ALEVI IDENTITY



Edited by Tord Olsson, Elisabeth Özdalga, Catharina Raudvere

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ALEVI IDENTITY

CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES

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Anthropology and Ethnicity: The Place of Ethnography in the New Alevi Movement

DAVID SHANKLAND

Periodically, even since the founding years of the Turkish Republic, there have been attempts to 'discover' the Alevi. These accounts have usually followed a pattern: the reporter stresses certain Alevi qualities: their humanism, their loyalty to the state, the equality of men and women, and the 'hidden' or occluded rituals which lie at the heart of their society. The Alevi then appear lost to the public view until the next intrepid writer, who produces something fairly similar. Today, in 1998, the situation is different. Whilst there is no lack of journalistic interest, there have appeared in addition a spate of publications covering diverse aspects of Alevi society, their history, relations with the state, ceremonies and doctrines. These are not just articles but major publications, going through many editions. Unlike the previous accounts, many of them are written by the Alevi themselves.

It is frequently said that these new works lack innovation. This is unfair. There is no doubt that they represent something very different from the hitherto periodic rediscovering of the existence of the Alevi people. These volumes represent and display varied and important aspects of Alevi life: explorations of attitudes and beliefs which have previously been spoken rather than written down, the beginnings of a codification of an oral tradition, the working through of what it means to be an Alevi today in both fiction and prose, odd pieces of anecdote and research, and more coherent sweeps of several different aspects of Alevi social history and ethnography. Realising that they are such spontaneous outpourings, rather than outcome of a guided research programme, explains their colloquial tone, repetitiveness and at the same time the intimacy that they often offer the reader.[1] Indeed, they are part of a general trend, and should not be seen as distinct from it. The past decade has seen an unprecedented rise in Alevi cultural associations, periodicals devoted to exploring the nature of 'Aleviness', television programs, discussion groups debating the 'Alevi question' and higher political exposure than they have before known. In short, there is occurring nothing short of the creation of a modern cultural heritage by a people who until recently were mute on the national stage.

These developments are at once exciting and deeply worrying. One of the triumphs of the Republic is that the conflict between Alevi and Sunni which marked

1 Out of many, see for example C. Şener, *Alevilik Olayı*, Yön Yayıncılık, Istanbul, 1982, for a very popular summary of Alevi religious history which has now gone through many editions; Şener *Alevi Sorunu Üstüne Düşünceler*, Ant Yayınları, Istanbul, 1994 for commentaries on contemporary Alevi problems; F. Bozkurt *Aleviliğin Toplumsal Boyutları*, Tekin Yayınevi, Istanbul, 1990 for a description of different Alevi customs; Birdoğan, *Anadolu'nun Gizli Kültürü Alevilik*, Berfin Yayınları, Istanbul, 1990, for a similar and even more extensive description of Alevi traditions; B. Pehlivan *Aleviler ve Diyanet*, Pencere Yayınları, Istanbul, 1993, for a discussion of the Alevi links with the Directorate of Religious Affairs; B. Öz *Aleviliğin Tarihsel Konumu*, Der Yayınları, Istanbul, 1995, for an examination of Alevi history; and İ. Kaygusuz *Son Görgü Cemi*, Alev Yayınları, Istanbul, 1991, for a novel conveying some of the difficulties facing Alevi villages in Anatolia as they modernise.

some of the most bloody episodes in the history of the Ottoman Empire has been so markedly reduced. The reasons for this are complex, but are certainly linked to the fact that both Alevi and Sunni Turks have felt able to identify with the aims and desires of the new Republican movement. Today, however, the increasing Sunnification of the Turkish nation has resulted in many Alevi people becoming uneasy. They are explicitly concerned that the ostensibly neutral territory of the state is being used for religious purposes and will accordingly result in their being discriminated against.

The Alevi reaction to these fears will not be identical, their community is after all large and diverse. However, there is a sad possibility that increasing sectarian sensitivity will lead to open disagreement, even violence between the two sects. It need not do so, and I hope profoundly that it will not. However, it would be irresponsible for us as researchers actively associated with the study of the Alevi not to be aware of the dangers.

This, indeed, is the rub. We are academics gathered together to discuss and publish an account of Alevi society. What we publish will also be taken up by the people for whom the revitalisation and recreation of their culture is a vital issue. How are we to evaluate our place in this cultural process of uncertain outcome? Should we not publish at all for fear of the way that this work will be used? I do not think so. On balance, I believe that a world deprived of reasoned research is worse off than a world with it, even if the consequences are so very difficult to predict.

