



BALKANLARDA
İSLÂM
MİADİ DOLMAYAN UMUT

İSLAM IN THE BALKANS
UNEXPIRED HOPE

VAKTİ AZİZDEN VAKTİ ZELALETE
FROM TIMES OF GLORY TO TIMES OF HUMILITY

EDİTÖR
MUHAMMET SAVAŞ KAFKASYALI



ANKARA - BELGRADE - BUCHAREST - BUDAPEST - CHISINAU - KIEV
PODGORICA - SARAJEVO - SKOPJE - TIRANA - ZAGREB





İnceleme Araştırma Dizisi

Yayın No:19

BALKANLARDA İSLAM
MİADI DOLMAYAN UMUT

Cilt 4: Vakti Azizden Vakti Zelalete
From Times of Glory to Times of Humility

Editör

Dr. Muhammet Savaş KAFKASYALI

Balkanlarda İslam: Vakti Azizden Vakti Zelalete - *From Times of Glory to Times of Humility* / **Editör:** Dr. Muhammet Savaş Kafkasyalı
Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı 2016 5.c.
(2902 s.) ; 16*24 cm T.C. Başbakanlık Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı
inceleme-araştırma-dizisi; yayın no:19

İçindekiler:

- c.1:** Muğlaklıktan Berraklığa / *From Ambiguity to Clarity*
c.2: Türkistan'dan Balkanlara / *From Turkestan to the Balkans*
c.3: Gönül Fethinden Zihniyet Temsiline / *From the Conquest of
Hearts to the Representation of Mentality*
c.4: Vakti Azizden Vakti Zelalete / *From Times of Glory to Times of Humility*
c.5: Köprüler Yıkan Zihniyetin Yıkılışı / *Demolishing Mentality Which Demolishes Bridges*
ISBN: 978-605-9642-11-8 - Takım
ISBN: 978-605-9642-15-6 - Cilt-4
Kafkasyalı, Muhammet Savaş

Redaksiyon

Prof. Dr. İsmail ÇALIŞKAN
Prof. Dr. Ahmet YILDIRIM

Proje Ekibi

Doç. Dr. Bahadır GÜCÜYETER
Dr. Hamza KOLUKISA
Dr. Fatih VEYİS
Hasan BEKDEŞ

Tasarım-Baskı

Karınca Creative Ajans



Adres: Dr. Mediha Eldem Sokak 56/1 Kızılay/Ankara
Tel: 0 312 431 54 83 / Faks: 0312 431 54 84
<http://www.karincayayinlari.net>
karınca@karincayayinlari.net

Baskı Tarihi: 2016

Baskı Yeri: Ankara

Baskı ve Cilt: Eflal Matbaacılık

Sertifika No: 13987

© Tika Yayınları

GMK Bulvarı No:140 / Anadolu Meydanı
PK: 06570 Çankaya/ANKARA

Tel: +90 312 939 70 00

Fax: +90 312 939 75 15-16

www.tika.gov.tr



The Cross versus the Crescent: Aspects of Religion in Modern Greek Politics and Ideology (1821-1923)

Spyridon G. PLOUMIDIS

Dr., University of Athens

Summary

Modern Greece is a case par excellence, wherein religion played (and still plays) a major role in identity formation and state building. The aim of my paper is to examine aspects of religion within the realm of a. Modern Greek national identity and ideology; and b. irredentist politics in the Greek 'long nineteenth century' (1821-1923). The identification of national identity with religion was officialised upon the breaking out of the Revolution of 1821: in revolutionary legal documents Greekness was identified with Orthodoxy. In 1833, the Orthodox Church of Greece was unilaterally declared administratively independent (autocephalous) from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, and thus was turned into an instrument of nation-building and identity formation in the hands of the civil authorities. Religious holy days, such as the Annunciation Day, the Dormition Day and the Three Hierarchs' Day, took on a secular meaning and were re-

deployed as national holidays. At the same time, the Greek nation-state identified the Orthodox populations of the Ottoman Empire (both in its European and its Minor Asiatic provinces) as Greek irredenta. The identification of Orthodoxy with Hellenism in the Balkans was irrevocably shattered by the Bulgarian Schism of 1872. The Greco-Bulgarian ecclesiastical Schism represented the recognition of a major shift in the nature of Church affiliation, with national secular identity gaining the upper hand against the religious identity of the Rum millet. The upheaval of the Bulgarian Schism had a direct effect on the discourse of Greek irredentism, which became more exclusive. In the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the attention of the Athenian press focused almost exclusively on the 'Christian Greeks', since the affairs of Hellenism were separated from those of 'Slavism'. In the early twentieth century, the identification of Greekdom with Orthodoxy still applied to the eastern shore of the Aegean. In the discourse of Greek foreign policies, the Orthodox populations of Asia Minor irrespective of their ethnic origin, language (a major part of the Greek Orthodox in Asia Minor were Turkish-, Armenian- and Arabic-speakers) or ecclesiastical affiliation (i.e. whether they belonged to the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople or the Patriarchate of Antioch) were identified with 'Asiatic Hellenism'.

In fact, religion was germane to Greek foreign policies and propaganda. Appeals to the solidarity of the Christian Powers of Europe dated back to the National Revolution. Greek revolutionaries represented their Struggle of Independence as a holy war of the Cross versus the Crescent. In this religious struggle, ethnic identities were blurred. Every Muslim irrespective of his ethnic background was identified as a 'Turk' and a national enemy of the Greek insurgents. After the accomplishment of independence (1830), the appeals to Christian solidarity continued to be a prime tool of Greek diplomacy. The appeals to the Christian philanthropy of Europe along with the identification of the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan with Greek irredenta peaked during the Crimean War (1853-56) and the Cretan Revolution of 1866-69; the Greek press pleaded the 'Christian' Powers of Europe –especially to 'fellow-Orthodox' Russia– to succour the revolutionaries so as to prevent a new victory of the Crescent upon the Cross and a massive slaughter of 'Christians'.

Along the same lines roughly forty years later, the Balkan Alliance of 1912 between the three Christian Balkan nations was built upon

a clearly crusadal discourse. In the discourse of the Balkan nationalisms, the war in the Balkans was not only a big step towards 'national unity', but also a religious war, a 'common struggle of all the Balkan peoples for the redemption of Christians that were suffering under the Ottoman yoke'; alias a modern 'Crusade' for the final expulsion of Islam from Europe. The crusadal discourse was not, by any means, limited to Balkan irredentists, but also permeated the Western narrative on the Eastern Question. For instance, the French historian Édouard Driault (an authority on this issue) understood the Eastern Question, 'in its widest sense', within the context of 'the history of the relations of Islamism with the Christian world' and more particularly in the sense of 'the advance of Christian Europe against Islam', which eventually brought about 'the ruin of the political might of Islam'. For that matter, in 1912 Driault identified the First Balkan War as a 'Crusade in the Twentieth century', a 'gigantic crusade, compared to which the medieval ones were really a joke'; the war accordingly was a 'new Crusade of the Cross against the Crescent, victorious this time' (unlike its medieval predecessors, which eventually failed to free Jerusalem), wherein 'all the Christians of the Balkans stood up and faced the Sultan of the Turks'. A major change in the discourse of Greek irredentist nationalism and propaganda, and a radical turn from a religious to a secular political context occurred in the aftermath of the First World War. In 1918-20, Greek diplomacy under Venizelos (an astute diplomat and master of Realpolitik) was obliged to act in concert with a European liberal frame of thinking that was formulated collectively by the victorious Entente Powers. The demise of tsarist Russia (the principal defender of the Orthodox in the Balkans) and the reshaping of the world by the Western Powers in 1919-20 brought about a significant secularization and liberalization of international politics in South-Eastern Europe and the Near East.

