and subsequently acquitted on appeal, commenced intensive political activity in the postwar era. In 1945 Turkey passed from a single-party to a multiparty regime,[37] which obviously offered new vistas for political organization. Later, the military intervention of 1960–1961 was followed by an era of relative liberalization: censorship of the press was relaxed and political groupings were permitted to organize and act rather freely. Political associations proliferated, including Pan-Turk groups. Several Pan-Turk periodicals of the interwar era were revived and others launched, books and pamphlets were published, seminars were convened, and public lectures were given. Initially there was no countrywide Pan-Turk organization, but in the 1950s and early 1960s local groups intensified their activity and kept in touch with other Pan-Turk groups.

Although the ideological makeup of these diverse groups varied, there were some common denominators in their propaganda. First, the formerly official doctrines of Kemalism could now be publicly challenged. Second, although race theories were propounded no more (or only rarely), as they had been discredited with the defeat of Nazi Germany, irredentism became a virtually constant source of inspiration for the Pan-Turks in Turkey. Such views appeared more acceptable in the postwar generation than during the first generation of the republic; after all, Turkey had since veered from neutrality toward an alliance with the West, cemented by U.S. economic aid, membership in NATO, and participation in the Korean War. Moreover, "Outside Turks" were having problems in Greece, Cyprus, Iraq, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere, and appeals for their liberation now found more favor with the masses in Turkey than before. Irredentism thus became the oft-repeated message of Pan-Turkists, whose clarion call for the reestablishment of the large Turkish-Turkic empire extending from the Mediterranean to the Pacific was sounded with increasing frequency. The more extreme among them, led by Atsiz and his disciples, undisguisedly called for war against Greece and the formation of a

grand alliance for a future war against the Soviet Union.

As so much of Turkey's politics evolved around its political parties in the years following World War II, it was only a matter of time until a party with Pan-Turk principles would be launched. Its leader, Alparslan Türkeş, an "Outside Turk" born in Cyprus in 1917, moved to Istanbul at the age of fifteen, opted for a military career, and rose to the rank of colonel. In 1944, while on active service, he took part in Pan-Turk demonstrations and was tried along with other leaders, convicted, and then acquitted. In 1960, he was active in the military group that seized control of the government, but was later expelled from it. He resigned from the military and entered politics in 1963.[38] Two years later, realizing that the Pan-Turks were too few and too scattered to set up a political party on their own, Türkeş took over the leadership of an extant political party, the Republican Peasant and Nation party, whose name he later changed to the more appealing Nationalist Action party.[39] Although the party's fortunes are not relevant to this study, we note its performance in several electoral contests: eleven seats in the 1965 National Assembly (the Lower House), one seat in 1969, three in 1973, and sixteen in 1977.[40] Although the National Assembly had 450 members, the Nationalist Action party succeeded in entering cabinet coalitions in the years 1975–1977 and again in 1977–1980—with Türkeş as vice-premier. The military intervention of September 12, 1980 dissolved the parliament, and later (1981) all political parties as well.[41] Türkeş and other leaders of the Nationalist Action party were indicted for subversive activities, and their lengthy trial ended with several convictions.

Our primary concern is with the Pan-Turk irredentist views of Türkeş, which represented a component in the party's ideology. Once the party entered parliament and the cabinet, Pan-Turkism came out of the political wilderness into which it had been thrust by Mustafa Kemal and his associates and rejoined the mainstream of Turkish politics. However, one should remember, again, that Pan-Turkism was only one component in the Nationalist Action party's platform. When the party was in opposition, irredentist sentiment often found expression in Türkeş's speeches and written statements. The Turks of Cyprus, not surprisingly, constituted the focus of his passionate pleas for the "Outside Turks," whose universal liberation he advocated. His pronouncements remind one of earlier Pan-Turk propaganda, characteristic of anti-Greek and anticommunist (as well as anti-Soviet) positions. Understandably, perhaps, Türkeş toned down his style considerably when serving in the cabinet, refraining from irredentist declarations that would have embarrassed the government. This caused a rift between him and many of his Pan-Turk supporters, who left the party demonstratively. The Pan-Turks have now reverted to their peripheral

position in the Republic of Turkey and have exerted little impact during military rule in 1980–1983 and the subsequent return to civilian government. Apparently, their number has decreased radically and their efforts now concentrate primarily on journalistic propaganda.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The following observations establish a tentative typology of irredentism as expressed in Pan-Turkism and compare several of its features with those expressed in irredentist movements and ideologies elsewhere.[42]

