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IS OCAM 1994

THAILAND. DESCRIPTION AND TRAVEL

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FO.V Forbin, Du Comte de

Voyage du Comte de Forbin à Siam des mémoires de L'Abbé de Choisy 1685 - 1688 / by Du Comte de Forbin.- Paris: Librairie de l'Hachette, 1853.
176 p.; 17 cm.

9241 1. Description and Travel, Siam I. Title

915.04
EL.G Elias, Frank

The Gorgeous East: India Burma, Ceylon and Siam / by Frank Elias.- London: Adam and Charles Black, 1913.
viii, 221 p., 27 p. of plates: 1 fold map; 21 cm.- (Peeps at many lands)
Missing 5 ill of the book

1. Description and Travel, Asia I. Title II. (Series)

9868

TAYLAN

Siam: Land of Temples. By John Audric. London: Robert Hale, 1962. Pp. 184. Illus. Index.

The author of this book is an English schoolmaster who spent some three years in Siam as an adviser in secondary education. Although the book is in no sense a treatise on education, in many places the author writes about Siamese teachers, the method of teaching and the pupils. Reading it, I received the strong impression that it was an edited diary, a fact which is disclosed on one of the last pages. I should doubt whether proofs were ever submitted to a Siamese or to any Englishman who had an intimate knowledge of Siam, since there are inaccurate statements concerning matters outside the author's personal knowledge. There is one piece of gross carelessness: on page 37 he writes "It was opened by King Mongkut on 7th January, 1917, as a Throne Hall. King Mongkut (1851-1868) and his son King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) were two of Siam's greatest monarchs." The Throne Hall was, of course, opened by King Vajiravudh in 1917.

The first two chapters deal with sightseeing under an excellent guide, including some of the night-life not always witnessed by the ordinary tourist. The most interesting part of the book concerns the author's experiences up-country, mainly at Chachoengsao, a provincial town some 60-odd miles from Bangkok, where he was stationed. As an adviser to the Ministry of Education he was an honoured guest at the various local festivities, and his prolonged stay in Chachoengsao gave him a reasonably deep insight into provincial life. This book is certainly not without merit, though one regrets inaccuracies which one feels might have been avoided.

K. A. LAWSON

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-Pathanites

-Patani

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· Delhi
· Pathanites

Delhi Pathan Sultanlari ha ait ban enter paralar-

NUMISMATIK

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A study in cultural confrontation

THE CRESCENT IN THE EAST

Islam in Asia Major

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THE THAI MUSLIMS

M. Ladd Thomas

THE SETTING

Approximately one million Thai Muslims live in the five provinces immediately north of the Thailand-Malaysia border.[1] They account for nearly one-fifth of the population in Songkhla province, almost two-thirds in Yala province, and more than three-fourths in each of the provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat and Satun. These people are devout Muslims, follow Malay customs, and most (except for those in Satun and in portions of Songkhla) speak a local dialect of Malay as their first or only language. The vast majority reside in rural villages and engage in fishing or agriculture, the latter consisting essentially of rubber and rice cultivation.[2] However, most proprietors of small shops in rural areas and in semi-urban areas, such as sanitation districts, also are Muslims. Furthermore many Muslims live in the towns and either operate small shops and businesses or are manual labourers.

Other population groups, of any consequence, who live in these provinces are the Chinese (either resident aliens or Thai citizens of pure Chinese extraction) and the Thai Buddhists. The Chinese mostly live in the towns, where they tend to dominate the business sector.[3] Some of these urban-based Chinese also own tin mines and large rubber plantations in the countryside. Still others, however, work as manual labourers. Thai Buddhists (who constitute an overwhelming majority of the population elsewhere in Thailand) are largely found in the towns where they primarily are engaged either in business or as government officials.

Considerable social interaction take place between the Chinese and Thai Buddhist communities, in part because nearly all of the Chinese have learned to speak Thai and partly because of the pragmatic nature of Thai and Chinese religious beliefs. But there is very little interaction between these two communities on the one hand and the Thai Muslims on the other. The lack of social intercourse *vis-à-vis* the Muslims is due to several factors. First, most Thai Muslims (particularly those in rural areas of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat) speak little or no Thai and therefore are unable to communicate with the Chinese and Thai Buddhists. Second, some of the religious beliefs and practices of the Thai Muslims militate against social dealings with the other two communal groups.[4] For instance, it is considered improper for Thai Muslims to attend social functions having any kind of non-Muslim religious overtones, nor can they marry those of other religious persuasions unless the latter first become converts to Islam. Or, as another example, they refuse to eat food prepared by non-Muslims unless they are certain that it contains no pork, that other meat is slaughtered in the approved Islamic fashion, that pork grease is not used in cooking the food, and that utensils used for preparing the meal never have been exposed to pork grease; these considerations tend to prevent Thai Muslims from entering homes, or attending social functions, of Chinese and Thai Buddhists since it is the custom of people in Southeast Asia to offer and accept food as an integral part of playing the roles of host and guest. A third factor is the fear of Thai Muslims that social interaction with the Thai Buddhists would have the effect of encouraging their children to accept features of the Thai culture, thereby facilitating assimilation and the eventual destruction of their Malay heritage. A fourth factor is that many Chinese and Thai Buddhists are prone to view the Thai Muslims as being culturally and socially inferior, and accordingly speak of them in a condescending fashion.

While nearly all Thai Buddhist and Chinese children, and an increasing number of Thai Muslim children, attend public schools for the first four years, fewer Thai Muslims -- as contrasted with the other two communal groups -- continue on in the public system. Rather, some are sent by their parents to study in private religious schools for varying periods of time. Until fairly recently these schools, known as *pondoks*, offered no secular instruction, and even now such instruction is extremely limited. Many Thai Muslim children do not even study in *pondoks*, their education stopping after the fourth grade. Usually they soon lose whatever functional literacy they had obtained via Thai language instruction during their four years of schooling.

The isolation of the Thai Muslims, in part self-imposed, is reinforced by the orientation of the communications media. Programmes of the one local television station and the few radio stations within the region are directed primarily toward the Thai-speaking audience. That is to say, the broadcasts are mostly in the Thai language and focus on matters of greatest interest to the Thai Buddhist and Chinese populations.[5] Only a very limited amount of time is given over to programmes in the Malay language. Of course radio broadcasts from stations in Bangkok, to the extent that they can be clearly received within the five provinces, are exclusively in the Thai language. Moreover, newspapers are all printed in the Thai language, except for one local paper which contains a page or so in the Malay language. Many Thai Muslims, in turn, rely on broadcasts and newspapers emanating from nearby Malaysia since these are increasingly in the Malay language (some are still in English).

Economic conditions in rural areas of the five provinces once were better than in many other parts of Thailand, and were comparable to conditions in the northern tier of Malaysian states. But conditions in these provinces began to worsen in the mid-50s, and the process of deterioration has continued through the 1960s and the 1970s. Reasons for the decline are essentially fourfold. First the rate of natural population growth (about three per cent) combined with some in-migration from elsewhere in Thailand has resulted in growing population pressure on cultivatable land. That is to say, the size of the average rural landholding has decreased steadily to the

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EN ESKİ DEVİRLERDEN ZAMANIMIZA KADAR

UZAK DOĞU TARİHİ

Uzak Doğu'da ilk insanlar ve prehistorik devirler, Japonya, Kora, Hindiçini, Siyam, Burma, Malaya, Endonezya, Avustralya ve Adalar

Prof. Dr. W. EBERHARD

Metin içinde 3 harita, metin dışında 1 cetvel ve 15 resim vardır.

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BEŞİNCİ BÖLÜM

SİYAM TARİHİ

I. Siyam'ın eski tarihi

Siyam tarihinin kaynakları, hemen hemen Hindiçinî tarihinin kaynaklarına benzemektedir. Yerli tarihler, gayet geç yazılmıştır ve hâkim sülâle ile millî hislerin kuvvetli tesiri altındadır. Bundan maada, Çin ve Batı kaynaklarımız vardır ki, devletin ancak muayyen devirleri ve hâdiseleri hakkında malûmat vermektedirler. Henüz ilmî bir Siyam tarihi yazılmadığından, bilhassa hâdiseler arkasındaki cereyanlar ve ilerlemeler hakkında bir fikir edinemiyor, ancak hâdiselerin seyrini tesbit etmekle iktifa edebiliriz. Bunda da, meselâ Siyam ve Kambodja kaynaklarında yazılanı mukayese edersek, pek büyük hatalara düşebiliriz.

Siyam'ın tarihi, tam mânasıyle, ancak Moğol devriyle başlamaktadır. Siyam'ın tesbit edilebilen en eski halkı, Mon-Khmer ırk ve dil grubuna dahil kavimlerdir. Khmer devletinin kuruluşundan sonra, bu kabilelerin bazıları, Khmer hâkimiyeti altına girmişler, diğer bazıları ise, müstakil kalarak, ikiye ayrılmışlardır.

Bugünkü Siyam'lılar, Tay dil ve kültür gurupuna aittir. Tay'lara gelince, bunlar eskiden Orta ve Güney Çin'in ilk sakinleri olup, ya sonradan meydana gelen Çin kültür birliğine dahil olmuş, yahut da daha güney memleketlere doğru hicret etmişlerdir. Böylece, Çin'in bugünkü Yün-nan eyaletinde, "Çin tarihi„ mizde ve bu kitabın önceki kısmında zikredilen, Tibet ve Tay'dan mürekkep "Nan-cav„ devleti meydana gelmiştir. Fakat, Nan-cav devleti henüz kuvvetli olduğu zamanlarda bile, küçük Tay gurupları, Hindiçinî'ye göçmüştür. Bunlar, iki kısma ayrılmıştır : Batı, ve "Şan„ denilen gurup ile doğu ve "Laos„ ile " Tay „ denilen gurublar. Bu göçmenler, Nan-cav'ın güneyinde, büyük nehir vadilerini takip ederek, sırasiyle küçük kabile krallıkları meydana getirmişlerdir. Görünüşe göre, bunlar arasında, kuzeydekiler, en önce kurulmuş ve sonradan

kurulan daha güneydeki krallıklar tarafından mağlûp ve işgal edilmiştir. Böylece, Moğol istilâsından az önce, Bankok şehri kuzeyinde, bugünkü Siyam'ın nüvesi olan bir devlet meydana gelmiştir. Bu devletin de ancak hâkim sınıfı, Tay'lardan mürekkep olup halkın ekseriyetini ise, Khmer'ler teşkil ediyordu. Böylece, ilk Tay devletleri, bir nevi sömürge devletleri karakteri taşımıştır.

Moğollar, Hindiçinî'ye nüfuz ettikleri zaman, 1282 senesinde, Kubilay'ın emri ile, bir Çinli, "Sukotay„ Tay devletine gelip, haraç istemiştir. Çin kaynakları tarafından teyit edilmemekle beraber, Siyam kaynaklarına göre, Sukotay şahsen 1294 ile 1300 seneleriede, Moğol başkentine gelerek, haracını teslim etmiştir. Bu zamanda, bugünkü Siyam'ın kuzeyinde ve Moğollar tarafından 1254 senesinde imha edilen Nan-cav devleti güneyinde, bir "Ciyeng-may„ devleti mevcuttu. Ayrıca, birtakım küçük müstakil Tay krallıkları da vardı.

Sukotay krallığı, 1378 senesine kadar devam etmiş ise de, 1350'den itibaren, Kambodja'nın batısındaki en büyük kuvvet, başkenti Ayodha'da olan Suvanpumi devleti olmuştur; Sukotay da, nihayet Ayodha'nın himayesi altına girmek zorunda kalmıştır.

Ayodha veya Suvanpumi devletinin hükümdarları, kuzeyden gelenlerdir. Bunların şahsiyeti ve devletinin kuruluşu hakkında, hiçbir şey bilmiyoruz. Ancak, hükümdar olduktan sonra, "Rama Tibodi„ ismini veya daha doğrusu ünvanını kabul eden bu şahsiyet, Siyamlı'lara göre, devlet idaresi ile hukukunun kurucusu sayılır. Ananeye göre, bu kıral, 1350 ile 1359 arasında birtakım kanunlar neşretmiş ve böylece, halkın hayatını bir nizama sokmuştur. Kıralın ölümünden sonra, bu genç devlet, eskiden Sukotay'ın yaptığı gibi, Çin ile münasebete girmek istemiş, fakat Siyam heyeti, artık yıkılan Moğollara değil, Nankin'de yeni kurulan "Ming„ sülâlesinin başkentine gidip, Çinli'lerden ünvan istiyerek, haraç vermiştir (1371'den itibaren).

Bu yıllarda, Siyam tarihi, hem diğer küçük Tay krallıklarına karşı, hem de Kambodja'daki Khmer devletine karşı girişilen ve harpten ziyade soygunculuk seferleri denecek hareketlerin tarihidir. Bunlar esnasında, Khmer başkenti Siyamlıların kurbanı olduğu kadar, Siyam başkenti de birçok defa Khmer'liler tarafından soyulmuştur. Çok iptidaî bir halde bulu-

Tayland


تايلاند

الوجه والأساطير

وسط مجتمع ودولة يدينان بالبوذية ، ورغم أن الدولة تحاول أن توهم الجميع بأن لا فرق بين مواطنيها إلا أن البوذيين كأغلبية يستأثرون بكل الامتيازات التى يمكن أن توفرها الدولة لمواطنيها ، فلا ذكر لحقوق الأقليات في أجهزة الاعلام الرسمية بينما تلقى الاحتفالات والطقوس والأعياد البوذية كل اهتمام ومتابعة من الأجهزة الرسمية في الدولة باعتبارها الديانة الرسمية اذ كثيرا ماتطالعك وجوه الكهان البوذيون في نشرات الاخبار وصور الصحف .. كما أن المعابد البوذية والتى تعتبر معلما من المعالم السياحية في تايلاند تنتشر بشكل ملفت للنظر وفي كل انحاء البلاد ، ولا ابالغ اذا قلت ان (بين كل معبد ومعبد ، يوجد معبد) !

أما المساجد فلا تكاد تراها الا اذا قصدت ان تذهب اليها بنفسك أو دلوك عليها .. وقد كان مرافقى الأخ (خالد) حريصا على تعريفى باماكنها أو بالمرور عليها اذا كانت تقع في طريقنا . والمدارس الاسلامية كذلك تشكل هاجسا لدى المسلمين هناك حيث يريد الواحد منهم أن يحافظ على هويته الاسلامية فيعمل على تعليم أبنائه أصول العقيدة الاسلامية فيلقى

مطلوب تحرك دول الاسلامية لأقلية المسلمة والضياع..





فطاني.. وجالا.. وستول.. وناراتيواس أماكن الكثافة الاسلامية في تايلاند

هذه أمثلة ونماذج لمن يشوهون سمعة الاسلام والمسلمين !

في سبيل تحقيق هذا الهدف التعب والعني ويواجه الحيرة اذ تقوم اغلب هذه المدارس على الجهد الشخصي وتأخذ الطابع الفردى مما يجعلها تفتقد الى التنسيق والاستقرار في الناحية المنهجية والدراسية حيث يتم التركيز على جانب واحد من العلوم وهي الدينية بينما تهمل الجوانب الاخرى فيفضل الدارس الالتحاق بالمدارس الحكومية والرسمية لانها طريقة الى الحياة العملية عن طريق الشهادات الرسمية والمعترف بها من قبل السلطات .

كما ان عدم وجود مناهج دراسية موحدة أو كتب تحمل مضمونا واحدا يعتبر مشكلة اخرى يقاسى منها هؤلاء فبعض المدارس تستعين مثلا بكتب تتبع المنهج الدراسى السعودى واخرى تتبع العراقى وثالثة مصرية وهكذا .. ورغم ان الاسس الاسلامية تبقى هي ، هى في كل المناهج الا ان محاولة توحيد مايدرسه الطالب والطالبة قد يسهل عملية الاستيعاب . كما ييسر الحصول على الكتب والمطبوعات الاخرى من مصدر واحد بدلا من الاختلاف والتشتت .

والمشكلة الثالثة التى تلقى بظلالها على الانسان المسلم في تايلاند هي مشكلة عدم وجود المدرسين المؤهلين في مثل هذه الاصقاع البعيدة عن العالم الاسلامي ، ولقد كانت لفتة بارعة من سعادة سفير جمهورية مصر العربية الذي اعلن ضمن وقائع الحفل الختامى للمسابقة الثالثة للقرآن الكريم عن تخصيص خمس منح دراسية لبعض الفائزين لتلقى دراسات اسلامية عليا في جامعة الازهر . فمجتمع يحاول التمسك بهويته الاسلامية وسط هذا الموج الهائل من عبدة الاصنام وبرغم الضغوط الاجتماعية التى تحاصره ، جدير بالاهتمام به ، واتاحة الفرصة لأبنائه من التعلم والاستزادة في زمن اصبحت الشهادات فيه هي الفيصل والمحك .

ان الهيئات والمنظمات والدول الاسلامية مطالبة بفتح مدارسها وجامعاتها ومعاهدها لاستقبال هؤلاء حفاظا عليهم ، وحماية وتسلط الغير عليهم ، وضمانا لابنائهم للعيش في مستوى انسانى راق في مستقبل ايامهم .

ولعل جهات كثيرة مرشحة للقيام بهذا الدور الاسلامي والانسانى الكبير ، بل وأقول الواجب المحتم ومنها رابطة العالم الاسلامي والبنك الاسلامي للتنمية الذي اعرف انه يتيح فرصا للطلاب المسلمين من أبناء غير الدول الاسلامية لاستكمال دراساتهم .. وللجامعات الاسلامية كالازهر والجامعة الاسلامية بالمدينة المنورة وجامعة الامام محمد بن سعود الاسلامية والجامعة الاسلامية بباكستان دور مهم وفعال في تحقيق هذا الهدف السامى وهو اتاحة الفرصة لابناء الأقليات الاسلامية في العالم - والتايلانديون من بينهم - لتلقى المزيد من العلم في ظروف دراسية ودينية واجتماعية مناسبة حتى يعودوا الى بلادهم لقيادة العمل الاسلامي ولحفظ الكيان المسلم هناك من الانصهار أو الذوبان في المجتمعات الكافرة .

كما ان هذه الجهات - وخاصة معهد الأئمة والدعاة التابع للرابطة - مطالبة باتاحة الفرصة وتدريب الكوادر في مجال الدعوة الاسلامية والامامة حتى يتسنى لهم العمل في اوساط المسلمين هناك دعوة وارشادا ووعظا وتوجيها .. وان كنا نقدر تمام التقدير مايقوم به الدعاة الاسلاميون الآن في تايلاند من جهد خارق وعمل متواصل ودؤوب وفعال يقدمهم في هذا المجال فضيلة الشيخ على عيسى ونفر ممن نذر نفسه لخدمة الاسلام والقضية الاسلامية والمسلمين ، ويواصل ليله بنهاره في سبيل تحقيق هذا الهدف .. إلا أن شد أزر هؤلاء وتدعيمهم واجب يجب عدم التقاعس عنه ، ولا الجلوس دونه .

أقول .. ان قضايا المسلمين ومشاكلهم في تايلاند وغيرها من دول الاقليات كثيرة ومتنوعة ومتشابكة غير أن هم من يتصدون للعمل الاسلامي في تلك الديار لا تعرف التقاعس وعزمهم لا يعرف اللين ، وشكيمتهم لا تعرف التخاذل أو التراجع فهم يجوبون الفيافى ويقطعون الوديان ويتوغلون في الغابات حاملين ارواحهم في أياديهم فلا خوف من غدر غادر ، أو حاقد أو ظالم .. فهم رجال آمنوا بعقيدتهم ورسالتهم فأوصلوا الليل بالنهار لتحقيق أهدافهم النبيلة .


ورغم شح الامكانيات المادية ، وصعوبة التنفيذ ، فان مسيرة العمل الاسلامي لم تتوقف لحظة واحدة بفضل عزم هؤلاء الرجال ، وقوة ارادتهم وتصميمهم في تحدى الصعاب وتذليلها للوصول المبتغى أسوتهم في ذلك العمل وقدوتهم الرسول الكريم صلى الله عليه وسلم الذي خاض الصعاب مجتمعات شبيهة لهذه التى نراها في نهاية القرن العشرين ممن يتخذون الأصنام آلهة يعبدونها .

ان العالم الاسلامي مطالب ببذل المزيد من الجهد ، ورصد الامكانيات في خدمة الاقليات المسلمة التى تعانى الامرين في حياتها .. ويجب ان نتخطى مرحلة الشعارات والقول الاجوف الى العمل الدؤوب وخوض المخاطر في سبيل تحقيق حياة كريمة لهذه المجتمعات ، وان يكون عملنا خالصا لله وحده وبعيدا عن الأضواء الاعلامية والتظاهرات الجوفاء والقعقعة التى بلا طحين فالمسلمون في تايلاند كما قال لى الشيخ (هارون) يعتبرون أنفسهم أفضل جنس في ذلك البلد لأنهم إختاروا العقيدة الصحيحة ولأنهم من خير أمة اخرجت للناس .. وهم فوق هذه وتلك يحتاجون ويتطلعون الى مؤازرتنا في أنحاء العالم الاسلامي ورغم ايماننا بجدية الجهود المبذولة من قبل العاملين في مجال الدعوة هناك ، الا اننا نؤكد ان هؤلاء يجب الا يبقوا وحدهم في الساحة فالمعركة مع مختلف القوى والتحديات شرسة ، ولا تنتهى .. واليد الواحدة كما يقولون «لا تصفق» فالقائمون بأمر الدعوة يتحملون مسئولية جسيمة ، وتحيط بهم المخاطر من كل جانب وصوب ويجب مؤازرتهم ومد أيادى العون والمساعدة لهم حتى يكونوا خير درع يصد عن المتربصين بالمسلمين وعقيدتهم في تايلاند كل خطر .

لكل ذلك أعود فأؤكد المسئولية الجسيمة والدور الذي ينتظر المنظمات الاسلامية لترسيخ المفاهيم الاسلامية ، وحماية الأجيال المسلمة التى تولد في ظل مجتمع وثنى يعبد الحجر . ولا ينتهى هذا الدور في تدعيم المدارس الاسلامية القائمة ، أو افتتاح وانشاء المزيد منها ولا عند ابتعاث المدرسين أو تدريب الكوادر وتأهيلها .. أو قامة دورات الأئمة والوعاظ لأبناء البلد .. ولا عند بناء المزيد من المساجد أو المراكز الثقافية .. ولا باتاحة الفرص الدراسية لأبناء المسلمين في الجامعات الاسلامية .. كل ذلك مطلوب اليوم قبل غد ولكن ماهو أهم هو تبنى حقوق هؤلاء المسلمين ومحاولة حل مشاكلاتهم وقضاياهم من خلال الاستفادة منهم في مجالات العمل في الدول التى تستعين بالايدى العاملة الأجنبية أو بالخبرات المستقدمة من تلك الديار ، فيقينى أن فرصة وظيفية واحدة تتاح لمسلم في اى مجال يخير له ، ولأهله ولنا بدلا من استقدام أناس وثنيون يعبدون صنما . ولا مجال هنا للمقارنة .

ولعل حالة الفقر التى تعيشها المناطق الجنوبية في تايلاند لا تحتاج منا الى اشارة فالتنمية مظاهرها قليلة في تلك المناطق ، والمستوى المعيشى للمسلمين في تلك المناطق متواضعة .. ومظاهر التخلف في كثير من نواحى الحياة ظاهرة للعيان ، ومد يد العون والمساعدة في اجتياز تلك المحن لأول واجب تستنهض من أجله الهمم الاسلامية وتلك اول واجبات المنظامات الاسلامية والهيئات الدولية التابعة للعالم الاسلامي وهي مسئولية جسيمة سنسأل عنها يوم القيامة .

البقية ص ١٤



Tayland

ARA 2005

دیگر سطوح لوزی‌شکل‌اند. بالای قوسهای مورب یک ۸ گوشه شکل گرفته است، و بالای آن ۱۶ طاق‌نمای کور که گریو داخلی گنبد را تقویت می‌کند، قرار دارد (اکین، همان، 91-90؛ *دایرةالمعارف*، ۷۷).

روش طاق‌زنی مسجد مولانا همسان با آرامگاه گوهرشاد در هرات است. همان‌طوری که در آنجا آشکار شده، احتمال دارد که رویهٔ پرکار و مقرنسهای ربع گنبدهای تایباد نیز همانند آن سازه‌ای نباشد، و مشخص نیست تا چه اندازه این سطح پرکار طاق بیانگر آجرکاری زیر آن است (اکین، همانجا).

نقشهٔ مسجد مولانا ــ ترکیب گنبدخانه با پیش‌طاق جلو ــ در ایران از سدهٔ ۴ق/۱۰م نقشهٔ رایجی است. در اینجا معمار نوآوری خود را در تنظیم فضاهای گوناگون نشان داده، و حجره‌های دو طبقهٔ دو سوی ایوان آن را از بناهای متقدم‌تر جدا ساخته است (همان، 93-92).

بانی و خوش‌نویس بقعه و مدرسهٔ غیاثیهٔ خرگرد یکی است، و همانندیهای طاق‌زنی آن بیانگر آن است که به ظن قوی معمار آنها نیز یکی بوده است. ساختمان هر دو بنا در ۸۴۸ق/۱۴۴۴م به انجام رسیده است. کار در مدرسهٔ خرگرد را قوام‌الدین شیرازی آغاز کرد و پس از درگذشت او (۸۴۲ق/ ۱۴۳۸م) برادرش غیاث‌الدین آن را به انجام رسانید. از آنجایی که بقعهٔ تایباد کوچک‌تر از مدرسهٔ غیاثیه است، مدت ساختمان آن نباید طولانی بوده باشد، از این‌رو، می‌توان حدس زد که غیاث‌الدین شیرازی در برپایی بقعهٔ تایباد شرکت داشته است. کیفیت استادانه و غنای مصالح و مواد در این دو بنا فقط با بناهای شاهانه قابل مقایسه است و گواهی بر ثروت و قدرت پیراحمد خوافی، و دسترسی او به معماران بزرگی مانند استاد قوام‌الدین و غیاث‌الدین شیرازی است (گدار، 199؛ اکین، «معماری»، 224؛ گلمبک، I/63).

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Godard, A., «Note», *Āthār-é Īrān*, Haarlem, 1938, vol. III (2); Golombek, L. and D. Wilber, *The Timurid Architecture of Iran and Turan*, Princeton, 1988; Muṣṭafawī, M. T., «Le Masdjid-é Mawlānā de Tāiyābād», *Āthār-é Īrān*, Haarlem, 1938, vol. III (2); O'Kane, B., «Tāybād, Turbat-i Jām and Timurid Vaulting», *Iran*, London, 1979, vol. XVII; id, *Timurid Architecture in Khurasan*, California, 1987; Said, Issam el and A. Parman, *Geometric Concepts in Islamic Art*, London, 1976.

فاطمه کریمی

تایبادی، نک: ابوبکر تایبادی.

تائیلَنْد، نک: سیام.

تایی، زبان رسمی کشور تایلند که «سیامی» نیز نامیده می‌شود و عضوی از گروه زبانهای «تای» از خانواده‌ای بزرگ‌تر به نام «زبانهای آستروتای» به شمار می‌رود (باسمن، 482).

البته در موردتعلق تایی به خانوادهٔ زبانهای آستروتای، اختلاف‌نظرهایی وجود دارد (هوداک، 757)، زیرا در منابع مختلف، تایی به عنوان عضوی از گروه «چینی ـ سیامی» خانوادهٔ زبانی «هند و چینی» قلمداد شده (*آمریکانا*، XXVI/486) که نادرست است. زبانهای خانوادهٔ تای به ۳ گروه جنوب غربی، مرکزی و شمالی تقسیم می‌شوند (هوداک، همانجا) که تایی به همراه «لائوسی»، «شان» و «یوان» به گروه زبانهای تای جنوب غربی تعلق دارد (همانجا؛ کریستال، 310).

از قرن ۱۲ تا ۲۰م کشور تایلند «سیام» نامیده می‌شد و زبان مردم آن نیز به تبع نام کشور، سیامی نام داشت. از ۱۳۱۸ش/ ۱۹۳۹م نام این کشور به «میانگ تای» (کشور پادشاهی تای) تغییر یافت و نام امروزین این زبان نیز به همین اعتبار، تایی است (کمبل، II/1631).

این زبان بیشترین میزان گویندگان را در خانوادهٔ زبانهای آستروتای داراست (باسمن، همانجا) و به همراه زبانهای لائوسی و چوانگ، تنها زبانهای گروه تای هستند که نظام نوشتاری دارند (مالرب، ۳۳۲).

خویشاوندان اصلی زبان تایی عبارت‌اند از زبانهای «لائو» (لائوسی) که خطی شبیه به تایی دارد و تفاهم زبانی میان گویشوران آن و گویشوران تایی وجود دارد؛ و «چوانگ» که در استانهای «گوانگسی» و «یونان» چین تکلم می‌شود، ولی تفاهم زبانی میان گویشوران آن با تایی زیاد نیست و تفاوت خط آنها نیز بر این اختلاف می‌افزاید (همو، ۳۳۱-۳۳۲).

برای تایی ۴ گویش اصلی شناخته شده است که تفاوتهای آنها عمدتاً به اعتبار ویژگیهای واجی و نواختی است (کمبل، همانجا).

کریستال(همانجا)سابقهٔ متون نوشتاری تایی را تا قرن۷ق/۱۳م به عقب می‌برد. اختراع خط تایی به زمان پادشاهی رامکهامهنگ (۱۲۷۵-۱۳۱۷م) نسبت داده شده است (هوداک، همانجا). کهن‌ترین متنی که از ادبیات تایی در دست است، یک متن کیهان‌شناختی بودایی است که *ترایبهوم* نام دارد و به قرن ۱۴م متعلق است. نمونه‌های دیگر از متون قدیم این زبان، نسخهٔ تایی *رامایَنه* و *رامه‌کرین* و حماسهٔ ملی تایلند، *کهون جانگ کهون پهائن* هستند که البته قدمت زیادی ندارند و در قرن ۱۳ق/ ۱۹م پدید آمده‌اند. بخش مهمی از ادبیات تایی مربوط به متونی در حوزهٔ

TAYLAND

07 ARALIK 1994

Unity? What Unity?

APEC: The leaders of the 18 Pacific Rim economies will talk togetherness and free trade in Indonesia. But there are many forces pulling them apart.



AFP

By Michael Hirsh and Steven Strasser

It's an odd bunch that gathered in remote, rainy Bogor, Indonesia, this week. Dictators and democrats, free traders and mercantilists, superpowers and geopolitical flyweights—their shores in some cases hemispheres apart—are mingling under the klieg lights in an old Dutch colonial palace and calling themselves a "forum." The event is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, and its host, Indonesia's President Suharto, has spared no pain to make his multifarious guests feel at home. Unfortunately, the pain is sometimes other people's. Suharto, a former general, has cracked down on the press and mobilized 10,000 troops to sweep his streets clean of vagrants, peddlers, transvestites and petty criminals. He has personally supervised the dress rehearsals of the motorcades. He has even rounded up local jazz musicians to accompany Bill Clinton in case the U.S. president wants to pick up a sax and play the blues after his midterm election disaster last Tuesday.

In an event so well scripted, it's no surprise that the 18 APEC leaders will have a ready-made triumph to bruit as well. This is to be known as the Bogor Declaration, a statement of common interests and a vague timetable for trade liberalization, which is expected to be hashed out this week. The nonbinding document will be a spinmeister's delight: it will likely project APEC's goals for a free-trade zone hazily forward to the year 2020 and be broad enough to mean anything that APEC's nimble-tongued diplomats can make of it. The key point, though, is that the notion of an Asia-Pacific community is now more than 25 years old, and it hasn't moved much beyond last year's warm-and-fuzzy photo op in Seattle, site of the first summit. The Bogor paper's flimsiness somehow symbolizes that of the the Asia-Pacific community itself.

Globalists like to talk of three major economic zones or, more ominously, blocs,

Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs. c.5 (5.2). s. 410-425, 1984. (London)

Islam in Thailand
Notes on the History of Muslim Provinces, Thai Islamic Modernism and the Separatist Movement in the South

Werner Kraus

TAYLAND

Introduction

Thailand is usually thought to be a country with a comparatively homogeneous population. However, at least one third of its population differs ethnically from the Thais of the Menambasin and can be considered as minorities.

Chinese are the most important minority group in Thailand. They count an estimated four million or 10% of the total population. The Laotian minority in Northeastern Thailand is even higher in number but they present only a minor problem for political integration. Approximately 500,000 members of different hill tribes live in the north, near the borders to Laos and Burma. Because of long term discrimination, their relationship with the central Thai government is of an uneasy nature.

During the last decades new minorities of Vietnamese and Cambodian origin were added to the already existing ones. These people fled into Thailand during the long war in Indochina and their return to their homeland is not expected in the near future.

Muslims in Thailand

The minority group which concerns us here are the Muslims of Thailand who mainly live in the four southern provinces of Patani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun. They are Malay by ethnic and cultural standards. However, they are not the only Muslims in Thailand. Descendants of Indians, Pakistanis, Persians, Cham, Yunanese and Indonesians are scattered over many provinces. Six to eight percent of the population of Bangkok are Muslims[1], and even in Chiengmai there are more than 5000 followers of Islam who are of Pakistani and Yunanese (Hua) origin.[2]

While the Muslims in Central and North Thailand have a pronounced minority consciousness, their fellow believers in the south (with 75% of the regional population) do not consider themselves a minority. In Islamic termninology the south is referred to as *dar al-Islam,* the territory of Islam, and the rest of Thailand is referred to as *dar al-harb,* the territory of war. The south is by cultural, ethnic and linguistic standards part of the Malay world and only as a result of imperial conquest and through the rather coincidental formation of colonial borders became part of the Thai Buddhist state. Although the Malay and Thai cultures are clearly different on the level of the "Great Tradition", they have plenty of meeting points in the realm of the "Little Tradition". This is specially true for the Malays and the Thai Pak Thai, the Thai population of the south, which has mixed with Malays and Negritos for many centuries and has little in common with the mainstream of Siamese culture.[3] The concepts of nature and the spirit pantheon are rather similar[4], and there are no differences in the modes of production and the economy of Malays and Thai Pak Thais. The main crops for Muslims and Buddhists are rubber and copra, besides subsistence agriculture and fishing. However, Muslims, for religious reasons, detest pork breeding which is very popular with the Thais.