Haç Hilal'e Karşı: Çağdaş Yunan Siyaseti ve İdeoloji de Dini Unsurlar (1821-1923)

Özet

Çağdaş Yunanistan dinin kimliğinin oluşturulmasında ve devletin yapılandırılmasında önemli rolü olan (ve olmaya devam eden) mükemmel bir örnektir. Bildirimin amacı a. Çağdaş Yunan ulusal kimlik ve ideoloji, ve b. Yunan 'uzun on dokuzuncu yüzyılda' irredentist siyaset açısından din alemin yönlerinin incelenmesidir (1821-1923). Ulusal kimliğin din ile tespiti 1821 tarihli Devrimin ortaya çıkması ile resmileştirilmiştir: devrimci yasal belgelerde Yunanlık Ortodoksluğu ile özdeşleştirildi. 1833 de Yunanistan Ortodoks Kilisesi tek taraflı olarak Konstantinopolis Ekümenik Patriklik dan idari olarak bağımsız (müstakil) ilan edildi ve böylece sivil yetkililerin elinde ulus-inşası ve kimlik oluşumunun aracı haline getirilmiştir. Meryemana Yortusu, Uykuya dalış Günü ve Üç Baş Piskopos Günü gibi kutsal dini günleri laik anlam kazandı ve yeniden ulusal tatil günleri olarak ilan edildi. Aynı zamanda Yunan ulus-devlet Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndaki Ortodoks nüfusları (hem

Avrupa'da hem Küçük Asya illerinde) Yunan irredentasi olarak kimliklendirdi. Balkanlarda Ortodoksluğun Helenizm ile kimliklendirilmesi üzerine 1872 de Bulgar Hizipleşme ile geri dönülmez şekilde kepenkleri indirilmiştir. Yunan-Bulgar kilise hizipleşmesi ulusal laik kimliğin Rum milletinin dini kimliğe karşı galip gelmesi ile Kilise ilişkilerinin mahiyetindeki önemli kaymanın tanımlanmasını temsil ediyordu. Bulgar hiziplerin ayaklanmasının daha özel hale gelen Yunan irredentizm söylemlerine doğrudan etkiliydi. 1877-78 tarihli Rus-Türk Savaşında 'Slavizm' den ayrılmış olan Helenizm işleri nedeniyle Atina'daki basın neredeyse tamamen 'Hıristiyan Yunanlara' odaklanmış bulunmaktaydı. Yirminci yüzyılın erken dönemlerinde Ege denizinin doğu kıyısında Yunanlık halen Ortodoksluk ile tanımlanıyordu. Yunan dış politikaları ile ilgili söylemlerde etnik kökenine, dile (Anadolu'daki Yunan Ortodoksların önemli bir bölümü Türkçe, Ermenice ve Arapça konuşuyorlardı) veya kilise ile ilişkilendirmeye (örneğin Konstantinopolis Ortodoks Patrikhanesi veya Antakya Patrikliği ile ilişkili) bakılmaksızın Küçük Asya'daki Ortodoks nüfuslar 'Asyalı Helenizm' ile ilişkilendiriliyorlardı.

Aslında din Yunan dış politikası ve propagandası ile ilgiliydi. Avrupa'daki Hıristiyan Güçlerin dayanışmasına yapılan çağrılar Ulusal Devrim'e kadar uzanıyordu. Yunan devrimcileri Bağımsızlık Mücadelelerini Hilal'e karşı Haç şeklinde kutsal savaş olarak takdim ediyorlardı. Bu dini mücadelede etnik kimliklerin netliği kaybolabilir. Her Müslüman etnik kökenine bakılmaksızın 'Türk' ve Yunan asilerin ulusal düşmanı olarak tanımlanıyordu. Bağımsızlık kazanıldıktan sonra (1830) Hıristiyan dayanışma için yapılan çağrılar Yunan diplomasisinin başlıca aracı olmaya devam etti. Avrupa'da Hıristiyan yardımı için yapılan çağrılar ve Yunan irredentanın Sultanın Ortodoks halkı olarak tanımlanması Kırım Savaşı (1853-1856) ve 1866-69 Girit Devrimi sırasında zirve yaptı; Yunan basını Avrupa'daki 'Hıristiyan' Güçlere – özellikle 'dost-Ortodoks Rusya'ya – Hilal'in Haç üzerine yeni bir zaferin engellenmesi ve 'Hıristiyanların' büyük çapta katledilmesinin engellenmesi için devrimcilere yardım etmeleri konusunda yalvardılar.

Yaklaşık kırk yıl sonra 1912 tarihli ve üç Hıristiyan Balkan ulusu arasında yapılan Balkan İttifakı da aynı doğrultuda açık bir şekilde Haçlı söylem üzerine yapılandırılmıştır. Balkan milliyetçilik söylemlerinde Balkanlardaki savaş sadece 'ulusal birliğe' doğru atılan büyük bir adım olmayıp aynı zamanda Osmanlı boyunduruğu altında ezilen Hıristiyanların kurtuluşu için Balkan halkların 'ortak

mücadelesi' olan din savaşı niteliğindeki İslam'ı Avrupa'dan çıkarmak için atılan nihai çağdaş 'haçlı sefer' idi. Haçlı söylem sadece Balkan irredentistleri ile sınırlı kalmayıp Doğu Sorunu ile ilgili Batılı anlatıya da nüfuz etmiştir. Örneğin Fransız tarihçi Édouard Driault (bu konuda otorite olan) Doğu Sorununa 'en geniş anlamda' 'İslam'ın Hıristiyan dünyası ile olan ilişkilerin tarihi' kapsamında ve özellikle 'İslam'ın siyasi kudretini zamanla harabeye çeviren' 'Hıristiyan Avrupa'nın İslam'a karşı ilerlemesi' şeklinde anlam veriyordu. Bu konu ile ilgili olarak 1912 yılında Driault Birinci Balkan Harbini 'Yirminci yüzyılın Haçlı Seferi', orta çağda gerçekleştirilen haçlı seferlerin yanında şaka gibi kalan devasa bir haçlı sefer olarak tanımlıyordu ve dolayısıyla savaş da 'Haç'ın Hilal'e karşı yürüttüğü ve bu sefer muzaffer olan yeni Haçlı Sefer idi (Orta Çağda yapılan ve zamanla Kudüs'ü özgür kılamayan öncekilerin aksine) ve Balkan'lardaki tüm Hıristiyanlar ayaklanarak Türk'lerin Sultanına karşı koydular. Birinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra Yunan irredentist milliyetçilikte ve propagandada önemli bir değişiklik ve dini siyasi içeriğin laik içerikle ikame edilmesi gibi radikal bir dönüş gerçekleşti. 1918-20 yıllarında Venizelos (zeki bir diplomat ve Realpolitik ustası) tarafından yürütülen Yunan diplomasi muzaffer İtilaf Devletleri tarafından topluca formüle edilen liberal Avrupalı düşünce çerçevesi ile uyumlu hareket etmek zorunda kalmıştı. Çarlık Rusya'nın bitmesi (Balkanlar'da Ortodoksların başlıca savunucusu) ve 1919-20 tarihinde Batı Güçlerinin dünyayı yeniden şekillendirilmesi ile Güney-Doğu Avrupa ve Yakın Doğu'da önemli sekülerleşme ve uluslararası politikaların liberalizasyonunu beraberinde getirdi.