1. Pan-Turk ideology originated in the diaspora and was propounded in the home country (the Ottoman Empire, then the Republic of Turkey) only later. In this respect, it appears to resemble Pan-Arabism, which was first preached by Syrian émigrés in Western Europe, or Pan-Slavism, whose inception occurred outside Czarist Russia (the first Pan-Slavic Congress convened in Prague in 1848), but differs from Pan-Italianism, Pan-Hellenism, and Pan-Germanism, all of which began in their respective home countries.[43]

2. The inception of Pan-Turkism unfolded on the cultural plane with emphasis on such disciplines as language, history, literature, folklore, and archaeology, common to all Turkish-Turkic groups. The irredentist element surfaced only later when political considerations set in, whereupon research and literary works on those disciplines began discussing "liberation" of the "Outside Turks" and annexation of their territories. The trend is frequently from the moderate to the extreme. This process appears familiar to many other Pan-ideologies. Pan-Arabism, for example, began as a literary and linguistic movement active in cultural clubs in Syria and elsewhere in the late nineteenth century, but reached its clearest irredentist expression in the Pan-Arabism that is now a principal component of the doctrines of the Baath party governing Iraq and Syria. The Iraqi attack on Iran in 1980 was partly explained as stemming from a desire to free and annex the Arab population in Iran's border district (which the Iraqis call Arabistan and the Iranians call Khozistan). The Syrian leadership, in turn, seeks to create a Greater Syria comprising Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, and southern Turkey (which the Syrians call Alexandretta and the Turks call Hatay). This observation also applies to Pan-Hellenism, which started as a cultural renaissance and developed politically into an irredentist Megali Idea aiming at the annexation of Asia Minor (now in Turkey), which is the home of several Greek communities and was once part of the Greek Empire. Pan-Germanism, likewise cultural at first, aimed at colonial expansion at the end of the nineteenth century and degenerated

into Hitler's renewed version, which aimed at and succeeded in annexing the Sudetenland, Austria, and several other lands claimed to be part of the German *Heimat*.

3. Pan-Turk irredentism is evidently romantic and emotional; basically, however, it is not irrational, but rather possesses a rationale of its own. Because Pan-Turkism is largely motivated by cultural, ethnic, and political considerations, it has tended to ignore: (1) geographical factors (contiguousness or the lack thereof has never been an argument); (2) military situations (the might of the Soviet Union has not deterred Pan-Turkism in Turkey); (3) economic considerations (raised only in rare instances and somewhat apologetically, as it was thought that they should not constitute a motivation for nationalism); and (4) religious matters (in Russia and elsewhere the Turkic groups were divided between Sunnis and Shiites, whereas the Republic of Turkey prided itself on its secularism and passed laws banning the mixing of religion and politics; moreover, Islam was not particular to the Turks alone). It would appear that many of these attitudes of romantic emotionalism and apparent irrationalism were manifest in other irredentist Pan-ideologies, with the exception of Pan-Germanism (which was definitely economic-minded in its early years) and several other ideologies that turned to religion for a while: early Pan-Slavism, although not since its revival by Stalin after the German attack in 1941; Pan-Hellenism at first, but not at present; and Pan-Arabism, which used to express itself in Islamic terms but has ceased doing so in its current (Baath) version. It thus appears that over time there has been a gradual weakening of the religious element in irredentism, which now approaches the Turkish model in this aspect as well.

4. Pan-Turk irredentism has consistently maintained and fostered a "villain image" of its principal opponent, that is, the factor chiefly responsible for subjugating "Outside Turks" and their territories, which may comprise one or more states or peoples. Initially it was Czarist Russia and, to a lesser degree, China; then the Soviet Union and, to a lesser degree, Iraq and Iran; later, with the rising tensions over Cyprus, it became Greece (a book attacking the Megali Idea was published in Ankara as recently as 1985)[44] and currently Bulgaria (where the local Turkish population is allegedly compelled to change its personal names and lose its identity).[45] The villain image has obviously been germane to every irredentist ideology known to us: Pan-Arabism had the Ottoman Turks, then Israel; Pan-Slavism the Germans; Pan-Germanism, the Slavs; Pan-Italianism, the Austro-Hungarians and later the Yugoslavs (over Trieste); Pan-Hellenism, the Turks; Hungarian irredentism, the Romanians (over Transylvania); Romanian irredentism, the Hungarians (over Transylvania) and later the Soviets (over Bessarabia, now called the Moldavian Soviet Republic); and Albanian irredentism had

Yugoslavia (over the Kosovo district). Even so, it would seem that Turkish irredentism has had more than its share of villains to contest with (perhaps because of the nature of the Turkish-Turkic diaspora).