Historical Development[5]

The first state which was able to establish itself in the region we call now South Thailand was Langkasuka. Its roots reach back to the 2nd century A.D. In the early 7th century Langkasuka was a well-known Buddhist centre. Four centuries later Langkasuka profited from the decline of its former overlord Srivijaya and became one of the most important trading centres on the eastern coast of the Malay Peninsula.

During the second half of the 13th century the northern part of the Malay peninsula was brought under control of the Thai state of Sukothai which forced a tributary relationship on Patani (or Langkasuka). Probably around this time (and perhaps as a result of Siamese expansion) Islam began to spread in Patani. The rise of Majapahit and Malacca checked the Siamese forward movement for the time being, but after the conquest of Malacca by the Portuguese and the consolidation of the dynasty of Ayudhya in Central Thailand, the northern Malay states of Kedah, Pahang and Patani fell again into the tributary orbit of Siam.

Next to Aceh, Bantam and Makassar, Patani became an important link in the Islamic trade system, which established itself after the fall of the Sultanate of Malacca to the Portuguese (1511). Especially the pepper trade with China and non-Portuguese European powers brought great wealth to Patani. When the Burmese attacked and conquered Ayudhiya in 1564, Patani sent two hundred ships to assist its Siamese overlord. But after the defeat of the Siamese it held back its tribute payments and experienced a relatively independent period.

From 1584-1688 Patani was ruled by women, the so-called "Queens of Patani". According to Nicolas Gervais, these queens did not possess political power (which was vested in the hands of the Bendahara-family, that is the 'prime minister') but played a more representative and ritually defined role. During the reign of the first two queens, Raja Ijau and Raja Biru (1584-1624) Patani enjoyed the peak of its power, the most glorious period in its history. Even today's nationalists glorify this time as Patani's golden age, when it was rich, independent and strongly Islamic.

After the reign of the last queen, Raja Kuning, in 1688 political power was transferred to a dynasty in Kelantan which ruled the now highly impoverished state until 1729. At this time Patani ceased to be a power of consequence on the Malay Peninsula and during the following years it was gradually integrated into the Siamese Empire. In 1785 the Uparat of Rama I subjugated the Sultanate, Patani lost its status as *muang pratesarat* (tributary state) and it became now an integral part of Siam. In 1791 Bangkok appointed a ruler favourable to its interests in Patani and caused a rebellion which was not easily suppressed. In 1817 the former Sultanate of Patani was divided into seven provinces of the third and fourth categories. The old Islamic Malay elites were recognised as rulers of the now much smaller states, but they were closely supervised by the

MECELLETU'L-EZHER, C. 32 ,
(sayı 8) s. 350-54 , 1960 KAHİRE.

الإسلام فى تايلاند

للأستاذ عطيه صقر

فى شبه جزيرة الهند الصينية ، وبين ممالك كمبوديا ولاوس وبورما تقع مملكة كانت تعرف باسم « سيام » ثم عرفت بعد سنة ١٩٣٩م باسم تايلاند Thailande ومعناه بلاد الأحرار . وتبلغ مساحتها نحو ٥٢١٫٥٣١ كيلو متراً مربعا ويروى أرضها نهران هما : ميكونج وميناو ، ويبلغ عدد سكانها نحو ٢٣ مليونا كما جاء فى إحصاء سنة ١٩٥١ م . وهم خليط من السياميين الأصليين الذين يكونون الأغلبية الساحقة، ومن الصينيين الذين يبلغون نحو ٣ ملايين ، ومن الأوربيين الذين يقرب عددهم من ٥٠ ألفا أغلبهم فرنسيون .

وبين هذه الملايين يعيش نحو ثلاثة ملايين من المسلمين ، كما قدر عددهم وزير خارجية تايلاند فى تصريحه بمؤتمر باندونج ١٩٥٥م. ويعيش أكثرهم فى الولايات الأربع الجنوبية، وتوجد منهم جماعات صغيرة منبثة فى ضواحى الولايات الوسطى يبلغون نحو ٢٠٠ ألف ، وفى العاصمة « بانجكوك » يوجد حوالى ١٠٠ ألف مسلم .

والدين الغالب فى البلاد هو البوذية ، ويوجد عدد من المسيحيين اعتنقوا هذه الديانة مؤخرا بجهود المبشرين ، ولكنهم يقلون كثيرا عن المسلمين .

وقد دخل الإسلام هذه المملكة من طريقين : الصين والأرخبيل المالايزى . وقد انتشر الإسلام بوضوح أيام الفتح المغولى الذى حكم الهند من سنة ١٥٢٦م إلى ١٨٥٧م ويقول أحد المستشرقين: إن قبائل «شامس» التى أنشأت مملكة « شاميا » جنوبى آنام حاليا ، كانت تدين بالإسلام عندما أخرجها الصينيون والأناميون من البلاد ، وتعيش هذه القبائل الآن فى شبه الجزيرة وفى سيام ، ولكنها ارتدت إلى ديانتها البدائية ، ما عدا جماعة منهم تقيم شعائرها الإسلامية مع الاحتفاظ بالتقاليد البرهمية .

والنفوذ السياسى فى البلاد للبوذيين ، كما أن النفوذ التجارى للصينيين ، والمسلمون بين هؤلاء لم يصلوا إلى حقهم الكامل فى الناحية السياسية ، ومتخلفون جداً فى الميدان الاقتصادى . فكبار الموظفين من البوذيين ، ولا يتولى [illegible] بالكلية

بوذى ، [illegible] قومه وعشيرته ، والبرلمان الذى يقوم على مجلس واحد يضم ٢٤٠ عضواً ، لا يمثل المسلمين فيه إلا عضوان فقط ، ولو روعيت نسبة المسلمين وهى ١٥ ٪ من السكان ، لكان لهم فى البرلمان أكثر من ٣٠ عضوا .

وتقوم اقتصاديات المسلمين على الزراعة ومزاولة المهن البسيطة وبعض الوظائف ، فإن ٧٠ ٪ منهم يعملون فى حقول الأرز ومزارع المطاط ، و ٢٥ ٪ يعملون فى البساتين وصيد الأسماك والتجارة وشغل بعض الوظائف ، و ٥ ٪ منهم فى الجيش . والموجودون بالمدن يزاولون الحرف والصناعات البسيطة ، ويقيمون فى مساكن متواضعة ينقصها النظام والنظافة .

وتعين الحكومة ممثلا للمسلمين فى كل منطقة يكثر عددهم فيها ويسمى هذا الممثل بلغتهم Pard ham أى الرئيس . وهؤلاء الممثلون ينتخبون من بينهم المستشار الدينى العام ، ويسمى بلغتهم Ghula Rajmentrie وهو يعد شيخ الإسلام هناك . وقد جاء فى التقارير أن هؤلاء المستشارين يختارون غالبا من الطبقة الرجعية . وأنهم يدينون للحكومة بالطاعة والولاء ليضمنوا مراكزهم ، وهم لا يتدخلون [illegible] المسلمين التقدميين . ويعاون هذا المستشار فى مهمته مجلس مكون من ١٢ عضواً على غرار المجلس الملى .

كما تدل التقارير أيضا على أن للمسلمين هناك اتجاهين : الأول يتزعمه طائفة يعرفون بالعلماء ، استمدوا ثقافتهم البسيطة من مكة وغيرها ، وعددهم كثير ، وأفقهم ضيق ، وتفكيرهم محدود ، لا يفهمون الإسلام على وجهه الصحيح ، فهم يحرمون مثلا تعلم اللغة الوطنية ، ولا يشجعون من التعليم أى نوع إلا التعليم الدينى البحت ، فحسب الإنسان ليفوز برضوان الله أن يديم تلاوة القرآن الذى لا يفهم معناه ، ولا يستطيع أن يطبق أحكامه بالطبع ، بل لقد بلغ من شره هذه الفئة — كما تقول التقارير — أنها توحى إلى التلاميذ بأن إكرام العلماء وبرهم بالهدايا والصدقات أولى وأفضل عند الله من إكرام الوالدين وصلة الأرحام ، ولذلك يؤثرونهم بالزكاة وما يستطيعون من قرب . وهذه الطائفة تحظى بعطف الحكومة التى ترى فى مسلكهم هذا رجوعا بالمسلمين إلى الوراء ، وزحزحة لهم عن معترك الحياة ، وهو ما يريده المسئولون وسادتهم الغربيون

Occupational Distribution of Muslims in Thailand: Problems and Prospects

Arong Suthasasna

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Introduction

This is a report on an ongoing study of the occupational distribution and employment problems of the Muslim minority in Thailand. There have been many studies on the Muslim minority in Thailand. It is infact one of the more popular subjects of interest for native as well as foreign scholars.[1] But no one to my knowledge has attempted a systematic analysis of the economic aspect of Muslim life and, in particular, their occupational structure, barring a few fragmented analyses of particular occupations.[2] The predominant focus of most studies has been on typical minority aspects such as social conflict, assimilation or integration, secession or separation etc.

This, therefore, is a first analytical attempt to trace a broad picture of Muslim occupational patterns in Thailand. Its specific objectives might be stated as follows: (i) to present a survey of the type and range of occupations which Muslims typically engage in; (ii) to underline problems they encounter in these occupations and, (iii) to propose where possible, some solutions.

The survey has followed a simple methodology. First, a quick review of basic data concerning the subjects' occupations and related themes was undertaken. Second, in-depth interviews on the Muslim occupational situation were conducted with a group of selected panelists who had extensive experience and close association with Muslim communities in Thailand. Finally, the findings of the studies previously undertaken by this author on Muslims in Thailand were utilized.

Population Distribution

According to the last national census (1960) there were approximately 1.5 million Muslims in Thailand. With a 20 year time lag, based on various factors such as natural increase, migration, etc., the number of Thai Muslims is now estimated to be close to 3 million. Muslims themselves consider even this figure to be an underestimation. According to them a six to seven million figure would be more accurate.

Whatever the real figure, the majority of Muslims, probably over 70 per cent, reside in the four southern provinces — Pattani, Yala, Naratiwat, and Setul. In fact, in these provinces Muslims constitute the majority of the population.[3] Outside these four provinces, Bangkok and the adjacent provinces probably hold the majority of the remaining Muslim population of Thailand. Generally, Muslim presence in Bangkok has a higher visibility. Far more Muslim associations and activity groups are to be found in Bangkok than in any other region of the country.

Muslims are also to be found in some other provinces, such as Chiangmai, Chiangrai, Lampang, Maehongsorn and Taak in the north, Rayong and Traad in the east. In fact, there are 26 provinces which have sufficient number of Muslims to officially constitute a provincial Islamic Committee under the Ministry of the Interior.

History

The history of Thai Muslims is almost co-extensive with the history of Thailand itself. Perhaps, the earliest Muslims came through religious and trade missions in the early period of the Ayuthaya kingdom.[4] These groups, or parts of them, settled down in Aythaya and some of them were even appointed as high ranking officials by the old Thai kings.[5]

Muslims in the four southern provinces, however, appeared on the Thai scene in a different manner. Starting with their own kingdom of Pattani around the 12th or 13th century, they from time to time interacted with the contemporary Thai kingdom. In the 19th century, however, Pattani was permanently integrated into the Thai kingdom. Pattani then was split into smaller provinces as we know it today. It is with this group of Muslims that the Thai government has been perennially faced with a struggle known as the "problem of the four southern provinces".[6]

Soon after Pattani was subdued a large number or Pattani warriors and commoners were brought to Bangkok as prisoners of war to work as laborers and service personnel. These were the ancestors of the present day Bangkok Muslims.

Occupational Distribution

Like the majority of the Thai population, most Muslims live in rural areas. Naturally, their occupations are predominantly agricultural. This is true of all regions except, perhaps, in the north where Muslims are predominantly of Chinese and Pathan stock who generally favor business rather than agriculture. The proportion of white collar and urban jobbers is small, if not insignificant. Table I gives a proportionate distribution of Muslims in major occupations.

Since there has never been an occupational survey based on religion, the above figures are an estimate derived from various categories in the last national census. A brief explanation of each of the categories is given below:

Muslims in Agriculture: Among agricultural occupations, rice growing is the most dominant type among Thai Muslims. This is concentrated in the central and, in a lesser degree, in the southern parts of the country. In the central part, Muslims produce rice outside the Bangkok Metropolitan area, and in the provinces of Nondburi, Pathoomthani, Ayuthaya, Nakorn-nayok, etc., and in the southern parts in the provinces of Pattani, Yala, Naratiwat, Setul, and Pathaloong.

There is no figure as to the amount contributed by Muslims to the total rice production of the country. According to an estimate by some Muslim sources, Muslim share is no less than 10 per cent of the national production. If this estimate is accepted, Muslim contribution to rice production would average 50,000 tons per year.

Plantations come next. These include the growing of durian, rambutan, mangosteen, and other fruit in the four southern provinces. However, the most

في بلاد الله

تايلاند

أرض الأحرار وبلد المتناقضات والعجائب

بقلم: زكريا يحيى لالا*

* أمير الشواليح، على إحدى السوارى التايلاندية ★



تمثل «تايلاند» مملكة سيام سابقاً حيث تقع في شرقها: «لاوس وكمبوديا»، وفي الغرب: «بورما»، وفي الجنوب: «ماليزيا»، وتعتبر هذه المملكة القديمة «الدولة الوحيدة في جنوب شرقي آسيا» التي لم تحكمها قوة استعمارية أوروبية واسمها الرسمي «موانج تاي» أي [أرض الأحرار].. ومنذ الحرب العالمية الثانية حدثت بها عدة انقلابات عسكرية وتغيرات في الحكومة كان آخرها ما حدث في أول ابريل (نيسان) ١٩٨١م، لكنه لم ينجح.. إلا أن تايلاند ظلت من أكثر بلاد جنوب شرقي آسيا نجاحاً واستقراراً.

Faysal, c.67, s. 35-41, 1982 (RIYAD) — Tayland

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASIAN HISTORY, c.4, s.86-88, 1988, New York

Tayland

THAGI *(thugee)*, the killing of travelers by groups known as Thags or Thugs (literally, "deceivers"), probably an ancient institution in India, was allegedly based on worship of the Hindu goddess Kali. Thugs followed strict rituals and were distinct from the Pindaris or dacoits, who were essentially bandits. They used a *rumal*, a white or yellow handkerchief weighted on one end with a silver rupee, to strangle the victim and employed a pickaxe, said to symbolize Kali's tooth, to facilitate burial.

Virtually unknown except by villagers and local magnates who gave them protection, the Thugs were first seriously studied by William Sleeman (1788–1856) in the 1820s and 1830s. Sleeman found that Thug groups included both Hindus and Muslims, and were governed by their own moral code and complex internal organization. Despite their remarkable qualities of solidarity and leadership, by the late 1830s Sleeman, with government help, had virtually ended *thagi*.

[*See also* Pindaris.]

George Bruce, *The Stranglers: The Cult of Thugee and Its Overthrow in British India* (1969). William H. Sleeman, *Ramaseeana, or A Vocabulary of the Peculiar Language Used by the Thugs, with an Introduction and Appendix, Descriptive of the System Pursued by that Fraternity . . .* (1836).

USHA SANYAL

THAILAND, Southeast Asian state formerly known as Siam, was one of the few Asian countries to escape colonial rule. It has an area of 198,455 square miles and a population, as of 1984, of fifty million.

Widespread finds from the Stone Age attest to the antiquity of human settlement in Thailand, and the extraordinary Ban Chiang excavations have recently revealed the presence of an early advanced civilization, with knowledge of metallurgy and urban settlements, four thousand years ago on the Khorat Plateau in the northeast. The earliest populations in the region appear to have been of Austroasiatic (Mon-Khmer) linguistic stock. [*See* Ban Chiang *and* Austroasiatic Languages.]

Throughout the first millennium CE, two cultural complexes dominated the region. The Dvaravati civilization, characterized by oval-shaped walled cities, Mon-language inscriptions, and Buddhist monumental remains, lasted from the sixth to the ninth century and brought Buddhism to the countryside. The spread into the region of the control and influence of Cambodian Angkor toward the end of the period brought elements of Hindu religion, bureaucratized administration, and the Indic arts and sciences. Some overland trade extending inland from the Gulf of Siam to the north and northeast began the patterns of interregional interaction that were to knit the region together. About the end of this period, during the tenth through the twelfth century, the Tai peoples began moving into what is now Thailand, perhaps even as far to the south as Nakhon Si Thammarat on the Malay Peninsula. Already, the people were referred to as Syam (i.e., "Siamese") in Cham, Khmer, and Mon inscriptions. [*See* Dvaravati; Angkor; Tai Peoples; Mon; Cham; *and* Nakhon Si Thammarat.]

In the thirteenth century, local Tai and other chiefs who had survived as vassals of the Angkor rulers began to establish independent principalities, notably at Sukhothai in the 1240s and at Chiang Mai in 1296. Older principalities to the south simply broke away from Angkor. The earlier Tai attempts at state building were fragile, for they featured personal political relationships—characteristic of the Tai peoples in narrow upland valleys—and the early Tai states were not durable. [*See* Sukhothai.]

A major turning point in Tai history comes in 1351, when a new kingdom was founded at Ayudhya. It combined traditional Tai forms of labor control through personalized, informal, patron–client relations with the more formal, impersonal, and legalistic relationships characteristic of bureaucracies. The latter forms were derived from the lower Chaophraya River basin under Angkorian rule and were established in such centers as Lopburi. Within a century the early kings of Ayudhya had developed a very powerful, bureaucratic state, most notably during the reign of King Borommatrailokanat (r. 1448–1488). [*See* Ayudhya; Lopburi; *and* Borommatrailokanat.]

From the beginning, Ayudhya's rulers had been acutely aware of events in the world beyond their horizons, and they welcomed foreign traders (at first, Chinese and Persians) to their capital. Compared with their country cousins in the interior, Ayudhya's rulers tended to be much more worldly and sophisticated, always up-to-date on the latest techniques of ruling and on fashionable currents of thought in the Asian maritime world.

Ayudhya was not, however, sufficiently well integrated as a state to be able to resist effectively the fierce aggression mounted against it by the kings of Burma in the middle of the sixteenth century, and the kingdom fell to Burmese armies in 1569. Its recovery under King Naresuan (r. 1590–1605), however, was dramatic, and the Siamese met the

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PATTANI: FULL ONSLAUGHT OF ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL IMPERIALISM

The ruling Malays in the neighbouring Malaysia engaged in a bitter and internecine struggle for wealth and power . . . can hardly spare any thoughts for a situation like this . . .

There is a report that Malaysia plans to build a barricade of concrete walls and barbed wire fence in order to seal its 650 kms long border with South Thailand. The idea is to seal the border against communist infiltration from across the border.

The 'problem' of communist insurgency in Northern Malaysia being exported from South Thailand has been largely an artificial and overly exaggerated problem. It has been spawned mainly by the Thai authorities themselves as a counterveiling measure against the genuine and really serious problem of Muslim Malay discontent. The discontent has been often taking form of rebellion ever since the British granted to the Siamese the sovereignty of their historical Sultanate of Pattani.*

Naturally the Malays in independent Malay(sia) sympathised with their brethren so consigned under Thai rule, but they lacked both the will and the ability to help them either to self-determine their post-colonial status or to get their rightful economic, political and cultural autonomy. Evidently the Thai stratagem of getting the Malays embroiled into this largely contrived problem of chasing the communist guerrillas has been successful. They felt blackmailed by the idea that if they lent any political support to the Pattani Malays, the Thais would back up the communists.

*Now divided into Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani, Songkhla and Satun.

Ineffective, ill-prepared and ill-supported liberation struggle in Pattani has, on the other hand, helped the Bangkok government to use insurgency as a pretext to completely suppress the Muslims politically, to colonise their economy, to change the demographic ratio of the former sultanate by sending Buddhist settlers from the North and finally to destroy them as a cultural entity.

The political will of Pattani Muslims having been defeated sometime ago, the area was now witnessing the full onslaught of economic and cultural imperialism. This is done in a sly and quiet manner through administrative orders issued by Thai officials posted in Pattani.

Earlier this year, a 'Project Director' sent a 'proposal' to all district officers asking them to implement a policy of obtaining 'voluntary' change of names from, Arabic and Islamic to Thai and Buddhist, from all the pupils in the schools. They were asked to explain to the captive and impressionable pupils the advantages of doing so as well as the long-term consequences of not having their names 'correctly' written. They would virtually become non-persons insofar as the state was concerned, they were to be 'politely' told — See 'After Bulgaria, Thailand', *Impact* 15:10, 24 May-13 June 1985.

Muslim leaders pretended that this was perhaps misplaced overzealousness on the part of a petty bureaucrat and had nothing to do with the policy of the central government in Bangkok. There were protests, appeals and explanations that how important it was for Muslims to have their Islamic names.

Explanations that the Muslim names were not ethnic Malay names, they were Arabic and Islamic; they represented the unalterable religious and cultural personality of the Pattani Malays. They reminded the government that to try to force a change of Muslim names would be against the Article 25 of the Thai constitution which guarantees freedom of religion. The Association of Southern Thai Muslims in Bangkok saw the deputy prime minister and asked him to convey their protest to Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda and to ask him to clarify the matter.

The matter was so serious that even the Federation of Muslim Government Servants in South Thailand felt impelled to demand that the order should be rescinded by the government. The officially appointed leader of the Muslim community, the Chulamantri Prasert Muhammad, had to add his voice in support of the protests. He warned that if the government still tried to push the unconstitutional policy of forced change of names, he would be constrained to oppose it even if it meant paddling 'against the stream'.

Nothing evidently has come out of these counsels of sorrow and protest. While the Thai government seems to be giving a deaf ear to these voices, the Buddhist bureaucrats in the South continue in their sly policy of religious torture, putting one stone over the other.

The primary education officer in Pattani has ordered all primary schools to instal large idols of Buddha by the end of 1985. It does not matter that the majority of pupils in these schools were Muslims and Muslims abhor any semblance of even adoring not to speak of worshipping idols. But the order to instal Buddha's idol was not the brainwave of some petty officials, in fact the ministry of education has launched a campaign to raise religious and ethical standards among the Thai youth and this was to be achieved by installing the images of Buddha in primary schools all over the country!

Surely the Thai authorities do not believe that by installing the idols of Buddha they would be able to convert Muslims to

Biggest gilt statue of Buddha in Southeast Asia installed by the Thai government in the Muslim province of Narathiwat. The statue cost 1.5 million US dollars to build.



Thai security forces patrolling the Muslim countryside.



OFFICE OF THE ISLAMIC MISSION
56/21-22 Rama 1 Road. Bangkok 10500. Thailand

19 MAYIS 1992

The Manager
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Turkey.

12 May, 1992

Assalamu alaikum wa Rahmatullaki wa Barakatuh.

I have received with thanks your booklet on the publication of the Encyclopaedia of Islam on the academic standard to complete -insha Allah- in about 30 volumes in 2000 A.D. This is a colossal endeavour - al - Hamdulillah.

As this Encycloapaedia is in Turkish, I as well as many billion people won't be able to derive academic benefit from it unless it is also printed in English. Please endeavour to spread its English version.

I have in my library the revised edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam up to VOL. V1 (Mughals) and that too after a patient waiting for a long time. By the grace of Allah, I also have the Urdu Encyclopaedia of Islam published by the University of the Punjab since the beginning up to VOL.22. It will be completed in VOL.23 and perhaps with appendixes - insha Allah.

I am enclosing my article on "Islam in Siam and Thailand" and "Multaqa fil Japan" for your reference.

With Salam and Du'a

I. Qureshi

(Ibrahim Qureshi)

Sipariş ve Takip
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الأيدي والقبضات والأكواع والأقدام.

ـ **القتال، كيروجي** Kyoruki : المزاولة الحقيقية لهذه الرياضة وتدور بين شخصين باستخدام جميع أنواع الفنون الدفاعية والهجومية والمهارات التي اكتسبها المتدرب من البومسة من أجل التغلب على الخصم.

وللتايكواندو لباس رسمي خاص أبيض اللون دلالة على النقاء وصفاء الروح فضفاض ليتناسب وحركات الجسم التلقائية، وحزام يضعه اللاعب حول خصره ذو ألوان تدل على درجة اللاعبين، فالأبيض للمبتدئين من المرتبتين التاسعة والعاشرة، والأصفر للسابعة والثامنة، والأخضر للخامسة والسادسة، والأزرق للثالثة والرابعة، والأحمر للأولى والثانية. ثم يأتي الحزام الأحمر بخط أسود ويرتديه من هم دون الثامنة عشرة من العمر، ويعد المرحلة الأولى من مراحل الحزام الأسود ويدعى (بوم) Poom.

وفي أعلى هذه المراتب يأتي الحزام الأسود ويرتديه من هم فوق الثامنة عشرة، وله درجات تبدأ من الأولى وتنتهي بالعاشرة. وتزداد درجة اللاعب ومقدرته كلما ازدادت درجته في هذا الحزام.

وللتايكواندو قواعد خاصة تقسم إلى فردية وجماعية. وتجري المنافسات الفردية بين متنافسين اثنين، الأول يدعى (شونغ) أي الأزرق، يرتدي واقية صدر لونها أزرق. والثاني يدعى (هونغ) أي الأحمر، ويرتدي واقية صدر حمراء. وتجري المباريات على حلبة مساحتها (١٢×١٢م٢)، ومنطقة اللعب بداخلها مساحتها (٨×٨ م٢). وتكون جميع أجزاء الجسم الحساسة المعرضة للإصابة مغطاة بواقيات خاصة في أثناء المباريات تقي الصدر، والرأس، والساعد، والقصبة، والخصية. ويسمح في أثناء المباريات باستخدام كل فنيات اللكم والركل على الجزء الأمامي من الجسم. ويسمح باستخدام الأيدي على نحو مستقيم على الصدر والوجه ويمنع استخدامها تحت الجذع.

تتألف كل مباراة من ثلاث جولات. مدة الجولة ثلاث دقائق بينها دقيقة استراحة. ويقودها أربعة حكام، ثلاثة للزوايا وواحد للساحة. ومهمة حكام الزوايا تسجيل النقاط التي يحرزها المتباريان، وتكون النقاط صحيحة عندما يسجلها حكمان من الثلاثة في آن واحد معاً، ويجب أن تكون النقاط واضحة وقوية كي تحتسب. وقد دخلت اليوم الأجهزة الإلكترونية ليستخدمها الحكام في احتساب النقاط. أما حكم الساحة فمهمته ضبط المباراة بصورة جيدة وإعطاء الإنذارات عند المخالفات، وحسم النقاط استناداً لذلك، ويفوز اللاعب الذي يحرز نقاطاً أكثر، أو إذا فاز بالضربة الفنية القاضية. وفي حال التعادل يفوز من كانت له مبادرات هجومية أكثر، أو أظهر فنيات أعلى وأكثر في المباراة.

الكوكوان: المركز العالمي الرئيس للتايكواندو ومقره في مدينة كانغام قرب سيؤول، وهو مسؤول عن كل الأمور المتعلقة بالحزام الأسود، من ترقية ورسوم. كما يقوم بدورات التأهيل وحلقات البحث للحكام والمدربين الدوليين الحاصلين على الحزام الأسود من الدرجة الرابعة حداً أدنى. وتشرف على هذا المركز وزارة الثقافة والرياضة الكورية التي تضع المناهج التعليمية للدارسين. وقد تم تخريج ٣٠٠٠ مدرب كوري حتى اليوم انتشروا في كل أنحاء العالم لنشر هذه اللعبة عالمياً إضافة إلى غيرهم من المدربين العالميين المعتمدين، غير الكوريين.

مروان عرفات

■ تايلند

تعد مملكة تايلند Thailand، وعاصمتها بانكوك، من الدول الآسيوية ذات التاريخ الحافل بالأحداث محلياً وإقليمياً، بسبب موقعها الجغرافي في منطقة مضطربة تصطرع فيها القوى الاستعمارية الأوربية ـ اليابانية ـ الأمريكية، مما قادها، بصورة مباشرة أو غير مباشرة، إلى الاشتراك في الحرب العالمية الأولى والثانية، وفي حرب فيتنام وكمبودية. وقد أثرت هذه الحروب وضغوط الدول الاستعمارية في الأوضاع الداخلية للبلاد، فكثرت الانقلابات العسكرية والاضطرابات الشعبية. ومع ذلك فقد ظلت تايلند محافظة على استقلالها السياسي ولم تصل إليها يد الاستعمار الغربي إطلاقاً. وقد عرفت تايلند باسم سيام ما بين عامي (١٧٨٢ ـ ١٩٣٩)، وأيضاً في المدة ما بين عامي (١٩٤٥ ـ ١٩٤٩)، وتعني تايلند باللغة المحلية أرض الأحرار.

الموقع والحدود والمساحة

تقع تايلند بين خطي عرض ٣ و ٢١درجة شمال خط الاستواء، وبين خطي طول ٩٩ و١٠٣درجات شرق خط غرينتش. تحدها ميانمار من جهة الغرب والشمال الغربي، ولاوس من جهة الشمال الشرقي، وكمبودية من الجنوب الشرقي، وخليج تايلند (سيام) وماليزية من الجنوب. وتبلغ مساحة البلاد ٥١٣,١١٥ ألف كم٢.

الأوضاع الجغرافية الطبيعية

١ـ البناء الجيولوجي: تؤلف المرتفعات الجبلية الشمالية والغربية من تايلند وشبه جزيرة الملايو جزءاً من سلسلة الجبال الهندو ـ مالاوية التي تمتد طولياً عبر آسيا الجنوبية الشرقية، وتتألف معظم حافات الجبال الغربية من صخور الغرانيت، وتتكشف الصخور الكلسية في بعض الأماكن.

وفي الشمال الشرقي من البلاد تمتد هضبة كورات Khorat المكونة من طبقات أفقية من الحجر الرملي الترياسي من الحقب الجيولوجي الثاني، المتوضعة فوق صخور أقدم، وتوجد التوضعات اللحقية الرباعية فوق أجزاء مختلفة من الهضبة، ومن المحتمل أن تكون الجروف المحاذية لهضبة كورات من الغرب والجنوب ذات أصل انكساري. أما المنطقة الوسطى فتأخذ شكل حوض منخفض يمكن أن يكون حوضاً بنيوياً صدعياً، توضعت فيه الصخور الرسوبية التي غطت معظم أجزائه باللحقيات الرباعية، وتتخلل الحوض تلال منخفضة من الحجر الكلسي.

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توزيع
DESTREPUTION

ISLAM AND MUSLIMS IN THAILAND

16 OCAK 2001

Presented by
BR. MUNSUR SALEH
YOUNG MUSLIM ASSOCIATION OF THAILAND
September 13, 1986

ISLAM IN THAILAND

By Munsur Saleh

Muslim in Thailand are approximately 7 to 8 million out of total 50 million of the population. Mostly they have settled in the South[illegible] some have scattered throughout the country. The place of Islam in Thailand is similar [illegible] Islam in those countries where Muslims are minority.

General problems

Muslims in Thailand have been surrounded with non-Muslim society and had to associate with non-Muslims, the Buddhists. Consequently some problems originate from outside and partly from inside. The followings are general problems of the Muslim society in this country.

a) Internal problems

1. Understanding in Islam We can say without any argument that the majority of Muslims in Thailand do not have a true understanding of Islam, as Deen- the complete way of life. Islam is limited to some ceremonies and rituals such as prayer, fasting and pilgrimage.

2. Interference The Buddhist government has tried to demolish the Islamic identity and culture of Muslims in every way by the implementation of its vicious policies, e.g. contraception, changing of the Arabic names into Thai, promotion of the Thai culture, etc.

3. Lack of dedication to Islamic education Seeking of Islamic knowledge is circumscribed due to their materialistic idea and the economic problem.

4. Unclear conception on Islam A conception which is served as a normative idea has been the controversy in the Muslim society. The following of the ideal society in the life of the Prophet and his companions, the contemporary Muslim society of Saudi, other Arab countries, Iran and Pakistan is the matter in dispute. However the best exemplar still cannot be identified.

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* I wrote this brief report from my own experience and according to the social fact of this country. I did not intellectually prepare it. Moreover the coming of Islam into this country was not traced back and some problems, of which their impact have been inflicted upon the Muslim society, were not detailed.

Asian Affairs c. XXIV. (s. 4) s. 711-713
1937. (GERMANY)

It is the early Chinese attitude towards Europeans which has given that peculiar character to Sino-foreign relations which marks them even to-day, and now embitters Chinese feelings. It led to consular jurisdiction and foreign settlements, both at present developed into a state of affairs which at the outset could never have been contemplated.

Imperialism in its worst form was let loose on the coast of China after Japan had exposed her military weakness. The author might have shown that it was the Kaiser who immediately upon the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war mooted the idea of occupying a Chinese port, and that Russia's proposal of intervention was principally a result of German scheming.

It is probably not generally known that John Hay's famous American proposal to the Powers of September 6, 1899, about the "Open Door" in China was a direct result of the efforts of Mr. A. E. Hippisley, a British Commissioner in the Chinese Customs Service, urging the American Government to take this initiative.

It is too strong to say that England threatened China with naval action to obtain the lease of Wei hai wei. Sir Claude MacDonald did say that in case of refusal "the matter would be out of his hands," but it must be remembered that the offer of the lease came from the Chinese themselves in February, 1898.

The last chapters and the conclusions form the best and the most interesting part of the book, as they deal not with what is now already ancient history but with the problems of the day: the revolutionary efforts of Moscow; the Chinese opposition against existing treaties; the Russo-Japanese tension; the activities of the Kuomintang; the creation of Manchukuo and Japanese politics and aspirations; and finally the United States policy in the Western Pacific.

There are a few small mistakes in the book, probably due to clerical errors. On page 129: February, 1903 (outbreak of Russo-Japanese war), must be 1904. On page 142: battle of Hei tou kai must be Hei kow tai. The rebellion of Kuo Sung-ling against Chang Tso-lin was in 1926, not 1936 (p. 229).

W. J. OUDENDIJK.

TAYLAND

Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Siam. H.M. Stationery Office. 1937. 1s.

This Report, written for the Department of Overseas Trade by Mr. John Bailey, H.M. Consul General at Bangkok, and published in April last, contains much that is of economic and commercial interest, and, when read between the lines, a good deal that is of political significance also. It is based on the Report of the Siamese Financial Adviser and the Annual Statement of the Customs Department, both issued in November, 1936, and covering the period April, 1935-36; and also on later information obtained by the writer down to January, 1937.