Religion and nationalism

The link between religion and nationalism is certainly a multidimensional and dynamic one. Although nationalism appeals to people more in terms of their rights and secular identities rather than in terms of their faith and shared beliefs, religion provided essential bonds of sentiments and organization to modern nations and nation-states.¹ Eric Hobsbawm notes that the link between religion and nationalism can be very close; in fact, the relation seems to grow closer where nationalism becomes a mass force than in its phase as a minority ideology and activists' movement. For religion is an ancient and well-tried primordial method of establishing communion and brotherhood between people.² Certainly, modern nations are *not* exclusively defined by religion (with the exception of Judaism), and the relationship between religion and national identification remains complex and resists simple generalization. However, religion undoubtedly is a powerful cement for the construction of national identities and a forcible tool for the attainment of exclusiveness and loyalty. Elie Kedourie's view is more germane to this issue: religion is a particular aspect of a group's culture that nationalism may choose to emphasise as the paramount attribute of national consciousness. 'Nationalists can thereby utilise the powerful and tenacious loyalties which the faith, held in common for centuries, creates. These loyalties can be utilised to mobilise the group against its enemies even when they are not spoken of.'³ Hobsbawm points to Catholic Ireland and Poland as examples of a closer link between religion and national consciousness.⁴ In my opinion, Greece is as another case, wherein religion played (and still plays) a major role in identity formation and state building. The aim of this paper is to examine aspects of religion within the realm of a. Modern Greek national ideology; and b. irredentist politics in the Greek 'long nineteenth century' (1821-1923).

The close correlation between religion and identity in the modern Balkans can be interpreted as a legacy of the Eastern Roman (i.e. Byzantine) Empire and the Ottoman millet system. The Orthodox Church in Southeastern Europe was widely perceived as the historic repository and/or the hallmark of nationhood, national values, and, quite often, as the saviour of a nation's very existence.⁵ In

1 John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 48-49.

2 E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 [1992]), p. 67-68.

3 Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 67, 71.

4 Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 124. In addition to Irish and Polish nationalism, the historian of nationalism Hedva Ben-Israel ('The role of religion in nationalism: some comparative remarks on Irish nationalism and on Zionism', in H. Ben-Israel et al. (eds.), *Religion, Ideology and Nationalism in Europe and America* [Jerusalem: Historical Society of Israel and the Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish History, 1986] p. 331, 337.) brings forward Zionism as another typical case of the religion-nationalism nexus: 'The Jewish national consciousness, unlike almost all others, was rooted in one specific religion without which nationalism would have no meaning'.

5 Michael Radu, 'The burden of Eastern Orthodoxy', *Orbis* 42/2 (1998), p. 285, cited in Vjekoslav Perica, *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 6.

the long course of the Ottoman history, the lines between religion and nationality became blurred and equated. This is especially true for Greece (a nation-state that seceded from the Ottoman Empire), where Orthodox religion, ethnicity and citizenship are seen as identical.⁶ The alternative use of the terms *genos* (a word closer in meaning to the Arab-Ottoman millet notion) and *ethnos* (an equivalent to the modern sense of nationality) for the expression of the concept of nation in modern Greek is another proof of this religiopolitical equation.⁷ This age-long legacy of the millet system and the subsequent equation of ethnicity/nationality with religion is also most apparent in the identification, in the public discourse of the Balkan Christians, of Balkan Muslims as ‘Turks’ irrespective of their ethnic (Turkish, Albanian, Slavic or other) origin.⁸ Anyhow, the advent of the nationalist ideology was detrimental to the position of religion in society and politics. In Eastern Europe, the era of nationalism meant the demise of the (in Paschalis M. Kitromilides’ terms) Orthodox Commonwealth, which transcended linguistic barriers and cultural borders and made coexistence between Eastern European Orthodox ethnicities (Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Romanians, Russians, etc.) possible in the post-Byzantine period; in the course of the nineteenth century, the Orthodox Commonwealth was fragmented into individual national communities. For one thing, the logic of nationalism is intrinsically exclusive and parochial, and thus stands in diametrical opposition to the moral universalism of Orthodoxy.⁹

The Greek War of Independence

For that matter, the Serbian and the Greek Wars of Independence produced a clash between the ecumenicity and the transcendental values of Eastern Christianity and the parochialism of nationalism.¹⁰ This clash did not bring about the demise but a transformation and a new use of religion. In particular, Orthodox religion was a basic analytical category of Greek nationalism and national identity. From the outbreak of hostilities in 1821 the influence of the Church among the insurgents and its capacity to lead them against a Muslim adversary became

6 Peter F. Sugar, ‘External and domestic roots of Eastern European nationalisms’, in P. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (eds.), *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1973 [1969]), p. 32-3; Hugh Poulton, ‘Islam, ethnicity and state in the contemporary Balkans’, in H. Poulton and Suha Taji-Farouki (eds.), *Muslim Identity and the Balkan State* (London: Hurst, 1997), p. 14.

7 Stephen G. Xydis, ‘Modern Greek nationalism’, in P. Sugar and I. Lederer (eds.), *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, p. 208-9.

8 Poulton, ‘Islam, ethnicity and state’, p. 19.

9 Paschalis M. Kitromilides, ‘From Orthodox Commonwealth to national communities: Greek-Russian intellectual and ecclesiastical ties in the Ottoman era’, essay no. VI in P. Kitromilides, *An Orthodox Commonwealth: Symbolic Legacies and Cultural Encounters in Southeastern Europe* (Aldershot, Hampshire and Burlington: Ashgate, 2007), p. 4-5, p. 14, 18.

10 Paschalis M. Kitromilides, ‘The legacy of the French Revolution: Orthodoxy and nationalism’, in Michael Angold (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Christianity*, vol. 5 (*Eastern Christianity*) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 229.

obvious.¹¹ The statute of the Peloponnesian Senate (one of the first three polities of the Greek insurgents), drafted on 1 December 1821, declared that: ‘Because of the extreme contempt that the Ottoman Administration showed toward Christian religion, by means of demolishing and desecrating holy churches upon the tiniest suspicion [for an insurrection], the Greeks were forced to take up arms in order to defend their religion and mere existence, which the Ottoman administration strove to annihilate’.¹² The Greek National Revolution was nonetheless a holy war. In this struggle of the Cross versus the Crescent, ethnic identities were blurred. Every Muslim irrespective of his ethnic background was identified as a ‘Turk’ and a national enemy of the Greek insurgents. The first Greek contingent to engage in battle with the ‘Turks’ was the ‘Sacred Battalion’ of voluntaries in Moldavia. The oath of the members of the ‘Sacred Battalion’ touched more on a Holy War than on a nationalist rivalry. The Greek voluntaries swore to fight for ‘freedom of the Fatherland’ and to shed their blood for the purpose of bringing victory upon ‘the enemy of the religion’, and avowed to die ‘as martyrs of Jesus Christ’.¹³ Along the same lines, in revolutionary legal documents Greekness was identified with Orthodoxy. For instance, in the Legal Provisions for Eastern Greece (one of first corpi of administrative law of revolutionary Greece), drafted in November 1821, granted Greek citizenship to ‘all inhabitants of [revolutionary] Greece who believe in Christ’.¹⁴ These principles of *jus soli* and *jus religionis* were equally applied to all three constitutional charters of the Greek Revolution (those of 1822, 1823 and 1827).¹⁵

In addition to home politics, Orthodox religion promptly found also a principal place in Greek foreign policies and propaganda. Appeals to the Christian feelings and the solidarity of the Christian Powers of Europe was a commonplace in the propaganda of Greek revolutionaries. These appeals to the shared ideals of religious faith were a prime tool of Greek diplomacy, and particularly appeared in the manifestos addressed to Britain, France and Russia.¹⁶ The discourse of the memory and the historiography of the Greek Struggle for Independence went even further, and has overt crusadal dimensions. For instance, Spyridon Trikoupis (an eminent political figure of the Revolution and its major historiographer) identifies the Greek insurrection as a struggle between ‘Christianity’ and

11 Thanos Veremis, ‘From the national state to the stateless nation 1821-1910’, in Martin Blinkhorn and Thanos Veremis (eds.), *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality* (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1990), p. 10.