5. Organization appears to have been a main weakness of irredentist Pan-Turkism. Although no precise data are available regarding the size and composition of its membership, one may gauge its range from several hundred, at present, to several thousand during World War I and again in the 1970s. Pan-Turk speeches and writings indicate that the movement, which comprised competing small groups, was tightknit and elitist, led by intellectuals and supported by students and middle-class townspeople. It emphasized written and oral propaganda, with newspapers serving as rallying points for each group, supplemented by cultural meetings featuring lectures, music, and performances. Available information indicates that this situation is no different from that of other irredentist Pan-movements, with the possible exception of the Pan-German League, which reached its peak in 1901 with 21,924 members.[46] Otherwise, irredentist Pan-movements seem to have generally resembled Pan-Turkism in scope and organization.[47]

6. Finally, irredentism in Turkey has evidently failed to achieve its objectives so far, probably due to a variety of reasons, both internal and external. Among the former are poor organization; limited public support; an ideology phrased in too elaborate terms; and the inability to mobilize government support and commitment (in the only instance in which Pan-Turkism did find favor with the state leadership, during World War I, this leadership allied itself with the losing side). Among the latter are the relatively greater power of some of Turkey's neighbors, chiefly the Soviet Union (when Turkey was stronger, as in 1974, it did not hesitate to risk war with Greece over Cyprus, where it established a new Turkish political entity); the particular makeup of Turkic groups abroad (where they are dispersed among other ethnic minorities, often at great distance from one another); and the energetic pursuit by the Turkish republic of a policy of peace and improvement of relations with its immediate neighbors.[48] It is tempting to compare this case with the failure of other irredentist movements and ideologies, such as Pan-Arabism, Pan-Germanism, Pan-Hellenism, or Hungarian and Albanian irredentism, or with the relative success of others, such as Pan-Italianism or Romanian irredentism. This subject, however, obviously requires additional research.

NOTES

1. In the Tarihi Araştirmalar ve Dokümantasyon Merkezleri Kurma ve Gelistirme Vakfi.

2. Myron Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome: An Historical Model of

International Relations and Political Development," *World Politics* 13, 4 (July 1971): 665–683.

3. S. A. Zenkovsky, "A Century of Tatar Revival," *American Slavic and East European Review* 12 (October 1953): 303–318.

4. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Quelquejay, *Les mouvements nationaux chez les Musulmans de Russie* (Paris and The Hague: Mouton, 1960), pp. 28ff., 40.

5. Vincent Monteil, *Les Musulmans soviétiques* (Paris: Seuil, 1957), p. 22; A. Vambery, "The Awakening of the Tatars," *The Nineteenth Century* (London) 57 (February 1905): 217–227.

6. H. C. d'Encausse, *Réforme et révolution chez les Musulmans de l'Empire russe* (Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1966), pp. 103–104.

7. The only detailed study of this language to date seems to be Gustav Burbice's "Die Sprache Ismail Bey Gaspyralys," unpublished doctoral thesis, Hamburg University, 1950.

8. G. V. Mende, *Der nationale Kampf der Russlandtürken* (Berlin: Seminar Für Orientalische Sprachen, 1936), p. 93.

9. For Gasprinsky's lifework and impact, see, in addition to materials in the previous notes, Cafer Seydahmet Kirimer, *Gaspirali Ismail Bey* (Istanbul, 1934); Ahmet Caferoğlu, *Ismail Gaspirali. Öümünün 50. Yildönümü münasebetile bir etüd* (Istanbul, 1964).

10. For these three congresses, see A. V. Pyaskovskiy, *Ryevolutsiya 1905–1907 godov v Tyurkyestanye* (Moscow, 1958), pp. 98–102, 543ff.; R. A. Pierce, *Russian Central Asia, 1867–1917: A Study in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960), pp. 255–258.