The annual publication of the Siamese Financial Adviser's Report, an unfailing event for the last thirty-five years of the recently abolished Absolute Monarchy régime, went into abeyance shortly after constitutional government was introduced. Now, after three years, the financial silence is broken and the report for 1935-36, clearing the air of any dark suspicions that may have been aroused by that same silence, exhibits the financial situation as stable and, on the whole, not unlike that which obtained under the old conditions. Changes of course there are, and certain weak spots are apparent, but the budget is balanced, the currency position is sound, and the Treasury balance, though drawn upon somewhat freely in the latest financial forecast (1937-38) is still considerable. It is to be noted that the great savings expected to result from the disappearance of autocratic rule have only partially materialized and have, in fact, no more than sufficed for the addition

years to persuade the people to grow it for export, but with practically no result. Tobacco, sugar, and silk are in like case, all being imports of some importance, though all are produced locally and might be widely developed.

GENERAL.—Reference is made in the Report to the anxiety of the Government to attract the internal trade of the country into Siamese hands; an anxiety which, the writer adds, seems likely to be long in the allaying, in view of the absence of trade instinct in the people. This anxiety is no new thing. Though a Siamese can spend money as easily as another when he happens to have any, he has hitherto shown no aptitude for amassing it by laborious methods. But to keep pace with the times, his rulers have found it necessary to create wealth, and to do so have grudgingly admitted foreigners and foreign capital to develop internal trade. The people have accepted the cash results but have always resented the process, and at any time would willingly have dispensed with their "uitlander" exploiters but for the knowledge that they could not replace them with any hope of efficiency. Under the old régime spasmodic attempts were made to take over business from the foreigner, but these seldom met with any sort of success. Now, under the new order, the anxiety has become a passionate urge with the intelligentsia, and plans are being carefully laid which, if faithfully persisted in, may ultimately wrest from the alien a considerable share of the internal trade and business of the country; with what effect upon the well-being of the people, time will show. At present the workers in the rice-mills, rubber plantations, tin mines, and sea fisheries, the inland carriers and the retail traders, are practically all Chinese and other foreigners, the Siamese giving about four months of the year to rice cultivation and the rest to more or less comfortable leisure. The average standard of life is low, but if it is to be raised only by hard labour, the Siamese peasant would as lief have it so. About 95 per cent. of the working population are rice growers.

The Report, which contains also notes on conditions in the outlying Chieng Mai and Sôngkla Consular Districts, is prepared with the usual care and humorous insight of the distinguished writer and should be read by all who are interested in the commercial possibilities and the present and future economic condition of Siam.

She was a Queen. By Maurice Collis. 9″ × 6″. Pp. 301. Maps and illustrations. Faber and Faber. 1937. 15s.

Mr. Maurice Collis is much to be congratulated, for, whilst the demand for his book, *Siamese White*, published eighteen months ago, was still active, he produced in *She was a Queen* another which seems to be attracting an equal, if not greater, degree of public interest. Both works are in the nature of historical romance, but, whereas in the first the author had the authentic records of comparatively recent events to brace the fledgling wings of his imagination, now, with pinions suddenly full-grown, he sails serenely on the upper airs of fantasy with only a tenuous thread of vaguest legend to hold him to prosaic earth.

There are many known annals of the kings who have reigned in Burma and adjacent lands from the most ancient times, in most of which thin veins of crystallized fact run through an amorphous mass of fable and bombast; and in none are the veins of fact thinner or the cloying mass more dense than in the *Hman-nan Yuzawin*, a vapouring epitome of former magniloquent works, compiled about a hundred years ago to amuse and console King Bagyidaw of Burma, badly disgruntled by the results of the first Anglo-Burmese war. Students in search of information as to history, customs, ceremonies and superstitions of

Asian Affairs .c.20(S.3), s.375-393, 1933(Germany)

THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTION IN SIAM

siam

siyam

By W. A. GRAHAM

On May 30 Mr. W. A. Graham lectured to the Royal Central Asian Society, the Rt. Hon. Lord Lloyd in the Chair. In introducing Mr. Graham, the Chairman congratulated the Society on hearing a lecture from one who had spent thirty years in Siam, serving in many capacities, enjoying the friendship of the Siamese, and who was, moreover, the author of the standard work on that country, *Siam*.

ABOUT eleven months ago some little interest was aroused here and elsewhere in Europe by the announcement of a revolutionary outbreak in Siam. The first hint of trouble was contained in a vague telegram sent home by a German flying-woman who had left the Bangkok aerodrome immediately after the outbreak, and it was not until some days later that censored telegrams from *The Times* correspondent in Bangkok, and others, began to come through, gradually making it known that a *coup-d'état* had indeed been effected but that no loss of life had occurred, that the king was still on his throne and that a new government had been peacefully set up.

In due course private letters and local newspapers came to hand, from which it was possible for persons knowing Siam and its people to reconstruct the drama that had been enacted there, and to form an estimate of the probable reactions of the Siamese nation to the new conditions confronting it.

Later in the year this Society very kindly invited me to speak on the situation, and, having by then heard a good deal of detail and, as I thought, got the position fairly sized up, I accepted the invitation. But, foregathering with a number of people connected with Siam at a social function in November, my confidence was shaken by a multiplicity of rumours I heard then: of the tottering weakness of the new government; of the fury of frustrated extremists, and their determination to push on through bloodshed and confiscation to communism; and of the high probability of impending disruption of the State, either by internecine strife or by foreign intervention.

Such forebodings, though emanating chiefly from officials, active or retired, in agony about their salaries and pensions, and from men of business anxious for their trade and investments, could not well be dis-

incubus and the necessity for teaching the people to bear with its evils and to profit by any advantages that might be extracted from it. Early in his reign he entered into a treaty of friendship and commerce with England and later made similar arrangements with the U.S.A. and the Powers of Europe. And by these and other means he placated the ravening foreigner and set his country on a line that brought it, not without much wavering and stumbling, to ultimate international security and commercial prosperity.

It will be well to remember that in so acting the king went entirely against the sentiments of his people, who, if left to themselves, would most certainly have wrought their own destruction by continuing to kick against the foreign pricks.

King Chulalongkorn, who succeeded in 1868, gave himself with the utmost devotion to the cultivation of good foreign relations and to internal improvements, and, before he died, after a reign of forty-two years, had the satisfaction of knowing that dangerous foreign complications had become practically things of the past, that the condition of the people had improved out of all knowledge, and that the nation fully recognized the good genius of the Royal House and regarded it with unqualified respect and affection.

The eldest son of King Chulalongkorn and his first Queen succeeded in 1910 and reigned fifteen years. He continued the consolidation of foreign affairs, in which he was very successful, but in matters concerning internal welfare he was remiss, allowing the reins of power to fall into the hands of Court favourites to such an extent that the authority of his Ministers was undermined and many of the administrative institutions so carefully nurtured by his father degenerated into mere instruments of corruption and extortion. The favourites found pretexts to increase the already large privy purse, and when these failed to satisfy their rapacity they abused the royal power to override the fiscal laws and raid the State resources. At the same time the pernicious example of those in high places set up extravagant ideas of the standard of living and a period of reckless expenditure set in, which continued until a failure of the rice-crop, of unprecedented magnitude, found the people depleted of reserves and plunged them into indigence and discontent.

To the mind of the unsophisticated Siamese peasant his monarch is not only the sole proprietor of everything in the kingdom, but is also its ordained guardian, whose business it is, as such, to protect it from all trouble, whether due to natural or supernatural causes. Hence he

ASIAN AFFAIRS, C. XV (5.III) S. 305-325 1928 (Germany)

SIAM*

THAILAND

By Mr. D. BOURKE-BORROWES
(Late Forest Adviser to the Siamese Government.)

General description.

Siam covers an area of 200,000 square miles—that is to say, about 35 per cent. larger than the British Isles. Its population is nearly 10,000,000; it is, therefore, very thinly populated.

The main feature of its geographical situation is that it lies, practically speaking, between Burma on the west and French Indo-China on the east.

The western land boundary is made up partly by the Salween river, but chiefly by a long series of mountain ranges; the eastern boundary is marked chiefly by the Mehkong river—an enormous river, the third or fourth largest in the world. The northern boundary is formed by a narrow tongue of land jutting out from the Shan States on the west and French Laos territory on the east, about 100 miles broad, separating Northern Siam from Yunnan. To the south Siam stretches far down the Malay Peninsula to just south of latitude 6° N., where it meets the northern boundary of the unfederated Malay States.

Siam falls into four major and one minor natural divisions.

The four major divisions are:

1. Northern Siam—a region containing several mountain ranges, with peaks up to 8,500 feet, running parallel in a north and south direction. Between these ranges flow southwards four rivers, which, with many tributaries, form the headwaters of the large Siamese river, the Menam Chao Phya. Northern Siam resembles Central Burma climatically and also in other respects. The climate is somewhat continental, with an average rainfall of 47·8 inches. It is well known for its valuable forest areas, especially for its teak forests, from which comes the second largest export of teak in the world. In the valleys there is considerable rice cultivation, which is capable of great expansion under irrigation schemes.

2. Central Siam lies directly south of Northern Siam. In this region the great river, with a vast number of affluents and canals, runs through the centre of a large, flat, irrigated rice plain. This is by far the richest part of Siam, and the only one which has been under continuous cultivation for many centuries. Bangkok, the capital, is situated on the banks of the Menam Chao Phya, at a distance of

* Lecture given to the Central Asian Society on April 18, 1928; Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby in the chair.

The forests resemble the well-known "indaing" forests of Burma. Since the construction of the North-Eastern Railway their value has recently been much enhanced. Climatically, Eastern Siam is marked by three seasons, and as a whole it is the driest part of the kingdom.

There is one minor natural division worthy of mention—Western Siam. A long strip running along the Burmese frontier, composed partly of the Salween river and its affluents, and partly by the headwaters of the Meklong river. This is a rugged, mountainous region, largely unexplored, inhabited by wild nomadic tribes.

Siam is a very interesting country, owing to its great variety and to the wealth of its natural resources. It is teeming with every kind of scientific interest, and this feature is enhanced by the fact that so much in the country is as yet unknown and undiscovered.

Population, races, religions.

There are about thirty different races and tribes, great and small, indigenous to Siam, and amongst them a few of the most primitive people. In addition, there are a great number of Chinese immigrants, and a large number of foreigners from neighbouring Oriental countries, such as India, Burma, and the Dutch East Indies. A few representatives of the aboriginal races still linger in the remotest parts of the country.

Some thousands of years ago successive waves of northern races, mostly of Mongolian origin, swept down and populated most of Siam.

The first immigration was composed of people of the Mon-Khmer stock—supposed to be of northern Indian origin—represented in Siam of today by the scattered Mon or Talaing communities, by the Cambodians or Khmer in Eastern Siam, and by the Khamoo communities in Northern Siam.

The next and greatest immigration was that of the Tai group of races—that is, the Siamese, Laos, Shans, and some other elements, who now number about 7,500,000 people. Their languages clearly show that they came from Southern and perhaps even from Central China.

In the southernmost portions of Siam there are about 400,000 Malays, who were much later arrivals. The Siamese Malay is of very mixed origin.

Since the Middle Ages there has been a steady large immigration of Southern Chinese. In the past these immigrants were almost entirely males, who married Siamese women and produced a mixed breed known as "luk-Chin" (children of Chinamen). These inherit many of the good qualities of their Chinese ancestors and some of their defects. The Chinese and "luk-Chin" are especially numerous in the Bangkok district, and are to be found all along the railways, rivers, and main channels of communications. They are engaged in all kinds of industry and commerce. In the last fifteen years or so the Chinese seem to have developed some nationalist feelings—they now often

İSAM 89574 . موسوعة السياسية , مج , الاول , 1999 بيروت؛ ص .

ويابانية لم يسلم منها تاناكا الذي أعلن أنه يجهل الأمر برمته ، إلا أن خليفته ميكي قرر فتح تحقيق في القضية . فجاءت النتيجة لتدينه ، وتمّ اعتقاله في شهر تموز ـ يوليو من العام نفسه .

تانوم ، كيتيكاتشورن (١٩١٠ –)

Thanom, Kittikachorn (1910-)

عسكري ورجل دولة تايلندي . وصل إلى أعلى المراتب العسكرية وأصبح رئيساً للوزارة ووزيراً للدفاع عام ١٩٥٨ ، ثم نائباً لرئيس الوزراء ووزيراً للدفاع (١٩٥٩ – ١٩٦٣) ، ومنذ عام ١٩٦٣ تولى رئاسة الوزارة . وتميز عهده بالتسلط والفساد والتبعية للولايات المتحدة الأميركية إلى أن اقصي عن الحكم عام ١٩٧٥ .

تاهيتي

أنظر : بولينيزيا الفرنسية .

التايبنغ ، ثورة

أنظر : ثورة التايبنغ .

تايبه

أنظر : الصين الوطنية .

تايلاند ، مملكة

Prathet Thai

Kingdom of Thailand

الموقع : تقع مملكة تايلاند في جنوبي شرقي آسيا . وتمتد جنوباً حتى شبه جزيرة ماليزيا التي تقع على حدودها الجنوبية . وتحدها بورما من الغرب والشمال ، ولاوس من الشمال الشرقي . وكمبوديا من الجنوب الشرقي . وكانت تايلاند تعرف قديماً باسم سيام .

المناخ : مناخها استوائي ورطب . ومتوسط الحرارة فيها ٢٩ درجة مئوية .

المساحة : ٥١٤.٠٠٠ كلم٢ (١٩٨.٤٥٥ ميلاً مربعاً) .

عدد السكان : ٤٦.٠٠٠.٠٠٠ نسمة (تقديرات عام ١٩٧٨) . يشكل التايلانديون ٨٠ ٪ منهم . وهناك أقلية صينية لا تتجاوز نسبتها ١٠ ٪ من عدد السكان . بالإضافة إلى بعض الأقليات الكمبودية والماليزية .

العاصمة : بانكوك (Bangkok).

المدن الرئيسية : شينغ ماي ـ تونبوري .

اللغة : التايلاندية .

الدين : ٩٥ ٪ من السكان يعتنقون البوذية . وهناك أقلية مسلمة في الجنوب على الحدود مع ماليزيا وأقلية مسيحية في الشمال .

نبذة تاريخية : يعود أصل شعب تايلاند إلى قبائل نزحت من مقاطعة يونان الصينية منذ أكثر من ألف سنة إلى تايلاند . وفي القرن الرابع عشر ، أصبحت تايلاند مملكة عاصمتها مدينة آيوتهايا . قامت القوات البورمية في نهاية القرن الثامن عشر بغزو تايلاند . ولكن الملك راما مؤسس السلالة الملكية الحاكمة استطاع اخراج البورميين من تايلاند ، ونقل العاصمة إلى مدينة بانكوك .

بعد أن استعمرت بريطانيا بورما عام ١٨٢٦ ، بدأ التايلانديون يتخوفون من الاستعمار الأوروبي . فقام الملك راما الثالث في ذلك العام بالتقرب من الغرب ، فعقد معاهدة صداقة وتبادل تجاري مع بريطانيا . واتبع بعده الملكان راما الرابع والخامس سياسة انفتاح على الغرب استفادت منها بريطانيا لتحقيق بعض المكاسب والامتيازات . إلا أن التنافس الاستعماري على المنطقة ، وبشكل خاص التنافس الفرنسي البريطاني ، أمن لتايلاند نوعاً من استقلالية الحركة . وتكرس ذلك في الاتفاقيات البريطانية ـ الفرنسية عام ١٨٩٦ التي ضمنت استقلال تايلاند . وقد ظلت أسرة راما الملكية تحكم تايلاند (سيام آنذاك) حكماً ملكياً مطلقاً حتى عام ١٩٣٢ .

IMPRESSIONS OF THAILAND

By J. E. L. PEPYS

THAILAND

Lecture given on April 17, 1940, Sir Charles Wingfield, K.C.M.G., in the Chair. The lecture was illustrated with excellent slides, the coloured ones being specially beautiful.

THAILAND is by no means a new name for Siam. The Siamese have always called themselves the "Thai," or Free People; they have always called their country "Muang Thai," the Land of the Free. And when you look at the position of Thailand on the map you can see that it is a title to be proud of. It is a remarkable fact that this curiously shaped little country, tucked away in the farthest corner of South-East Asia, sandwiched between the British in Burma and Malaya and the French in Indo-China, should have retained her independence for at least six hundred years. Ever since the fourteenth century, when the capital was set up at Ayudhya, there have been attempted invasions from both East and West; but Cambodian and Burmese conquerors were driven off and French and British intrigues were parried. On two occasions at least Siamese independence was very seriously threatened by the French. But the Thai, in spite of all these dangers and difficulties, managed to hold their own, and are now busy completing the creation of a modern nationalist State on the Western model, without relinquishing their own heritage and traditions.

That this experiment has been so far successful is due, to a great extent, to the wisdom and ability of the present King's grandfather, King Chulalongkorn, or Rama V., who reigned from 1868 to 1910. During his long and successful reign the gates of the country were once more opened to the foreigner, European experts and advisers were invited to give their assistance in reorganizing the State, communications were opened up, slavery abolished and a large part of the essential paraphernalia of Western civilization introduced. King Chulalongkorn himself set the example in the education of his very large family by sending his many sons to English public schools and to European and American universities, and by encouraging some of them to serve in the armies and navies of the Great Powers. Most of the royal princes

Asian Affairs, c.27 (3.3), s. 321–26, 1940

(Germany)

in 1932, when, by a *coup d'état,* the absolute monarchy was ended and King Prajadhipok was forced by the leaders of the "People's Party" to grant a Constitution. Three years later, in 1935, he abdicated, and his nephew, Ananda Mahidol, a little boy of ten, came to the throne. It was as King Ananda's private tutor that I had the honour and the privilege to visit Thailand eighteen months ago.

Before I tell the story of that visit I think we should be well advised to look once more at the map. Thailand is about the size of France—that is, about 200,000 square miles. But the population is only about 14,000,000, and most of these are peasants. The country can be split up into four natural divisions—north, south, east, and central. In the north are the mountains and forests (it is from there that the teak comes); in the south there are rubber plantations and tin mines, and there is a good deal of fishing on both sides of the Isthmus of Kra; in the east is a large barren basin, parched in summer and swamped during the rainy season, where a meagre population of very poor peasants scratch a living from the soil as best they can; while the central area, the heart of the country, provides nine-tenths of its wealth. This central area, as flat as a pancake, under water for three months in every year, is almost entirely given over to rice cultivation. Some of the finest rice in the world comes from Thailand. Right through the middle of this vast rice-field flows the Menam Chao Phaya—Royal Mother of Waters—near the mouth of which is the present capital, Bangkok.

Above all, Thailand is a country of water. Half the population lead amphibious lives. There are four railways leading out from Bangkok, with roads only at the railheads. The rest of the country's communications are entirely by water. Like Holland, it is a land of rivers and canals.

My story begins in September, 1938, when the Czecho-Slovak crisis was working up to its climax. On the day on which Mr. Chamberlain flew out to that fateful meeting at Munich I crossed to France to join His Majesty King Ananda in Switzerland. He was then thirteen and lived with his mother on the shores of the Lake of Geneva, going to school every day with his little brother and bringing back homework in the evening like any other little boy. He had already spent three years of his reign in this way and had not seen his own country since he had left it five years before. The Council of Regency and other authorities in Thailand thought it was high time that the King should see his people and the people see their King. A State visit was accordingly arranged. Though it would interrupt his ordinary studies at school, it

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THAILAND TODAY

RAYCAWD

By HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS
PRINCE CHULA OF THAILAND, G.C.V.O.

Report of the Anniversary Lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, June 14, 1961, Sir William Dickson in the chair.

The PRESIDENT: Your Royal Highness, Your Excellencies, My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen: I have the honour to introduce to you our Anniversary Lecturer, His Royal Highness Prince Chula of Thailand. We are honoured, and very grateful and fortunate to have His Royal Highness with us this afternoon to talk about his country. It does occupy, as you know, and always has done, a key position in South-East Asia.

His Royal Highness is, of course, extremely well-known to all of us, and is a very popular figure in England; an intrepid racing motorist, an author, and a speaker on the television and radio; Her Royal Highness the Princess, who could not be here this afternoon, is an English lady; one of their homes is in Cornwall, and, amongst other things, they are Freemen of the City of Bodmin. So we know a great deal about His Royal Highness in England. In Thailand, as you know, he has very special connections; he is first cousin to His Majesty the King of Thailand, and is his special A.D.C.

Naturally, he is an authority on his own country, but his lecture to us this afternoon is of special interest and importance, firstly, because we have a very close and very old friendly relationship, interest and sympathy with, and love and understanding for Thailand, and anything we hear about it is of great interest, and secondly, because His Royal Highness has only just come back from a visit there and will be able to give us an up-to-date account of conditions of life in Thailand as it is today.

H.R.H. PRINCE CHULA of Thailand: Mr. Chairman, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen: it is a very great privilege for me to be addressing you once again, after the occasion, a few years ago, when I came to talk to you about my country. At that time you had just a talk; today I have been asked by the Council of your Society to bring a film. But, before we go on to the film, may I just say a few words with, perhaps, some fresh information, further to what some of you, if you were present then, may have heard at my last talk.

The size of our country has not increased; we are still approximately 200,000 square miles, or about, say, the size of France, or four times the size of England and Wales; but our population has greatly increased and, at the census of April, 1960, it was found that we have a population of 26½ million. That is a very big increase indeed for us. Until recently our population was increasing at the rate of three-quarters of a million a year, and now we find, not entirely to our satisfaction, that we are increasing at the rate of a million a year; and, although our area should be capable of supporting a population of 55 to 60 millions, it will not be as comfortable as it is now, and there may be very serious difficulties—so much so that even very important Government spokesmen, such as the Minister of Finance,

recently spoke about the serious necessity of some form of birth control if we are to maintain the standard of living which we have.

Despite the increase in the population, we are still largely an agricultural community. Over 75 per cent. of our people are still agriculturalists, and, of course, the main crop, and almost the only really important crop from the point of view of export, is rice.

Now, the growing of rice by something like over 75 per cent. of our population has got a strangely important social import, and that is that, unlike most countries in Asia—I am not saying this in any way against any of our friendly neighbours, but I repeat—unlike many of our neighbours in Asia, Thailand and the Thai people have always enjoyed almost complete equality between men and women. There has never been a purdah in Thailand; there have never been any disadvantages for women. I think this is due to two things; one is the Buddhist religion, which most of us practise—95 per cent., if not more of our people are practising Buddhists; and the other is this rice-growing, for, despite the immense advances made by the West in machinery, I am informed by experts (of which I am not one) that no machine has yet been invented that can sow rice into the field during the flood season (because rice, you know, is put into the land with about 8 inches of water; that is why we have to have paddy fields with little 12-inch or 18-inch banks to keep the water in), no machine has yet been invented that can supplant the fair hands of women to plant the rice. Therefore in our country, in the most important part of our country, the farmers, the men and women, work side by side; and that may be responsible for the equality in the status of Thai women with men.

In the past, we did have polygamy, and a man could have as many wives as he could afford. I would say that polygamy was an undemocratic system, because you have to be fairly well off, even in Thailand, to keep more than one woman, and I think that an ordinary farmer would be quite hard put to it to manage even a little bit of bigamy; so that polygamy was restricted to the upper and more well-off classes. I myself never had the pleasure, or the disadvantage, of practising it, because—whether it was done especially to thwart me or to help me I would not know—polygamy was officially abolished in Thailand three years before I was married.

As far as education is concerned, the thirst for education is growing and growing and growing; in fact, we are unable at the moment really to cope with it. When I was there, for the examination for some 700 places in Chulalongkorn University (which you will see in the film) for first-year students there were 10,000 candidates, and it is the same with the Military College, the same with everything; there is a fabulous thirst for education amongst our young people, and that applies to the men and the women, and, educationally, our men and women are equal. Today the women of Thailand, the well-educated ones—(I am not talking about the farmers' wives, they work in the fields with their men)—also work, and it is now a rare family where the wife does not go out to work. In an average upper middle-class family (if I may use a very old-fashioned term; shall I say, upper middle-income-group family) in Thailand today the husband and wife meet for breakfast, then they go away and each do their work, and often lunch apart, and meet in the evening. We have women who are

Tayland

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training in madarsa is compulsory in childhood for both the sexes. They do not follow family planning. Economically, the Khadim are an affluent community.

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M.K. MASTER

Khaek

Community of Thailand

In Thailand, the Muslim minorities are popularly referred to as *Khaek*, respectively. The terms have pejorative connotations and symbolize the general disease of the Muslim position *vis-a-vis* the majority peoples. The term *Khaek* lends itself to no such reconstruction. In the Thai language, it literally means 'visitor'. But, for at least a century, the term has also been used to refer to dark skinned foreign visitors or immigrants and, in that connotation, has been popularly applied to Indians and Malays residing in Thailand.

The Muslims of southern Thailand, being Malays, are also called 'Khaek', which they deeply resent for they are neither foreign visitors nor immigrants. They have inhabited the lands they occupy for many centuries. Officially, they are called 'Khaek Muslims', but even this designation is offensive to some, particularly the separatists. To the latter, 'Thai' means 'Siamese', and though there are a number of Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, and Siamese Muslims in Thailand, the vast majority are of the Malay race. The separatists-and some who are not separatists-want to be known simply as 'Malays' or 'Malay Muslims'. They charge that the government's policy of calling them 'Khaek Muslims' is a deliberate attempt to blur their identity as an altogether different people from the rest of the Thai nation.

There is ample evidence in Thailand that negative attitudes towards the Muslim minorities do exist among the majority peoples. Perhaps, nothing contributes more to the breakdown of the integration efforts of the two nations *vis-a-vis* the Muslims than the persistence of the pejorative popular stereotypes of 'Khaek'. These stereotypes are, in part, the inheritance from centuries of conflict between the Muslim and non-Muslim peoples: and, in part, the result of simple prejudice against people of a different religion and culture who, from a national point of view, appear to be stubborn and unprogressive.

Parts of southern Thailand have long been exploited for tin, though the Muslim villagers have been mostly farmers and fishermen. In the twentieth century, the area has shown itself amenable to the commercial production of rubber and coconuts. Partly for the purpose of developing plantations for these and other cash crops, and partly to introduce an ethnic mixture into the predominantly Malay south, the Thai Government has sponsored, since World War II, the resettlement of thousands of non-Muslims from other parts of the country in the more sparsely inhabited interior districts of the southern provinces. Khaek Muslims fear that, in time, they will be submerged in their own homeland by non-Muslims and that this is the government's real plan.

The motives behind Khaek efforts at the cultural integration of the minority peoples—including the Muslims—are quite complex, Certainly a prime motive has been a natural wish to forge national unity in order to counter the centrifugal forces of traditional regionalism and tribalism.

In Thailand, the Muslims, of all the minority peoples subjected to government integration objectives, have demonstrated themselves to be more determined and better organised to resist. Hence, greater pressure has had to be applied to them. This pressure has been applied far more restrainedly in Thailand.

The Kingdom of Thailand is not a secular state, but throughout the twentieth century, the laws of the country, including all of the Constitutions since 1934, have permitted freedom of religion in terms similar to those in most secular democratic states. Still, Khaek Muslims have had much to fear for their culture and way of life (seen by them as integral to

-Tayland

تايلانـــد..

أرض المناقضات والتماثيل والطبيعة والأساطير [٢]

حلقات يكتبها : منـــير حســـن منـــير

الحديث عن تايلاند وبصفة خاصة عاصمتها «بانكوك» يمكن ان يكون ذا وجهين .. احدهمام وجه مشرق ومضيء والآخر مظلم وقاتم !

أمـا الاول فهـو الحديث عن المسابقة الثالثة للقرآن الكريم والتى عقدت في العاصمة التايلاندية حيث جمعت أبناء وبنات المسلمين من كل انحاء البلاد في تظاهرة اسلامية فريدة ونادرة الحدوث في بلد يعتبر المسلمون فيه اقلية لا تذكر وليست ذات تأثير في اغلب نواحى الحياة بحكم الاهمال وحالة الفقر التى تعيش فيها المناطق التى يعيشون فيها .

ولقد اشرنا في الحلقة الاولى من هذه التحقيقات عن العنت والمشقة التى يلاقيها العاملون في مجال الدعوة الاسلامية لولا ايمـانهم واصرارهم وقـوة عزيمتهم التى يواجهـون بهـا تلك الصعاب لان العمل في حقل الدعوة الملىء بالاشواك والعقبات ليس نزهـة ولكنه تحديات ومواجهة للمستحيل ! ذلك هو الوجه المشرق الوضاء .

اما الآخـر .. واقولها آسفا ، فهو وجه بعض المحسـوبـين على الاسلام والمسلمين اسمـا وهم ابعد مايكونون عن قيم وتعاليم الاسـلام بممـارساتهم المؤسفة والرعناء .. فانت تجدهم في كل أماكن اللهو غير البريىء وحانات الرقص وحوانيت الخمر والميسر وكل ماحـرم الاسـلام ، يتبـاهون بانهم «عرب» طعـام في الفنـادق والمطاعم مطبوخا حسب الشريعة الاسلامية ؟! اى مفارقة هذه ؟!

لقـد رأيت انمـاطا من هؤلاء تتـدرج اعمارهم من سن العشرين الى السبعين ركلوا كل القيم ، وقذفوا بكل المبادىء .. فتوارى الخجـل «خجـلا» منهم !! فاصبحـوا لا يقيمون وزنا لشيء اطلاقا .. السنا نحن من نقول «اذا لم تستح فانصنع ماشئت !!» ؟!

إن ديننا يأمرنا بالستر اذا ابتلينا ولكنهم يمـارسـون سفاهاتهم وجهالاتهم في وضح النهار «وعينى عينك» ومن لم يعجبه فليشرب مياه كل المحيطات .. حقا انهم سبة ونقطة سوداء في وجه كل غيور على دينه حريص على سمعـة المسلمـين الابرياء من افعال امثال هؤلاء .. اليس شيئـا مخجـلا ومؤسفا ان تكون كل اللافتات التى تشير وتدل وتقود الى الامـاكن التى ذكـرتهـا باللغة العربية لغة القرآن الكريم ؟!! اليس مخجلا ان تجدب على لافتـات كل الامـاكن القذرة والمشبوهة لافتـة تقـول «نحن نتحـدث العـربيـة» ؟! ولافتات الاطباء واغلبهم من «الهنود السيخ» مكتـوب عليهـا بالعربية وبكل وقاحة «نحن نعالج امراض الجنس ونجرى اختبار الايدز» !!!

لقد حزنت حقا حين قرأت بعد عودتى من مناكك خبر ذلك الذى اخبر زوجته انه ذاهب الى «مكة المكرمة» لاداء العمرة فيسافر الى بانكوك ويشاء الله ان يعيش ذلك الشخص مأساة محنة الطائرة الكويتية التى اختطفت من تايلاند «الجابرية» ويعيش على اعصابه طيلة ايـام الاختطاف يرى الموت بين لحظة واخرى .. وكان الله اراد ان يفضحه بعمله ونيتـه التى ذهبت به الى بانكـوك بدلا من مكـة !! انهم يتسترون وراء اسم الاسلام حتى عند ممارستهم للفساد !!

اعـرف ان كلمـاتى هذه قاسية ولكننى اقـرع ناقوسا في آذان جميع الاباء واولياء الامـور لعلهم يمنعـون ابنـاءهم من مغبة الانسيـاق وراء العبث والشهـوة . وأضىء نورا احمـرا في وجـه كل مسؤول مسلم في بلادنـا العـربيـة والاسـلاميـة بان هذه الممارسات لها انعكاسات سلبية على المدى القريب والبعيد اولها ان منطقة جنوب شرق آسيا منطقة «موبوءة» بمرض نقص المناعة الطبيعية «الايدز» وحانات بانكوك وشوارعها عبارة عن «مستودعات» لفيروس هذا الوباء اللعين وثانيها ان هذه المنطقة تعتبر من اكبر المنـاطق المصدرة لانواع المخدرات الى كل انحـاء العـالم ويكفى ان في شمال تايلاند توجـد منـطقـة «المثلث الذهبى» وهي اكبر مناطق «الكوكايين» في الشرق الاقصى والعالم ولذلك يتجمـع فيها كل سياح العالم الذين يتعاملون مع هذه الآفة الكريهة .. وهؤلاء هم من حملوا معهم فيروس «الايـدز» الى هذه المنـطقـة كمـا يقول طبيب سودانى يعيش تجمـع انمـاطا وأشكـالا من البشر يذهب اغلبهم الى هنـاك ليمارس كل مايريد بعيدا عن الاعين والفضول والرقابة .. كما يشاء دون حسـيـب ولا رقـيـب فانـتشرت بذلك الامراض الجسدية والاجتماعية وتعتبر تلك الامكنـة ساحات مفتوحة لممارسة كل ما لا يقره شرع أو مبادىء !!

لقد قلت في الحلقة السابقة ان «الساكت عن الحق شيطان اخرس» ولا اريد ان اكون كذلك . ألا هل بلغت .. اللهم فاشهد .

مسابقة القرآن :

لم تكن هذه المرة هي الاولى التى تعقد فيها هذه المسابقة .. فهي المرة الثالثة من نوعها .. وكان لى شرف حضورها موفدا من قبـل الرابـطة وممثلا للجريدة . ولقد كانت تجـربـة ثرة بالنسبـة لى اتمنى ان تتـاح المشاركة سواء لى أو لغيرى مرة اخرى فقد منعتنى ظروف داخلية وخاصة من البقاء في امـاكن المسلمـين في جنـو ب تايلاند وهي «فطانى وجـالا وبزاتيوس ومستول» فهذه المناطق تحتاج الى تسليط الاضواء عليها في اجهزة الاعلام لكونها مناطق اقلية متمسكة بعقيـدتهـا وعـاضة عليها بالنواجذ في ظل ظـروف خاصة عاشتها المنطقة لفترة طويلة ان تتـاح الفرصة لاعلاميين مسلمين لنقل الصورة الحقيقية عن قرب لحال المسلمين في فبطانى .

وكما ذكرنا في الحلقة السابقة فان مجرد تنظيم مثل هذه المسابقة في ظل الظروف التى ذكـرتهـا تعتبر تحدثا كبيرا وانجازا ضخما يستحق القـائمـون به كل تقـدير وتشجيع ومـؤازرة . لذلك فقد طالبنا بتحرك وانفتاح المنـظمات والهيئات الاسلامية القادرة على تلك المناطق حتى يتحول الوجود الاسلامي الى واقع احسن حالا مماهو عليه الآن .