12 Apostolos V. Daskalakis, *Κείμενα – πηγές της ιστορίας της ελληνικής επανάστασης* [Texts and Sources on the History of Greek Revolution], vol. I (Athens: n.e., 1966), p. 174-5.

13 Ibid., p. 107-8.

14 Elpida K. Vogli, «Έλληνες το γένος»: *Η ιθαγένεια και η ταυτότητα στο εθνικό κράτος των Ελλήνων (1821-1844)* [‘Greeks by descent’: Citizenship and Identity in the Greek nation-state (1821-1844)] (Herakleion: Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2008), p. 43-50; Dimitris Christopoulos, *Ποιος είναι Έλληνας πολίτης: Το καθεστώς ιθαγένειας από την ίδρυση του ελληνικού κράτους ως τις αρχές του 21ου αιώνα* [Who is a Greek Citizen? The Citizenship Status from the Establishment of the Greek State to the Early Twenty-First Century] (Athens: Vivliorama, 2012), p. 46-7.

15 Christopoulos, *Ποιος είναι Έλληνας πολίτης*, p. 48-51.

16 Vogli, «Έλληνες το γένος», p. 58, 62.

'Islamism' with a dual agenda ('for faith and country'). In his narrative, the two warring 'nations', namely 'Greeks' and 'Turks', are alternatively and inexorably 'Christians' and 'Mohammedans'. National liberation went hand-in-hand with the sacred cause of a holy war.¹⁷

Greece in the Crimean War (1853-56) and its aftermath

The attainment of national independence and the process of state-building consolidated the nexus between religion and nationality in Greece. Religion was 'nationalized', and Orthodoxy was interpreted as an extension and an integral part of Greek national identity.¹⁸ The unilateral declaration of the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Greece (an essentially caesaropapist act) and its administrative detachment from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1833 brought the Church under the aegis of civil authority and turned it into an instrument of nation-building and identity formation. (The autocephaly of the Church of Greece was recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, by means of a Synodal Tome, in 1850.)¹⁹ Religious symbolism was redeployed as part of national symbolism and myths of the nation. In 1838, March 25 (Annunciation Day) was established, by decree of King Otto, as a national Greek holiday (the Day of Independence). In 1842, the Three Hierarchs (i.e. three Holy Fathers of the 4th century AD) were officially pronounced as Protectors of Greek Letters. (Similarly, St Vitus' Day and SS Cyril and Methodius Day were redeployed as national holidays by the Serbs and the Bulgarians respectively.)²⁰ In 1844, article I of the new Greek constitution (conceded by King Otto) declared Orthodoxy as the official state religion, and forbade other creeds from engaging in proselytizing activities.²¹ The celebration of the Dormition of Virgin Mary (August 15) as the Day of the Greek Armed Forces is another pertinent example.²² Orthodox religion became thus a powerful tool for national cohesion and rallying the na-

17 Spyridon Trikoupis, *Ιστορία της Ελληνικής Επανάστασεως* [History of the Greek Revolution] (Athens: n.e., 31888), xv, p. 1-2, 4, 37, 50.

18 Paraskevas Matalas, *Εθνος και Ορθοδοξία: Οι περιπέτειες μιας σχέσης. Από το ελληνικό στο βουλγαρικό Σχίσμα* [Nation and Orthodoxy: The Vicissitudes of a Relationship. From the Greek to the Bulgarian Schism] (Herakleion: Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2002), p. 19-20.

19 John Anthony Petropoulos, *Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece 1833-1843* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968), 181; Paschalis M. Kitromilides, "Imagined Communities" and the origins of the national question in the Balkans', in Blinkhorn and Veremis (eds), *Nationalism and Nationality*, 54-5; Ibidem., "The legacy of the French Revolution: Orthodoxy and nationalism", p. 232, 235-6.

20 Victor Roudometof, *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans* (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 2001), p. 16, 103; Effi Gazi, *Ο δεύτερος βίος των Τριών Ιεραρχών: Μια γενεαλογία του «ελληνοχριστιανικού πολιτισμού»* [The Second Life of the Three Hierarchs: A Genealogy of the 'Greco-Christian Civilization'] (Athens: Nefeli, 2004), p. 86-88.

21 Douglas Dakin, *The Unification of Greece 1770-1923* (London: Ernest Benn, 1972), p. 78.

22 Basilius J. Groen, 'Religion am Balkan: Situation sowie ökumenische und interreligiöse Beziehungen am Beispiel Bulgariens und Griechenlands', in B. Groen and Saskia Löser (eds.), *Der Balkan: Religion, Gesellschaft und Kultur* (Innsbruck and Vienna: Tyrolia Verlag, 2011), p. 43.

tion round irredentist purposes. Greek romantic intellectuals viewed Greece as the inheritor of Byzantium and therefore the legitimate successor to the Ottoman Empire, whenever ‘the Sick Man of Europe’ would fall apart. This vision (namely, the legitimate interest of Greece in the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan) is insinuated by the terms ‘Greco-Christian civilization’ or alias ‘Greco-Orthodoxy’, coined by the historian Spyridon Zambelios in 1852.²³

The identification of Orthodoxy with Greek irredentist nationalism became most obvious during the Crimean War (1853-56). In fact, the outbreak of the Crimean War had a religious connection: the origins of the War were rooted in the controversy between Catholics and Orthodox over the control of the Holy Places in Jerusalem. Moreover, religion played a major role in Russia’s entanglements in the Balkans (1806-1914). Like other European monarchs, Orthodox tsars presented themselves to be the defenders of the faith, namely of the twelve million Balkan Orthodox Christians who were subjects of the Sultan. The tsars repeatedly invoked their right to protection of the Balkan Christians by virtue of Article VII of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji of 1774.²⁴ (The subordination of the Russian Orthodox Church to the exigencies of the state dated back to 1667, to the reign of Tsar Peter the Great.)²⁵ The call of Russia for a Holy War against the Porte had a strong echo in the Balkans and Greece. Orthodox Greeks within and across the borders of the Greek state were overwhelmed with bellicose enthusiasm. The conditions for the fulfillment of the Great Idea (*Megali Idea*), i.e. for the expansion of Greece across the territories of the defunct Byzantine Empire, seemed to be most favourable.²⁶ In 1854, cross-class rallies in favour of war were called around the country wherein the slogans ‘Byzantine Empire’ and ‘Greek Empire or Death’ held a dominant place. The target group of this irredentist movement were ‘the Christians of Turkey’ (i.e. irrespective of ethnic background). The identification of Greek *irredenta* with the Orthodox populations of the Ottoman Empire (inclusive of the coreligionist Bulgarians) was most apparent in the discourse of the pro-Russian Athens daily *Elpis*:

So long as the Christian of Turkey sees the fellow Christian of Greece being independent, free and ruled by a European-style law, he cannot resist wishing his own independence, freedom and rule of law. At the same time, as long as the Christian of free Greece sees his fellow Christian of Turkey, with whom he fought side by side in the sacred War of Independence [i.e. of 1821-30], yet from whom he was separated by virtue of the protocols of the European diplomacy, he cannot but wish the liberation of his brother-in-faith. State borders separated the

23 Roudometof, *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy*, 109; Gazi, *Ο δεύτερος βίος των Τριών Ιεραρχών*, p. 63, 77.