But what is our role? There is no simple response, and perhaps no one answer. In a famous passage, Malinowski, the man who above all was responsible for the crystallization of Social Anthropology as a modern discipline, assumed that one of the prime justifications of field research was to provide information about the way people live before they are swept up in a tide of modernization.[2] Whilst the process of global industrialization is perhaps less straightforward than he claimed, to supply as precisely and as clearly as possible ethnography based on detailed fieldwork seems to me still the best ultimate justification for our discipline. Not everyone will agree.[3] At least, however, this approach conforms to the minimum academic requirement of supplying information as accurately as we can, and also, in as much as it tries to offer information which does not conform to the stereotyping of particular communities, avoids the oversimplification which is so often inherent within the political process.

The Alevi are an excellent case in point. Contrast the situation today with that even a few years ago. Until the wave of industrialization and modernization which has swept through Anatolia since the late sixties and early seventies, the Alevi have been a largely rural community. It is true that many Alevi respect the Bektashis as their spiritual leaders, and that this provides a minimal degree of leadership and codification of their doctrines.[4] In practice, however, the rituals and practices of the Anatolian Alevi are those of tight, closely knit but far-flung communities which have developed a complicated and varied *modus operandi* with the surrounding Sunni villages, so much so that it is not always possible to be clear where Aleviness stops and orthodox Islam begins: indeed individuals may take different lines on precisely this point. That is not to say that there is no sense of being an Alevi; there is, and a very powerful one at that, just that the every-day boundaries are unclear.

Contrast this with the situation today. Migration, modernization, industrialization are all continuing rapidly. The previously largely isolated communities are simply no

2 B. Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, Routledge, London, 1992, p. XV.

3 Cf. the bold assertions in H. Moore (ed.) *The Future of Anthropological Knowledge*, Routledge, London, 1996, Introduction.

4 Cf. J. Birge, *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes*, Luzac & Co. London, 1937, p. 211.

longer so. Social ties, where they were once confined for the majority of the villagers to their immediate community and neighbours, now spread across the country, and even internationally.[5] The great thirst to learn about the Alevi comes from the people who have moved from the community but who wish to retain contact with their cultural roots. No longer living in tightly knit rural communities with their local, mainly oral means of passing on their doctrines, they turn to writing and learning through publications, both scholarly and otherwise. In doing so, there is occurring a process of codification, of doctrinal specificity which simply did not exist in the village setting as I knew it. The previously fuzzy boundaries[6] are in the process of being made hard, and as a result the past may suffer from a needless process of simplification.

Fieldwork

It is time to be more specific. Between 1988 and 1990, I conducted fieldwork in one particular sub-province, living in an Alevi village but making also frequent visits to the surrounding communities. At no time did I use an interpreter, and by the end of my stay I had spent a little more than twelve months in the fieldwork area. I have kept in regular contact with the villagers and the area in question, though the account I give below is based largely on my experience during that one long period of fieldwork and my use of the ethnographic present refers to that period.

Administratively, the sub-province consists of a sub-province centre, which is also the largest settlement, and 96 villages. Of these villages, but for any state personnel stationed there, 20 are solely Alevi, 74 Sunni, and two both Alevi and Sunni. All the Alevi villages regarded themselves as being Turkish, as do all the Sunni villages but three. These last have come to the sub-province as the result of official resettlement policies: one consists of Kurdish people from the east, another of Muslims from Yugoslavia (known as *göçmen* - immigrants), and the last Muslims from Circassian (*Çerkez*).

Both Alevi and Sunni villagers explained to me that during the troubles of the late seventies sectarian relations had been very tense. This culminated in 1979, when there were riots, and the shops owned by Alevi had their windows smashed. As a result of this, most of the Alevi of the sub-province centre moved out, leaving it predominantly, I estimate 90 per cent, Sunni. Now, relations are broadly peaceful: villagers of both sects come into the town in order to conduct their official business, attend market day and, occasionally, to sell their livestock. In spite of this, Alevi and Sunni largely go to their own respective shops, restaurants and garages. Unless a man is a civil servant or interested in left-wing politics he is unlikely to meet members of another sect on a regular basis. There is little inter-marriage between the two sects, and even in the two villages with a mixed sectarian population, the Alevi and the Sunni live in separate village quarters.