وهي مناسبة نشيد فيها ونشد على ايدى الذين اقـامـوا تلك التـظاهـرة الاسـلامية الرائعة ، وجمعوا فيها هذه البراعم اليانعة الحـافظة لكتاب الله العزيز .. وهم مجموعة من الحادبين على الدعوة الاسلامية ، ومن [illegible] سبيل تحقيق هذا الهدف النبيل ، مللا ولا يعرقل جهودهم كلل .. فما وهنوا ساعة ولا تقاسوا لحظة عن خدمة الدعوة بجهدهم ، واموالهم ووقتهم وعلمهم .


يتقـدم هؤلاء الدعاة رجل كانت له اليد العليـا والقـدح المعـلى في ان تكـون هذه المسابقة مناسبة سنوية يجتمع لها مسلمو تايلاند كل عام منذ ثلاث سنوات مضت .. ذلكم هو الشيخ الجليل «على عيسى» حيث لا يكل ولا يمل في عمله بمجال الدعوة .. فهو مسـافر كل يوم الى اقليم من اقاليم البلاد لشأن من شؤون الدعوة الاسلامية .. ولعل من كرم هذا الرجل ـ وهو لا يريد ان يعلن عن هذا ـ ان استضـاف كل المشتـركـات في المسـابقـة من البنات في منزله متحملا كل نفقات الاقامة والاكل والشرب لعلمه بان جو «الفنادق في العاصمة لا يصلح لسكنى بنات مسلمات يحفظن كتاب الله ، حيث الجو في تلك الفنادق «مسمم» بكل سيىء فكان ان فتح الرجل بيته ووقفت اسرته كلها على خدمة ضيـوف المسـابقة يتساوى في ذلك كبيرهم وصغـيرهـم فجـزاهم الله عن هؤلاء خير الجزاء .. ولعلهم يغفرون لى ان كشفت هذه المعلومـات لانهم لم يفعلوها الا لوجه الله ، وابتغـاء مرضاته وما كانوا يريدون لعملهم هذا ان ينشر ولكننى اردت ان اوفيهم بعض حقهم فقد كانوا يعملون في خدمة الضيوف والمشاركين في المسابقة منذ الصباح الباكر الى مابعد صلاة العشاء .. إنه في رأيى نوع من اعمـال الدعوة أو قل الجهاد في سبيل اعلاء كلمة الله .

بدأت المسـابقـة الثـالثة للقرآن الكريم حفظا وتجويدا وتلاوة بتقسيم المشاركين من البنـات والاولاد حسب عدد الاجـزاء التى يحفظونها فقسموا الى ثلاثة مجموعات من يحفظون عشرة اجزاء وعشرين جزءا فما فوق .

وتكونت لجنة التحكيم من الافاضل :

١ ـ الشيـخ عمر عيسى مدير دار الرابطة الاسلامية بتايلاند .

٢ ـ الشيـخ علاء الدين القيسى رئيس الرابطة العالمية للقراء والمجودين عن وزارة الاوقاف العراقية .



■ تيمنة من الشيخ على عيسى لاحد الفائزين ■

تنـظيم مثـل هذه المسابقة

المسلمـون التـايلنـديون يعـ


المسابقـة الثـالثـة للقـرآن ا

حشـدت فيهـا البـراعم الاس

المسابقة تميزت عن سابقاتها بازدياد

عدد المتنافسين وارتفاع مستواهم

وهى ظاهرة جديرة بالمؤازرة والتشجيع





■ جانب من الحضور في الحفل الختامى ويبدو السفير السوفيتى وسفير اندونيسيا وسفير مصر ومبعوث الازهر ■

Economic growth, however robust, has a hard time eradicating the country's rural poverty and urban squalor, particularly here in Thailand's deep south. Narathiwat is only 840 kilometers (520 miles) as the crow flies from the capital Bangkok – but it might as well lie in another country in terms of race, religion, culture and even language.

"The Muslims are the poorest people in Thailand," imam Ahmad says. "We need government assistance." Eighty kilometers (50 miles) to the northwest, Chamnong Koomrak, governor of Pattani province, replies, "We're trying.... Our budget is growing by 10 percent a year. We give special privileges to Muslims to enter university and we want to develop the south, in fisheries, food-processing and tourism."

The truth is that there are few shortcuts to development anywhere. Both the government in Bangkok and the Muslim electorate in Thailand's southern provinces of Pattani, Satun, Narathiwat and Yala know that the key to prosperity is education. For the authorities, that means instruction in the Thai language. The people of the south agree – but they intend at the same time to preserve their religion and their culture.

The result is a fascinating renaissance of Muslim awareness spreading across the narrow, elongated arm of land that reaches down from the body of Buddhist Thailand in the north to the Muslim nation of Malaysia in the south. You see it everywhere, from the simple yet elegant central mosque in Pattani to the corrugated-iron mosques of the fishing villages along the eastern coast. You see it, too, among the 1,700 students who cram the classrooms of Narathiwat's Islamic Foundation for Education, built 20 years ago with a donation from the late King Faysal of Saudi Arabia. And you sense it in the faces of the tiny children learning Arabic from Jitsom bint Salih in a one-room *madrasa*, or Qur'anic school, in the sand-swept coastal hamlet of Ban Budi.



Muslim schoolgirls at Laem Pho elementary school. Opposite page, Pattani's new central mosque and (inset) a young worshipper.


So who are these Thai Muslims? To government statisticians they are one of Thailand's minorities, perhaps four percent of a population now numbering about 55 million, overwhelmingly concentrated in the far south. To their Buddhist compatriots they are known as *khaek*, a word that means "visitor" in the Thai language – though the Muslims came to the region several centuries before the Thais.

To any real visitor, however – a *farang* or foreigner from overseas – the ethnic identity of the Muslims is obvious: They are Malay, just like their neighbors and relatives in the northern Malaysian states of Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu and Perlis. The two groups dress the same way: patterned sarong and white skullcap or angular black *songkok* hat for the men, long-sleeved dress and *dawa* head-scarf for the women. They speak the same Malay language, although many of the fishing families have a dialect all their own. And, most of all, they worship God in the same way, recoiling from the ornamented figures of Buddhism, Thailand's state religion. The fact that they bear Thai, not Malaysian, citizenship has nothing to do with cultural affinity– but it has everything to do with the politics of the past.

The Malays originated on the island of Borneo, now divided between Malaysia's Sabah and Sarawak and Indonesia's Kalimantan. About 1,500 years ago they began an expansion that took them south and west through the islands of Indonesia and northward to the Philippines and the Malay Peninsula. Meanwhile, the Thais – originating perhaps in southeastern China – were expanding southward in competition with peoples like the Shans, Mons and the Khmers of today's Kampuchea. The inevitable meeting of Thai and Malay came around the beginning of the 13th century.

But this meeting was not a clash of nations in any modern sense. Southeast Asia nearly 800 years ago was a shifting patchwork of kingdoms, each vying for tribute and influence but not necessarily for conquest. The Siamese, as the Thais used to be known, had one kingdom – but so did the Khmers, while to the south there were the kingdoms of Majahapit and Langchia. Just as the medieval Arab historian Ibn Khaldun theorized, when a state was vigorous, it expanded in territory and influence at the expense of weaker states – until the weak in turn became strong and led a fresh cycle of change.

Today's Muslim provinces of southern Thailand are the descendants of Malay kingdoms that in the Middle Ages paid tribute – in the form of *bunga mas*, or ornamental flowers of gold and silver – to the king of Siam. The payment of flowers showed a degree of loyalty to the king, and dependence on his protection against rival forces. It hardly mattered that the Siamese were purveyors of the region's Buddhist and Hindu tradition, while the Malays were 14th-century converts to Islam. What was at stake was power, not culture.



THAYLAND vs PATANI

John Andrews, "Muslim In Southern Thailand From Bunga Mas to Minarets", ARAMCO XXXIX (5.3), Washington 1988

ARABIA (5.33) 5-36-37 1984 (England)
TAYLAND

27 members of the committee were in favour. Those who rejected the proposal included Christians who feared that the ministry would be monopolised by Muslims.


The Christians did not need government help to take care of their religious affairs as they had strong religious organisations which, since colonial times, receive massive support from abroad. The Muslims, however, felt that the ministry was only a compensation for the omission of "Islam" from the Jakarta Charter. This became apparent subsequently when the Muslim leaders failed, during the sessions of the first elected parliament in the 1950s, to get that clause restored to the Constitution.

Now, after more than 38 years of independence, the issue has again come to the fore. The government decision virtually to outlaw Islamic parties which stress the political role of Islam in Indonesia has made it clear that it is not interested in accepting Islam. The government may feel satisfied temporarily that some Muslim organisations have changed their objectives to suit its requirements. However, a serious confrontation awaits the rulers. If the Islamic parties unite to resist the latest state move the government will find it hard to ignore these feelings.

POLITICS **THAILAND**

Dawa with a difference

The Thailand government is seeking to attract Muslim support by sponsoring a dawa conference, *our Bangkok correspondent reports.* Although this might give Islam a boost in Thailand, *Mohamad Ghazali Khan*, in the report which follows, questions the motives behind the move and argues that it is a manoeuvre which fails to address the legitimate demands of Pattani Mujahideen



The Thai Army, long an object of suspicion and distrust in the country's Muslim-dominated south, has thrown its backing behind a growing dawa movement that is sweeping the southern provinces and attracting Muslims from neighbouring countries and beyond.

Army support for the mushrooming Islamic proselytising movement appears to mark a major shift in official thinking on how best to deal with the problem posed by Muslim unrest and the Pattani jihad. Some analysts say it reflects an appreciation that, despite continuing misgivings in some official circles, there is more to be gained by encouraging and channeling the religious upsurge than by attempting to stem it.

The most recent dawa convention was held in early February, at the army's Sirinthorn camp in Pattani province. The meeting attracted a massive congregation of nearly 200,000 from all over Thailand and more than 20 other countries, and was the biggest of its kind seen so far in Thailand. To date, eight army-sponsored gatherings have been held in the south, and more than 20 nation-wide.

Senior army officers and Muslim organisers described the Sirinthorn assembly as a success. Both sides stressed beforehand its "purely religious" purpose, and that contentious political issues were to be avoided. It was aimed, said organisers, at promoting unity among Muslims in Thailand.

"We also succeeded in creating better understanding between local officials and Muslim people, especially those who came from abroad – some of whom were Muslim leaders," said Colonel Chamnong Pairoj, head of the mixed army-police-civil Command 43 in the border provinces.

Thailand's official dawa movement began in the late 1960s, but has gained momentum only over the past two years. Its unofficial head is Haji Yusuf Khan, 60, a well-to-do businessman who was born in Burma but later moved to Mae Sot, which is on the Thai side of the Thai-Burmese border. As the movement has expanded to attract large turn-outs at its prayer-meetings, Yusuf Khan has come under fire from both Pattani jihad elements (who have accused him of working for the government) and from some establishment figures (who see him as having links with the jihad movement in the border provinces).

Yusuf Khan has denied both sets of charges. He says he recognises the religious authority of Prasert Mohamad, Thailand's "Chula Rajmontri" or official head of the Muslim community. He is not, he has stressed, attempting to establish an "alternative" – and hence divisive – Islam in Thailand.

Army sponsorship of the dawa movement has owed much to Major General Panya Singsakda, the Southern Army Region deputy commander who is now nicknamed "General Dawa". It has also been encouraged by General

أنباء وآراء

محنة

« مسلمى تايلاند » بعد مسلمى الفلبين

هل ينجح مسلمو تايلاند فى أن يعيشوا حياة آمنة ينالون فيها حرية ممارسة شعائرهم الدينية التى تتفق مع عقيدتهم وتقاليدها بعيداً عن وابل الرصاص المنهمر الذى يحصدهم بالمئات ؟

وهل ينجح مسلمو تايلاند فى تبليغ كافة حكومات العالم الإسلامى وغيرها بواقعهم المرير حيث تجرد عليهم حكومة تايلاند حملات تصفية مستمرة فى المقاطعة التاسعة التى تشمل يالا وباتانى وأورتان ونارا ثيوات — تستخدم فيها الدبابات والمدفعية المعززة بالطائرات فى ظل أحكام عرفية فرضت على المقاطعة .

لقد نجحت حكومة تايلاند — حتى الآن — فى قمع المسلمين ومنعهم من أداء شعائر دينهم ، كذلك نجحت فى انتزاع الكثير من أراضيهم ودورهم ومزارعهم ، والمسلمون عزل من كل سلاح وكان النجاح الأكبر لحكومة تايلاند مركزاً فى تطويقها للمسلمين وحرمان العالم الخارجى من معرفة حقيقة هذه المذبحة . وقد بلغ عدد المعتقلين من المسلمين — حسب إحصائية الحكومة (١٦٥٠) معتقلا بينما القتلى تجاوز الألوف .

فيا لله للمسلمين ؟

MECELLETU'L-EZHER, C. 55 ,
(sayı 2), s. 190 — , 1977 KAHİRE.

الفر
أصول الدين جامعة الأزهر يقول .

ذكرت إحدى المجلات العربية الصادرة فى فبراير ١٩٧٣ فى باب (بريد القراء) سؤالا عن قراءة قوله تعالى : (قل لو كان معه آلهة كما يقولون إذا لابتغوا إلى ذى العرش سبيلا) ٤٢ الإسراء .

وكان السائل — وهو من بلاد المغرب العربى — يقول : إنه يجد فى المصحف الذى عنده لفظ (يقولون) مكتوبة بالتاء هكذا (كما تقولون) .

وأجابت المجلة بخطأة السائل وطلبت إليه معاودة النظر فى المصحف لينأكد من صحة ما ورد فى المجلة وخطأ ما يدعيه

ولما كان الموضوع يتعلق بكلام رب العالمين ، أحببت أن أحيط علم سيادتكم أنه كما كانت المجلة غير مخطئة فى كتابة الآية ، فكذلك كان السائل غير مخطىء فيما ذكره من وجود الآية مكتوبة فى مصحفه بالتاء ، والخطأ حقيقة هنا كان يأتى لو أن أحدهما أو كليهما ادعى لصواب ما هو عليه فقط دون غيره ، كما وأنه كان على المجلة أن تراجع هذا الفعل المذكور فى الآية الكريمة ورد بقراءتين : الأولى بالياء « يقولون » والأخرى بالتاء « تقولون » .

فمن قرأها بالياء : ابن كثير ، وحفص وابن محيصن ، والشنبوزى .

ومن قرأها بالتاء : باقى القراء ومنهم « نافع » الذى اشتهر بالرواية عنه « ورش » وهذا الراوى هو الذى اشتهرت روايته بالمغرب الشقيق .

ومن هنا نعلم أن المصحف المغربى منقوط فى هذه الآية بالتاء وهو صواب وفقا لرواية « ورش » عن « نافع » .

● الإسلام دين الدولة فى باكستان :

وافقت الجمعية الوطنية الباكستانية فى الثانى من المحرم ١٣٩٣ الموافق ٧ / ٣ ١٩٧٣ على تعديل فى الدستور ينص على أن الإسلام هو الدين الرسمى للدولة .

● اعتراف بلجيكا بالإسلام دينا رسميا فى بلادها :

وافق مجلس النواب البلجيكى على مشروع قانون يقضى باعتبار الدين الإسلامى أحد الأديان الرسمية فى بلجيكا

ARABIA, The Islamic World Review, (#13) p. 18-19, 1982 (England)

TOYLAND

PATTANI rebel split blunts insurgency

In the final part of our report on the Muslims of southern Thailand, *Anthony Davis* concludes: "The insurgents' chief liability (is still) their chronic disunity. Genuine cooperation is inhibited by ideological differences and suspicion."



Friday prayers in Pattani: there are nearly three million Muslims in south Thailand

In late May, the police chief of Thailand's southern province of Pattani, Colonel Saroj Chantaviroj, announced to the national press that by the end of 1983 secessionists fighting to establish an independent Islamic state of Pattani in the country's southernmost Muslim provinces would be "wiped out." The statement was greeted with some scepticism by political observers both in Bangkok and the south, for whom the Pattani conflict has become virtually an inseparable part of the southern scene.

But Saroj's remarks were a pointed reflection of the fact that Thailand's Muslim insurgency is neither seen as a serious military problem for Bangkok nor remotely likely in the foreseeable future to change the map of southeast Asia. Inextricably tied into the general fabric of economic underdevelopment and lawlessness in the south, the insurgency remains today incapable of mustering the sort of political or military backing, domestically or internationally, that might put it on a par with the Moro revolt in the southern Philippines.

Statistics hardly suggest a burgeoning national liberation struggle. According to official Thai sources, during 1981 security forces were involved in 86 firefights with Muslim guerillas that cost them 22 dead and 64 wounded. The Muslims lost 46, 22 were captured and 30 surrendered. In just under 100 other "incidents," 39 civilians died, 128 were injured and 7 abducted. By contrast with the threat posed to the government by the insurgent Communist Party of Thailand, this amounts to an easily contained military distraction.

Informed sources estimate as many as 16 clandestine Muslim factions, quite apart from bandit gangs endemic in the southern majority Muslim provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Satun and Songkhla. But only three are active militarily – the Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National Revolutionary Front or BRN) and the Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani (Pattani National Liberation Front – BNPP). Together they claim to field around 3,000 guerillas. Thai military intelligence estimates are less generous, conceding less than 600 – PULO 320, BRN 210, BNPP 50. Given the low level of military activity and a perceptible decline in the insurgency this year, official figures appear to accord more closely with reality than insurgent claims.

The insurgents' chief liability continues to be their chronic disunity. Despite a commitment to a common goal of complete independence from Thailand and pressure to unite from sympathetic Arab governments – specifically Libya and Syria – the group remains divided. In recent separate talks with *Arabia* BRN and BNPP leaders Ustaz Abdul Karim ibn Haji Hasan and Badril Hamdan both conceded the prospect for unity in the near or medium future was remote.

Genuine cooperation is inhibited both by ideological differences and mutual suspicion. BRN is committed to a broadly Islamic socialist programme looked at askance by both other groups. It in turn sees PULO as weakened by internal divisions and BNPP close to collapse.

Certainly PULO's credibility has suffered under the leadership of Tengku Bira, scion of an aristocratic Pattani family, whose extended absences abroad, albeit on fund-raising activities, bespeak a minimal grasp of the real situation in the southern provinces. It is widely believed by some observers, including sources sympathetic to the Pattani cause, that the major proportion of funds solicited in the Middle East is spent maintaining PULO's leadership in comfortable exile. Little reaches fighters inside Thailand, they say.

For its part, the more conservative BNPP is now moving towards a radical Islamic position, influenced to some extent by the Iranian revolution. But since the death of its former leaders, Tengku Jalal Nasae, in 1977, the group appears to have declined.

Disunity aside, however, the insurgent cause is hardly furthered by an unbending and at present unrealistic insistence on full independence. Attempts to raise the Pattani issue at the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and secure diplomatic backing in the Islamic world have foundered on this point.

Nor is credibility helped by the military methods used, which amount to what can only be described as terrorism, aimed at polarising the Muslim and Buddhist communities in the border provinces. Bombings of civilian targets and kidnappings are typical; protection rackets involving (generally Chinese) businesses in the south play a major role in fund raising, claimed as both necessary and justified by one guerilla spokesman.

The credibility gap is further widened by the ease and frequency with which ideological militancy and plain banditry overlap or are confused. The authorities deliberately make no distinction between the two and refer to PULO, BRN and BNPP as "bandit terrorist movements." Guerilla leaders conceded that it was not always possible to control the "independent initiatives" of armed units or vet the type of individual attracted to them.

Few observers doubt that, as Thai officials claim, insurgent bands have served as sanctuaries for common criminals; and that bandit gangs with loose affiliations to a Muslim organisation gain a measure of political respec-

c 8(s.7)s 6 September, 12, 1970 - Karachi

A GLIMPSE INTO THE PAST !

History of the Muslims in Thailand

The country which is called "Thailand" was called as "Siam" before 1939. The name was changed because of the Thai people who form the majority of its population.

The ancestors of the Thai people migrated from South Western China in 1000 A. D. and subsequently adopted the Buddhist faith. A monarchy emerged in 1350 A.D. with Ahyuthia as the capital, which was subsequently transferred to Bangkok. In those days Siam did not include any territory in the Mal yan peninsula.

Islam had spread in the Malayan Peninsula as well as the Indonesian Islands and in early fifteenth century there was a Muslim Kingdom over the Peninsula and Indonesia, with capital at Malacca in Malaya.

In 1511 the Portugese captured the port of Malacca. The vast Kingdom of the Sultanate of Malacca split into many small Kingdoms, one of which was the Sultanate of Pattani in the northern portion of the Malay Peninsula.

The Siamese Kingdom was frequently at war with Cambodia in the East and Burma in the West. And there was an occasion when the Siamese King sought the help of the Sultan of Pattani to resist an attack by the then Burmese King.

But from 1700, the Siamese monarchy beeame expansionist and began a southward push. By 1769 the Thai invading army reached the Muslim Kingdom of Pattani.

In 1786 the Sultan of Pattani was defeated in war due to the treachery of his nobles. The Sultan was killed in the battle and thousands of prisoners were taken to Bangkok as well as a cannon which till this day lies in front of the Thai Defence Ministry at Bangkok, as a historic relic. These prisoners were subsequently released and were the ancestors of the Malayan Muslim community in Bangkok and Ahyuthia.

After making Pattani a vassal state, the Thais pushed further southward and occupied the Malay States of Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis (which are now part of Malaysia).

The Malay Muslims of Pattani did not submit to the rule of the Thai conquerors and there were many uprisings from 1789-1832, which were crushed by the numerical superiority of the Thai army.

In 1902 the Thais wanted the vassal Raja of Pattani to surrender all his rights and receive a pension. The last Raja of Pattani, Abdul Qadir Qamaruddin, was imprisoned. Released in 1905, he escaped to the Malay State of Kelantan, where he died in 1933.

Meanwhile, the Malay States in the South of the Malayan peninsula had become British protectorates.

Portugal's colonialism in South East Asia was followed by the Spanish, the Dutch and then the British and the French. The British had occupied Burma as well as established control over southern Malaya, while the French had taken over Indo-China. Both the British and the French allowed Siam to exist as a buffer state between their territories by treaties in 1896 and 1907.

In 1909 the British made the Thais to withdraw from the Malay States of Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis, which became part of Malaya under British control. Unfortunately for the Malay Muslims of Pattani, the British allowed the Thais to continue their control over Pattani in the Northern end of the Malay Peninsuta.

Along with the other Malay States, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis, as parts of Malaya, became independent in 1957 and Malaya merged in Malaysia in 1963.

But the Malay Muslim State of Pattani continued to be under the yoke of the Thai Government. Calling the territory as Southern Thailand, the Thai Government is trying to assimilate the Malay Muslim people of Pattani. In spite of all efforts at cultural assimilation, there continues to be agitation by the people of Pattani for their self-determination and independence.

Thailand to-day has a population of 32 million. Muslims form 11 per cent; most of them are the people of Pattani.

The Muslims scattered in Thailand proper are decently treated by the Thai Government, but the people of Pattani continue to resent their colonisation, though by an Asian country.

Even powers like Britain and France had to relinquish their hold over their colonies. In due course, Thailand will also have to follow the same way.

MUSLIMS IN PORTUGAL

There are presently over two million Muslims in Portugal, mainly concentrated in the province of Guine (60 per cent are Muslims).

In Mozambique, Portuguese colony in Africa, Muslims constitute 25 per cent of the population. In Macao, Timor and European Portugal, there also exist groups of Muslims, relatively small in number, but important for their cultural and economic projection.

According to statistics on an over-all basis, it has been verified that out of every ten Portuguese one is a Muslim.

UAR MILITARY POSITION

According to the latest report of London's "Institute for Strategic Studies", there were 10,000 Soviet advisers in the UAR in July this year compared with 4,000 a year ago. In addition there are about 100 MIG-21's flown by Soviet pilots. Some 22 SAM-2 ground-to-air missile sites are supervised by Soviet personnel. An equal number were under construction.

The UAR forces have increased by 70,000 men over the past year and its Air Force is stronger and better equipped, the Report said.

O.A.U'S CALL

The African summit meeting in Addis Ababa on Sep 3 called for the total withdrawal of all foreign troops from all occupied Arab territories. The appeal was contained in a resolution on the Middle East accepted by the OAU (Organisation for African Unity) Summit Conference.

THE MUSLIM WORLD

e.13(s.24)s.3 January 3, 1976

Karachi

THAILAND

"The Freedom Struggle in South Thailand

(Mr. Adil Ahmad, PULO)

The struggle for independent in South Thailand is a popular and National people War with the aims of the expulsion of the foreign Thai imperialist invaders. The Muslims Malay of the South Thailand are the indigenous and majority population there are an oppressed nation, fighting for independent.

The four million Muslims in extreme south Thailand ethnically Malays bordering the northern and Eastern state of the Malaysian peninsula have become a source of acute embarassment to Bangkok and to some anxiety to Kuala Lumpur. In recent months the Muslims have been waging a sort "Jihad" against the Buddhist rulers (Thai colonialist) trying, to fight large bodies of their Thai Government military and police force alongwith war planes, tanks in the city and jungle fastness. According to Bangkok Radio as per declaration Deputy Interior Minister Prakob Prayumphokhrat that the government has sent several battalions of troop as reinforcements for the drive to suppress a guerillas near the Malaysian border as well as all villages at the foot of Boodo, Yaha mountains straddling the southern province prohibited zone. But this has not isolated the Muslims fedayeen hard core on the contrary. The Patani United Liberation Organisation (P.U.L.O) a national movement has been gaining momentum.

The nationalist movement whom Bangkok has variously described as Bandit Communist, but in reality the Muslims have their aim for self-determination "Malay republic of Patani". The Muslim guerillas are well armed with M-2, M-16 automatic rifle captured from the Thai force. Apart from these weapons supplied to Thailand under the SEATO agreement the Muslims decendent also have large quantities of home made weapons.

What is going on in southern Thailand is really racist and inhuman treatment.

WORLD ATTENTION

In the early years after World War-II the Muslims drew some support from the Malay in the federation of the Malaya whose Eastern states Kelantan and Trengganu had been placed under Bangkok control by the Japanese. At that time the Muslims movement in south Thailand was irredentist in nature aimed at nothing short of a merger of the predominantly Malay provinces of Thailand with the federation of Malay. But the British rulers of the federation and the local elite who were to succeed their imperial mastars actively discouraged the Muslim movement.

PACT

The most active Muslim Patani leaders nowaday are Mr. Kabir Abdul Rahman (Chief of Patani United Liberation Organisation), Mr. Kuyala (Chief of National Front). The movement of both organisations are progressing well.

APPEASEMENT

During Marshall Phibul Songgram brief eclipse from power Bangkok embarked of a policy of appeasement by appointing Muslims to some high offices in the disaffected province and by permitting Islamic religious instruction in school. But Marshal returned to power following the year 1947 coup denationalization was pursued with a systematic vigour that border on persecution.

In the early fifties a Royal Commission was appointed to look into the grievance of the ethnic Malay but it recommendation to win over the diseffected were summarily shelved. In recent year Bangkok has been wholly unresponsive to the demands of economic and educational reforms in the south Thailand. As a result bitterness permeats every layer of the Muslim community, effort by some liberal That politician to defuse the explosive situation made up of a mixture of sheer bitterness, persecution complex and stark poverty have made little impression on Thai authorities.

★ ★ ★

Call to Ulema

(Maulana Kausar Niazi)

Pakistan's Minister for Religious Affairs Maulana Kausar Niazi said in Cairo on Dec. 23 that economic urges of modern times call for highlighting those Islamic principles which stress on social justice and condemn capitalism.

Addressing a distinguished gathering of Ulema of Al-Azhar University and members of Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, Maulana Kausar Niazi said that these are times of economic upsurge as oppressed people all over the world have risen against the forces of capitalism and are determined to change this system.

It is therefore, high time that the Ulema play their rightful role in the struggle for emancipation of this exploited.

He said unfortunately some Ulema in certain countries have adopted an attitude which gave out an impression that Islam is in favour of capitalism. This is far away from the truth.

He said Islamic elements in their respective countries should struggle against poverty, illitteracy and exploitation of the poor.

He said Pakistan will fully cooperate with Al-Azhar and the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs in this connection as Pakistan is based on the concept of Islam.

He said the present Government in Pakistan have taken positive steps for service to Islam and will continue to lend support to Muslim countries for reviving the Islamic spirit and making it a living force for al times to come.

Maulana Kausar Niazi, who spoke in Arabic was heard with utmost respect by world renowned Ulema of Al-Azhar University. He regretted dissensions and conflicts amongst various sects of Islam and said Islam holds sectarianism as "Shirk".

He said now when the Islamic World is coming closer politically it is high time that the Ulema should lay stress on unity and tolerance in religious field also.

He said some people think that there is no need for morality and spiritualism as this is the age of materialism.

(*Continued on page 7*)

THE MUSLIM WORLD

c.2(s.48)s.2 July 3, 1965 Karachi

Muslims in Thailand

Visitors to Thailand feel immediately the impact of the nation's strong Buddhist faith. Yet other religions, including Islam, the country's second faith, have flourished in Thailand for hundreds of years, and enjoy complete freedom.

Muslim Thais number some three millions, with the greatest concentrations in the four southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathivas and Satual. Almost half the country's 1,267 mosques, including a great central mosque at Pattani are in this area; the remainder are scattered over 32 other provinces, with 101 in the capital city of Bangkok alone.

Royal patronage of Islam in Thailand began 360 years ago with the arrival at the old capital of Ayudhya of two brothers from Persia, Sheikh Ahmad and Sheikh Said. Ayudhya was then a flourishing city and the brothers, according to old court chronicles, engaged in trade. The elder, Sheikh Ahmad, was later accepted into the king's service, put in charge of Muslim affairs and given a high court rank.

Islam took great strides forward during the reign of King Narai the Great (ca. 1656-1688). Although the king resisted the efforts of emissaries of Muslim rulers in Sumatra and India to convert him to Islam, he permitted the Indian ambassador to build a mosque in the royal capital, and later gave money for the building of mosques.

A French emissary recorded in this period: "Of the many foreign nationals settling here, the Moors were better off than the rest. This was the effect of one of the Moors being appointed as the King's Finance Minister. The Siamese king at the time was of the opinion that the employment of such a policy would enhance the nation's trade prospects, as all the rulers of Siam's powerful neighbours were Muslims. This accounted for the fact that most of the important positions inside and outside the capital were in the Moors' hands. "The Siamese king had built many mosques for the Moors with his own money. He also gave financial support to the Moors in the observance of their important religious functions. The Siamese, who were baptized into the Moorish religion, were given the right to exempt themselves from monthly service to the king....."

Royal protection continued in spite of the subsequent movings of the capital, first from Ayudhya to Dhonburi, and then to its present site at Bangkok. Muslim affairs were the province of a high official, known as the Phya Chularajmontri.

In 1901, King Chulalongkorn established a legal procedure by which all civil cases concerning matrimonial and inheritance matters among Muslims were to be tried jointly by Muslim judges. His successor, King Vajiravudh, laid down a set of rules covering the Government's relations with his Muslim subjects.

The constitution which followed the abolition of the absolute monarchy in 1932 guaranteed tolerance and protection for all religions in Thailand by an article declaring the king to be "upholder of all religious faiths".

So far as Islam was concerned, the intention of the constitution was fulfilled and the present policy was established by Royal decree in 1945. The office of Chularajmontri, which had ceased to be known by that name many years before, was revived, a Central Islamic Committee was established to advise the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Education (which has a Department of Religious Affairs) and Provincial Islamic Committees were set up to advise the governors of the 24 provinces with a Muslim population of more than 500. Local mosque committees were also provided for.

The decree reaffirmed the well established principles of religious freedom in the Kingdom whereby all are assisted and protected in the observance of their religious duties.

One important action following the decree was the establishment in Bangkok in 1950 of the Muslim College of Thailand. The college is a modern, well-equipped institution with over 800 students. It offers Government scholarships for further study at local universities and at religious institutions abroad.

The building of the central mosque at Pattani was financed by the Government, which also provides an annual budget for the repair and construction of mosques.

Legislation since the royal decree of 1945 has confirmed the application of Islamic religious laws in the trial of civil cases involving matrimony and inheritance among the Muslims of the four southern provinces, exempted Muslims from taxes on animal slaughtering for the purpose of religious sacrifice, regulated the administration of mosques and the allocation of land for their construction.

The Government also handles transport arrangements for the pilgrimage to Mecca, which is made by about 2,000 Thai Muslims each year. Government officials who are Muslims are granted leave on full pay to make the pilgrimage, in addition to special holidays each year for Eid-ul-Fitr and Eid-ul-Zuha. Muslim members of the armed forces and police are given time off every Friday for Prayers.

The Chularajmontri holds a pivotal position in all matters concerning Islam in Thailand. He is the representative of the King, as patron of the religion. As chairman of the Central Islamic Committee, the Chularajmontri is the principal adviser on Muslim affairs to the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Education. While the royal decree provides that the Chularajmontri shall be appointed by the king, the nominating procedure in practice has been democratic, taking into consideration the wish of the community whose interests the Chularajmontri represents. Imams, who preside over the local mosque committees, are elected by Muslim laymen; they in turn elect the chairmen of 24 Provincial Islamic Committees; and the chairmen elect the Chularajmontri, whose name would then be submitted to the king for Royal appointment.

Thai Muslims are zealous in following Islamic practices and teachings. They regularly take part in the international 'Qir'at' contest in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. In 1962, Thai readers carried off the first and second prizes. (A.P.P. Feature Service)

c.8(5.37)5.6 TAILAND Karachi

A GLIMPSE INTO THE PAST !

HISTORY OF TOGOLAND

[Togoland is situated on the west coast of Africa. It is bounded on the East by Dahomey, on the North by Upper Volta, on the West by Ghana, and on the South by the Atlantic Ocean.]

There is no evidence of the past history of the country known as Togoland in West Africa to-day except that the northern part had come under the influence of Islam in the past centuries while pagan and primitive tribes lived in the south and the coast.

The Ewe tribe, who now constitute the dominating element in the developed and urban areas of the south and the coast are said to have migrated to this region in the twelfth and fourteenth centuries from the Niger River Valley as a result of pressure from warlike tribes in the east.

Portuguese traders were the first to arrive in the coastal area in the fifteenth century. But at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Germans, who also came into the scramble for African territories, focussed their attention on the West African coast. In 1884 Bismark's agent succeeded in making treaties with coastal chiefs making Togo and Cameroon as German colonies. Their aim was to make a model colony of Togo, but their plans came to an abrupt end because of the German defeat in the First World War, when British and French troops landed in Togoland and the German troops in that territory surrendered.