24 Barbara Jelavich, *Russia’s Balkan entanglements 1806-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 32-41, 115-16.

25 Chris Chulos, ‘Russian piety and culture from Peter the Great to 1917’, in Angold (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Christianity*, p. 348-9, 351.

26 Dakin, *The Unification of Greece*, p. 82-6.

Christians of Greece from those of Turkey. However, local borders can only set a space limit, yet not a barrier to common sympathies, to relations, to unbreakable blood bonds as well as to the indescribable divine relationship that is created by the shared identity of religion, language, historical memories and ancestral glory; [...] the national inheritance from our late [Byzantine] emperors includes: Thessaly, Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace and Bulgaria.²⁷

The religious connotations of the Greek involvement in the Crimean War (namely the insurrections of the Greek Orthodox in Epirus, Thessaly and southern Macedonia) are also conspicuous in ‘the manifesto of Greek freedom and independence addressed to All the Hellenes and the other Christians of all denominations’, drafted by warlords of Epirus (Radovizi of Arta, 25 January 1854). Therein, the new war against the Turks was perceived as both nationalist (a Greco-Turkish conflict) and religious (a ‘struggle of the Cross against the Crescent’) as well as latently a clash of civilizations (the European versus the Asiatic civilization):

Our noble nation bore upon its neck the barbaric yoke of the barbaric Ottomans for entire four centuries, and up until today was saved from a total annihilation by the intervention of the Holy Provision. [...] Today we are taking up arms for our liberty and independence, and we are taking revenge for the abuse, the humiliations, the tortures and deaths that were committed upon us for the past four centuries. The avenging All Seeing Eye of God can witness that our national honour, our national greatness and the Greek name, which we carry with pride, as well as our duty to rid our glorious homeland from the disgraceful Turkish yoke, and nothing else but that induced us to a struggle of no return for Greek freedom against the savage and implacable Asiatic despotism; to a struggle of the Cross against the Crescent. We declare to the whole world that our war is exclusively a customary war of Hellenism against the Turks; of Europe against Asia; of light against darkness.²⁸

This ‘second war for faith and freedom of all the Greek nation’ (following the Revolution of 1821), which aimed at the replacement of the Ottoman by a ‘Hellenic Empire’, came under ‘the flag of the Holy Cross’.²⁹ All in all, Greek *irredenta* was grossly identified with the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan.³⁰

The intervention of two ‘Christian Powers’ (France and Britain) on the side of ‘Islamic’ Turkey and the defeat of Russia filled Greeks with awe and astonishment at this ‘odd’ situation (of Christian Powers aligning with the infidel against the Orthodox):

27 *Elpis* 754 (8 February 1854), p. 3087-8.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 3089-90.

29 *Aion* 1435 (13 February 1854), p. 1.

30 Christopoulos, *Ποιος είναι Έλληνας πολίτης*, p. 59.

Our times are truly full of oddities! Two most Christian Powers, one of which, France, venerates its king as *Rex Christianissimus*, form an alliance with the aim to save, by the blood of their boys, Islamism in Europe; to save it not only from the menace presented by another Christian Power, i.e. Russia, but also from the heroic struggle that was undertaken by the native Christians of Turkey. [...] we cannot understand how Christians can ally themselves with Mohammedans for the destruction of Christians and engage themselves in this shameful war [...] If then Christianity is a lie and Islamism is the truth, why then the monarchs of these two Powers do not convert to Islam, setting thus an example for their people, like Constantine the Great did for his own people by converting to Christianity? [...] Let's say it in plain words: Christianity in France and England has now appeared to be merely a custom and not a divine religion; it is proven that the governments sell Christianity in the same way as the merchants sell their cotton rugs and scarves; they invoke the name of Our Lord Jesus Christ in all their acts against Christianity; therefore, the balance of power in Europe is simply nothing else than the interest of the stronger.³¹

In 1854, Greek publicists failed to envisage and understand the grounds and purposes of European Power diplomacy in the Eastern Question.

Greek intellectual expectations and interpretations remained the same for another two decades. The Greek intelligentsia interpreted the Cretan Revolution of 1866-69 and 'more generally' the Eastern Question along the same lines, as a clash between (European) 'civilization' and 'Islamism', and appealed to the 'Christian' Powers of Europe –especially to 'fellow-Orthodox' Russia– to succour the revolutionaries so as to prevent a new victory of the Crescent upon the Cross and a massive slaughter ('hecatomb') of 'Christians'. Thereupon, the Athens weekly *Hellas* commented that the admission of the Ottoman state into 'the great family of Christian states' by virtue of the Treaty of Paris in 1856 had been a 'contradiction'.³² Therefore, the success of this 'great and heroic struggle' of the Cretans was dependent on the assistance not only of the fellow Greeks but also of 'the Christian Powers of Europe'. In their 'revolutionary manifesto' to the consuls of 'the Christian Powers' (16/28 August 1866), the General Assembly of the Cretans based its claim for 'Union with Motherland Greece' upon the rights to 'honour, life and property' of 'the Christian inhabitants of the island'.³³ According to the Athens Press, the only 'just' and 'useful' solution to the Eastern Question would be 'the full self-determination of the Christian peoples of Turkey'.³⁴ The Revolution of 1866 was again perceived as a battle of the Cross against the Crescent, for 'every Greek revolution is, above all, an action of faith and religion'; 'Greeks would stop being Greeks if they ever stopped being Christians', because

31 *Elpis* 765 (29 April 1854), p. 3135, 3137.

32 *Hellas* 62 (17 December 1866), p. 1-2.

33 *Ethnophylax* 1064 (16 August 1866), p. 2-3.

34 *Hellas* 66 (14 January 1867), p. 1.