Though the two communities lead such separate lives, there are highly significant points in common. They are aligned to the same state, the same nation, speak the same language, and share an immense amount of practical and local knowledge. They both regard themselves as being Islamic. Among both Alevi and Sunni, the standard economic unit is the patrilinial, patrilocal household which owns the land it farms, and consumes its own produce. There are no large landowners, the average

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5 Cf. D. Shankland, "Alevi and Sunni in Rural Turkey: Diverse Paths of Change", in P. Stirling (ed.) *Culture and Economy: Changes in Turkish Village*, Eothen Press, Huntingdon, 1993, pp. 46-64.

6 I owe this expression to Professor Paul Stirling.

household holding is about thirty *dönüm**. The land throughout most of the sub-province is poor: fields yield at very best 12 or 13 to 1, and most much less than this. In the whole of the sub-province, there is only one private business which employs more than ten people, and no tourism. In practice, whilst most people who stay in the sub-province do farm, whether Alevi or Sunni the majority rely for their cash needs on relatives who have migrated, either to Germany or urban centres within Turkey, and are now prepared and able to remit back regular sums of money.

There are also major and important differences in social organization and ideology.[7] One of the most striking is the settlement layout: Sunni villages are collected together in distinct, nucleated settlements. In the centre of each lies a mosque. As the village expands, a new quarter adjoining the old may be built, in which case a new mosque is built in the centre of the new quarter. By contrast, the Alevi villages are more dispersed, sometimes in as many as twenty village quarters, each separated from the next, and each with its distinct fields and pasture and woodland rights. Whilst there usually is a mosque in an Alevi village, it is not usually in the new style with dome and minaret, and there is very rarely more than one for the village as a whole, however many village quarters there may be.

Patrilineages

Patrilineages have been a subject of controversy among people who study Anatolia since Stirling asserted their existence among the Sunni village he studied in Kayseri.[8] In fact, among the villages, both Sunni and Alevi, where I worked, the lineage exists and operates much along the lines described by Stirling: a number of households are linked together through common descent through male ancestors. In certain circumstances these lineages co-operate together for mutual defense and other social support but were not otherwise corporate groups and rarely reached more than about fifty households.

In the Sunni communities, amongst men there exists a loose equality: they differ by virtue of their wealth, their age and their position in the lineage, but no man is held to be qualitatively superior or closer to God than any other. This is quite different among the Alevi, whose society has three quite distinct ranks. About one in ten Alevi lineages regard themselves, and are regarded by their fellows, as being descended from a founder distinguished in the eyes of God through possessing *keramet*. *Keramet*, is sometimes literally translated as 'charisma'. In the context used by the Alevi, it is used to mean favoured by God by virtue of being able to perform a miracle, as in Sufism in general. The oral histories of *dede* lineages invariably include one or more episodes in which a male figure has performed such a feat. The distribution of these lineages varies: occasionally, a village quarter consists only of *dede* lineages, on other occasions a *dede* lineage lives in a village quarter where the other residents are not *dede*. Often, a particular *dede* lineage would claim descent from other similar *dede* lineages in the area, forming a network of related lineages laterally across the countryside.

Every lineage, whether a *dede* lineage or not possesses a *dede* lineage with whom they were defined *talip*. At one level, to be a *talip* implies to be in a relation of subordination and respect. In practice, a *talip* lineage may call in a *dede* to mediate in

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* One *dönüm* is approximately 1000 m^2.

7 D. Shankland, "Six Propositions Concerning the Alevi of Anatolia", *International Journal* of *Turkish Studies*, forthcoming.

8 P. Stirling, *Turkish Village*, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1964.

quarrels between them or another lineage. He may also be requested to mediate in marriage negotiations, and if widely respected, requested to comment on matters of significance to the community as a whole. The *dede* themselves characterise their task to be the way, the light, the inspiration to a community. They sometimes refer to themselves as *rehber*, guides, whilst their followers may refer to their *ocak*, 'hearth', with implications of being the source of light and warmth of a household.