At the termination of the War, Togoland was placed under the League of Nations mandate and split into two parts—the part bordering the then British colony of Gold Coast coming under British administration, and the part bordering on the then French colony of Dahomey coming under French administration.

After the second World War, the two Togolands came under United Nations Trusteeship, with Britain and France to administer their respective areas.

In 1956 British Togoland voted for integration with Ghana and has since then been a part of Ghana.

French Togoland voted for the status of a self-governing republic in the same year. The UN General Assembly's Trusteeship Committee, early in November 1958, unanimously recommended the withdrawal of French Trusteeship over French Togoland on 27 April 1960. The Republic of Togo was admitted into the UN on 20 September 1960.

The population of Togoland today is 2.5 million, Muslims forming 55 per cent of the population. They form a large majority in the north ,but in the developed, educated and urbanised south they are only about 9 per cent. French is the official language and the administrators are mostly Christians.

"A NEW UAR"

(*Continued from page 3*)

war", the responsibility for this decision lay with America alone.

Asked about UAR's position in the present situation where one of the most powerful nations of the world was the biggest enemy of the Arabs, Suez Canal was closed and Israel was armed to the teeth with the most modern weapons and the Jarring Mission had not been able to solve the crisis, President Anwar Sadat said "I am a Muslim, who believes in Allah; and it is my duty to be obedient to His dictates. I believe firmly that everything is in Allah's hands and I have not lost hope in His Mercy."

NEW SPIRIT IN EGYPT

An article in "Newsweek" said that a new mood of "spiritual revival and intellectual ferment" has engulfed Egypt since President Anwar Sadat assumed office. The article gives President Sadat credit for launching the "renaissance" by freeing political prisoners, cutting prices, ending the seizure of private property and allowing previously banned foreign periodicals among other things.

SEMINAR FOR IMAMS IN NIGERIA

A Seminar for Imams of Mosques was organised in July 1969 in the University of Ibadan (Western Nigeria) by the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, in association with the Islamic Youth League of Nigeria.

The "Nigerian Journal of Islam" in its issue of June 1970 has given an informative report of the addresses delivered in the Seminar. In a paper on "Problems facing Islam in Modern Times", Dr. I. O. Azeez said :

"There are two religious groups in Nigeria—Christians and Muslims. Conflicting statistical figures have been given on the relative proportions of Christians to Muslims all over the country. But these are not important. What is important is the fact that if we take a cross-section of the population in Nigeria, we find that :

(1) "Most of the uneducated are Muslims.

(2) "Most of the very poor are Muslims.

(3) "An overwhelming majority of people in responsible political, administrative and executive and academic life are Christians.

(4) "Most of those who are behind bars in prisons are Muslims."

The Muslims in Nigeria need leadership and educators. The Mosques could become the centres of social renaissance. And hence, a Seminar for Imams was a laudable move.

We are glad to know that another Seminar for Imams is being organised this month at Ibadan.

TURKEY TO BUILD SUBMARINES

Turkey's Minister of National Defence Mr. Topaloglu said that Turkey will soon begin building submarines at the Golcuk shipyard. Plans were under way to set up a national war industry. Cargo and transport ships are already under construction at the Gulcuk shipyards. Manufacture of small arms is soon to begin.

Commander of the Turkish Air Force Gen. Batur said that Turkey is now capable of building its own aircraft. Work will be intensified to become self-sufficient.

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MUSLIMS IN THAILAND

(By Mr. M. Moosah, President, Muslim Welfare Organisation of Thailand)

From aboard a beautifully decorated barge, gliding slowly on the surface of the languidly flowing Chao Phraya River, Thailand presents a panorama of most beautiful sceneries in the world. On both sides of the palm fringed river, green and luxurious paddy fields stretch so far that they seem almost to merge with the horizons. The simple and lively peasants stop for a while amidst their work to look at the glittering barge, and then resume their work with as lively a spirit as ever. Every now and then the barge passes by beautiful villages of various sizes. The richly decorated pagodas and occasionally even the minarets of moques add greatly to the beauty of the environment. Often the barge passes through dense forests darkened by thick foliage of giant trees under which roam game of all descriptions.

This exceedingly beautiful country, the land of beautiful pagodas, measures an area of 198,456 square miles. Almost 70% of the total area is forest. Agriculture is the main economic stay of the country. The fertile soil, together with plenty of water, helps the peasants grow more food than the country needs. Rice is the staple food and it is also the source of earning foreign exchange. Other exports include rubber and tin.

The Siamese (the people of Thailand) are a martial race. During the 6th country A. D. they arrived in Thailand from the north and gradually established their sway over a vast area of the country. In 1824 they came under the British sphere of influence but an Anglo-French accord signed in 1896 guaranteed Siamese (Thailand's) independence. The present ruler, King Bhumibol Adulyadej is constitutional monarch.

MUSLIMS :

The population of Thailand is about 30 million in which Muslims figure at 3.5 million. This sets them at over 10% of the total population. The Buddhists constitute an over-whelming majority, but their relations with Muslims are extremely cordial.

A good majority of the Muslim population lives in the 4 southern provinces; they figure at 2.5 million. The rest of the Muslim population is scattered in all parts of the country. The spiritual life of Muslims is dominated by the 1,200 registered mosques in the country of which as many as 103 mosques are in the capital, Bangkok.

The Thai Muslims speak a language of their own, a Malay dialect. As a general rule they are backward in education and as such they are unable to get legitimate quota in government services. A mere 3% of the Muslim population are employed as government officials.

The adult male Muslim population is divided in various professional groups. The following figures will serve to give an idea of the real situation :—

Landlords	...	0.5%
Government Officials	...	3.0%
Traders	...	2.5%
Employees	...	20.0%
Labour	...	40.0%
Farmers & Plantation Owners	...	25.0%
Hawkers & Retailers	...	9.0%
Total	...	100.0%

The Thai Muslims are very fond of performing Haj. Often they mortgage and even sell out their property in order to be able to perform the pilgrimage. It is obvious that in many cases they return from the holy lands in a state of utter poverty. Such incidents are quite frequent and have their root in the ignorance of the spirit and the basic teachings of Islam.

ADMINISTRATION :

The Sheikh-ul-Islam is the State Councillor for Muslim affairs in Thailand. He is appointed for life by His Majesty the King and presides over a committee known as the Central Muslim Committee. The Sheik-ul-Islam belongs to the Ministry of Education and receives a fixed monthly pay. The Central Muslim Committee members receive no salary and they belong to the Ministry of Interior. They are entitled to nominal allowances when called to attend the committee meetings. The Committee is comprised of 14 members who are elected mostly from the Imams of registered mosques.

Next in importance to the Central Committee are the Provincial Committees of which there are 24 in number. A Muslim Provincial Committee is formed in a province where live at least one hundred Muslim families and which has at least one registered mosque. These committees are presided over usually by an Imam of one of the provincial mosques, and are directly under the control of the Central Muslim Committee.

The present Sheikh-ul-Islam is Tuan Suwanasana Haji Ismail.

The Thai Muslims are free, like all other religious groups, to worship and perform their religious rites in the mosques or at their homes. In certain cases they are also allowed to hold their celebrations in public places. The celebration of the Prophet's birth-day always takes place in the public Hall.

Muslims are also free to form their social organisations. Of these there are about 30 in the country, though most of them are not as active as may be desired.


ISRAELI PRESENCE IN THE CONGO

Mass-circulation Cairo daily AL AHRAM commented recently on the news that Israeli mercenary forces were participating in the fighting in the Congo against the rebels. It mentioned that Israeli penetration of Africa was not limited to capitalist expansion but also involved supply of arms and equipment to the imperialist and reactionary forces in Africa for use against the African liberation movement. Recent developments show the extent of this Israeli aggression against the African peoples and the increased role Israel is playing in serving the interests of imperialism in Africa, the paper said. AL AHRAM added that Israeli forces fought side by side with the dissolved foreign bands of mercenaries from South Africa in close collaboration with the enemies of Africa and the strongest supporters of racial discrimination. The paper urged the African Unity Organization to condemn this Israeli aggression and to take the necessary steps to halt Israeli plots against the African countries.

NOT: Mahale "MALEZYIA
Poschinde dik.

MALEZIA
TAYLANDIA

PATTANI



A POLITICAL POWDER KEG

"The situation has developed to the point of crisis," admitted a recent Thai government report on the Malay Muslim separatist movements in Pattani, says *John Davis*

At first glance the little town of Pattani on Thailand's southern coast appears to be a tropical idyll. Brightly-coloured fishing boats ride at anchor in the river estuary. Old-fashioned Chinese merchant houses line the river banks and man-powered trishaws provide the commonest and most convenient means of transport for the town-dwellers. Surrounding Pattani are traditional villages with wooden houses built on stilts amid green and lush scenery.

The peace of Pattani is illusory: southern Thailand is a political powder keg, a countryside for years torn apart by civil strife and insurgency. Hidden in the distant hills, visible from Pattani Town, are Muslim guerillas who demand independence for Thailand's four southernmost provinces: Jala, Narathiwat, Pattani and Satun, where the population is ethnically Malay, not Thai. Assaults on government outposts are frequent and the last year has seen an increase in guerilla attacks on police stations and army camps. This increased activity by the Muslim minority in the predominantly Buddhist Thailand has caused great concern for the government in Bangkok.

In a recent government report, a team which had spent some time examining conditions in the south, stated that "...the situation has developed to the point of crisis and has raised the question of a possible disintegration in unity of the people there. The security of the nation is being threatened..."

The origin of the conflict in southern Thailand and the bloody fighting between government troops and Muslim insurgents is not simply a matter of religion. Thai Buddhists and Muslims, mainly of Chinese and Indian descent, live together peacefully in Bangkok, Chiang Mai and other affluent cities further to the north, and outside the south there is no equivalent to the movement among the Pattani Muslims.

The root of the conflict is that Pattani follows the usual pattern of a remote and neglected border area. Average income in the south is well below the national level, unemployment is high and government projects are few and far between. Government officials, who view their assignment to the south more or less as a punishment, tend to withhold reports of serious developments in the areas under their responsibility from their superiors in Bangkok.

"If they report that the situation is serious, then their superiors would construe the reports as a sign of their inefficiency," one local source told *Arabia* in Pattani. "They

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Author: ANURUGSA, PANOMPORN
Title: POLITICAL INTEGRATION POLICY IN THAILAND: THE CASE OF THE MALAY MUSLIM MINORITY
School: THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN (0227) Degree: PHD Date: 1984
pp: 537
Source: DAI 45/07A, p.2238 Publication No.: AAC8421649
Subject: POLITICAL SCIENCE, GENERAL (0615)
Abstract: The dissertation focuses on methods and strategies of the past and present Thai governments in political integration, aimed at creating national loyalty in the Malay Muslim minority. The study explores political integration within three basic models--assimilation, accommodation, and autonomy. The study argues that accommodative strategies are the most likely to lead to peace in the Malay Muslim provinces. Within this framework, the study comprises four sequential stages of integrative efforts, from the late nineteenth century to 1982.


During the first state (late 1800s to 1932), the Siamese kings incorporated the Malay tributary states and later expanded administrative rule into the area. The crown pursued territorial integration and forced the Malay Muslim nobility to submit to the power of the Siamese state through a divide-and-rule policy. The second stage (1932-1959) was characterized by diverse assimilative and accommodative policies and ethnic conflict resulting from Malay Muslim nationalist movements and government suppression.

During the third stage (1960-1979), the government expanded its power among the Muslims and tried to control their parochial institutions. The purpose of political integration was to build a new loyal generation of the Malay Muslims called "Thai Muslims." The policy aimed at de-emphasizing ethnicity among the Malay Muslims, while encouraging Islam so long as it did not interfere with development of nationhood.

The final stage (1980 to present) is one of revised policies. The study concentrates on contemporary education, administration, economics, and security. The theme of the dissertation is that, although the present government does not directly pursue sole assimilation, these revised policies effectively undermine accommodative premises. The study suggests that ethnic conflict is likely to persist in southern Thailand as long as the current policies are pursued, unless corrective measures as enumerated are taken.

11 OCAK 1997

The earliest Brāhmī script of Sri Lanka is as follows:




If we examine the two scripts closely, we can see that although they are similar, there are also significant differences. In the vowel system Asokan Brāhmī has ∴ while Sri Lankan Brāhmī has 𑀇. This is found in the Brāhmī inscriptions of South India as well. But in the later inscriptions of Sri Lanka of about the Ist century A.D. 𑀇 goes out of vogue and an evolved form of ∴ takes its place. This shows that the Asokan Brāhmī has influenced the Sri Lankan script in due course and ousted the earlier form.

A feature peculiar to the Sri Lankan Brāhmī is the absence of the form for ja and the use of the aspirate 𑀬 for both aspirate and unaspirate. This is unique in the Sri Lankan script and is not known in any other script of India. In about the first century B.C. 𑀚 form is introduced and we have the regular use of ja and jha.

The earliest Sri Lankan Brāhmī also has the exclusive use of palatal śa 𑀰 and no other sibilants are found. The sa 𑀲 is introduced in the Ist century B.C. as the Mauryan variety gains ground.

A form of la 𑀴 found in the South Indian Brāhmī is also used in the earliest script of Sri Lanka. Another significant feature is that the direction of writing in some of the earliest inscriptions is from right to left. In most of these inscriptions the letters are also reversed.

The conclusion which can be drawn from these instances is that Sri Lankan Brāhmī is not identical with any other known Brāhmī script of India. It had been used in Sri Lanka long before the missionaries came in the 3rd century B.C. Perhaps the original Brāhmī script was introduced to Sri Lanka by the Aryan settlers who came to this Island in the 6th century B.C.



8 EKİM 1996

OMAR FAROUK SHAEIK AHMAD BAJUNID

The Political Integration of the Muslims in Burma and Thailand A Cross-National Analysis

Historically, geographically and culturally Burma shares some of Thailand's peculiar traits, however, in the more recent times, the impact of colonial rule in Burma on the one hand, and Thailand's continued political independence on the other, and their consequential adoption of different political methods and strategies in meeting the challenges of the tasks of nation-building in the post-Second World War period have contributed to make these states economically, ideologically and politically distinctive from each other. Both Burma and Thailand, as modern nation-states are multi-ethnic in character although this seems much more so in the case of the former. Both countries are Buddhist and have attempted at one point of time or other to use Buddhism as a unifying religio-cultural force but Buddhism has almost invariably been overshadowed by political and ideological considerations in these two states. In Burma, Buddhism has been used to legitimize the Marxist-Leninist ideology with the conceptualization of the Burmese Way to Socialism. In Thailand, the development of constitutional politics has ushered in an unresolved tussle between the proponents of liberal democracy on the one hand and the advocates of bureaucratic and in particular military hegemony on the other. Both these states have a substantial and significant Muslim minority population which has had to grapple with difficult problems of readjustments following the abovementioned developments.

This paper seeks to depict the role of the Muslims in the modern polities of Burma and Thailand within a comparative framework. The current status of the Muslims in present-day Burma is first described and the heterogeneity of the Muslim community highlighted. The evolution of the community from the traditional period through to the post-colonial era in the case of Burma and from the traditional through to the constitutional period in the context of Thailand is assessed. It is argued that in the traditional period the Muslims co-existed harmoniously with their Buddhist counterparts in Burma and Thailand, for the most part. Colonial rule in Burma created gulfs between the Muslims and the Burmans in particular. In the case of Thailand, the modernization of its polity as a consequence of the impact of colonialism in the region began to sow the seeds of political trouble. The role of external variables both in Burma and Thailand has threatened to internationalize the political problems of the Muslim minorities in both these states much to their chagrin.

The dislocation of liberal democracy in Burma affected the Muslims severely. The isolationist measures undertaken by the military leaders of Burma and the espousal of socialist goals translated in Buddhist terms became unnerving for the majority of the Muslims, particularly those who cherished a strong Indian identity and conservative Islamic way of life. But for those who had envisioned the need for greater rapport with Burmese national aspirations having recognized the irreversibilty of their membership in the new Burmese polity, the process of readjustments was attempted. Inevitably the inward-looking Muslims became threatened by this new development and intra-communal schisms began to develop making the Muslim minority within Burma a dynamic group in its own right.

Unlike Burma, Thailand's political evolution in the constitutional era has been more gradual and consistent. In view of the absence of the colonial experience, the attempt to introduce liberal democracy has had to contend with the inner forces of Thai political culture which

A. Wezler/E. Hammerschmidt (Hrsg.): Proceedings of the XXXII International Congress for Asian and North African Studies, Hamburg, 25th–30th August 1986 (ZDMG-Suppl. 9).
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167971

MICHEL GILQUIN

THE MUSLIMS OF THAILAND

Translated by

MICHAEL SMITHIES

Tayland (1900 ?)

- 1 ARA 2006

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2005 Bangkok

Muslim Community Development in a Non-Muslim Country: A Case Study of Thailand

Abdul-Salam Preeda Prapartchob

Introduction

Thailand is widely known as a Budhist country, but Muslims rank second in terms of number of believers and Muslim communities are spread through out the Kingdom. There are 2,573 registered mosques in Thailand, in Bangkok alone there are as many as 155. Out of 53 million Thais, it is estimated that, the Muslim number about 3.8 million or almost 7.2 percent of the population.[1] Muslims are mainly concentrated in Southern Thailand, but there are significant pockets in other regions as well. Unlike the Muslim minority in Europe and America where the settlement of Muslims was relatively recent, Muslims in Thailand have a long history dating back to the 13th century. Hence they cannot be considered as immigrants or foreigners.

The majority of the Thai Muslims are of Malay origin. There are however many who trace their ancestry to the Indian subcontinent. In the northern provinces many communities have been formed by Muslims of Chinese background. In the northeastern regions in the past there were no Muslims. But recent surveys indicate that Muslims have started appearing there as well.

One special feature of Muslim life in Thailand is its preponderant rural character. Traditionally Muslims seem to have been more attracted to village life, but recently a trend toward city life in metropolitan areas such as Bangkok is clearly visible. Perhaps because of their rural bent Thai Muslims are economically backward and many of them live below the poverty line. In rural areas they are mostly fishermen, farmers or possess small rubber tree holdings. Those who have migrated to the cities are mostly vendors, petty officers, unskilled workers etc. In Bangkok a large number of them live in the slum areas.

However, despite their relative backwardness some Muslim communities possess the potential of economic as well as social development that could enable them to integrate and be accepted in the plural society of Thailand. The following is a case study of three distinct Muslim communities, one in the South, one int he Central Plain, and the other in the Northeast which provide some clues to such possibilities.

Saeng Wimarn Village: Operation Bootstrap

A great number of Muslims live in the south of Thailand but all Southerners are not Muslim. Nakorn Sri Thammarat is one of the major provinces of the south where

İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi

THAILAND
by
Osman Bakar and Engku Ibrahim Ismail

23 ŞUBAT 1995

General Editor: Geoffrey Roper
World Survey of Islamic Manuscripts
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DN: 30542

INTRODUCTION

Thailand is predominantly a Buddhist country. However, its southern provinces of Patani, Narathiwat, Yala and Setun, which (with the exception of Patani) share a common border with Malaysia, are Malay dominated areas. Like their brethren in Malaysia the Malays of Thailand profess the Islamic faith. The present Muslim population of these provinces, sometimes also referred to as "Greater Patani", is estimated at more than two million.[1]

In former times, these southern provinces constituted the prosperous Malay kingdom of Patani. The Patani Malays adopted Islam in the fifteenth century, or perhaps even earlier. The Islamic intellectual tradition in the kingdom can be traced as far back as the sixteenth century. It is well known that Patani produced a number of prominent and prolific Islamic scholars (*ʿulamāʾ*) whose religious and intellectual influence extended beyond its borders to permeate the whole of the Malay-speaking world. The most famous and prolific of them was Shaykh Daud bin Abdullah bin Idris al-Fatani (late 18th–early 19th century).

More recently, under Thai rule, the Islamic intellectual tradition in Greater Patani, although still living, has been in decline and the once rich Islamic manuscript holdings there have suffered neglect. Most of the writings of Patani authors in their manuscript form are now kept not in Thailand but in Malaysia. Collectors of Islamic manuscripts in Patani have sold many of them in Malaysia, mainly to the Islamic Centre (Pusat Islam) of the Prime Minister's Department in Kuala Lumpur (see Vol. II, p. 265). As a result, not many Islamic MSS now remain in Thailand, and their locations are subject to change.

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[1] For a good general introduction to the present Muslim provinces of Thailand, see *The Muslims of Thailand*. Ed. A.D.W. Forbes; gen.ed. S. Sahai. Gaya: Centre for South East Asian Studies, 1989. 2 vols.

Muslims in South Thailand: A Review Essay

Raymond Scupin

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm ... Merkezi

Normally Ph.D theses do not make good books without substantial revision. However, this work[1], a published version of a Ph.D dissertation completed at Harvard University, is an exception to the above generalization for a variety of reasons. First, the work is of high quality and of interest to all social scientists interested in Southeast Asia, minority groups, Islam, or Thailand. Second, the book deals with the minority Muslim population in Thailand, a neglected area of study. Third, the author, Surin Pitsuwan, is a Muslim from Thailand, and consequently, has considerable insight into the indigenous concepts and political sensibilities of the Muslim minority in Thailand. The author was able to draw on Thai and Malay documentary sources normally not available to Western scholars and make this data accessible. Fourth, the work is unique in that it involves an admirable interdisciplinary approach combining the data of a political scientist (the author's field) with the theoretical architecture derived from anthropology. A major advisor of the thesis was Stanley Tambiah, an anthropologist who has written extensively on Thai culture, politics, and religion. Fifth, and most important, the book makes an original contribution to our understanding of the Muslim minority in Thailand.

Pitsuwan begins his introduction by situating his case study of the Muslims in South Thailand within the classical framework posed by Weber, and later his anthropological disciple Geertz, in their attempts to grapple with modernization and cultural change in traditional societies. The basic problem faced by developing countries, as developed by Weber and Geertz was how could indigenous populations with ethnic, cultural, religious, or 'primordial ties' transfer these loyalties to modernized rational-legal-secular institutions imposed by state bureaucratic processes. The Muslims of southern Thailand, a linguistic, ethnic, and religious minority, have been attempting to preserve their cultural autonomy in the midst of systematic waves of repression and assimilationalist policies induced by the Thai bureaucratic state. Complicating the Muslim minority's position in Thailand is its geographical, historical, religious, and cultural proximity to Malaysia. The author correctly views this cultural problem, combined with the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism, as a possible international difficulty which could darkly affect the cooperation of the ASEAN countries of Southeast Asia. Western scholars such as Carl Trocki have also noted similar tendencies (1980).

Aside from Geertz and Weber the author draws upon Tambiah's analysis of the Thai state to illustrate the unique problem of the Muslims of South Thailand. Tambiah (1978) argues that the secular authorities within the Thai polity have co-opted the Buddhist religious hierarchy so as to give the state the appearance of legitimacy. This policy was highly effective in the Buddhist regions of Thailand (see Keyes 1971 for confirmation on this). However, because Muslims of South Thailand had their own tradition of religious independence with a religious leadership, the *ulama* as the moral arbiters for the Islamic communities, this state policy ran aground. Muslims resisted this attempt at incorporating their religious hierarchy and have reacted negatively toward Thai state policies to establish control and legitimacy up to the present.

The author's anthropological approach is influenced by Geertz's and Tambiah's well-known form of cultural and symbolic analysis. Thus, Pitsuwan follows their theoretical lead in suggesting that the political dynamics for the Muslims in South Thailand stem from deeply entrenched cultural-religious-cosmological roots. He draws upon Geertz's thesis in *Islam Observed* (1968) that the process of religious purification in Morocco and Indonesia precedes and coincides with the upsurge of political consciousness. Tambiah makes a similar case for Thailand in his discussion of the religious-political precedents established by various Buddhist monarchs which have structured Thai bureaucratic policies up to the present (1978). Pitsuwan combines this symbolic-cultural approach with some of the anthropological analyses of ethnicity by Cohen (1969) and Barth (1969) from other areas of the world in order to provide a framework for comprehending the political situation of the Muslims in South Thailand.

Pitsuwan concludes his introduction with a brief description of the socioeconomic conditions of South Thailand. He draws upon the work of Ladd Thomas (1975) and Thomas Fraser (1966) to describe the steady deterioration of these socioeconomic conditions in South Thailand. He notes the separation of rural Muslim villagers from the urban based economy dominated by Thai Buddhists connected with the government and the Chinese shopkeepers and landowners. The villagers have little relationship with the urban areas and are separated by language, religion, and culture. Despite rich natural resources in South Thailand the wages of the average Muslim villager are two-thirds of what the wages are for other villagers in the rest of Thailand. Average landholdings for rubber trees are small for these Muslims, and in other industries such as fishing and mining their profits are marginal because of the exclusive marketing operations of the Chinese middlemen. These socioeconomic conditions have encouraged the development of the separatist movements on behalf of this Muslim minority in Thailand.

Chapter 2 presents a brief history of how the southern Islamic provinces were incorporated into the Thai state and the early manifestations of Muslim resistance. Before the nineteenth century these southern Islamic regions were tributary states tied to Bangkok authorities. But after the nineteenth century and the introduction of colonialism into this region, the Thai state began to compete with the designs of Western interests, especially the British in Malaysia, and initiated a policy of internal colonialism and dependency over these Islamic regions. According to Pitsuwan the real trouble began after 1902, when the Thai state led by the reforms of King Chulalongkorn and his close advisor Prince Damrong attempted to restructure the traditional political order in the Islamic regions. Through the imposition of new tax policies and administrative reforms the Thai polity divested the nobility

11 KASIM 1994



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
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En préparation

Les Comores
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Dergi / Kitap
Güzelhisarde Merkezi

THE THAI MUSLIMS

M. Ladd Thomas

THE SETTING

Approximately one million Thai Muslims live in the five provinces immediately north of the Thailand-Malaysia border.[1] They account for nearly one-fifth of the population in Songkhla province, almost two-thirds in Yala province, and more than three-fourths in each of the provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat and Satun. These people are devout Muslims, follow Malay customs, and most (except for those in Satun and in portions of Songkhla) speak a local dialect of Malay as their first or only language. The vast majority reside in rural villages and engage in fishing or agriculture, the latter consisting essentially of rubber and rice cultivation.[2] However, most proprietors of small shops in rural areas and in semi-urban areas, such as sanitation districts, also are Muslims. Furthermore many Muslims live in the towns and either operate small shops and businesses or are manual labourers.

Other population groups, of any consequence, who live in these provinces are the Chinese (either resident aliens or Thai citizens of pure Chinese extraction) and the Thai Buddhists. The Chinese mostly live in the towns, where they tend to dominate the business sector.[3] Some of these urban-based Chinese also own tin mines and large rubber plantations in the countryside. Still others, however, work as manual labourers. Thai Buddhists (who constitute an overwhelming majority of the population elsewhere in Thailand) are largely found in the towns where they primarily are engaged either in business or as government officials.

Considerable social interaction take place between the Chinese and Thai Buddhist communities, in part because nearly all of the Chinese have learned to speak Thai and partly because of the pragmatic nature of Thai and Chinese religious beliefs. But there is very little interaction between these two communities on the one hand and the Thai Muslims on the other. The lack of social intercourse *vis-à-vis* the Muslims is due to several factors. First, most Thai Muslims (particularly those in rural areas of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat) speak little or no Thai and therefore are unable to communicate with the Chinese and Thai Buddhists. Second, some of the religious beliefs and practices of the Thai Muslims militate against social dealings with the other two communal groups.[4] For instance, it is considered improper for Thai Muslims to attend social functions having any kind of non-Muslim religious overtones, nor can they marry those of other religious persuasions unless the latter first become converts to Islam. Or, as another example, they refuse to eat food prepared by non-Muslims unless they are certain that it contains no pork, that other meat is slaughtered in the approved Islamic fashion, that pork grease is not used in cooking the food, and that

utensils used for preparing the meal never have been exposed to pork grease; these considerations tend to prevent Thai Muslims from entering homes, or attending social functions, of Chinese and Thai Buddhists since it is the custom of people in Southeast Asia to offer and accept food as an integral part of playing the roles of host and guest. A third factor is the fear of Thai Muslims that social interaction with the Thai Buddhists would have the effect of encouraging their children to accept features of the Thai culture, thereby facilitating assimilation and the eventual destruction of their Malay heritage. A fourth factor is that many Chinese and Thai Buddhists are prone to view the Thai Muslims as being culturally and socially inferior, and accordingly speak of them in a condescending fashion.

While nearly all Thai Buddhist and Chinese children, and an increasing number of Thai Muslim children, attend public schools for the first four years, fewer Thai Muslims -- as contrasted with the other two communal groups -- continue on in the public system. Rather, some are sent by their parents to study in private religious schools for varying periods of time. Until fairly recently these schools, known as *pondoks*, offered no secular instruction, and even now such instruction is extremely limited. Many Thai Muslim children do not even study in *pondoks*, their education stopping after the fourth grade. Usually they soon lose whatever functional literacy they had obtained via Thai language instruction during their four years of schooling.

The isolation of the Thai Muslims, in part self-imposed, is reinforced by the orientation of the communications media. Programmes of the one local television station and the few radio stations within the region are directed primarily toward the Thai-speaking audience. That is to say, the broadcasts are mostly in the Thai language and focus on matters of greatest interest to the Thai Buddhist and Chinese populations.[5] Only a very limited amount of time is given over to programmes in the Malay language. Of course radio broadcasts from stations in Bangkok, to the extent that they can be clearly received within the five provinces, are exclusively in the Thai language. Moreover, newspapers are all printed in the Thai language, except for one local paper which contains a page or so in the Malay language. Many Thai Muslims, in turn, rely on broadcasts and newspapers emanating from nearby Malaysia since these are increasingly in the Malay language (some are still in English).

Economic conditions in rural areas of the five provinces once were better than in many other parts of Thailand, and were comparable to conditions in the northern tier of Malaysian states. But conditions in these provinces began to worsen in the mid-50s, and the process of deterioration has continued through the 1960s and the 1970s. Reasons for the decline are essentially fourfold. First the rate of natural population growth (about three per cent) combined with some in-migration from elsewhere in Thailand has resulted in growing population pressure on cultivatable land. That is to say, the size of the average rural landholding has decreased steadily to the

50 Straits Times, 28 May 1982.

51 Lee Kuan Yew, Opening Speech at the Mendaki Conference, Straits Times, 29 May 1982.

52 Ibid.

53 1983 Key Education Statistics (Singapore: Education Statistics Section, Computer Services Branch, Planning and Management Services Division, Ministry of Education, 1983), Table 10.

54 Ibid., Table 14.

55 Sunday Times, 3 March 1985.

56 Straits Times, 29 May 1982.

57 Straits Times, 16 January 1985.

18 SUBAT 1994

SHAROM AHMAT
SHARON SIDDIQUE

MUSLIM SOCIETY, HIGHER EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
THE CASE OF THAILAND
Singapore, 1987, s. 177-219.
DN: 24285

Pawee Thim Kham
Dolmanach Baka
Phayom Petkla

Introduction

Southern Thailand consists of fourteen provinces: Chumporn, Surathani, Ranong, Phangnga, Krabi, Phathalung, Phuket, Nakorn Sri Thammarat, Trang, Songkhla, Pattani, Yala, Narathiwas, and Satun. The Ministry of Education has divided these fourteen provinces into three educational regions: Educational Region 2, consisting of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwas, and Satun; Educational Region 3, consisting of Songkhla, Phathalung, Nakorn Sri Thammarat, Surathani, and Chumporn; and Educational Region 4, consisting of Phuket, Phangnga, Trang, Krabi, and Ranong. In this paper, attention will be focused on Educational Regional 2, as most of the inhabitants there are Muslims. Together with Songkhla, these provinces make up the Southern Thai Border Provinces.

According to the 1980 census report there were a total of 1,238,016 people living in Educational Region 2. Of this number, 321,568, or about 25 per cent were Buddhist and 73 per cent, or 906,490 were Muslim.

The majority of Muslim parents have traditionally chosen to send their children to private religious schools,

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in Asia Major, New Delhi, 1985, s. 140-155.

ISLAM IN MALAYSIA AND THAILAND

Ronald Provencher

INTRODUCTION

Half of the 13 million inhabitants of Malaysia and perhaps four per cent of the 40 million inhabitants of Thailand are Muslims.[1] Almost all of these 8 million people speak the Malay language, follow the customs of Malay traditional law, and are adherents of the Shafi'i school of the orthodox Sunni sect of Islam. These loyalties and behaviours define Malay ethnicity, in the Malay point of view, and Malays are very much concerned with maintaining them in the context of relationships with other peoples. Islam, as the least variable aspect of Malay ethnicity (there are many dialects of Malay and traditional law varies from locality to locality), is the major focus of ethnic consciousness. It has been an especially important aspect of Malay ethnicity during the periods of competitive relationships with Thais, Europeans, and Overseas Chinese, very few of whom have been Muslims. The virtual identification of Malay ethnicity with Islam is obvious in the common expression, *masok melayu*, which means both 'to convert to Islam' and 'to become a Malay'.

Malay identity, in its present form, began in a context of political and economic rivalry with other peoples, and this context has continued to the present. In Malaysia, the Malays comprise a bare majority of the population. They control the political apparatus of the state and command the cultural direction of society, but others control the corporate sector of the economy. Foreign interests own more than sixty per cent of the corporate sector but Chinese Malaysians, who own less than thirty per cent, are more visible as capitalists. Also, they constitute a large non-Muslim minority, about thirty-five per cent of the population, which has become increasingly interested in Malaysian politics.[2] This is all the more threatening to Malays because of the concentration of Chinese Malaysians in urban areas which are the foci of economic and political power.

A different but more threatening situation exists for the Malays of four of the southern provinces of Thailand (Satun, Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat), where they constitute approximately seventy-five per cent of the population.[3] Political power and educational institutions are controlled by Thai government authorities. Thai is the official language and Theravada Buddhism is the state religion in these four provinces, as in the rest of Thailand. Malay efforts to maintain their own language and religion (much as Chinese Malaysians try to maintain their own languages and religions in Malaysia) are inevitably suspected of being linked with separatist movements. The Malays of southern Thailand are even more concentrated in rural areas than the Malays of Malaysia. Moreover,

they do not have easy access to government employment, which is guaranteed to Malays in Malaysia, and they are even less involved in the corporate sector of the economy.[4] The effect of Thai government efforts to assimilate Malays into Thai national culture and society has been the same as that of Malaysian Chinese attempting to participate more thoroughly in Malaysian national culture: Malays have become more consciously orthodox Muslims. This effect discomforts many Malays who otherwise would prefer to focus upon a pursuit of modern education and material progress. They are as frustrated by the traditional fundamentalists who eschew materialism as they are by other ethnic groups who control the economy.