Greek ethnicity is 'a mere social application of the Christian principles'; the Re-generation of Greece in 1821 was an outcome of religious 'faith'.³⁵ The identification of the Cretan Revolution as a 'struggle of freedom against tyranny, of civilization against barbarity, and of the Gospel against the Koran' was a common place in the Athenian Press.³⁶

The identification of Orthodoxy with Hellenism was irrevocably shattered by the Bulgarian Schism of 1872. The Bulgarian claims for an independent Church were rejected by a major synod of Orthodox patriarchs and condemned as a heresy of 'ethnophyletism', i.e. as an un-Christian ideology, incompatible with the teachings and ideals of true Christianity. The establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate represented the fragmentation of Eastern Orthodox universalism in the most visible and dramatic manner. The Greco-Bulgarian ecclesiastical Schism represented the recognition of a major shift in the nature of Church affiliation, with national secular identity gaining the upper hand against the religious identity of the Rum millet.³⁷ Practically, the secession of the Bulgarians from the Rum millet two years earlier put an end to endeavours for their Hellenization. At the same time, the excommunication of the Exarchist Bulgarians by the Church of Constantinople, which came as a result of the Schism, confirmed the long-ingrained belief of the Greek Orthodox that they were the true Orthodox Christians. The Bulgarian Orthodox were henceforth perceived as heretics and Schismatic outcasts. This essentially puritanist view, which typically lasted until the abolishment of the Schism in 1945, aimed at offering a religious cover to pretensions for a Greek cultural and potentially political hegemony in the Balkans.³⁸

The upheaval of the Bulgarian Schism had a direct effect on the discourse of Greek irredentism, which became more exclusive. In the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the attention of the Athenian Press focused almost exclusively on the 'Christian Greeks', since the affairs of Hellenism were separated from those of 'Slavism'. What was more alarming, the Greek agenda in the Balkans appeared to be overshadowed by the 'Slavic' (i.e. Bulgarian) agenda. The potential creation of a Greater Bulgaria would preclude the creation of a Greater Greece and the annexation of Macedonia into the Greek nation-state.³⁹ Anti-Slavism (namely, anti-Bulgarianism) substituted for the pan-Orthodox appeals of Greek irredentism especially in the aftermath of the Ilinden uprising of 1903 in Macedonia, which alarmed the Athens publicists and intellectuals. The ruling Turks became a tactical ally to the Greeks andartes in their Macedonian Struggle against the Bulgarian

35 *Hellas* 65 (7 January 1867), p. 1.

36 *Ethnophylax* 1064 (16 August 1866), p. 1; 1067 (1 September 1867), p. 1.

37 Roudometof, *Nationalism, Globalization and Orthodoxy*, 235; Basil K. Gounaris, *Ta Balckania ton Ellhnwn: Apó ton Diaforotismó éwos ton A' Pankósmio Pólemo* [The Balkans of the Greeks from the Enlightenment to the First World War] (Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2007), p. 164.

38 Matalas, *Éthnos kai Orthodoxía*, 313, 317, 337, 346-7; Kitromilides, 'The legacy of the French Revolution: Orthodoxy and nationalism', p. 242-3.

39 *Ephimeris* 2 (2 January 1878), p. 1; 6 (6 January 1878), p. 1-2; 10 (10 January 1878), p. 1-2.

comitadjis; Zambelios' 'Greco-Orthodoxy' or calls for a new crusade against the Turkish Crescent had no place in the Greek foreign agenda before the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, which brought the Macedonian Struggle to an end.⁴⁰

The Balkan Wars of 1912-13: A 'Crusade in the Twentieth Century'

Things took a new turn after 1908, when Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbs united vis-à-vis the Young Turkish challenge. The Balkan Alliance of 1912 between the three Christian Balkan nations was built upon a clearly crusadal discourse.⁴¹ Following the narrative of the nineteenth century, the Balkan Wars were seen as a continuity in the perennial struggle of the Cross against the Crescent.⁴² In the discourse of the Balkan nationalisms, the war in the Balkans was not only a big step towards 'national unity', but also a religious war, a 'common struggle of all the Balkan peoples for the redemption of Christians that were suffering under the Ottoman yoke'; alias a modern 'Crusade' for the final expulsion of Islam from Europe.⁴³ This traditional cum religious frame of analysis was shared by the other belligerent Christian Balkan nations⁴⁴ as well as by the majority of the contemporary Western analyzers. For one thing, (in the words of the eminent historian at the University of Athens and later, in 1916, Greek premier Spyridon Lambros) 'the Balkan problem was one of the knots of the legendary eastern question'.⁴⁵ The French historian Édouard Driault (an authority on this issue) understood the Eastern Question, 'in its widest sense', within the context of 'the history of the relations of Islamism with the Christian world' and more particularly in the sense of 'the advance of Christian Europe against Islam', which eventually brought about 'the ruin of the political might of Islam'.⁴⁶ His definition of the Eastern Question clearly followed these lines:

40 Gounaris, *Ta Balckania ton Ellhnon*, p. 408-11.

41 *Ibid.*, p. 215-8.

42 On the perceptions of the Balkan Wars, see Spyridon G. Ploumidis, 'From the Old to the New Greater Greece: The bellicose evolution of the Greek Great Idea in 1912-1913', *Études balkaniques* XLIX/2 (2013), pp. 69-73.

43 Spyr. P. Lambros, 'Τα ελληνικά δίκαια' [The Greek Rights], *Neos Hellinomnimon* 10/1-2 (30 June 1913), p. 175.

44 Yura Konstantinova, 'Political propaganda in Bulgaria during the Balkan wars', *Études balkaniques* XLVII/2-3 (2011), p. 93-5.

45 Lambros, 'Τα ελληνικά δίκαια', 143. A contemporary Greek historiographer described the two Balkan Wars as 'the cutting of the Gordian Knot of the Eastern Question, which for centuries had been a concern of the entire Europe'; see Timoleon Ambelas, *Ιστορία του ελληνοβουλγαρικού πολέμου 1913 επί τη βάσει επισήμων εκθέσεων, περιγραφών αυτοπτών και εγγράφων* [History of the Greco-Bulgarian War of 1913, Based on Official Reports, Eyewitnesses' Accounts and Documents] (New York: Atlantis, 1914), p. 261.

46 Édouard Driault, *La question d'Orient depuis ses origines jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1912), viii, x-xi. This view of the Eastern Question in religious terms was not, by any means, universal. William Miller defines 'the near eastern question' as 'the problem of filling up the vacuum created by the gradual disappearance of the Turkish empire from Europe'; see W. Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and its Successors 1801-1927* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1936), p. 1.

The retreat of Islam in Europe and in Asia, from both shores of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, gave birth to the question of the Orient. Its history is properly the history of the progress of the neighbouring nations at the expense of the Muslim peoples. Consequently, it has assumed a religious character. The triumph of Mohamed II and of Suleiman the Magnificent, on a purely Christian ground, was a triumph of the crescent upon the cross [...] In our days, the victories of the Russians upon the Turks, the resurrection of the Christian countries of the Balkans, are the retribution of the cross upon the crescent, and in many parts the Christian peoples have removed the flag of the prophet.⁴⁷

For that matter, Driault identified the First Balkan War as a ‘Crusade in the Twentieth century’, a ‘gigantic crusade, compared to which the medieval ones were really a joke’; the war accordingly was a ‘new Crusade of the Cross against the Crescent, victorious this time’ (unlike its medieval predecessors, which eventually failed to free Jerusalem), wherein ‘all the Christians of the Balkans stood up and faced the Sultan of the Turks’.⁴⁸

This perception runs through the official addresses of the Balkan monarchs to their nations upon the declaration of war in October 1912. For instance, the address of King George I to the Greek people referred to the duty of the Greek army and navy ‘toward the [Greek] nation and Christendom’; therein, the King of the Hellenes declared that the ‘sacred struggle for justice and freedom’ was undertaken by Greece ‘for the attainment and the securing of the human rights, and to put an end, by means of arms, to the ages-long misery of the Christians that are still living under the Turkish yoke’; this meant that Greece’s war effort entailed the liberation not only of fellow-Greeks but more broadly of a whole religious community.⁴⁹ In his solemn message to the allied Balkan monarchs (4 October 1912, o.s.), King George I underlined the significance of ‘this new Crusade’ that the ‘four Orthodox nations’ undertook ‘in the holy name of the Orthodoxy’.⁵⁰ In their replies, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria stressed the ‘the common effort’ of the allied armies ‘for the triumph of this twofold holy agenda of faith and [national] liberation’, whereas King Peter of Serbia referred to the ‘unbreakable religious bonds of the unified Forces of the Balkan States’.⁵¹ Along the same times, on 5 October 1912 Minister of Foreign Affairs Lambros Koromilas spoke, in his formal address to the Greek parliament, of the ‘crusade of the Balkan Orthodox countries’, identifying it as a ‘crusade made in the name of progress, civilization and freedom against the Asiatic conquest, which in the past had threatened Europe up to the walls of Vienna’.⁵² Speaking in parliament on 2 March 1913,

47 Driault, *La question d’Orient*, p. 2.

48 Ibid., p. ix, 2; Édouard Driault, *Le roi Constantin* (Versailles: Moderne de Versailles, 1930), p. 61.

49 *Skip* 6,192 (6 October 1912), p. 3.