These two ranks are accompanied by a third: that of *efendi*. *Efendi* are said to be descended from Hacı Bektaş Veli himself. They usually live at Hacıbektaş town, and representatives come to the village about once a year, when they may collect a due, known as *hak kulak*. It is said that the *efendi* may be used as a sort of court of last appeal if there are disputes to be settled. I did not see them fulfill such a function, though many villagers do revere them, and I think some would accept them in such a role.[9]

Whilst the *efendi* lineage may have little influence on the day to day life of the community, the legendary figure of Hacı Bektaş and his monastery are highly important within the village cosmology. The villagers say that the *dede/talip* links were given to them by Hacı Bektaş Veli. Many *dede* lineages claim to be descended from holy men who attended Hacı Bektaş's *tekke* in the town of that name, near Nevşehir. The emphasis on Hacı Bektaş is reflected also in prayer and poetry, where he is referred to variously as 'Saint' (*Pir*) and 'Sovereign' (*Hünkâr*). Several of the villagers visited the tomb of Hacı Bektaş whilst I was in the village, referring to the trip as going on the pilgrimage, *hac*. Many villagers claim also that Hacı Bektaş is descended from the twelve *imams*, and through them to *Ali* himself. Hacı Bektaş is thus at once a spiritual focus, and also an orienting figure through which the Alevi build up a link and define their place in the wider world of Islam as a whole. The three ranks together give Alevi society a strong hierarchical basis, one that links in all its members into an overlapping network with a well-defined ritual, spiritual and poetic tradition.

Alevilik and *Sünnilik*

The *dede* are rightly regarded as one of the keys to Alevi society: they are at once its focus, its teachers, temporal judges and links to their religious heritage. From the individual's point of view, however, Aleviness can be more focused. All the villagers I spoke to were quite clear that to be Alevi was encapsulated in the saying *'Eline, diline, beline sahip ol!:* 'Be master of your hands, tongue and loins!' Glosses on this vary, though the most frequent is 'Do not take what is not yours, do not lie, and do not make love outside marriage!' The phrase is well-known within mystical Islam, where it is called *edep*, the Alevi are distinctive in that they have made it part of the very core of their concept of religious fulfillment.

The Alevi further characterise their way of life through a series of comparisons with the Sunni communities with which they are surrounded. The principal Alevi ceremony is the *cem*, at which both men and women worship together. The cem celebrates several things at once: its core rituals symbolise the martyrdom of Hüseyin at the Kerbala, but they also include music and interpretation of key themes within Alevi doctrine, such as the *edep* philosophy. The ceremonies may last for several

9 Of the distribution of power within the village, D Shankland, "Social Change and Culture: Responses to Modernization in an Alevi Village in Anatolia", in C. Hann (ed.), *When History Accelerates*, Athlone Press, London, pp. 238-254.

hours, and one of their features is that all in the congregation must be at peace with one another before worship can begin. If there are any quarrels, the protagonists must either make up their differences, or leave the gathering.[10] This last point is very important with the Alevi men, who contrast their way with the Sunni prayer in the mosque, saying that the greatest problem about praying in a mosque is that it is possible to be next to a murderer without realising it, something which the Alevi prohibition on strangers, and on all present being at peace with each other before the ceremony begins precludes.

Though men vary to the extent that they are able, or indeed wish to articulate their religious beliefs, many men also draw a contrast between the depth of the Alevi, and the supposed superficiality of the Sunni religious experience. Thus, they maintain that belief in the Sunni God is based on fear, but that the Alevi base their faith in love, a love which is within all people and that can be found within them. They illustrate this by saying that in the beginning, God created the world, and gave creatures life (*can*). However, He looked at his work and felt that there was nothing which truly reflected His Being. Accordingly, He gave all humans a part of Himself, this part is our soul (*ruh*). Now, when we pray together in the *cem*, we do so face to face, and through the collective worship, see into one anothers' hearts and so become part of God.

The Four Doors of Islam

The boundaries of Aleviness however, are not ultimately made up with a simple contrast between the Alevi and the Sunni way of going about things. Whilst it is important to realise that individual villagers vary to the degree with which they elucidate these matters, the *dede* teach that there are four ways to God: *şeriat, tarikat, marifet* and *hakikat*. A person may pass through one stage on an individual progression to God, going from the *şeriat* to the *tarikat* level (where most Alevi are said to be) to *marifet*, and finally to *hakikat*, when a person is at one with God. At this last stage, the physical properties of this world no longer become an impediment. *Dede* lineages are ideally held to be at this last level.