ISLAM IN MALAY HISTORY

The beginnings as well as the growth of Islam in Malaysia and Thailand were closely associated with economic and political conflict. Islamic merchants probably visited centres of trade in Southeast Asia within a century after the Prophet's death in A.D. 632. A Muslim grave marker discovered in Trengganu, West Malaysia, bears witness to such visits in the eleventh century. But very few indigenous people of the area became Muslims until the beginning of political and economic turmoil which accompanied the fall of the Empire of Sri Vijaya in the thirteenth century.[5] The first evidence of Islamic inroads into their heretofore Tantric Buddhist realm is Marco Polo's report of several small Islamic states in northern Sumatra at the end of the thirteenth century.

From the seventh until the thirteenth century, coastal states of the Malay peninsula and Sumatra were joined in a loosely-knit trading empire, Sri Vijaya, which controlled most of the sea trade throughout Southeast Asia and between India and China. After the ninth century, most of the coastal states of Java were a part of the empire. All of these states were as much artifacts of religious ideology as of commerce. Religion provided the rationale for the hierarchical structure of power, the uneven distribution of goods and services in the economy, and the relationships of warfare, tribute, and alliance among states. The religious ideologies of state were based in large part upon Hindu-Buddhist conceptions, which were also an important basis of association and trade with India and China.[6] By the thirteenth century, Islam was firmly established in India. Moreover, the sea trade was increasingly controlled by Gujarati Muslims. At the same time, the Sri Vijayan empire (Tantric Buddhist) was crumbling, losing control of the eastern and central portions of its realm to Majapahit (a Hindu Kingdom which had expanded very rapidly from an agrarian base in central Java). The capital of Sri Vijaya shifted from Palembang to Melayu (near present-day Djambi) in the last years of Sri Vijaya as Majapahit gained control of Java and the southern third of Sumatra. Majapahit claimed suzerainty over the rest of Sumatra and over the trading states of the Malay peninsula. The Thais also claimed suzerainty over the Malay peninsula. But actual control was in the hands of local rulers who

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Abstract: This study is concerned with the Islamic education and Arabic influence in the Muslim institutions, pondok and madrasah, of Pattani--a southern border province of Thailand--once a center of Islamic education and a 'cradle of Islam' for the Malay Muslim world. The introduction provides definitions of some terms used in this work. The discussion begins with the general atmosphere of Pattani, the pondok, and its contributions. The Pattani '$ulam\ a$', their works and their roles in Islamic education both inside and outside Pattani are discussed in depth. The influence of Kitab Jawi (religious books written in the Malay language in modified Arabic script) and the Arabic language in the Muslim community of Pattani are critically discussed in detail. The Pattani Muslim-owned printing presses play a key

09 AGUSTOS 1997

Appendix III: cont.

Sinhalese	0.7	50	0.4	1103
Mauritian	0.1	8	0.2	553
	6.7		**2.2**	
Southeast Asia				
Vietnamese	0.4	31	0.7	1775
Lao	0.0	3	0.2	555
Khmer	0.1	9	0.2	651
Malay	4.1	294	0.2	547
Indonesian	3.4	246	0.2	626
Filipino	0.2	13	0.6	1480
Other SE Asian	0.6	44	0.4	1019
	8.8		**2.5**	
East Asia				
Chinese	0.6	47	1.8	4695
Chinese-mix	0.6	43	0.7	2478
Japanese	0.1	4	0.3	808
Korean	0.0	2	0.3	729
	1.3		**3.1**	
Americas				
North America	0.2	18	0.9	2425
North America-mix	0.2	17	1.0	2701
Latin America	0.1	5	0.4	976
South America	0.7	48	0.4	1172
	1.2		**2.7**	
Others	4.7	344	2.3	6218
Unclear/Unknown	1.3	93	2.1	5680
Other-mixed	2.4	175	1.0	2581
Not Stated	3.5	251	4.3	11515
	11.9		9.7	
Total	**100.0**	**7,252**	**100.0**	**268150**

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Census 1986*, unpublished Sample Ancestry Data File. The ancestry data file is a sample file of 1986 Census. The numbers refer to the sampled population and not to the total Australian population.

 6.2.7 307-320

The Religious Factor in Three Minority Movements: The Moro of the Phillipines, the Malays of Thailand and Indonesia's West Papuans*

R.J. May

03 KASIM 1992

Dergi / Kitap
Kütüphanede Mevcuttu

Introduction

This paper looks at three minority subnationalist movements: among the Philippine Muslims in the predominantly Christian Philippines; among the Malay Muslims in predominantly Buddhist Thailand, and among the largely Christian and tradition-religious people of Irian Jaya (West Papua) in predominantly Muslim Indonesia. It observes similarities and differences in the three movements and in their relations with their respective national governments, and it attempts to examine the significance of religious aspects in defining the nature of the respective movements and affecting their relations with national governments.

The Moro of the Philippines

The Islamization of the Philippine islands began in the fourteenth century. When the Spanish colonists arrived in 1565 they were dismayed to find 'Moro' sultanates in the islands and immediately mounted what was effectively a crusade against the 'evil and false doctrine Mahoma', defeating the Moro in the north and launching a series of attacks on the Moro sultanates in the southern islands of Mindanao and Sulu which continued for the next three and a half centuries. However, when the Philippine islands were ceded to the USA after the Spanish-American War in 1898, the colonial government and its converted 'Indo' allies had still not established sovereignty over the Moro, who consequently disputed the handover of their territory to the Americans. Resistance to American occupation in the south was savagely quashed by the new colonial government, and in time attempts were made to win over the Moro leadership through a 'policy of attraction' intended to integrate the Moro into the larger, Christian, Philippine society. The heritage of Christian-Muslim antipathy and distrust remained, however, and when in 1935 the American regime proposed to hand over powers to a Philippine Commonwealth government, a group of Muslim leaders in Mindanao unsuccessfully petitioned the US president to let Mindanao and Sulu remain under US administration. Occasional uprisings

* I am indebted to Harold Crouch and Larissa Taylor for their helpful comments on a draft of this paper.

ZAMAN 21 MART 1991 s.12.

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
Burada da Müslümanlar baskı altında. Dinî eğitimlerini yeterince yapamıyorlar. Direnenler utanç verici şekilde öldürülmektedir. Müslüman isimleri değiştirilmekte

Tayland ve Pattani Müslümanları

İŞKENCENİN HER TÜRÜ

Bu ülkede Müslümanların birarayа gelmesi konan kanunlarla yasaklanmış durumda. Kurban Bayramı'nda kurban kesmek yasak, hacca gidecekler belirli bir süre gözaltında tutulmakta

MESUT ÜNLÜ



Pattani Camii

Güneydoğu Asya'da yer alan Tayland Krallığı'nda Budizmden sonraki ikinci büyük din İslâm'dır. Ülkenin başlıca 4 güney eyaletinde 5 milyonu aşkın Müslüman yaşamaktadır. Ayrıca diğer eyaletlerde yaşayan Müslümanlar da vardır ve toplam nüfusun yaklaşık % 10'unu teşkil ederler. Ancak, **resmen Budist olan Tayland yönetimi yıllardan beri sürdürdüğü asimilasyon politikasının bir tezahürü olarak Müslümanlar'ın oranını % 4 olarak göstermekte ve ülkedeki İslâmî faaliyetlere engel olmaktadır. Özellikle Müslümanlar'ın çoğunlukta olduğu güneydeki Pattani bölgesinde yapılan eziyet ve zulümler 200 yıldan beri İslâm dünyasının kanayan bir yarasını oluşturmaktadır.**

PHUKET'TE CAMİDEN ÇOK PLAJ VARDI

Bir gazeteci arkadaşımla birlikte geçen yıl Kuala Lumpur'a yaptığımız seyahatin sonunda Allah'ın lütfuyla Tayland'a da uğradık ve İslâm dünyasının bu yetim evlatlarıyla tanışma imkânı bulduk. Bizzat müşahede ettik ki asırlardır nihayetsiz baskılara maruz bırakılan, serbestçe ibadet ve dinî eğitim imkânları ellerinden alınan, Müslüman isimleri Tay isimleriyle değiştirilen, diri diri gömülen ve insanlık adına utanç verici bir şekilde şehid edildikten sonra ibret-i alem için tankların arkasına bağlanarak cesetleri dikenli taşlı yollarda paramparça edilen (11 Aralık 1985'te 2'si öğrenci 6 Müslüman bu şekilde şehid edilmişlerdir.) bu kardeşlerimiz bizlerden manevi bakımdan çok şey bekliyorlardı. Öyle ki 70.000 Müslüman'ın yaşadığı (şehrin % 40'ı) Phuket şehrindeki camilerin sayısı plajların sayısından ne yazık ki daha azdı.

İSLÂM'I 10. VE 11. YÜZYILLARDA ARAP TÜCCARLAR GETİRDİ

Tayland Müslümanları'nın çoğu Malay asıllıdır. M.S. 500 ile 1500 arasında bugünkü Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti'nin Yunnan bölgesinden gelerek bölgeye yerleşmişlerdir. Uzun yıllar Budizm veya Brahmanizm dinine mensup olan bu insanların İslâm'la tanışmaları miladi 10. ve 11. yüzyıllarda Arap tüccarların vasıtaları ile olmuştur. İlk olarak güneydeki sahil bölgelerde yayılmış ve gittikçe daha da rağbet bularak bölgedeki bazı adalar halkı da İslâmiyet'i kabul etmiştir. Ayuttahaya'da Kral Narari zamanında Müslümanlar çok zengindiler. 17. yüzyılda Kral Narari'yi ziyaret eden bir Fransız hükümet temsilcisi yabancı uyrukların içerisinde en çok Müslümanlar'ı beğendiğini söylemiştir.

BUDİST YÖNETİMİN YARDAKÇISI ŞEYHÜLİSLÂMLAR

Bu usulle seçilen ilk Chula... Şeyhülislâm Tuan Suwanasasna idi. Şeyh Tuan, Kur'an-ı Kerim'i Tay diline çeviren ilk kişidir. Ancak onun yerine geçenler Müslümanlar'dan Tay hükümetine bağlılıklarını sürdürüyorlardı. Bununla birlikte birçok Müslüman liderlerinin krallığa bağlılığını, iç ve dış siyasette karışmama prensibini kabul etmemekteydiler. Nitekim Müslüman liderlerden İbrahim Kureyşi bir Bangkok gazetesinde şunları ifade etmişti: "Bu makamlar bazı ibadetleri yaptırmak için kullanılmaktadır. İslâmiyet bir hayat tarzıdır ve bir sürü manasız merasimler dinî değildir. İslâmî faaliyetin kapsamını merasimlerle sınırlamakla hükümetin, ülkenin en büyük azınlığı olan Tay Müslümanları'nın durumunu iyileştirmeye niyetli olmadığını göstermiştir" Tay hükümetinin İslâm'a karşı bu negatif tutumundan doğan huzursuzluk bazı Müslüman grupların gerilla faaliyetleri düzenlemelerine kadar yoğunlaşmıştır.

Özellikle Tayland hükümeti ile Müslümanlar arasındaki asırlık anlaşmazlığı da unutmamak lazım. Ülkenin güney eyaletlerinde, 1900'lerin başlarına kadar müstakil İslâm sultanlıkları hüküm sürüyordu. Ancak Avrupalı müstemlekecilerin de yardımıyla Tayland asır başında bunları hakimiyeti altına aldı. Sonra bölgede asimilasyon çalışmalarına başladı. Bölgeye Budist Tayland vatandaşlarını yerleştirdi. Huzursuzluklara yol açan bu durumlar neticesinde bilhassa Pattani'de teşkilatlanan Müslüman gerillalar hükümet kuvvetlerine karşı silahlı mücadele açtılar.

1932 yılında Tayland hükümeti Pattani'de İslâmî kurumların tüm faaliyetlerini yasakladı ve 1944'te geniş çapta İslâmî eserleri imha planına girişti. Bu yıllar Pattani Müslümanları'nın kendi idarecilerini belirleme ve iç işlerinde yarı bağımsız hareket edebildikleri yıllardır. 1948'de ise Pattani Sultanı Muhammed Suluh üç evladı ile birlikte önce tutuklanmış ardından da Budist yönetim tarafından öldürülerek Sunkala Körfezi'ne atılmıştır. Aynı yıl içinde toplu imha hareketi sürmüş, yalnız Bulikor Samik bölgesinde 125 Müslüman aile diri diri yakılmıştır. 11 Aralık 1985'te ise ikisi talebe altı Müslüman'ın şehid edilmeleri, cesetlerin tankların arkasına bağlatılarak, sürüklenerek parçalattırılması sonrasında kısa sürede bütün Pattani'yi kapsayan gösteriler başladı.

DERS KİTAPLARINDA PEYGAMBERİMİZİN RESMİ


1985'te Tayland Eğitim Bakanı, Peygamber Efendimiz ve sahabilerin resimlerini ders kitaplarına koydurdu. Ardından Müslüman üniversiteli kız öğrencilerinin başlarını örtmeleri yasaklandı. Toplu olarak Müslümanlar'ın biraraya gelmelerini engelleyici kanunlar yürürlüğe konuldu.

BAYRAMDA KURBAN KESMEK DAHİ YASAKTI

Pattani Ulusal Kurtuluş Cephesi Lideri İzzeddin Abdurrahman Tayland Müslümanları'nın uğradığı diğer eziyetleri de şöyle anlatıyordu: "Tayland'da hacca gidebilmeniz için belli bir süre gözaltında tutulmanız, bu gözaltı sonrasında belirli kişilerin kontrolü altında yola çıkmanız gerek. Namaz kıldığınız mescitlere her an saldırılar düzenlenebilir. Cami cemaati sürekli sayılır ve kontrol altında tutulur. Kurban Bayramı'nda kurban kesmeniz yasaktır. Zekatı devletin kendisi sizden almak ister."

Gerçekten, Budist Tayland yönetiminin Müslümanlar'a çektirdiği bu eziyetler belli başlı 3 gerilla örgütünü faaliyete geçirmişti. Bunlardan PULO Kabir Abdurrahman liderliğinde 1968 yılında kurulmuştur. Pattani Sultanlığı'nın 4 Müslüman bölgesinin bağımsızlığına kavuşması için mücadele etmektedir. Diğer bir grup olan Barisan Devrim Milleti (BRN) Tayland Müslümanları'nın Malezya iie birleşmesini istemektedir. 1974'te Hacı Kerim'in liderliğinde kurulmuştur. 3. grup ise Pattani Ulusal Kurtuluş Cephesi'dir (BNNP). 1977 yılında ölen Tunku Jalan tarafından kurulan BNNP Pattani Sultanlığı'nın yeniden kurulmasını ve Kuzey Malaya devletçilikleriyle birleşmesini istemektedir.

Tayland Müslümanları'nın en yakın zamanda, ellerinden alınan hak ve özgürlüklere kavuşması Yüce Rabb'imden (c.c) dileğimiz.



Tayland'da namaz kıldığımız ilk camideki Tay dilinde yazılmış vaaz programı çok ilgimizi çekti.

MÜSLÜMAN HALKI TEMSİL EDEN BİR CEPHE

PATTANİ

Pattani Millî Kurtuluş Cephesi Müslüman Pattani halkını temsil eden ulusal cephedir. 1960 yılında kurulan cephenin temel hedefleri şunlardır:

1— Tayland'ın güney bölgesinde (PATTANİ) yer alan Müslümanlar'ın işgal altındaki topraklarının kurtarılması.


2— Bu bölgede bağımsız Pattani İslâm devletinin kurulması.

3— Pattani Müslüman topluluğunun manevi ve maddi açıdan kendine yeterli hale gelebilmesini sağlama.

4— İslâmî esasların Pattani'de tatbikini sağlama.

5— Uluslararası örgütlerde Pattani halkının yasal temsilcisi olduğunun kabulünü sağlama.

Ulusal Kurtuluş Cephesi'nin hedeflerine varabilmek için tesbit ettiği programda aşağıdaki hususlar tesbit edilmiştir:



Tayland'daki Taoist Çinliler atalarının ejderhadan geldiğine inanıyorlardı.

1— Pattani kurtuluş savaşının başarıya ulaşabilmesini sağlamak için Müslüman savaşçıların ve Müslüman halkın tek bir örgüt içinde örgütlenmesini temin etme.

2— Halkın siyasî ve İslâmî açıdan şuurlanabilmesi için eğitim çalışmalarında bulunma.

3— Silahlı İslâmî cihadı gerçekleştirebilmek için her türlü vesileyi kullanmak.

4— Silahlı mücahidlerin her yönden eğitimlerini sağlama.

5— Tayland yönetimi tarafından işgal altında bulunan Pattani topraklarındaki düşmana ait her türlü iktisadi ve askerî merkezlere karşı saldırılar düzenleme.

6— Pattani savaşını dünyaya duyurarak başta İslâm ülkeleri olmak üzere ulusların yardım ve desteğini temin etme.

7— Millî bağımsızlık hareketleri ile çeşitli ülkelerde bulunan temsilcilikleri vasıtası ile temas etmek, onlarla işbirliğine girmek.

8— Pattani bağımsız İslâm devletini kurabilmek için çeşitli ülkelerde istişare toplantıları düzenlemek.

Hem Fransız okulunda, hem de Kur'an kursunda büyük başarı gösterdi

Fransa, bu çocuğu konuşuyor



ÜZEYİR LOKMAN ÇAYCI-PARİS

Ispartalı Ceylan Demirağaç'ın küçük oğlu Kadir Demirağaç Paris'te başarı üzerine başarı kazanıyor. Hem Fransız okulunda, hem de Kur'an kursunda başarı gösteren 9 yaşındaki Kadir Demirağaç şunları söylüyor: "Babamı Paris'te herkes Ceylan Hoca diye tanıyor.

Bir sorumuz üzerine Demirağaç, şunları söyledi: "Türkiye'yi çok seviyorum. Oraya gittiğimizde gürül gürül ezan okunuyor. Çeşmelerden buz gibi tatlı sular akıyor. Gerçi oradaki çocuklar sen Almanyalısın diye benimle oynamak istemiyorlar ama ben yine onları seviyorum. Çünkü namaz kılıyorlar..."

Tayland

THAILAND

LEARNED SOCIETIES and RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS

Islamic Social and Economic Development Foundation of Thailand
47 Ruamrudee Soi 2, Pleonchit Rd
Bangkok 5

Office of the Islamic Mission
56/21-25 Rama 1 Road, Bangkok 10500

LIBRARIES and ARCHIVES

Ho Samut Haeng Chat (National Library of Thailand)
Samsen Rd., Bangkok 10300

National Archives Division, Fine Arts Department
Samsen Rd., Bangkok 10300

MUSEUMS

National Museum
Na Phra-Dhart Rd., Bangkok 2

UNIVERSITIES and EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Chulalongkorn University, Faculty of Arts Dept. of Eastern Languages
Phyathai Rd., Bangkok 10500

Silpakorn University Faculty of Archaeology Dept. of Oriental Languages
Na-Phralan Rd., Bangkok 10200

Tayland

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Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, c.6(s.1) s. 98-112, 1985(London)

The Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand

W.K. Che Man

THAYLAND

Historical Background

Although Malay-Muslims make up only about 4 percent of Thailand's forty-five million predominantly Buddhist population, they constitute a large majority in the Greater Patani Region; i.e., the four southern provinces of Patani, Narathiwat, Yala and Satun.

Patani was historically the ancient Malay kingdom of Langkasuka. Founded some time in the first century A.D., Langkasuka was considered one of the important commercial ports for Asian mariners, especially those who sailed directly across the Gulf of Siam from the southen tip of Vietnam to the Malay peninsula.[1] When the major powers in the region — the Cambodian empire of Angkor, the Mon empire of Pagan, and the Srivijaya — intervened in the peninsula's affairs, the small states struggled to keep their independence, either maintaining a precarious existence or disappearing from sight. In the case of Langkasuka, the kingdom gradually disappeared and was replaced by the kingdom of Patani.

The *Hikayat Morong Mahawangsa* (Kedah Annals) attributes Patani's foundation to people from Kedah, while *Phongsawadan Muang Patani* (Chronicles of Patani) gives credit to a ruler from an unidentified Kota Mahligai. In *Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu Patani* (History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani), Ibrahim Shukri suggests that a ruler of an inland city of Kota Mahligai developed a small coastal village into a bustling port at the expense of the former. Subsequently, Kota Mahligai was abandoned in favour of the new city, which was Patani. The date of this event is not certain. Tome Pires, a Portuguese who passed through Malacca in 1511 wrote of Patani as though it had been in existence before 1370. On the other hand, the region still was identified by Chinese sailors as Langkasuka at the time of the voyage of Admiral Cheng-ho around the year 1403.

The Coming of Islam

Patani has been held to be one of the cradles of Islam in Southeast Asia. The initual contact of Patani with Islam was undoubtedly a by-product of Arab trade with China. Arab and Indian merchants had settled in the commercial centers of Patani by the end of the twelfth century, intermarrying with the indigenous people and forming the nucleus of a Muslim community. More than three centuries after Islam had spread into the area, the court of Patani was converted to Islam. The kingdom of Patani, it is believed, was officially declared an Islamic state in 1457.[2]

The Islamization of Patani led to the emergence of a new sense of ethnic identity that distinguished Muslims of Patani from Thai Buddhists. Patani conversion to Islam also resulted in an ideological bond among the people of the area, creating a new sense of community that transcended local and provincial loyalties. Furthermore, Islam became the unifying force and, in the face of the encroachments of imperialistic expansion, provided the demand for revolutionary action.[3] It is through this unifying ideology and a new sense of ethnic identity that the Muslim resistance to Thai expansion has been carried on intermittently since the seventeenth century.

The Muslim kingdom of Patani grew in terms of both population and prosperity. 'Patani', writes Newbold, 'was once the largest and most populous of the Malay states on the peninsula'.[4] It was described as an important commercial center for Asian as well as for European traders. The kingdom comprised two major Muslim dynasties: the Patani Dynasty (?-1688) and the Kelantan Dynasty (1688-1729).

The outbreak of civil war in 1729 set Patani in chaos: Alung Yunus, the last ruler of the Kelantan Dynasty, was killed. Civil war dragged on for a long period, until an aristocrat from Dawai, Mayo, was able to unify Patani and establish himself as Sultan Muhammad. Sultan Muhammad ruled Patani until it fell under Thai control in 1786.

Beginning of Thai Control

Ever since the establishment of Muslim dynasties the kingdom of Patani seems to have experienced alternate periods of independence and Thai control. At times when it was under Thai suzerainty, the sultans and sultanas were obliged to send the Flower of Gold to the Thai court as a tribute and sign of loyalty. They were also required to provide military aid when requested by the Thai king. At times when the kingdom of Patani was strong, it felt that the subservient status as a vassal state of the Thai kingdom was unreasonable and intolerable.

Having encountered rebellions, Thailand decided to reduce Patani's strength by applying a policy of divide and rule. In 1816 the Patani region was divided into seven provinces: Patani, Nongchik, Raman, Ra-ngae, Saiburi, Yala and Yaring. However, the policy of divide and rule did not promote political stability and failed to bring about effective control over revenue collection and taxation of the area. Most of the *rajas* (rulers) found themselves dissatisfied and distressed under the increasing control of Bangkok. Encouraged by disruptions in Kedah, then also a vassal state of Siam,[5] the indigenous Patani rulers revolted against Thailand in 1832 but were defeated. Nevertheless, there was yet another abortive revolt in the region six years later.

In time, however, the territorial division of Patani resulted in its weakening and becoming more dependent on Bangkok. A reversal of the policy of sending Thai officials to rule Patani proved to be effective in reducing disorder in the region. Thereafter, Bangkok was able to deal with the provinces on an individual basis and a peaceful atmosphere prevailed for several years.

The peace was broken when King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) introduced the policy of administrative centralization known as the *Thesaphiban* system, which aimed at exerting greater direct control from Bangkok. In 1901, Thai-

ASIAN AFFAIRS, c.69 (n.3), s.274–280, 1982 (London)

BANGKOK: CELEBRATION OF A DYNASTY

STUART SIMMONDS

Lecture given to the Society on 26th May, 1982. Professor Stuart Simmonds has held various teaching posts at The School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, since 1948. He was appointed to the Chair of Languages and Literatures of South East Asia in the University of London in 1970. He was Director of the Royal Asiatic Society from 1965–68, President 1973–76 and Pro-Director at SOAS 1981–82. He has written extensively on Thai languages and literature and on political subjects connected with South East Asia.

NOW, IN 1982, we are celebrating the two hundredth anniversary of the founding of Bangkok and in doing so we are also celebrating the Chakkri dynasty which brought it to birth and presided over its growth and attainment of maturity; parents of a much loved child. But before birth there is conception and gestation so let me first speak a little about that.

Bangkok or *Bāngkōk* is a simple place name which includes a reference, as many Thai country place names do, to a tree. Perhaps it means the village by the hog-plum trees. The original settlement would have been on the west bank of the Chao Phraya river where the ground was drier, or should we say less marshy than that on the eastern bank.

It was at a strategic point on the river route from the coast to the capital of Ayuthaya. A seventeenth century map in the State Archives at The Hague shows a small circular settlement called Bancoc on the west bank, the Oude Castel, and opposite on the east bank, in the great bend of the river, there is an indication of a five-sided fort, the Nieuwe Castel.

By the end of the seventeenth century the place had become well-known as a defended area to the French. Nicolas Gervaise, a Jesuit who accompanied the de Chaumont expedition, describes the area thus:

> "Bangkok is assuredly the most important place in the kingdom of Siam, for it is the only one along all the coast which may offer any resistance to its enemies. The town is much longer than broad and is only about half a league in extent. It is protected by walls only on the side facing the river which waters it on the east and south at a distance of some twelve leagues or less from its mouth.
>
> At the point where the river divides, the only defence is a kind of crescent where are mounted twenty four pieces of brass cannon which have been fairly well made. Facing this on the other bank of the river, there is a rather compact little fort which does not appear to be able to put up any great resistance, although there are over thirty pieces of cannon there. These two forts, if we may call them so, are guarded by a hundred Christian soldiers commonly called Portuguese half-castes, and these soldiers are commanded by captains and other officers who drill them every day; but for all that, they are none the braver, for they are born cowards, and I am sure that but a dozen of our musketeers would be more than sufficient to overpower, in an hour at least, these hundred soldiers.
>
> The engineer who M. le Chevalier de Chaumont gave to the King is about to construct new fortifications, for he is a very clever man, knows how to make the best of the site at his disposal, and can make a substantial town which will give the country ample protection from the assaults of its enemies."

DOKUMANTASYON MERKEZİ SOAS

In fact in 1688 the French stayed at Bangkok for a brief period before being forced out of the country.

After the capture of Ayuthaya by the Burmese in 1767, Phya Tak Sin, who took upon himself the defence of the realm, built a palace and a small town on the west bank close to an ancient monastery where Wat Arun, the Temple of the Dawn, stands today.

The dramatic events of 1782 involving the revolt against Tak Sin by local officials at Thonburi, the west bank capital, and the recall from a campaign in Cambodia of Chao Phraya Chakkri, the most senior and most successful general, mark two things: the birth of Bangkok as a capital on its present site and the coming into being of the Chakkri dynasty.

This double birth, so to speak, is what we are celebrating as an anniversary in 1982.

Chao Phraya Chakkri moved fast. In April 1782 he went through a *Prapdāphisēk*, a minor anointment and coronation ceremony, and occupied a new royal building on the east bank. A month later the *Lak Mu'ang*, a stone pillar in a small chapel, was erected to represent symbolically the fortune of the new city which was now rising. Nearby, in an area occupied by Chinese traders who moved to Sam Pheng, a part of Bangkok still occupied by them, appeared a new Grand Palace. This was completed in 1785 when the *Boromarāchāphisēk*, the major coronation ceremony, was performed. This included both Buddhist and Brahmanistic rites.


During the previous three years tens of thousands of Thai, Laotians and Cambodians were levied to construct not only the Grand Palace and Wat Phra Kaeo but the walls, fortifications and canals of the new city. New brickworks were set up and much building material was also transported from the ruins of the former capital, Ayuthaya.

The King chose the eastern bank because it was easier to defend than the Thonburi bank. However it was marshier and at a slightly lower elevation. In 1785 a grand celebration was held to mark the completion of the palaces and other major construction works. A whole range of dramatic and quasi-dramatic performances was given and the distribution of free food and gifts of money and jewels was an important feature of the celebrations. On a more sinister note, shortly afterwards, in November 1785, the first flood of Bangkok was recorded.

A greater project even than the Grand Palace was the rebuilding and enhancement of the old Photharam Monastery which became known as the Phra Chetuphon (Jetavana) Monastery. The ancient name still lingers in Wat Pho, the monastery of the Sacred Fig Tree.

The site, adjoining that of the Grand Palace, was a marshy one. The

Anti-Muslim Crusade in Tayland



The King and the Queen at a Buddhist Cerimony

Thailand with its curious mixture of Buddhism and the military is getting more intolerant of the Muslim minority, particularly of the Malays in the South. **Fadlullah Wilmott** reports.

JANUARY saw new developments in the continuous strategy of the Thai authorities against Muslims; four Muslims were murdered by soldiers from the 43rd Ranger Division; there was a big ceremony to celebrate the so-called surrender of Muslim freedom fighters whom the Thai regime calls bandits; Muslim land was confiscated as the site of an ancient Buddhist temple and Muslim girls at a teachers college faced discrimination and difficulties as well as suspension from classes for wearing Muslim dress. Unfortunately there is an almost complete ignorance not only of the religion of Islam among most Thais but also of the real history of the incorporation of the Muslim areas of the south into the kingdom. Most Thais are unaware that the Malay Muslims of the south are not Thais but are ethnic Malays who are citizens of the country through no choice of their own. The Muslims were, in fact, conquered by the Thais and had no hand in establishing the country of Thailand. In fact the Muslims of Patani have, for 350 years, been struggling against one of the most vicious colonial systems; Thai Buddhist colonialism. In 1786, 1789, 1791 and 1832 there were attacks on Patani by Thailand. The Muslims in Bangkok were brought there after 4,000 were taken captive in 1786 and used as slaves to dig Bangkok's canals. Between 1832 to 1902 Patani was ruled by seven Malay Sultans who paid tribute to Bangkok. It was as recent as 1948 that 250,000 Muslims from the southern provinces petitioned the United Nations with the request that it oversee the cession of the Muslim areas to the new Federation of Malaya before the Thai authorities became aware of the movement and placed the leaders under arrest.

Like occupied Palestine, the Southern Philippines, Eritrea, Kashmir and other occupied Muslim lands the Thai regime is using a policy of population transfer to increase their hold on the Malay Muslim land of Patani. Muslims are dispossessed of their land to make way for these usurpers. In 1980 five thousand Muslims were forced to evacuate their traditional lands to make way for these settlers. The government has supported terrorist squads to frighten the Muslims into leaving their lands. It was reported that in 1981 there were about 70 settlements with about 7,000 to 10,000 Buddhists living in them as part of a government plan to dilute the Muslim identity of Patani. Using Zionist experts the government is bringing in Buddhist settlers from the north, giving them land, fortified settlements, weapons and houses.

In an effort to destroy the historical record, the names of towns and villages are being changed from their historical Malay and, in many cases, Muslim names to Thai names. For instance the town of Minara is now called Narathiwat. It is claimed that the Muslims in the south are 'Thai Muslims' and their Malay identity is denied. Children do not learn of the historical Sultanate of Patani which played a leading role in the spread of Islam in South East Asia.

In 1975 five innocent Muslim religious students were brutally murdered by Thai Marines from Saiburi after refusing to worship a Buddhist statue. This murder led to huge demonstrations in Patani and there was further deaths of Muslims when a grenade was thrown into the demonstration by uniformed men.


Around fifty thousand Muslims from southern Thailand fled into the northern Malaysian states of Kedah, Perak, Perlis and Kelantan as well as Singapore and Saudi Arabia in 1980 to escape persecution from the Thai army and the communists. According to the refugees they were constantly harassed by the two groups leading to a number of deaths and the abduction of other. Religious schools were closed down and the teachers fled in fear of their lives.

In 1980 an active Muslim youth worker Burhanuddin, better know as 'Din German' because the studied in Germany, was shot by two assailants riding a motorcycle. Muslim workers, especially those active among the youth live in fear of their lives. In January 1981 a religious teacher sent by *Darul Ifta* of Saudi Arabia, Ustaz Muhammad Abdul Latif was brutally tortured and shot dead while he was on the way back to his house from teaching. The army was suspected of murdering him. In March the same year a village headman and his wife were shot dead by a Thai army officer whom they had earlier entertained to a meal as a 'guest' in their home. Following this, another religious teacher, Ustaz Nik Hassan was murdered by uniformed men when stepping down from his house to take *wudhu* before dawn prayers. One Chief of Police in the south once said that a Muslim life was worth only 26 cents.

The Thai authorities have continued a policy of destroying the Muslim educational system in the south by a series of rules and regulations which have made it difficult for any independent Muslim school to survive. There is no provision for Muslim children to learn their mother tongue, Malay in the schools and in a secret circular issued in 1985 by the National Security Council decided not to allow the establishment of new religious schools. At present very few private religious schools have survived and the secular curriculum has also been forced on them. The government has developed a series of Islamic textbooks for the use in Muslim schools but these are very basic and insufficient to give the children an effective understanding of their religion. The first copies of the text books produced contained offensive statements about Islam and even a picture of the Prophet Muhammad. Muslims embarked on a series of protest against the books which were subsequently revised. Muslims have accused the government of failing to provide an effectvie Islamic education programme. According to the programme announced by the government, 1,073 of the 1,574 primary schools should implement the programme by 1986 but by 1985 only 574 schools had implemented the programme. Teachers at private religious schools have to be approved by the government. The planned destruction of the traditional Islamic educational system is a long-term programme which is now having the desired effect of creating a generation of Muslims who are divorced from their religious and cultural tradition. Television frequencies from Malaysia have been blocked out to prevent Muslims receiving programmes from Malaysia.