50 Simon Molossos, *Ιστορία του Βαλκανοτουρκικού πολέμου* [History of the Balkano-Turkish War] (Athens: Papadimitriou, [1914]), p. 365-6.

51 Ibid., p. 366-7.

52 *Skip* 6,192 (6 October 1912), p. 3.

Premier Eleftherios Venizelos depicted the war as a 'sacred struggle for the liberation of the Christian Near East'.⁵³

This perception also permeated the semi-official discourse of the Athenian press. For example, on 6 October 1912 the leader of the daily *Skrip* stated:

The war has been declared. The Cross and the crescent are standing up to confront each other. Victory belongs to the mightier. And the mightiest is the Cross. [...] The shining weapons of the Christian countries of the Balkans and their lined-up brave armies are ready to prove this very soon. It is over! It is not any more possible the Barbarian to have a place among the civilized, the Turk among the Christians, the Asian among the Europeans, the blood-thirsty beast of the desert among the humans.

Greek soldiers! Remember that, above all, you are soldiers of Christ! [...].⁵⁴

All in all, the First Balkan War was framed within a prevalent religious context. This context was well-placed within the wider picture of the Eastern Question. John Marriott, another authority on the Question, asserted in 1918 that 'the essence' of the Eastern Question, which still remained 'unchanged' at his time, had 'arisen from the clash, in the lands of South-Eastern Europe, between the habits, ideas, and preconceptions of the West and those of the East' as well as from 'the struggle between the forces of Islam and those of Christianity'. And he paralleled the war of 1912-13 to the 'the Crusades in the Middle Ages', contextualizing it within 'the secular rivalry between the Cross and the Crescent'.⁵⁵ This perception of the 'Balkano-Turkish War' (i.e. the First Balkan War, as it was colloquially named at the time) was well ingrained into the concurrent historiography⁵⁶ and the memory of the participants. Ex-general Nikolaos Kladas (1871-1944), a history-writer who had served in the First Balkan War as a captain of the artillery, noted that 'the more profound and deeply-rooted causes of the war against Turkey were the racial and religious hatred of the Christians against the Turks and the subsequent centuries-long struggles of the Cross against the Crescent'.⁵⁷

53 Stefanos I. Stefanou (ed.), *Ta κείμενα του Ελευθερίου Βενιζέλου. Η ζωντανή ιστορία της δραματικής περιόδου του έθνους, 1909-1936* [The Texts of Eleftherios Venizelos: The Live History of the Dramatic Period of the Nation, 1909-1936], vol. I (Athens: Leschi Phileleftheron, 1981), p. 414.

54 *Skrip* 6,191 (5 October 1912), p. 1.

55 J.A.R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1918), p. 1.

56 Phokion Photopoulos, *Ιστορία του ελληνοβουλγαρικού πολέμου επί τη βάσει των επισήμων ανακοινώσεων του Στρατηγείου* [History of the Greco-Bulgarian War on the Basis of the Official Communiqués of the High Command] (Athens: n.e., 1914), p. 4.

57 N. Kl[adas], 'Βαλκανικοί πόλεμοι' [Balkan Wars], *Engyklopaïdikon Lexikon Eleftheroudaki* (Athens: Eleftheroudakis, 1963), vol. II, 865; cf. N.Th. Kladas, 'Βαλκανικοί πόλεμοι' [Balkan wars], *Megali Helliniki Engyklopaideia* (Athens: Drandakis, 1928), vol. VI, p. 565.

The fellow Greek Orthodox of Asia Minor

In the early twentieth century, the identification of Greekdom with Orthodoxy advanced to the eastern shore of the Aegean. In 1907, a senior Greek diplomat (former Consul General in Smyrna Stamatios Antonopoulos) published a short report on Asia Minor, 'with the hope that it may incite the leaders of the Nation to show more interest in the affairs of the Asia Minor Greeks'.⁵⁸ As a matter of fact, Asia Minor along with its Greek Orthodox populations was a terra incognita for Hellenic Greeks. For that matter, Antonopoulos maintained that Asia Minor Hellenism was an integral part of Greek irredenta.⁵⁹ What is most interesting here is that the former Consul General in Smyrna identified Asiatic Hellenism with the Orthodox populations of Asia Minor irrespective of the latter's ethnic origin, language (a major part of the Greek Orthodox in Asia Minor were Turkish-, Armenian- and Arabic-speakers) or ecclesiastical affiliation (i.e. whether they belonged to the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople or the Patriarchate of Antioch).⁶⁰ This identification was promptly seized upon by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and became the foundation of Greek irredentist policy in Anatolia.⁶¹ This identification (or rather its expansion to the eastern shore of the Aegean) is no surprise to the historians, since the association of modern Greekdom with Orthodoxy dates back to the era of the Greek Revolution of 1821. However, in the case of Anatolia, Greek propaganda waged in the aftermath of the First World War (1918-20) was not framed within a religious framework, but actually drew on the clash of civilizations, namely between the 'barbaric Asiatic' (identified with the Turks) and the modern 'European civilization' (represented by the Greeks), and on the persecution of the Greek Orthodox populations of Anatolia in the hands of the Young Turks during the Great War.⁶² This major change in the discourse of Greek irredentist nationalism and propaganda (a radical turn from a religious to a secular context) is due to the fact that Greek diplomacy under Venizelos was obliged (from the outbreak of the Great War onwards) to act in concert with a European liberal frame of thinking that was formulated collectively by the four Entente Powers and not solely by Russia. Another major hindrance to Greek diplomacy and propaganda was the influence of Indian Muslims (buttressed by Edwin Samuel Montagu, Secretary of State for India between 1917 and 1922) upon British public opinion; all endeavours of Greeks diplomats to solicit the support of Anglican prelates to a new crusade in the Near East came to nil because of liberal opposition to Greek territorial pretensions in Anatolia.⁶³

58 Stamatios Antonopoulos, *Μικρά Ασία* [Asia Minor] (Athens: To Kratos, 1907), p. 2.

59 Ibid., p. 3, 6.

60 Ibid., p. 15.

61 Alexis Alexandris, 'The Greek census of Anatolia and Thrace (1910-1912): Ottoman historical demography', in Dimitri Gondicas and Charles Issawi (eds.), *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism: Politics, Economy, and Society in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, New Jersey: Darwin Press, 1999), p. 48-50, 54.

62 Dimitri Kitsikis, *Propagande et pressions en politique internationale: La Grèce et ses revendications à la Conférence de la Paix (1919-1920)* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), p. 81-4, 163-211.