These categories also apply to the more broad practice of Islam itself. There is a consensus that the ritual and prayer which is taught by the *dede* is loosely known as *tarikat*. *Tarikat* is associated with the use of Turkish rather than Arabic in religious poetry and prayer, and also implies the private life of the Alevi community, where a strict segregation between men and women (*haremlik/selamlık*) is not usually practiced. It is for this reason that it has been necessary to 'discover' the Alevi so many times in the last decades: the Alevi traditionally do not allow strangers access to their ceremonies, nor do they provide detailed accounts of their rituals, procedures and doctrines. As I write, in 1997, this is changing very quickly: but certainly whilst I was in the village in 1989 I was permitted to attend *cem* ceremonies only after a great deal of discussion and deliberation. In spite of this token acceptance, many men were highly concerned at talking with me, and whilst wonderfully hospitable, clearly preferred not to discuss such intimate matters.

To the villagers, *şeriat*, generally is thought of as the way religion is usually conducted in the local Sunni villages. *Şeriat*, however, also implies the power of the state, the religious orthodoxy that it supports, the use of Arabic prayers, and the pub-

10 Cf. Shankland, "Alevi and Sunni". On the Alevi rituals in the village setting, see also the pioneering fieldwork conducted by A. Gökalp, *Tetes Rouges et Bouches Noires*, Société d'ethnographie, Paris, 1980.

lic, male side of life.[11] In practice, though, the Alevi villagers did not absolutely reject the ideas and practices associated with *şeriat*. Rather, life in the village itself consisted of a subtle interplay between different concepts of *şeriat* being the outward form of existence, and *tarikat* being the inner, more meaningful reality. It is immensely difficult to extract these interplays between belief and practice, and turn them into a codified document and say this is *Alevilik*.

To give an extended example of this. Only *dede* are permitted to lead Alevi rituals, and only they may pronounce Alevi prayers. Yet the *dede* themselves may pride themselves on their knowledge of Islam as a whole. Further, if a non-*dede* man is interested in religion, he may take the trouble to learn a body of prayer associated with orthodox religion, he may also learn how to conduct a funeral and to lead a mosque prayer ceremony. Such men are known as *hoca*, and the practice *hocalık*. This acceptance of the orthodox Islamic practice shows itself in many ways. The village only has one mosque, a building which but for being slightly larger looks not greatly different from the traditional village house. However, they respect the mosque *imam*, though a Sunni man appointed by the state, as the official prayer leader in the village. They gave him a house, a donkey with which to fetch wood, and gave him the use of a field to grow wheat without charge. Whilst very few men attended the five daily prayers regularly (I believe two), rather more than this would go to the Friday prayers (up to a dozen), and the mosque would be full on the two religious festivals of the year: *kurban bayramı* and *şeker bayramı*.

The sequence of funeral rituals illustrates this synchronism also. After their death, a person, whether man or woman, is washed, placed in a shroud and laid out in front of a purely male congregation in the open air, just as they are in a Sunni village. The mosque *imam*, or a village *hoca*, then pronounce, a service which the villagers' regard as being part of orthodox Islam, common to both Alevi and Sunni. Whilst I could not be sure of this claim, certainly the fact that the state-trained mosque *imam* may conduct the ceremony gives it support. The body is then taken to the graveyard, and interned to the intoning of *ilahi*, Arabic hymns, by the *hoca*.

Three days after the funeral, however, a further and quite different ceremony takes place, known as *dar çekme*. In this, neighbours and relatives collect in the deceased villager's house. In the main room, twelve people, six men and six women line up in a horseshoe formation. They face a number of *dede* lined up in front of them, and the spouse or close relative of the deceased. To their left, the hoca recites a prayer, and a verse is read from the Koran. I was unable to attend this brief ceremony, but I was kindly supplied the text of the prayer. It consists chiefly of repeated supplications to the one God, begging for mercy and asking for forgiveness. After the ceremony, the congregation partakes of a sacrificial meal. Nothing like this is found on the Sunni side, indeed it contains various elements: the *dede* who bless the sacrifice, and the men and women gathering together in a private ceremony are characteristic of the Alevi doctrines, whilst the prayer recited by the *hoca* is associated with orthodox Islamic practice.

In sum then, the Alevi acknowledge the different practices of their neighbours but do not disassociate from them entirely in their own ritual and personal life, they contrast the workings of the state with that of their own community but they do not reject the authority of the state. The consequences of this overlapping of different ritual cycles and different layers of belief within Alevi life are profound. The traditional

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11 E. Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas*, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1969, in his research among the Berbers in the High Atlas mountains also stresses such a contrast, between the *Makhzen*, the area controlled by the state and its codified, orthodox *Kuran*-based rule, and *siba*, the area outside its authority where the Berbers defined their own practice of Islam much more freely.