In 1985 all Muslim children attending school in Patani were subject to a campaign to get them to change their names from Muslim names to Thai names. This policy was implemented by the Patani District Officer, Thakerngask Patano "in accordance with the centre's policy." The Thai bureaucrats said that Muslims would face 'inconveniences' in their dealings with the government bureaucracy if they maintained their Muslim names. For the Malay Muslims this was regarded as yet another assault on their cultural and religious identity. The bureaucracy is pushing for the Malays to conform to the Thai Buddhists in all aspects of their life.

Also in 1985 Muslims were subjected to a concerted campaign to undertake family planning under the euphemism "Population Development and the Quality of Life" funded by the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA). There have been persistent claims that Muslim women giving birth in government hospitals are routinely sterilised without their consent.





Thai Muslim women in a meeting: their Hijab is increasingly coming in for criticism from the authorities.

Another problem which arose in 1985 was the installation of Buddhist statues in schools where over 90% of

After Inquiry, April 1988 (1988) pp. 58-62, London

PATTANI





A POLITICAL POWDER KEG

"The situation has developed to the point of crisis," admitted a recent Thai government report on the Malay Muslim separatist movements in Pattani, says *John Davis*

At first glance the little town of Pattani on Thailand's southern coast appears to be a tropical idyll. Brightly-coloured fishing boats ride at anchor in the river estuary. Old-fashioned Chinese merchant houses line the river banks and man-powered trishaws provide the commonest and most convenient means of transport for the town-dwellers. Surrounding Pattani are traditional villages with wooden houses built on stilts amid green and lush scenery.

The peace of Pattani is illusory: southern Thailand is a political powder keg, a countryside for years torn apart by civil strife and insurgency. Hidden in the distant hills, visible from Pattani Town, are Muslim guerillas who demand independence for Thailand's four southernmost provinces; Jala, Narathiwat, Pattani and Satun, where the population is ethnically Malay, not Thai. Assaults on government outposts are frequent and the last year has seen an increase in guerilla attacks on police stations and army camps. This increased activity by the Muslim minority in the predominantly Buddhist Thailand has caused great concern for the government in Bangkok.

In a recent government report, a team which had spent some time examining conditions in the south, stated that "...the situation has developed to the point of crisis and has raised the question of a possible disintegration in unity of the people there. The security of the nation is being threatened..."

The origin of the conflict in southern Thailand and the bloody fighting between government troops and Muslim insurgents is not simply a matter of religion. Thai Buddhists and Muslims, mainly of Chinese and Indian descent, live together peacefully in Bangkok, Chiang Mai and other affluent cities further to the north, and outside the south there is no equivalent to the movement among the Pattani Muslims.

The root of the conflict is that Pattani follows the usual pattern of a remote and neglected border area. Average income in the south is well below the national level, unemployment is high and government projects are few and far between. Government officials, who view their assignment to the south more or less as a punishment, tend to withhold reports of serious developments in the areas under their responsibility from their superiors in Bangkok.

"If they report that the situation is serious, then their superiors would construe the reports as a sign of their inefficiency," one local source told *Arabia* in Pattani. "They

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C.9. S. 209—223, 1909 (PARIS)

TAYLAND

LES MUSULMANS DU YUN-NAN

Sous les confins sud-ouest de l'Empire chinois, le chaos montagneux du Yun-nan prolonge et relie à la plaine les hauts sommets du plateau thibétain qui le ferme vers l'ouest. La brousse épaisse du Haut-Tonkin et les grandes forêts du Laos et de la Birmanie ont été bien longtemps pour lui une infranchissable barrière vers le sud. Tout récemment enfin, on comptait vers le nord une centaine d'étapes depuis la capitale de la province jusqu'à Pékin.

Isolée ainsi dans les vallées étroites et fertiles que le chemin de fer de Laokay à Yun-nan-fou rattache maintenant au monde extérieur, une importante communauté musulmane s'était formée au quatorzième siècle, avait grandi, et constitua, il y a cinquante ans à peine, un sultanat indépendant qui dura quelques années. Les Croyants, décimés lors des massacres qui furent la fin de leur tentative, ont retrouvé, dans le calme et la paix, une importance numérique toujours croissante, et l'influence que leur assurent une énergie et une intelligence bien peu fréquentes chez les indigènes du pays : ils constituent aujourd'hui plus du dixième de la

les meilleures sources, des *Thai* ou *Shan* qui n'avaient jamais eu de contact avec l'islamisme et dont la religion était le bouddhisme. Les empereurs chinois n'exigeaient qu'un tribut nominal des rois du *Nan Tchao*. Dans l'est de la province les expéditions faites à diverses époques avaient laissé dans le pays une population d'origine sseu-tch'ouanaise en majeure partie, qui gardait les grandes routes et occupait les points principaux. Cependant, vers le treizième siècle, Gengis Khan ayant soumis le nord de la Chine, envoya son fils Koubilaï avec le général Ouléangotaï conquérir le sud-ouest.

L'expédition, partie en 1253 du *Lin-t'ao* (Chen-si) traversa la région du Kou-kou nor, le Thibet oriental et déboucha devant Ta-li fou. Deux autres armées venaient, l'une par la vallée du Kien-tch'ang et l'autre par la grande route de Souei-fou et Tchao-t'ong. Le Yun-nan fut enlevé en une chevauchée : d'autres expéditions vinrent successivement traverser la province pour aller combattre soit en Birmanie, soit au Tonkin. Marco Polo nous a laissé le récit de l'une d'entre elles.

Or, dès la fin du treizième siècle, les troupes mongoles étaient musulmanes en majorité : tous les peuples de l'Asie Centrale se retrouvaient sous leurs bannières. M. A. Vissière a retracé récemment la biographie du Seyyid Edjell Chams Ed-din Omar qui fut six ans gouverneur du Yun-nan et dont le mausolée existe encore aux portes de la capitale de la province. L'armée d'occupation dont le centre était Ta-li fou, laissa de nombreux descendants dans la région pendant les deux cents ans que dura la domination mongole : beaucoup de soldats, d'ailleurs, leur temps de service terminé, s'installèrent définitivement et firent souche.

D'autre part, éloignés de la capitale, les mahométans, fanatiques comme toujours, durent oublier la loi de tolérance des Grands Khans et imposèrent sans nul doute leur religion aux populations qu'ils asservirent. Les gens du pays

The "*Čīn-Hō*" (Yunnanese Chinese) Muslims of North Thailand

Andrew D.W. Forbes

THAILAND BURMA

Introduction

The most northerly of the various Muslim minority peoples resident in Thailand are the Islamicized Chinese, known locally as "*Čīn-Hō*" (pronounced "Chin-Haw") or, more simply as "*Hǫ*" (pronounced "Haw") who have migrated over the centuries from China's south-westernmost province of Yunnan to the neighbouring states of Laos, Burma and Thailand. Indeed, the term "*Hǫ*" is used in northern Thailand as a general designation for all Yunnanese Chinese immigrants, whether Muslim or not, and this presents the researcher with a considerable problem in the evaluation of *Hǫ* Muslim demography.

The etymology of the term *Hǫ* is similarly problematic. Certainly it is not popular amongst the Yunnanese of north Thailand, who prefer simply to call themselves "Chinese" *(Han-ren, Chung-kuo ren)*, or, if Muslim, the standard Mandarin term for China's Chinese-speaking minority, *Hui-min* (or *Hui-hui*, or – more rarely – *Hui-tsu*).[1] "*Hǫ*" is, nevertheless, the name by which Yunnanese Chinese are most widely known in northern Thailand (and neighbouring Laos), and as such is the designation employed in the present paper.[2]

Early history

Yunnanese Chinese – and, prominently amongst them, Hui Muslims – have long been associated with the commerce of Szechwan, Burma, Laos and Thailand. As early as A.D. 1416, the Yunnanese Muslim interpreter and voyager Ma Huan noted in his *Ying-yai sheng-lan* the presence of a "back door" (Ch. *hou-men*) by which it was possible to travel between Yunnan and northern Thailand.[3] Similarly, the first Englishman to have left an account of his travels in southeast Asia, the merchant Ralph Fitch, noted in his *Voyage* 'Begun in the Yeere of Our Lord 1583, and ended in 1591' that to the town of "Jamahey" (Chiangmai) 'come many merchants out of China, and bring great store of Muske, Gold, Silver, and many other things of China worke'.[4]

In fact, whilst it is clear that overland trade links between Yunnan and mainland southeast Asia are of great antiquity, extending back as far as T'ang Dynasty times (618-907 A.D.) and even before,[5] Hui Muslim involvement in (and, ultimately, domination of) these trade routes is a later phenomenon, commencing with the Mongol domination of China under the Yüan Dynasty (1280-1368 A.D.). Any historical study of the Islamicized *Hǫ* in northern Thailand must, therefore, begin with some analysis of the origins and nature of Hui Muslim society in Yunnan, whence the ancestors of the present-day *Hǫ* Muslims of north Thailand derived. In the present paper this analysis will necessarily, be kept to a minimum.

It is generally supposed that Muslim settlements in the Yunnan region date from the time of the T'ang Dynasty; certainly the *Hsin T'ang Shu* records the

c.7 (S.1), S.173-186, 1986 (London)

Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs
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The Socio-Economic Status of Muslims in Central and North Thailand

Thailand

Raymond Scupin

Introduction

Thailand is a Theravada Buddhist nation in Southeast Asia with a population of about 42 million. Thailand as a nation is customarily divided into four distinct geographical regions: northern, northeastern, central, and southern Thailand. Southern Thailand includes four provinces which border on Malaysia: Narathiwat, Satul, Yala, and Pattani.[1] Eighty-five to ninety percent of the residents in these southern provinces are Muslim. Most of these Muslims reside in rural areas. In total this southern Thai Muslim population represents six to eight percent of the population in the nation. The northeastern region bordering on Laos and Cambodia has very few Muslim residents. In the central and northern regions of Thailand the minority Muslim population is concentrated in the urban areas.

This report is a general overview of the economic status of the Muslim minorities in Central and Northern Thailand. The data is drawn from two different ethnographic studies. Suthep Soonthornpasuch completed an ethnographic survey of the Muslim minority in Chiengmai city in Northern Thailand. I completed an ethnographic study of the Muslim minority in Bangkok, the capital city of Thailand, located in Central Thailand. Our studies complement each other in certain respects, because they represent the first ethnographic surveys of Muslim minorities residing in urban Buddhist environments in Thailand. However there are distinctive diffferences in these studies based on qualitative and quantitative factors. Soonthornpasuch and I focused on different aspects of the Muslim socioeconomic status in Thailand. For example, he elicited data regarding occupational prestige ranking and I did not. Many of the differences in our analysis are simply the result of the differences in scale. The Muslim minority in Chiengmai city consists of approximately 2,500 individuals. The Muslim minority in Bangkok is estimated at between 250,000 and 300,000 individuals. Consequently, Soonthornpasuch's analysis tends to reflect a micro-sociological approach, whereas my own study has a macro-sociological focus.

It must be noted that the socioeconomic data on these Muslim minority populations is highly generalized. To some extent this is due to the sensitive nature of the topic itself. In urban areas, income, savings, and consumption data are not easily elicited (in comparison to rural areas where this type of data is easily standardized). Aside from the obvious sensibilities (taxation concerns, etc.), most urban residents do not give accurate data on these aspects of their lives. But the generalized nature of the data is also the result of the sensitive nature of the relationship between the Muslim population and the Thai government. Hence, this report is, in some senses, only a platform for more intensive research into the socioeconomic conditions of Muslim minorities in Central and Northern Thailand.

Muslims in Central Thailand

As in other parts of Southeast Asia, trade was the important factor determining the migration of Muslims to Central Thailand. Although foreign trade was relatively unimportant in respect to the Thai economy as a whole, by the end of the sixteenth century overseas trade began to stimulate a demand for Thai exports.[2] A circular trading network developed which involved the importation of Indian cloth for Thai consumption in exchange for non-monetary commodities. These commodities were then sent to the Japanese market and exchanged for silver and other products which found their way to India. Thai exports included mainly unprocessed natural products such as deerskins, other animal hides, aloe wood, rice, pepper, sugar, ivory, and elephants.[3] This trade gathered momentum during the seventeenth century leading to the eventual penetration of the European economic powers. But Muslim traders from various countries had been participating in Thai foreign trade almost from the beginning.

During the seventeenth century the Thai economy was not a fully developed market economy but was rather an administered economy. Both Thai and European records indicate that the King of Ayudhya strictly and absolutely controlled both domestic and foreign trade.[4] The kings themselves established royal monopolies in order to gain revenue for the royal treasury. Many commodities were monopolized by the king, while others were denied to traders until the king had as much as he wanted to buy. Private traders were allowed to trade in certain so-called 'vulgar' commodities, but most exported goods were controlled by royal prerogatives. Although this institutional framework was not conductive to the development of indigenous entrepreneurs, ironically it led to some opportunities for foreign traders. For example, at times various Thai kings would lend capital to foreign traders in order to stimulate trade in particular commodities and ultimately derive some of the profits for the royal coffers.[5] Because of this economic and political climate many Muslims came and established themselves in the Ayudhyan capital to become successful traders.

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CONFLICT BETWEEN THE THAI AND ISLAMIC CULTURES IN SOUTHERN THAILAND 1948—1970

DENNIS WALKER

Early manifestations of a clash between Buddhist, that is to say, Thai and Islamic culture occurred when the Muslim Malays of the *Patani* kingdom and its neighbouring areas were first placed under the direct administration of the expanding Thai empire in 1902 and Thai options to culturally assimilate the Muslims to their South were decisively broadened. Nonetheless, it seems appropriate for our study to concentrate on the struggle between the two cultures as it unfolded between 1948 and 1970. For in 1948, under the leadership of Ḥājjī Sulong ʿAbd al-Qādir, the Muslim Malays formulated demands for administrative and cultural autonomy which first reveal the impact of the recognizably modern type of anti-colonial nationalism then sweeping the neighbouring and cognate Muslim lands of Malaya and Indonesia. With Hājjī Solong's demands, the Muslim Malays were strengthened in their determination to preserve their separate identity; and they began to travel a path of resistance and protest that was to lead them to the decision of an uprising for independence from Thailand which from 1969 onwards they have been striving to effect. The two decades since 1948 have thus been a decisive turning point for the concepts and outlook of Thailand's Muslim Malays. In more specific political terms Ḥājjī Sulong's protest and the harshness with which the Thai Government is reported to have silenced it, heralded the birth of a new Malaya nationalist leadership in the post-World War South. The royal Patani aristocracy whose role had by now petered out into *emigre* agitation from Malaysia was replaced as focus for Muslim discontent by these new leaders.

The new type of leadership raises again the deeper socio-cultural question of the part of the Arabic-oriented traditional

THAILAND AND THE JAPANESE INVASION

By A. F. THAVENOT

LECTURE given to the Royal Central Asian Society on January 14, 1942.

The lecturer was introduced by the Right. Hon. Lord Hailey, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., who said they liked to feel in this Society that they specialized in matters of topical interest, and this was certainly the case on the present occasion. He often felt a presentiment of evil when countries began to change their name. We were quite contented with "Siam," and indeed we were quite contented with "Mesopotamia" and had no fault to find with "Persia." But as soon as the names were altered to "Thailand," "Iraq," and "Iran," trouble began. How wise was Mr. Churchill to insist on reminding them of their old relationship with us by calling them by their original names! And what a pleasure it was to be able to speak of Russia again, instead of "U.S.S.R."

Mr. Thavenot had undisputed qualifications for lecturing on this subject; he had been in Thailand for over thirty years.

LORD HAILEY has referred to the change of name from Siam to Thailand. That change of name was made two and a half years ago, but, in fact, in talking with Siamese, one always said "Thai," which means "free." When the name was changed some of us thought the change was made deliberately in English as an indication of the fact that Siam had always been independent and desired to utter a warning, having regard to the growing Japanese menace. We thought—most of us who were there at the time—that it was an indication that the Siamese were still determined to resist this Japanese menace as far as possible. Most of the Siamese in talking English still call themselves "Siamese"; in fact, the Prime Minister, immediately after the change was made, spoke of "Siam" in a public speech and hastily corrected himself.

I originally went to Thailand in 1909, when foreign relations between Siam and Europe were really relations with Great Britain and France. Other countries had at that time no political interests, though the Germans were capturing trade and shipping.

The relations with England had always been extraordinarily good. I do not think we have had any serious dispute, and in 1909 we made a new treaty which did away with the extra-territorial status of British subjects in Siam. We were the first European nation to place its European subjects under the jurisdiction of the Siamese courts. We also made concessions about Custom duties. There was a further treaty in 1925, and ten years later negotiations ended in a treaty which gave Siam complete fiscal and juristic jurisdiction over all British subjects.

In 1907 the French had gone half-way. They had allowed their native protégés to come under the jurisdiction of the Siamese courts, but they still stuck to their French citizens, who remained under the jurisdiction of the French consular courts. All the other nations, including Japan, had always had consular courts, and a foreign national could not be prosecuted or sued except in those courts. These consular courts caused difficulties not only to the Siamese but to us, for when the original treaty of

Asian Affairs c. 29 (S. 2) s. 111-119, 1942

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IRENE A. BIERMAN

THAILAND. About 90 percent of the Thai population of approximately 54 million adheres to the Theravada Buddhist faith. The second-largest religious affiliation is Islamic. Approximately four million people in Thailand profess the Islamic faith and maintain about 2,300 mosques. The Muslims in Thailand comprise two broad, self-defined categories consisting of Malay Muslims residing primarily in southern Thailand, and Thai Muslims residing in central and northern Thailand.

The approximately three million Malay-speaking Muslims are mostly concentrated in the southern provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, Satun, and Yala; they were incorporated into the Thai polity during the latter part of the eighteenth century. Despite active assimilationist policies promoted by Thai authorities, the vast majority of Malay Muslims maintain strong ethnic and cultural affinities with neighboring Malaysian Muslims to the south. Thai government assimilationist policies have resulted largely in irredentist and separatist ethnic and religious movements among the Malay Muslims of Thailand.

The Thai Muslim population is a much more heterogeneous group than the Malay Muslim populace of Thailand. The Thai Muslims include descendants of Iranians, Chams, Indonesians, Indians, Pakistanis, Chinese, and Malay Muslims who reside in the predominantly Thai Buddhist regions of central and northern Thailand. Though aware of their own distinctive ethnic heritage and retaining their own religious traditions, the vast majority of these Muslims speak Thai and have assimilated into the mainstream of Thai society. Most of the descendants of Iranians, Chams, Indonesians, Indians, Pakistanis, and Malay Muslims reside in Bangkok and surrounding communities of central Thailand. The population of Bangkok Muslims alone is approximately three hundred thousand. Smaller communities of Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani Muslims reside in the northern provinces of Chiangmai, Chiangrai, and Lamphun. All these Thai Muslims in the central and northern provinces have been exposed to uniform socialization processes through education, the media, the marketplace, and other Thai institutions. Generally, aside from religious belief and practice, these Muslims have internalized many Thai cultural norms and practices, have intermarried among the Thai Buddhist population, and have not identified with the separatist or irredentist activities of the Malay Muslims in the south.

With the exception of a small number Iranian descendants who maintain Shīʿī traditions, all other Muslims in Thailand are Sunnī. However, there have been recent reports of Iranian Shīʿī influence and conversions in southern Thailand. Traditionally Islamic thought, beliefs, and practices in both the Malay Muslim and Thai Muslim communities of Thailand were suffused with Hindu-Buddhist and folk-animistic accretions. Charms, amulets, magical beliefs, and some aspects of Hindu-Buddhist teachings regarding merit-making were interwoven with Islam in both the rural and urban regions of Thailand.

Beginning in the early part of the twentieth century, a reformist, *sharīʿah*-minded form of Islam stemming from the renowned Salafīyah movement associated with Muḥammad ʿAbduh of Cairo (1849–1905) had influence on the urban Muslim intellectuals, primarily in Bangkok. Islamic reformism reached Bangkok in the 1920s through an Indonesian political refugee, Ahmad Wahab, who had spent considerable time in Mecca imbibing current Islamic orthodoxy and practice. Through Thai Muslim intellectuals, Wahab established organized centers of reformism that encouraged more orthodox Islamic beliefs and campaigned against popular forms of Islam in Thailand. These reformists viewed many of the popular Islamic beliefs as *shirk,* the association of other beings with the power of Allah, and emphasized the use of *akal* (Ar., *ʿaql*), rational thought, and *ijtihād* (inde-

دانشنامهٔ جهان اسلام، (۶)، تهران ۱۳۸۰، ISAM 86214

Taylan d -
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/ فاطمه فنا /

تایی‌ها ← تایلند

تایلند، مسلمانان. تایلند (سابقاً سیام) کشوری است به مساحت ۵۱۴٬۰۰۰ کیلومتر مربع در جنوب‌شرقی آسیا. جمعیت آن در ۱۳۷۹ش/ ۲۰۰۰، ۶۰٬۶۰۶٬۹۴۷ تن بوده، حکومت آن پادشاهی و پایتختش بانکوک[1] است (<کتاب سال جهان اروپا ۲۰۰۱>[2]، ج ۲، ص ۳۸۲۷، ۳۸۳۶). بیش از بیست گروه قومی در تایلند زندگی می‌کنند که در این میان تاییها اکثریت دارند. زبان رسمی تایلند، تایی است. حدود ۹۰٪ از جمعیت آن پیرو آیین بودایی تراوادا هستند و بنابر آمارهای رسمی فقط ۴٪ از جمعیت آن مسلمان‌اند (<اسلام و گروههای اسلامی>[3]، ص ۲۴۱؛ <دایرةالمعارف جهان اسلام آکسفورد>[4]، ذیل «تایلند»؛ کتانی، ص ۱۷۲)، ولی شمار واقعی آنان باید بیش از ۸٪ باشد.

در گذشته ناحیهٔ جنوبی تایلند امروزی، جزو آن نبود. مردم این منطقه در اواسط سدهٔ نهم/ پانزدهم، مانند اکثر مالاییها، اسلام آوردند (کتانی، ص ۱۷۲). از اوایل سدهٔ یازدهم / هفدهم اسلام در تایلند اهمیت ویژه‌ای یافت. این اهمیت از هنگامی شروع شد که دو برادر به نامهای شیخ احمد قمی و شیخ سعید از ایران به آیوتهایا[5]، پایتخت سیام، وارد شدند و به دادوستد پرداختند و بتدریج شیخ احمد به دربار تایلند راه یافت (فدایی، ص ۷۲). در دورهٔ نارای کبیر (۱۰۶۷-۱۰۹۹/ ۱۶۵۶-۱۶۸۸) اسلام بسرعت در تایلند نفوذ کرد. وی هرچند نسبت به تبلیغات دینی فرستادگان پادشاهان و رهبران اسلامی سوماترا و هندوستان محدودیت قایل می‌شد، با پیشنهاد سفیر هندوستان برای احداث مسجدی در آیوتهایا موافقت کرد و حتی از آن حمایت مالی نمود (همانجا). در ۱۱۸۱/۱۷۶۷ حکومت تایلند تا حد پایین سلطان‌نشین لیگور (نام کنونی: ناخون سی تامارات[6]) را گرفت؛ بدین ترتیب سلطان‌نشینهای اسلامی جایاس (نام کنونی: چایا)، گراهی (نام کنونی: سورات - تهانی[7]) و لیگور به پادشاهی تایی منضم شد. آنگاه تاییها فتوحات خود را به سوی جنوب گستردند و سلطان‌نشینهای پاتالونگ[8]، سونگ‌خلا[9] و ساتون[10] را گرفتند. در سدهٔ سیزدهم/ نوزدهم رقابت بر سر تصرف شبه‌جزیرهٔ مالایا بین تایلند و بریتانیا آغاز شد. در ۱۲۴۸/ ۱۸۳۲ تاییها سلطان‌نشین اسلامی پاتانی* را تسخیر کردند و دولت بریتانیا این پیروزی را در ۱۳۲۷/ ۱۹۰۹ به رسمیت شناخت. تایلند در ابتدای تصرف مناطق اسلامی، اجازه می‌داد که سلطانهای مسلمان همان سرزمینها، آنجا را اداره کنند، اما در ۱۳۲۰/ ۱۹۰۲ حاکمان مسلمان خلع شدند و ادارهٔ آنجا به‌دست تاییها افتاد (کتانی، ص ۱۷۲). مسلمانان در برابر حکومت تایلند مقاومت کردند. تا دههٔ ۱۳۴۰ش/ ۱۹۶۰ عواملی مانند کوتاهی کردن دولت تایلند در توسعهٔ این منطقه، حضور نداشتن مسلمانان مالایوتبار در مقامهای حکومتی، افزایش دست‌اندازی بوداییان تایلندی به سرزمینهای جنوب کشور و درخواست مسلمانان برای آنکه هویت قومی و مذهبیشان بیشتر شناخته شود، موجب افزایش بحران در روابط مسلمانان و حکومت شد. از دههٔ ۱۳۷۰ش/۱۹۹۰ جنبش مقاومت مسلمانان معتدلتر شده است، ولی تقاضای خودمختاری و حقوق برابر همچنان باقی است. سازمان کنفرانس اسلامی و کنفرانس وزرای امور خارجهٔ کشورهای اسلامی نیز از حق خودمختاری مسلمانان مالایوتبار جنوب پشتیبانی کرده‌اند، اما جدایی‌طلبی آنان را به رسمیت نشناخته‌اند (مهدن[11]، ص ۱۳۰-۱۳۱؛ برای اطلاعات بیشتر ← پاتانی).

مسلمانان در سراسر تایلند وجود دارند، اما در سه ناحیه متمرکزند: در جنوب از مرز مالزی تا تنگهٔ کرا[12]، در شمال در ناحیهٔ چیانگ‌رای، و در بانکوک (کتانی، ص ۱۷۲). حدود سه چهارم از مسلمانان تایلند مالایی‌زبان‌اند و در ناحیهٔ جنوبی و عمدتاً در استانهای ناراتیوات[13]، پاتانی[14]، ساتون و یالا متمرکز شده‌اند، به نحوی که حدود ۸۵٪ از جمعیت این استانها مسلمان‌اند (← پاتانی؛ اسکوپین، ص ۲۶؛ <دایرةالمعارف جهان اسلام آکسفورد>، همانجا). مسلمانان در استانهای سونگ خلا، ترانگ[15] و کرابی[16] نیز اکثریت دارند (کتانی، ص ۱۷۳). مسلمانان تایلند به دو گروه مالایایی و غیرمالایایی تقسیم می‌شوند (اسکوپین، ص ۲۵). غیرمالاییها، که مسلمانان تایی‌تبار را نیز دربرمی‌گیرند، از مالاییها ناهمگونترند. از این

1. Bangkok
2. *The Europa world year book 2001*
3. *Islam and Islamic groups*
4. *The Oxford encyclopedia of the modern Islamic world*
5. Ayuthia
6. Nakhon Si Thammarat
7. Surat- Thani
8. Phatthalung
9. Songkhla
10. Satun
11. Mehden
12. Kra
13. Narathiwat
14. Yala
15. Trang
16. Krabi

against Selīm III; he also sent several expeditions to plunder Wallachia (1800 and 1801) and incited the Janissaries, who had in the meanwhile returned to Belgrade, to occupy the fortress (in the summer of 1801) and to murder Ḥādjdjī Muṣṭafā Pasha (at the end of the year).

At this time, he repeatedly asked the Tsar to number him among his faithful subjects and also offered his services to France. The Porte, which shortly before had forgiven Paswan-oghlu everything, from 1803 declared war on him again, but the Serbian rising of 1804 diverted their attention. Paswan-oghlu himself had to fight in the western part of his territory against Pintzo's rising (1805). The appearance of the Russians on the left bank of the Danube (1806) induced him to offer his services to the Porte, but the latter instead gave the supreme command to the commander of Rusčuk [*q.v.*]. This embittered him so much that he resolved to defend only his own territory against the allied Russians and Serbians, but he died soon afterwards on 27 January 1807.

That Paswan-oghlu was able to hold out so long was due to the state of the Ottoman empire at the time, to his personal ability and foresight (he never abandoned Vidin), but for the most part to luck. Within his area he collected customs and taxes, ruled strictly and despotically, although not entirely without mildness and justice. In Vidin, he was active in public works, building a mosque, *madrasa* and library (see F. Kanitz, *Donau-Bulgarien und der Balkan*, Leipzig 1882, 4, 8). Although his health was rather poor as a result of too great mental strain, ambition led him to aim at independence, as evidence of which we have the coins struck by him and known as *Pazvančeta*.

Bibliography: Various notes on Paswan-oghlu are already found in the contemporary travels of G.A. Olivier (1801) and L. Pouqueville (1805), but it is not till the *Notes sur Passvan-Oglou 1758-1807 par l'adjudant-commandant Mériage*, of the French agent in Vidin (1807-8), that we have a complete picture of him which is still the best account of his career; these *Notes* were edited by Grgur Jakšić in *La Revue Slave* (i [Paris 1906], 261-79, 418-29; ii [1906], 139-44, 436-48; iii [1907], 138-44, 278-88) and tr. in the *Glasnik zemaljskog muzeja* (xvii [Sarajevo 1906], 173-216) into Serbo-croat. See also J.W. Zinkeisen, *GOR in Europa*, vii, Gotha 1863, 230-41; C. Jireček, *Geschichte der Bulgaren*, Prague 1876, 486-503; Iv. Pavlović, *Ispisi iz francuskih arhiva*, Belgrade 1890, esp. 103-28 (diplomatic reports regarding Paswan-oghlu, 1795-1807); M. Gavrilović, in *La Grande Encyclopédie*, xxvi, Paris n.d., 68; St. Novaković, *Turško carstvo pred srpski ustanak 1780-1804*, Belgrade 1906, 332-89; M. Vukićević, *Karadorde*, i, Belgrade 1907, 166-76, 185-208; P. Orčškov, *Několko dokumenta za Pazvantoglu i Sofroni Vračanski* (1800-1812) [from the Russian Foreign Ministry], in *Sbornik* of the Bulgarian Academy of Science, iii [Sofia 1914], article 3, pp. 1-55; V. Ćorovic, in *Narodna enciklopedija*, iii, Zagreb 1928, 272; Sh. Sāmī, *Ḳāmūs al-aʿlām*, ii, 1467; G. Lebel, *La France et les principautés danubiennes du XVI^ème^ siècle à la chute de Napoléon I^er^*, Paris 1955; *IA*, art. *Pazvand-oğlu* (A. Cevat Eren). (F. BAJRAKTAREVIĆ*)

PĀṬAN, one of the oldest and most renowned towns of Gudjarāt [*q.v.*] in the Aḥmādabād district of Bombay. It was founded in 746 by the Čavadas of Gudjarāt. Originally known as Anhilwāra, the Arab geographers refer to it as Nahrwāla [see NAHRAWĀL]. Later, it became known as Pāṭan. According to the *Mirʾāt-i Aḥmadī*, the Hindus used the word *Pāṭan* for a big or capital town. The poet Farrukhī [*q.v.*] says that on its possession "Bhīm prided himself over the princes of India" (Nāẓim, *The life and times of Sulṭān Maḥmūd of Ghazna*, Cambridge 1931, 217). Sultan Maḥmūd of Ghazna attacked and conquered it but did not annex it. In 573/1178 the Ghūrid Shihāb al-Dīn attacked it but did not succeed in defeating the *rāḏjā*. However, in 591/1195 Ḳuṭb al-Dīn Aybak defeated its ruler and collected enormous booty. After many ups and downs, Muslim power was established there under ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Khaldjī, who retained Pāṭan as the capital. Pāṭan continued as the capital of Muslim power in Gudjarāt till the time of Aḥmad Shāh I, who shifted it to Aḥmadābād after his accession in 813/1410.

Pāṭan was a great centre of Muslim culture, with imposing mosques, splendid *madrasas*, *khānaḳahs zāwiyas* and *dāʾiras*. Shaykh Niẓām al-Dīn Awliyāʾ [*q.v.*] sent his disciple Shaykh Ḥusām al-Dīn to implant the Čishtī order there. Due to the very large member of graves of saints, it came to be called *Pīrān Pāṭan*. Muẓaffar I and Muḥammad Shāh Tatār Khān were also buried there. It was perhaps in view of this background that Muḥammad b. Tughluḳ deputed there a grandson of Shaykh Farīd al-Dīn Gandj-i Shakar [*q.v.*] to deal with the recalcitrant elements. A highway—with hundreds of thousands of trees on both sides—connected Pāṭan with Barōda [*q.v.*]. The entire region was prosperous and fertile. Its trade potential attracted the Ismāʿīlī Bohrā [*q.v.*] community to it. During the time of Akbar, the region was in the grip of Mahdawī [see MAHDAWĪS] and anti-Mahdawī activities.

The earliest mosque was constructed in Pāṭan in 655/1257. Its *madrasas* enjoyed a wide academic reputation and had big libraries attached to them. A *madrasa* known as *Fayḍ-i Ṣafāʾ*, founded during the reign of Awrangzīb, had hostels, a mosque and baths attached to it. Shaykh Matā's *madrasa* produced eminent scholars like Shaykh Djamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ṭāhir, author of the *Maḏjmaʿ biḥār al-anwār*.

Bibliography: *Imperial Gazetteer of India*[2], xx, 24; M.S. Commissariat, *A history of Gujarat*, i, London 1938, ii, Bombay 1957; Sayyid ʿAbd al-Ḥayy, *Yād-i ayyām*, Lucknow 1926; Sayyid Abū Ẓafar Nadwī, *Gudjarāt ki tamaddunī tārīkh*, Aʿẓamgaṛh 1962; idem, *Tārīkh-i Gudjarāt*, Dihlī 1958; J. Tod, *Travels in Western India*, repr. Dihlī 1971. (K.A. NIẒAMI)

PATANI (Thai: Pattani), a region of Southeast Asia, formerly a Malay Sultanate but now included in Thailand (as a result of the Treaty of Bangkok, 1909, between Great Britain and Siam), and at present comprised of the four southern provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala (Jala) and Satun. The population of these four provinces is approximately 1,500,000, 80% of whom are Malay Muslims.

From the 14th to 18th centuries, Patani was a leading entrepôt for trade between China and Southeast Asia. The conversion of the royal court to Islam, reportedly in the mid-15th century, enabled it to profit from the economic and political advantages which affiliation with the Muslim community offered. Because of the relatively early date (in the local context) of official identification with Islam, Patani is regarded as one of the cradles of Islam in Southeast Asia.