63 Ibid., p. 436-52.

Conclusion

The place of religion in modern Greek ideology and politics during the long nineteenth century (1821-1923) was of paramount importance. Greek identity formation and state-building were founded on religion, namely on Orthodoxy. The roots of this nexus between religion and nationality can be traced back to the Byzantine caesaropapist state tradition and the Ottoman millet system. The tangle between religion and national identity was very strong and impossible to break before the dawn of the twentieth century and the establishment of a final status quo in the Near East by virtue of the Treaty of Lausanne. The exchange of minorities between Greece and Turkey was thus decided in 1923 on a religious basis (Greek Orthodox vis-à-vis Muslims).⁶⁴ The close connection between religious and national identities had a direct effect on irredentist politics. Greece (along with Bulgaria and Serbia) perceived their military struggles against Turkey as wars of the Cross against the Crescent. This crusadal discourse lasted until the First Balkan War of 1912-13, which was viewed as a 'Crusade in the Twentieth Century'. This interpretation waned in the early twentieth century. The First World War and the reshaping of the world by the victorious Entente Powers in 1919-20 brought about a significant secularization and liberalization of the political frame of thinking in the Balkans and the Near East.

64 Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact Upon Greece* (Paris: Mouton, 1962), p. 67-8.

Bibliography

- ALEXANDRIS, Alexis, 'The Greek census of Anatolia and Thrace (1910-1912): Ottoman historical demography', in Dimitri Gondicas and Charles Issawi (eds.), *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism: Politics, Economy, and Society in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, New Jersey: Darwin Press, 1999).
- ANTONOPOULOS, Stamatios, *Μικρά Ασία* [Asia Minor] (Athens: To Kratos, 1907).
- BREUILLY, John, *Nationalism and the State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982).
- CHRISTOPOULOS, Dimitris, *Ποιος είναι Έλληνας πολίτης: Το καθεστώς ιθαγένειας από την ίδρυση του ελληνικού κράτους ως τις αρχές του 21ου αιώνα* [Who is a Greek Citizen? The Citizenship Status from the Establishment of the Greek State to the Early Twenty-First Century] (Athens: Vivliorama, 2012).
- CHULOS, Chris, 'Russian piety and culture from Peter the Great to 1917', in Angold (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Christianity*.
- DAKIN, Douglas, *The Unification of Greece 1770-1923* (London: Ernest Benn, 1972).
- DASKALAKIS, Apostolos V., *Κείμενα – πηγαι της ιστορίας της ελληνικής επανάστασης* [Texts and Sources on the History of Greek Revolution], vol. I (Athens: n.e., 1966).
- DRIAULT, Édouard, *La question d'Orient depuis ses origines jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1912).
- GAZI, Effi, *Ο δεύτερος βίος των Τριών Ιεραρχών: Μια γενεαλογία του «ελληνοχριστιανικού πολιτισμού»* [The Second Life of the Three Hierarchs: A Genealogy of the 'Greco-Christian Civilization'] (Athens: Nefeli, 2004).
- GROEN, Basilius J., 'Religion am Balkan: Situation sowie ökumenische und interreligiöse Beziehungen am Beispiel Bulgariens und Griechenlands', in B. Groen and Saskia Löser (eds.), *Der Balkan: Religion, Gesellschaft und Kultur* (Innsbruck and Vienna: Tyrolia Verlag, 2011).
- HOBBSAWM, E.J., *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 [1992]).
- JELAVICH, Barbara, *Russia's Balkan entanglements 1806-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
- KEDOURIE, Elie, *Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
- KITROMILIDES, Paschalis M., 'The legacy of the French Revolution: Orthodoxy and nationalism', in Michael Angold (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Christianity*, vol. 5 (*Eastern Christianity*) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
- KITROMILIDES, Paschalis M., 'Imagined Communities' and the origins of the national question in the Balkans', in Blinkhorn and Veremis (eds), *Nationalism and Nationality*.
- KITSIKIS, Dimitri, *Propagande et pressions en politique internationale: La Grèce et ses revendications à la Conférence de la Paix (1919-1920)* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963).

- KONSTANTINOVA, Yura, 'Political propaganda in Bulgaria during the Balkan wars', *Études balkaniques* XLVII/2-3 (2011).
- LAMBROS, Spyros P., 'Τα ελληνικά δίκαια' [The Greek Rights], *Neos Hellenomnimon* 10/1-2 (30 June 1913).
- MARRIOTT, J.A.R., *The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1918).
- MATALAS, Paraskevas, *Εθνος και Ορθοδοξία: Οι περιπέτειες μιας σχέσης. Από το ελληνικό στο βουλγαρικό Σχίσμα* [Nation and Orthodoxy: The Vicissitudes of a Relationship. From the Greek to the Bulgarian Schism] (Herakleion: Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2002).
- MILLER, W., *The Ottoman Empire and its Successors 1801-1927* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936).
- MOLOSSOS, Simon, *Ιστορία του Βαλκανοτουρκικού πολέμου* [History of the Balkano-Turkish War] (Athens: Papadimitriou, [1914]).
- N. Kl.[adas], 'Βαλκανικοί πόλεμοι' [Balkan Wars], *Engyklopaïdikon Lexikon Eleftheroudaki* (Athens: Eleftheroudakis, 1963), vol. II, 865; cf. N.Th. Kladas, 'Βαλκανικοί πόλεμοι' [Balkan wars], *Megali Helliniki Engyklopaideia* (Athens: Drandakis, 1928).
- PENTZOPOULOS, Dimitri, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact Upon Greece* (Paris: Mouton, 1962).
- PETROPULOS, John Anthony, *Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece 1833-1843* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968).
- PHOTOPOULOS, Phokion, *Ιστορία του ελληνοβουλγαρικού πολέμου επί τη βάσει των επισήμων ανακοινώσεων του Στρατηγείου* [History of the Greco-Bulgarian War on the Basis of the Official Communiqués of the High Command] (Athens: n.e., 1914).
- POULTON, Hugh, 'Islam, ethnicity and state in the contemporary Balkans', in H. Poulton and Suha Taji-Farouki (eds.), *Muslim Identity and the Balkan State* (London: Hurst, 1997).
- RADU, Michael, 'The burden of Eastern Orthodoxy', *Orbis* 42/2 (1998), p. 285, cited in Vjekoslav Perica, *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
- ROUDOMETOF, Victor, *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans* (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 2001).
- STEFANOU, Stefanos I. (ed.), *Τα κείμενα του Ελευθερίου Βενιζέλου. Η ζωντανή ιστορία της δραματικής περιόδου του έθνους, 1909-1936* [The Texts of Eleftherios Venizelos: The Live History of the Dramatic Period of the Nation, 1909-1936], vol. I (Athens: Leschi Phileleftheron, 1981).

- SUGAR, Peter F., 'External and domestic roots of Eastern European nationalisms', in P. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (eds.), *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1973 [1969]).
- TRIKOUPIS, Spyridon, *Ιστορία της Ελληνικής Επανάστασεως* [History of the Greek Revolution] (Athens: n.e., ³1888).
- VEREMIS, Thanos, 'From the national state to the stateless nation 1821-1910', in Martin Blinkhorn and Thanos Veremis (eds.), *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality* (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1990).
- VOGLI, Elpida K., «Έλληνες το γένος»: *Η ιθαγένεια και η ταυτότητα στο εθνικό κράτος των Ελλήνων (1821-1844)* ['Greeks by descent': Citizenship and Identity in the Greek nation-state (1821-1844)] (Herakleion: Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2008).
- XYDIS, Stephen G., 'Modern Greek nationalism', in P. Sugar and I. Lederer (eds.), *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*.