11. Mende, *Der nationale Kampf*, pp. 71ff.

12. David Thomas, "Yusuf Akçura and the Intellectual Origins of Üç tarz-i siyaset," *Journal of Turkish Studies* 2 (1978): 127–140; François Georgeon, *Aux origines du nationalisme turc: Yusuf Akçura* (Paris: Institute d'Etudes Anatoliennes, Editions ADPF, 1980).

13. George Macartney, "Bolshevism as I Saw It in Tashkent in 1918," *Journal of the Central Asian Society* 7 (1920), esp. p. 42; Mustafa Chokaev, "The Basmaji Movement in Turkestan," *Asiatic Review* (London) 24 (April 1928): 273–288; P. Galuzo and F. Bodzhko, *Vosstaniye 1916 v Sryednyey Azii* (Moscow, 1932); A. Oktay, *Türkestan milî hareketi ve Mustafa Çokay* (Istanbul, 1950); Edige Kirimal, *Der nationale Kampf der Krimtürken mit besonderer Besichtigung der Jahr 1917-1918* (Emsdetten: Lechte, 1952), pp. 37–277; Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975); Z. D. Kastyel'skaya, *Iz istorii Tyurkestanskogo kraya (1865–1917)* (Moscow, 1980), pp. 89–99.

14. G. J. Massell, *The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategists in Soviet Central Asia, 1919–1929* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 32–34.

15. Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey* (London: C. Hurst, 1981), pp. 28ff.

16. A recent bibliography lists 436 item. I. Binark and N. Sefercioğlu, *Doğumunun 95. münasebetiyle Ziya Gökalp bibliyografiyasi: kitap, makale* (Ankara, 1971).

17. The most detailed works about Gökalp remain Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp* (London: Luzac, 1950) and Niyazi Berkes, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*

Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). Gökalp's main book was translated into English by Robert Devereux as *The Principles of Turkism* (Leiden: Brill, 1968).

18. Tekin Alp, *Türkismus und Pantürkismus* (Weimar: Deutsche Orientbücherei, 1915).

19. For further details, see Jacob M. Landau, *Tekinalp: Turkish Patriot 1883–1961* (Istanbul and Leiden: Nederlands Archeological-Historical Institute, 1984), esp. pp. 25–27, 99–102, 273–278.

20. Jacob M. Landau, "Pan-Islam and Pan-Turkism During the Final Years of the Ottoman Empire: Some Considerations," in Robert Hillenbrand, ed., *Proceedings, Union Européenne des Arabisants et Islamisants, 10th Congress, Edinburgh, September 9–16, 1980* (Edinburgh, 1982), pp. 43–45.

21. For instance, in Medina, in 1917. See Public Record Office (London), FO (Foreign Office series) 395/139, file 15725, no. 144185, decoded message from Sir Reginald Wingate to the Foreign Office, dated Ramleh, July 21, 1917.

22. C. J. Walker, *Armenia: The Survival of a Nation* (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 191.

23. See the archival sources mentioned in Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey*, pp. 49ff. and 65–66.

24. Quoted by Harry Luke, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London, 1936), p. 161.

25. Louis Fischer, "The End of Enver Pasha," *Virginia Quarterly Review* (University of Virginia) 6, 2 (April 1930): 232–239; and P. R. Ali, "Enver Pasha: His Status in Modern Turkish History," *Egyptian Historical Review* (Cairo) 22 (1975), esp. pp. 24–27.

26. Details are found in Jacob M. Landau, ed., *Ataturk and the Modernization of Turkey* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984).

27. On Atsiz see, besides his numerous writings, a biography by Altan Deliorman, *Tanidiğim Atsiz* (Istanbul, 1978), and a memorial volume in his honor, Erel Güngör et al., eds., *Atsiz armağani* (Istanbul, 1976).

28. Hüseyin Nihal Atsiz, "Yirminci asirda Türk meselesi," *Orhun*, 9 (July 16, 1934), esp. pp. 157–160.

29. See examples in the following Pan-Turk periodicals: *Bozkurt* (December 1940): 208–213, (March 1942): 6; *Tanridağ* 3 (May 22, 1942): 4–7, (August 21, 1942): 11–13, (August 28, 1942): 6–7.