Inquiries

Alevi-Bektashi studies were until recently largely the domain of the Ottomanists. They concentrated on the history of the Bektashi order (*tarikat*),[4] which goes back to the 13th century, and the *Babaî* and *Kızılbaş* (lit. "Redhead") movements. In the 13th and 16th centuries tribal and rural groups of probably mostly Turkish origin had rebelled against Ottoman central authority, first under the spiritual guidance of the *Babaî* - wandering dervishes and heterodox Sufi leaders - and later with the support of the Safavid *şeyh*s and *halife*s who had their center in Ardabil in Northeastern Iran. These groups adhered to a sort of folk Islam that integrated Shiite elements and later developed further towards heterodoxy and syncretism. Concerning the studies on these issues there is no need to repeat what Faroqhi (1995) has reviewed recently. She concludes that thanks to the works of Mehmet Fuat Köprülü (1925, 1929, 1966/1919), Abdülbakî Gölpınarlı,[5] Ahmet Yaşar Ocak (1983, 1989, 1996), Irène Mélikoff[6] - and we should not forget her own study (Faroqhi 1981)[7] - "we possess a reasonable understanding of the overall history of the [Bektashi] order" (Faroqhi 1995: 27). The same applies to research on the political and socio-economic aspects of Ottoman-Safavid relations, which are associated with the "Kızılbaş problem" that shook the Ottoman state from the late 15th through the whole of the 16th century.[8] There are indications that the rebellious Kızılbaş being followers of the Safavids, entered only after the Safavids' defeat at Çaldıran (1514) into closer relations with the Bektashi order. For the most part they adopted the legendary founder of the Bektashi order, Hacı Bektaş Veli (around 1300), as their patron saint (Faroqhi 1995: pp. 15-16). Certainly, such a spiritual and personal entanglement of Bektashi and Kızılbaş milieus must have led to mutual influence and cultural exchange. One may deplore the scantiness of sources concerning this process and the evolution of Bektashi doctrine and ritual, as well as the Alevi religious system. But it is also true that only a small part of the legends of Bektashi and Alevi holy men (*menakıbname*, *vilayetname*) have been edited in a sufficiently scholarly manner to be studied in a comparative perspective.[9] After Köprülü, a pupil of Mélikoff, Ahmet Yaşar Ocak (1983, 1996), has done some pioneer work in that field. On Bektashi legends we also have some studies by Hans-Joachim Kissling (1986) who worked especially on the Balkans, and a recent article by van Bruinessen (1991). Even though the abolition of the Bektashi order in 1826 and the suppression of all *tarikat* activity in 1925 may have caused some losses, we can be sure that a bulk of devotional literature still awaits study.[10] In the course of the recent Alevi revival it came to light that the descendants of the traditional religious leaders, the *ocakzade*, dispose of copies of the Alevi doctrinal books (*buyruk*, lit. "order"),[11] the Ottoman *icazet*, diploma of author-

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4 Note on transcription: Names and technical terms, even if of Arabic and Persian origin are here spelled in accordance with modern Turkish orthography. Transcriptions will be used only for distinctive purposes.

5 E.g. 1958, 1978, 1979, 1989. Gölpınarlı is an interesting personality of Turkey's academic scene as he had inclinations to Sufism and later to Shiism.

6 See her selected articles Mélikoff 1992, 1995a.

7 Note also an interesting recent contribution: Beldiceanu-Steinherr 1991.

8 For a survey and bibliography cf. Roemer 1989; recently Calmard 1993; Gronke 1991.

9 Gölpınarlı 1958. Popular editions cf. footnote 53. Comment and summary of the legend on Hacı Bektaş Veli in German cf. Groá 1927. For another Bektashi legend cf. Tschudi 1914. For a list of manuscripts cf. M. Öztürk 1991: pp. 26-36.

10 Just around these turning-points in Ottoman history (reform measures, revolution of the Young Turks, founding of the republic) we observe a boom in Bektashi apologetic literature, cf. e.g. Ahmed Cemaleddin Çelebi 1992/1909; Ahmed Rıfkı 1909-1912; B. Atalay 1991/1924; Mehmed Süreyya [Münci Baba] 1995/1914-1915.

11 There are only more or less popular editions cf. Aytekin 1982/1958; B. Ayyıldız 1984; Bozkurt 1982; Erbay 1994; *Tam ve Hakiki İmam*, 1989.