30. *Bozkurt* 11 (July 1941): 249.

31. Bozkurt 2nd series, no. 1 (March 5, 1942): 6.

32. See "Les puissances et la politique turco-tatare," *Politique Etrangère* (Paris) 3, 3 (June 1938): 236–241.

33. Archives of the German Foreign Office, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Panturan adh. 1941, file Büro Pers. M. See also *Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945, Serie D. 1937–1941* 13, 2 (1970): 467–470, dated September 26, 1941, Berlin.

34. Archives of the German Foreign Office, ibid., dated December 22, 1941.

35. Details in C. W. Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets: The Turks of the World and Their Political Objectives* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957), pp. 177ff.; Lothar Krecker, *Deutschland und die Türkei im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Frankfurt am Main: Frankfurter Wissenschaftliche Beiträge, 1964), p. 220, estimates them at 200,000.

36. For the whole affair, see Public Record Office, FO 371/44133, R 7715/

789/44, Ambassador Knatchbull-Hugessen's no. 173, "confidential," to Eden, dated May 6, 1944, Ankara.

37. The most detailed work on this change is K. H. Karpat's *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).

38. In addition to Türkeş's own writings and speeches, several biographies of him are available, such as M. Özdag, *Alparslan Türkeş* (Ankara, 1965); Fuat Uluç, *Işte liderler* (Ankara, 1965), esp. pp. 13ff.; Bekir Berk and N. M. Polat, *Islamî hareket ve Türkeş* (N.p. [Istanbul], 1969).

39. The only two studies of this party available to date are Jacob M. Landau, "The Militant Right in Turkish Politics," in J. M. Landau, *Middle Eastern Themes: Papers in History and Politics* (London: Frank Cass, 1973), pp. 277–289; and Jacob M. Landau, "The Nationalist Action Party in Turkey," *Journal of Contemporary History* (London) 17, 4 (October 1982): 587–606.

40. For details, see Jacob M. Landau, E. Özbudun, and F. Tachau, eds., *Electoral Politics in the Middle East: Issues, Voters and Elites* (London: Croom Helm/Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1980).

41. For which see M. Ali Birand, *12 Eylül saat: 04.00* (n.p., 1984).

42. There are as yet only few (and hardly satisfactory) comparative studies of Pan-movements and fewer of irredentism. See, for example, Karl Haushoffer, *Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen* (Berlin: Zentral-Verlag, 1931); Hans Kohn, "Pan-Movements," *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences* 11 (1931), s.v.; and F. Kazemzadeh, "Pan Movements," *International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences* 11 (1968), s.v.

43. See, for example, Michel Laissy, *Du Panarabisme à la Ligue arabe* (Paris: G. P. Maisonneuve, 1948); Shaukat Ali, *Pan-Movements in the Third World: Pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism, Pan-Islamism* (Lahore: Publishers United, n.d. [1976]); Fouad Ajami, "The End of Pan-Arabism," *Foreign Affairs* 57, 2 (Winter 1978); M. B. Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian Pan-Slavism, 1856–1870* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956); Hans Kohn, *Pan-Slavism in Its History and Ideology*, 2nd ed. (New York: University of Notre Dame Press, 1960); Th. G. Tatsios, *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866–1897*, unpublished doctoral thesis, Columbia University, New York, 1973; R. G. Usher, *Pan-Germanism* (London: Constable, 1914); M. S. Wertheimer, *The Pan-German League, 1890–1914* (New York: Studies in History, 1971).

44. *Türk-Yunan ilişkileri ve Megalo Idea* (Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1985). This book—intentionally, no doubt—retails for a mere T.L. 90 (= US $0.16).

45. Numerous publications have recently appeared on this. See, for example, the collection of lectures entitled *Ankara Üniversitesi Bulgaristan'da Türkler semineri (10 nisan 1985)* (Ankara, 1985).

46. Wertheimer, *The Pan-German League*, pp. 95ff.

47. Other Pan-movements may have had even fewer members than Pan-Turkism. See data in W. J. Argyle, "Size and Scale as Factors in the Development of Nationalist Movements," in A. D. Smith, ed., *Nationalist Movements* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), pp. 31–53.

48 See also Jacob M. Landau, "The Fortunes and Misfortunes of Pan-Turkism," *Central Asian Society* (Oxford) 7, 1 (1988): 1–5.