For the history of Islam, Patani is chiefly famous for two reasons. The first is a lengthy and continuing tradition of *kitab* literature, that is, works on *fikh*, *kalām*, and *taṣawwuf* written in Jawi (Malay using the Arabic script). The founder of this tradition and its most prolific author was Dāwūd b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Idrīs al-Faṭānī [*q.v.*]. He has been followed by a line of in-

Türkiye Vakfı Kütüphane ve Dokümantasyon Merkezi

واقع المسلمين في تايلاند وفطاني

بقلم / كمال السعيد صلب

تايلاند هي دولة عضو في منظمة دول جنوب شرق آسيا (الآسيان) ويبلغ عدد سكانها حسب احصاء عام ١٩٩٠م ٥٤,٩٨٠,٠٠٠ نسمة، وتختلف تقديرات المصادر حول عدد المسلمين فيها فيما تشير المصادر الرسمية والغربية التي تأخذ عنها الى أنهم يبلغون ٤٪ من جملة السكان فإن المصادر المحايدة والاسلامية تذهب الى أنهم يبلغون ١٠٪ - أي يزيدون على خمسة ملايين نسمة، وبذا يكون المسلمون هم ثاني جماعة سكانية من حيث العدد بعد الغالبية التي تدين بالبوذية وتطلق على نفسها (التاي) - أي الأحرار.

ويتوزع المسلمون في تايلاند على مناطق متعددة هي العاصمة بانكوك والمنطقة الوسطى والشمالية والجنوبية والشرقية خصوصا المحافظات الخمس المجاورة لماليزيا، وتختلف أصول المسلمين في هذه المناطق، فبينما مسلمي المناطق الشمالية ينحدر اكثرهم من الأصل الصيني حيث هاجروا الى تايلاند بعد الثورة الشيوعية نجد مسلمو المناطق الشمالية الشرقية ينحدرون من أصول بنغالية باكستانية وهندية وقد هاجروا إليها من أجل حياة أفضل ويعمل اكثرهم بالتجارة، أما مسلمو العاصمة فإنهم ينتمون الى جنوب تايلاند.

وبتايلاند عدد كبير من المساجد يصل الى ٢٠٠٠ مسجد وهناك مسجد مركزي في العاصمة، وترجمت معاني القرآن الكريم الى لغة (التاي) تحت رعاية مجلس الشئون الاسلامية الحكومي، وطبعت نسخ عربية أيضا من معاني القرآن الكريم، وتصدر جريدتان اسلاميتان احداهما تسمى (الرابطة) والأخرى تسمى (الجهاد) وقد توقفت مؤخرا ويبلغ عدد الحجاج المسلمين ٥٠٠٠ حاج سنويا، ويتلقى حوالي ٧٠٪ من أبناء المسلمين تعليما اسلاميا في الولايات الجنوبية بواسطة الأسر أو المدارس الاسلامية، فهناك حوالي ٤٠٠ مدرسة تضم حوالي ٢٢,٠٠٠ تلميذ وبعض هذه المدارس ملحقة بالمساجد، وفي الشمال تقل نسبة التعليم عن هذا، وشيدت الحكومة كلية اسلامية في وسط تايلاند ولا يبلغ الذين أتموا تعليمهم العالي من المسلمين ٢٠٠ مسلم.

فطانـــــــي:

إذا كان المسلمون في عموم تايلاند اقلية فإنهم في فطاني اكثرية إذ يبلغ عدد المسلمين فيها اكثر من ٨٠٪ من السكان وهم يبلغون حوالي ٣,٥ ملايين نسمة، وكانت فطاني دولة مستقلة حتى عام ١٧٨٦م حيث هاجمها ملك تايلاند - (سيام) واستطاع هزيمتها بسبب خيانة رجل (سيامي) وثق به سلطان فطاني المسلم وكانت تلك أول مرة تستطيع فيها تايلاند هزيمة المسلمين رغم محاولاتها المتكررة لاحتلال فطاني منذ عام ١٦٠٣م، وتوالت الحروب بين الدولتين وذلك عام ١٧٨٩م، ١٨١٠م، ١٨٣٢م ثم ١٩٠٢م حيث تلاشت مقاومة المسلمين الذين لم يخضعوا أبدا للحكم السياسي، وفي ١٩٠٦م صارت فطاني ولاية واحدة تسمى مونتون فتاني، ثم أصدر الملك التايلاندي الأمر بجعلها ثلاث ولايات صغيرة لكل ولاية حاكم تايلاندي، وفرضت الضرائب على الأهالي وأعمال السخرة وتقلص عدد المسلمين في الحكم والادارة وفرض عليها الحكم المباشر، وحين قام انقلاب عسكري في البلاد سنة ١٩٣٢م ونادى بحرية الاعتقاد والمساواة بين المواطنين انتظر المسلمون تغييرا لأوضاعهم لكن الاتجاه الجديد كان قوميا يهدف الى صهر الجميع في بوتقة البوذية واللغة والعادات والملابس التايلاندية، فلم يكن جائزا لمسلمي فطاني ارتداء ملابسهم الاسلامية أو التحدث بلغتهم الملاوية أو التمسك بدينهم الاسلامي، وأجبر المسلمون على الركوع أمام تمثال (بوذا) وأجبرت المرأة المسلمة على التبرج ونزع ملابسها الشرعية، وكان المخالفون من المسلمين يضربون بأعقاب البنادق ويرفسون ويهانون، ولدافع المسلمون عن أنفسهم ألفوا هيئة إسلامية أطلقوا عليها اسم هيئة تنفيذ الأحكام الاسلامية لمقاومة الحركة السيامية التي تهدف الى (تسييم) الملايو - أي جعل أهل فطاني الملاويين سياميين. كان ذلك في ١٤ يناير ١٩٤٤م، ورأس حركة المقاومة هذه الحاج سولونغ بن عبدالقادر وظل يقود حركة المقاومة الفاطانية حتى عام ١٩٤٨م حيث واجه حكما بالاعدام، وظل المسلمون في فطاني يقاومون الاحتلال التايلاندي بشكل غير منظم حتى عام ١٩٦٠م، وفي عام ١٩٦٣م تأسست جبهة الثورة الفطانية ثم تأسست الحركة الطلابية عام ١٩٦٤م، والحزب الوطني الثوري عام ١٩٦٥م واتفقت الهيئات الثلاث على التوحد عام ١٩٧٠م.

وأطلقوا على الهيئة الموحدة اسم «المنظمة الموحدة لتحرير فطاني».

لقد تعرض المسلمون في سبيل محاولتهم الحصول على استقلالهم للاعتقال فاعتقل نحو ٣٦ ألف شخص حتى عام ١٩٨١م منهم ١٦٨٤٧ نفذت فيهم الأحكام الارتجالية بدون محاكمات، ودفن بعضهم أحياء، وأحرق بعضهم أحياء بصب البنزين عليهم بالاضافة الى اغتصاب المسلمات واختطافهن، ولتغيير التركيبة السكانية فقد جرى توطين مائة ألف بوذي بفطاني المسلمة حتى عام ١٩٨٨م ويجري التخطيط لتوطين ٦٥٠,٠٠٠ في كافة أنحاء فطاني التي تبلغ مساحتها ١٥,٠٠٠كم٢.

ورغم أن الحكومة البوذية حاولت اختراق التعليم وفرض الثقافة البوذية عليه إلا انها لم تنجح لقوة تمسك أهل فطاني بالاستمرارية التاريخية لمؤسساتهم التعليمية والتي تتخذ طابعا اسلاميا فالاهتمام الأساس بتعلم القرآن والعلوم المتصلة بالشريعة، و تشهد فطاني اليوم نهضة تعليمية حيث يقوم بعض وجهاء المسلمين ببناء المدارس بأموالهم وجهودهم ويكون التعليم الديني هو الأساس كما تدرس فيها العلوم الضرورية.

Studies in Islâm, v.5(s.4), s.220-231, 1968 (New Delhi)

MUSLIMS IN SIAM 1900—1925

Y. B. MATHUR

During the first quarter of the twentieth century there was a general impression in India that the Muslims were ill-treated in Siam. In 1925 the Bangkok correspondent of the *Sultan*, a newspaper published from Calcutta, circulated the information that during the last fifteen years about 500,000 Muslims were forcibly converted to the Buddhist faith, the state religion of Siam. The Muslims who did not embrace Buddhism were deprived of the rights of citizenship and excluded from the Government and other services. They were not allowed to say the *aḏān*: on the contrary the mosques were stoned.[1] Above all, they were not permitted to recite the *Qurʾān* loudly and whenever they flouted this instruction they were maltreated and told by the Siamese : "So long as you remain Muslims, you will be meted out the same treatment."[2]

The *Sultan* also reported: "In 1924, the Siamese Commissioner sent for 500 Muslim students and compelled them to eat pork in the month of *Ramadan*. Then he summoned to his house Muslims who fasted, *maulavīs* and *hājjīs* and forced them to drink from the water in which the *phungis* (Buddhist monks) had bathed. During the same year, the Muslims of Pathani were refused permission even to offer their *ʿId* prayers: they were actually prevented. Till midday, a crowd of Muslims waited at the house of the Commissioner to ask permission for prayers, but the Commissioner compelled them all to say prayers at his house, replete with stone idols, pigs and wine."[3] The Muslims were not permitted to study Arabic in separate schools but were compelled to read in the temples of *phungis*, where they were taught the Buddhist faith. In case of refusal, the parents were grossly maltreated, and were put in prison. The Muslims were compelled to wear the Siamese dress and speak the Siamese language. They were harassed and nicknamed *Tew Prit* (false Devils). During the period

[1] Foreign and Political Department (External), F. No. 226-X, S. Nos. 1-26, dated 1925, *p.* 1.

[2] *Sultan*, Calcutta, dated January 14, 1925.

[3] *Hamdard*, dated January 14, 1925.

1921 to 1925 alone 165 Indian Muslims were killed and looted of about Rs. 1,500,000 by the Siamese, but whenever they complained of these outrages they were ordered by the courts to leave Siam. The British Consul did nothing to check these inhuman outrages.[1]

The Indian newspapers strongly protested against the religious persecution of Indian Muslims in Siam who were "forced to change their religion on pain of forfeiture of their civic rights,"[2] and invited the attention of the Muslim organizations in India to the necessity of standing by them in their hour of trial. Commenting on these atrocities a leading newspaper observed: "It is a strange irony of fate that the followers of Buddhism – who are strong advocates of *ahimsa* and non-violence and hold it to be a sin even to injure an insect—perpetrate all sorts of atrocities on the Musalmans whose plight in Siam should serve as a warning to the Indian Musalmans. It is the duty of *Jamʿīat al-ʿUlamāʾ*, *Khilāfat Committees* and other Muslim associations which are the guardians of Muslim honour to bestow their early attention to this matter. How long will the Musalmans remain in deep slumber and give a chance to their enemies to annihilate Islam?"[3]

The Muslims of Kasur, in a telegram to the Viceroy of India, prayed for help to the Indian Muslims in Siam. It read as follows:

> MUSLIMS OF KASUR VIEWED WITH CONSIDERABLE DISQUIETUDE FROM PRESS THAT SIAM MUSLIMS ARE COMPELLED TO RENOUNCE ISLAM FOR BUDDHISM PREVENTED UNDER COMPULSION AND TERROR FROM PERFORMANCE OF THEIR RELIGIOUS RITES HENCE THIS MEETING REPRESENTATIVE OF KASUR MUSLIMS RESPECTFULLY EARNESTLY PRAYS HIS EXCELLENCY KINDLY EXERT ALL POSSIBLE MEANS FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY OF SIAM MUSLIMS AND REMOVE THEIR PRESENT GRIEVANCES—RABNAWAZKHAN.[1]

The Muslims of Hoshiarpur were not slow to comment upon this state of affairs. In a telegram to the Viceroy of India one of their representatives, Aḥmad Khān, said:

> THE MUSALMANS OF THE HOSHIARPUR DISTRICT PRAY YOUR EXCELLENCY TO HELP THE MUSLIMS OF SIAM IN

[1] *ibid.*, *p.* 2.

[2] *Hamdam*, Lucknow, dated January 18, 1925.

[3] *Madina*, Bijnor, dated January 22, 1925.

[4] Telegram No. 521, 16/50 Kasur M 29 65 to His Excellency, Viceroy Delhi. Office of the Private Secretary Dy. No. 866 dated January 30, 1925.

CHAPTER XIV

THAILAND AND INDO-CHINA

Thailand or Siam

Thailand extends from the Middle Salween in the west to the Mekong in the east. It is mainly upland country apart from the lower Chao Praya Basin which is separated from that of the Mekong by a low and broken range which bisects the country from north to south. The former river is created by the joining of its two headstreams, the Ping and the Yom, at Nakon Sawan on the lowland. In their upper courses they flow through narrow valleys overlooked by steep-sided mountains. The Mekong forms the eastern boundary of Thailand over a considerable part of its course, and its chief tributary, the Mun, drains the plateau which forms the eastern province. Thus the country may be divided into four regions—the north-western mountainous area, the eastern plateau, the central plain, and the south-western peninsular area. In the south-west corner there is a portion of the Malay Peninsula which divides Lower Burma from Malaya. The climate is typically monsoon, the rains falling mainly between June and October.

Agriculture is by far the most important occupation and rice by far the chief product. It is of the very best quality and although it is the main food of the people, there is a large surplus for export. Altogether there are some 9 million acres under rice, yielding about 8 million tons. Maize is becoming increasingly important, the annual production having risen from 30,000 tons in 1950 to 1,000,000 tons in 1965. The completion of the Chao Praya Dam, 150 miles north of Bangkok, has enabled some 3,500 square miles of the central plain to be irrigated, has improved flood control and navigation, and provided hydro-electricity. Another scheme is at Korat on the western part of the Nun basin, where 30,000 acres are irrigated for rice, sugar, and bananas. It is an important area for cattle and poultry breeding. The eastern plateau is an infertile area of scrub and open parkland which is now gradually being brought under irrigation; tobacco

The communications are well organised. There are about 2,000 miles of State railways, radiating from Bangkok northwards, north-eastwards, eastwards, and southwards along the peninsula to link up with the Malayan line to Singapore. All parts of the country are linked by roads, but many of them are of poor surface, although improving. In the north-east the 92-mile "Friendship Highway" built with U.S. aid under the Colombo Plan is doing much to open up the region, as is the East-West Highway in the potentially important lumbering and mineral area of the west.

It now seems likely that a ship canal across the Kra isthmus will be started within a reasonable time. Such a canal would probably adversely affect the trade of Singapore.

Bangkok (2,300,000), the capital, is situated some distance up the Menam River. It is the chief port, but is handicapped by the bar at the mouth of the river. However, a channel is being cut through this that will double the draught of vessels able to navigate the river, *i.e.* from 13 ft. to 26 ft. The population of Thailand is over 36 million, nearly all of whom are Buddhists. Like the Burmese, they are of Mongol race.

Indo-China

Indo-China is a convenient expression for the area of South-East Asia ruled by the French until after World War Two. It is now divided in the western part by the Khmer Republic (formerly Cambodia) and the war-torn kingdom of Laos and on the eastern seaboard by Communist North Vietnam and Nationalist South Vietnam.

The whole of the area, with the exception of the Khmer Republic, has been subject to the devastation and disorganisation brought about by almost continuous war since the Japanese invasion.

POPULATION IN INDO-CHINA

	AREA (sq. miles)	POPULATION	DENSITY (per sq. ml.)
North Vietnam	63,360	17,900,000	268
South Vietnam	65,726	14,200,000	216
Khmer Republic	69,900	5,750,000	80
Laos	91,400	2,500,000	24

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Taylano

BY

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Essays and Documents

Tayland

Edited by
KHOO KAY KIM

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14 THAILAND: 1824-1910

TJOA HOCK GUAN

RAMA III

In 1824 Phra Nang Klao, otherwise known as Rama III, became the King of Thailand, although he was not born of a royal mother. His younger half-brother, who became king in 1851 as Rama IV (more popularly known as Mongkut), was the oldest fully royal prince. But Rama III was older and more experienced in the governing of Thailand, and the flexibility and realism of the Thai monarchy determined that it was he who should be crowned. For in 1824 Thailand needed a strong and experienced leader. Just about fifty years before, the Burmese had invaded and succeeded in destroying Ayuthia, the former capital. Only by the brilliant generalship of Phra Taksin (reigned, 1767–1782) was Thailand saved. After him Rama I (reigned, 1782–1809), another brilliant and more stable general, established a new dynasty at Bangkok. But Thai rivalry with Burma and Vietnam was still lively. And just beyond loomed the great powers: China, in the nineteenth century beginning to decline; Great Britain, slowly extending her influence from India into Burma and to Malaya; and France, expanding her activities in Indo-China and consolidating her power. Although much had been done to stabilize the internal politics of Thailand, there were still serious challenges ahead for the leaders of Thailand.

Fortunately, the monarchy had established a good working relationship with the nobility. The most important aristocratic families were represented in the state council which advised the king and helped to carry out his wishes; naturally they took measures to check actions that were unwise or too radical or against their interests. In the provinces, local aristocrats helped to collect taxes and organize the peasants into work groups (corvée labour) for the kingdom. The monarchy and the aristocracy in Thailand, as elsewhere in those days, lived off the land and its inhabitants; in exchange, they provided some protection from thieves and foreigners, and in Thailand they managed to guide the nation towards a modern way of life. It was most important that the

DT: Makale 166–185 sayfalara arasındadır

king and the aristocrats could work together, adapting to the changes of kings and rotations of office, as well as to threats from outside. The Thai nobility was not rigid; a man could become an aristocrat through wealth or achievement. Rama I was careful in his relationship with the noble families, but he made clear his preference for people of ability who could get things done. Thus, although the Thai king was supposed to be divine (a notion that Thai kings in the nineteenth century tried to discourage), he surrounded himself with advisers and helpers from the aristocracy which was practically the only class then that could provide men with education, experience in public affairs and leisure (for 'civil servants' in those days were not paid). The only other pool for such a resource was the Buddhist monkhood, but unlike Christian monks and priests in the West, a Buddhist monk (*bhiku*) did not get himself involved in 'worldly' affairs.

Rama III was fortunate in his relationship with Dit Bunnag (Phya Phrakhlang), an aristocrat who helped him in his negotiations with foreigners as well as in the running of the country. For the British had come to Thailand for help against the Burmese and then for trading privileges. Dit Bunnag, who with his family controlled much of the trade of Thailand, was far-sighted enough to realize that trade concessions would result in such an expansion of trade that, although his percentage gain was reduced, he would recover his costs through the increased volume of trade. These concessions were subsequently overshadowed by the more sweeping treaties signed by Mongkut (Rama IV, aided by another member of the Bunnag family), but at least they indicated an ability to face up to reality. The British success in occupying Burma enabled the Thais to direct their energies towards Laos and Cambodia during the reign of Rama III. Laos was taken, but the Thai efforts in Cambodia were resisted by the Vietnamese who became suspicious of these incursions, and a compromise had to be reached. At the end of Rama III's reign, Phya Phrakhlang performed one further service for his king and country: he ensured the succession of Mongkut over the ambitions of Rama III's own sons.

MONGKUT

A mere youth in 1824, Mongkut was an experienced man of forty-six years when he became king in 1851. He had spent the period in

العدد ٣٦٠ السنة الحادية والثلاثون نوفمبر ١٩٨٨

العربي

مجلة ثقافية مصورة تصدر شهريًا عن وزارة الإعلام
بدولة الكويت
للوطن العربي ولكل قارئ للعربية في العالم

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المراسلات باسم رئيس التحرير

يُتفق عليها مع الادارة ـ قسم الإعلانات

تُرسل الطلبات الى : قسم الاشتراكات ـ المكتب الفني وزارة الاعلام ـ ص.ب : ١٩٣ ـ الكويت
على طالب الاشتراك تحويل القيمة بموجب حوالة مصرفية أو شيك بالدينار الكويتي باسم وزارة الإعلام طبقًا لما يلي : الوطن العربي ٤ د.ك. باقي دول العالم ٦ د.ك.

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البحرين ٣٠٠ فلس	اليمن الشمالي ٣ ريالات	ليبيا ٣٥٠ درهمًا
اليمن الجنوبي ٢٥٠ فلسًا	قطر ٥ ريالات	أوروبا دولاران أو جنيه استرليني
مصر ٣٠ قرشًا	سلطنة عُمان ربع ريال	فرنسا ١٥ فرنكًا
السودان ٢٠ قرشًا	لبنان ١٥ ليرة	أميركا دولاران



ساعة تريدور داي ـ ديت من الذهب الابيض والاحمر والاصفر مرصعة بالماس.

« ألا أونا » « ألا دوي » . . هل من مزايد ؟ هل من يدفع اكثر ؟ انظروا اليه . . إنه صبي رائع قادر على صنع كل شيء . من يزيد على الدولارات العشرة ؟ لا أحد . . لا أحد ؟ . . إذن « ألا ترى » . . !

ويرسو المزاد على الصغير ، ويمد المشتري يده ليسوق الصبي أمامه بعد أن يدفع الثمن ، تماما كما يساق الآف مثله يتم بيعهم كل أسبوع في سوق الرقيق بالعاصمة بانجوك ، وفي مختلف مدن وقرى تايلند . . وكلهم تتراوح أعمارهم بين السادسة والخامسة عشرة . . !

سوق النخاسة القديم الجديد لا يتوقف أبداً رغم جهود الحكومة التايلندية لوقفه ، وزبائنه يتزايدون كل يوم ، وبيع الاطفال أصبح تجارة رائجة مثل كل أعمال البيع والشراء في البلد الذي يتاجر في كل شيء حتى الانسان . والسماسرة بارعون في إقناع الأهالي المعوزين الفقراء ـ وخاصة في مناطق الشمال الشرقي ـ ببيع أبنائهم ليتيحوا لهم حياة أفضل . . ! والمشترون ، وخاصة السواح والزوار ، يتسابقون الى الشراء والمساومة ودفع الرشاوي للحصول على عمال أو خدم أو عبيد ، دون وازع من ضمير يمنعهم من أن يحرموا الأبناء من آبائهم لينطلقوا بهم إلى بلادهم فرحين كأنهم قد فازوا بصفقة العمر ، وهم الذين يدعون أن انسان بلادهم قد بلغ أعلى مراحل التطور والتقدم والمدنية !

ومع ذلك فإن الاطفال الذين يباعون للملاك والسادة من أهل البلاد ، قد يكونون أسعد حظاً ، فهم على الأقل يستطيعون أن يتمتعوا برضا المالك الجديد إذا أثبتوا أنهم ـ خدماً وعبيداً وعمالاً ـ قادرون على تحمل العمل المستمر دون توقف أو حدود ، مستعدون لتحمل أقصى الاهانات وأقسى المعاملات . . . فعندئذ يسمح لهم السيد برؤية ذويهم وأهليهم مرة كل بضع سنوات . . !

مدينة الملائكة

مع ذلك فالشعب التايلندي يبتسم دائما . . وهو يسمي عاصمته بانجوك . . « مدينة الملائكة » . والملائكة فيما يتصور التايلون الحديثون هم الرهبان البوذيون الذين ينطلقون من المعابد في أثوابهم الزعفرانية ورءوسهم المحلوقة ، حاملين صحافاً فارغة ليملأها لهم الناس ، إنهم يطرقون الأبواب صامتين ، ينتظرون أن تملأ تلك الأواني بقليل من الأرز أو بعض الفاكهة ، وحين لا تمتلىء الصحاف في الوقت المناسب ، فإن الرهبان الكبار يتوقفون في ورع وتأمل بانتظار من يحضر من المتبرعين بالطعام والهدايا . ويأتي المتبرعون بصحبة أطفالهم أحياناً ويقدمون الأرز الساخن والمأكولات الأخرى لتقديمها للرهبان المنتظرين . وبعد بزوغ الشمس بساعة يعود الجميع الى معابدهم لتناول وجبة طعامهم الأولى ، ويتركون ما يتبقى لوجبة ما قبل الظهر ثم لا يأكلون بعد ذلك بقية النهار .

هؤلاء الرهبان هم « الملائكة المحدثون » . أما الملائكة الذين انتسب اليهم اسم المدينة وهو « كرانجثب » ، فهم خدم الآلهة . والاسم مستمد من اللغة السنسكريتية لغة البلاط الملكي . وكلمة « ثب » معناها الملائكة التي تخدم الآلهة في الطقوس البراهمية القديمة . وقد استبقيت هذه الآلهة والملائكة لتتبع العقيدة البوذية ولكنها ليست ضرورية لها ، وقد قبل بوذا نفسه وجود هذا التقليد ولم يغيره ، ولكنه لم يعترف به . . !

بانجوك أو « كرانجثب » كانت قبل مئات السنين مجرد نقطة حصينة على منحنى النهر لحماية العاصمة السابقة « أيوثايا » . وتعني كلمة بانجوك نفسها المكان الذي ينمو فيه الزيتون البري .


وقد استمدت « أيوثايا » اسمها من « أيودايا » المدينة الخرافية في شمالي الهند التي شن منها الإله راما حملته لغزو سيلان التي كانت تسمى عند الرحالة العرب « سرنديب » وهي الآن سريلانكا . وقد

ظلت بانجوك على حالها وعرفت هكذا لدى التجار الاوربيين . ولكن أيوثايا سقطت في أيدي البورميين بعد حصار طويل في منتصف القرن الثاني عشر ، وقد دمرت تدميراً تاماً . ونقل السكان الأسرى إلى بورما تمشياً مع تقاليد تلك الأيام ، ولكن جزءاً من جيش « تاي » بقيادة الجنرال نصف الصيني « تاك سين » هرب قبل سقوط المدينة . ولجأ تاك سين الى الشرق بالقرب من كمبوديا ، وحشد جيشاً هزم به البورميين وطردهم من البلاد فلم يعودوا إليها ثانية .

وأصبح تاك سين ملكاً ، واتخذ من « تونبيوري » عاصمة له عبر نهر تشاوفايا أمام بانجوك . وبعد السنوات الأولى من حكمه استطاع أن يوقف البورميين من ناحية والكمبوديين من الناحية الأخرى . إلا أنه أصيب في أخريات أيامه بالخبل وبدأ يتخيل نفسه إلهاً . وحينئذ خلفه قائده جنرال شاكري وتولى الحكم ، فنقل العاصمة الى بانجوك عام ١٧٨٢ ونصب نفسه ملكاً ، وأقام قصره الكبير الذي أصبح مركزاً للعاصمة الجديدة ، إذ جاء الأهالي فأقاموا حوله بيوتهم التي ظلت تتزايد حتى أصبحت مدينة كبيرة رائعة . أما الملك تاك سين فقد قتله الملك الجديد على الطريقة الملكية التائية : حوكم وهو موضوع داخل « جوال » ، وضرب بهراوات من خشب الصندل حتى لا يسكب دمه الملكي على الأرض إذا ذبح أو جرح . وفيما بعد أطلق على « شاكري » أول ملوك الأسرة الملكية الحالية لقب « راما » ، وتبعه خلفاؤه في حمل نفس اللقب حتى الملك الحالي « بهوميبول أديولياديج » الذي اتخذ اسم « راما التاسع » وذلك تبركاً بإسم الإله « راما » الذي نشهد تفاصيل قصته المأخوذة عن « رامايانا » على لوحات متتابعة مرسومة على جدران المدخل الشرقي لمجموعة القصر الملكي الكبير ومعبده الرئيسي . . وهي القصة التي انتهت بانتصار راما على ملك الشياطين « رافانا » بمساعدة القرد « هانومان »

أرض الاحرار

إذا كان للعاصمة قصة فان لتايلند نفسها قصة أخرى . فهذ الاسم لم يطلق عليها إلا في عام ١٩٣٩ قبل خمسين عاماً فقط ، حين قرر المسئولون تحويل



● خريطة تبين موقع تايلند والدول المحيطة بها

اسمها الاصلي من « سيام » الى « موانج تاي » التي تعني باللغة السيامية « أرض الأحرار » ومن ثم أصبح الاسم الرسمي للمملكة يتكون من شقين هما « تاي » و « لاند » . وسيام (أو تايلند) إحدى الدول التي تشكل شبه جزيرة الهند الصينية في جنوب شرقي آسيا والتي تضم فيتنام وكمبوديا ولاوس وبورما وماليزيا ، وهي كلها تشترك في الحدود مع تايلند ماعدا فيتنام .

بدأ اتصال سيام بأوروبا عن طريق البرتغاليين في أوائل القرن السادس عشر ، وعن طريق التجار الهولنديين والانجليز والفرنسيين بعد ذلك بقرن ، وقد سعى الفرنسيون الى مزيد من التوسع في سيام ولكن مجازفتهم في سيام انتهت بكارثة .

المهم هنا أنه مع توالي أحداث التاريخ استطاع ملوك أسرة شاكري وأولهم راما الأول عام ١٧٨٢ وتاسعهم الملك بهو ميبول راما التاسع الحالي ـ أن يقيموا حضارة جديدة للبلاد ، وكان أبرز عصورها في فترة حكم راما الخامس (١٨٦٨ ـ ١٩١٠) وهي تعتبر فترة تغيير جذري واتجاهاً نحو أعلى مستويات التقدم . أمام الفترة المهمة الثانية فهي فترة تغيير نظام

— Malezya postmk
— Tayland

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influence from this important Islamic centre. Bugis established a settlement there in the nineteenth century, as did Bajau at Geliting near Maumere in a somewhat earlier period. A similar pattern is evident in the regency of Ngada, which has a Muslim population of 11,466, more than half of which is concentrated in the north coast districts of Riung and Aesesa.

Throughout NTT most Muslims are settled along the coast; few live in the interior, and virtually none of the population of the interior has converted to Islam. One exception occurred recently, just after 1965, when a sizable group of Timorese of Atoni Pah Meto in the highland district of East Amanuban in the regency of South Central Timor converted to Islam. This community of Muslim Timorese numbers less than 3,000 people within an ethnic group of 600,000, but it represents the first change in a pattern that has persisted for over 300 years.

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OSMAN BAKAR

Malays

Community of Malayasia and Thailand

The Malays call themselves Orang Melayu (Malay persons). Others refer to them as Melayu (or a cognate term, such as Malay in English). The basic meaning of *melayu*, except as it applies to Malays and to their ancient centre of empire near present-day Jambi in Sumatra, is lost. Various folk explanations of the term depend on the possible meanings of the apparent root word *layu* in related dialects and languages, such as 'flee,' 'fade,' 'parch' or 'sail'.

Malays comprise almost half of the 15 million inhabitants of the Federation of Malaysia, whom they dominate politically. They are the majority population of the four southernmost provinces of Thailand, but their exact numbers there can only be estimated because of their similarity to southern Thai Muslims and because Malay-Thai bilingualism is fairly common. Estimates are as high as 1.8 million Malays living in Thailand. They are important minorities in Singapore (375,000) and Indonesia (7.6 million), and there are smaller communities of several thousands in Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, India and Malagasy. In all, their population exceeds 16 million.

Many of the Malays of the Malay peninsula are descendants of immigrants from the Indonesia islands, principally Sumatra, who assimilated to Malay ethnic identity during the first three decades of this century. All speak the Malay language (of which modern Indonesian is a variety), but many also speak the dialects and languages of their non-Malay ancestors—Minangkabau, Javanese, Korinci, Boyanese, Buginese, Mandailing or Acehnese. The wide variety of dialects of Malay language in the peninsular states of coastal enclaves throughout Southeast Asia provides further evidence of the tremendous number of sub-varieties of Malay culture.

Geographical dispersal has been as effective as assimilation of other populations in creating diversity within Malay culture. The dispersal of Malays was well underway by the fifth century A.D., when they began to dominate local trade in Southeast Asia and long-distance sea trade between northwestern India and southern China. Their domination of sea trade continued until the sixteenth century, and even into the early European colonial period before the onset of the Industrial Revolution.

Malays founded several trading empires, among which Sri Vijaya, Melayu and Melaka were most important, and their language became the major language of commerce in Southeast Asian ports.

Tayland

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The bureaus of the Department of Religion are filled with graduates from the schools for religious teaching. This department has its branches on Ternate and Tidore, where it appoints *imams* and *khatibs* and takes care of religious jurisdiction, as it does elsewhere in Indonesia.

The traditional position of Arabs as teachers of religion has been strongly undermined by the new educational system for religious teaching. The modern teachers of religion are more orthodox than the traditional Arab teachers and are inclined to purify Islam from traditional customs incompatible with orthodox Islam. The long-run effect to the integration of Ternate and Tidore within the Indonesian polity certainly will be that Islamic observance gradually will be purified and that elements of traditional and local culture both within the sphere of religion and without gradually will be of diminishing importance.

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MAULVI AL-HAQ

Thai Muslims

Community of Thailand

Throughout the major regions of Buddhist Thailand, the silhouettes of the minaret against the skyline attest to the existence there of some 2 million Muslims. They constitute the largest religious minority, about 4 per cent of the population. Nearly all Muslims of Thailand are either indigenous Malays or descendants of immigrants or refugees of other ethnic groups. Some have been settled so long among the Theravada Buddhists of the northern and central provinces that they have assimilated into the general culture of Thai society. These Muslims are considered, and consider themselves, as 'Thai.' They number about 200,000. (Malay-speaking Thais in the south number about 1.8 million.)

They live in the five provinces immediately north of the Thailand-Malaysia border. They account for nearly one-fifth of the population in Songkhla province, almost two-thirds in Yala province, and more than three-fourths in each of the provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat and Satun. These people are devout Muslims, follow Malay customs, and most (except for those in Satun and in portions of Songkhla) speak a local dialect of Malay as their first or only language.

The vast majority reside in rural villages and engage in fishing or agriculture, the latter consisting essentially of rubber and rice cultivation. However, most proprietors of small shops in rural areas and in semi-urban areas, such as sanitation districts, also are Muslims. Furthermore, many Muslims live in the towns and either operate small shops and businesses or are manual labourers.

Other population groups, of any consequence, who live in these provinces are the Chinese (either resident aliens or Thai citizens of pure Chinese extraction) and the Thai Buddhists. The Chinese mostly live in the towns, where they tend to dominate the business sector. Some of these urban-based Chinese also own tin mines and large rubber plantations in the countryside. Still others, however, work as manual labourers. Thai Buddhists (who constitute an overwhelming majority of the population elsewhere in Thailand are largely found in the towns where they primarily are engaged either in business or as government officials.

Considerable social interaction take place between the Chinese and Thai Buddhist communities, in part because nearly all of the Chinese have learned to speak Thai and partly because of the pragmatic nature of Thai and Chinese religious beliefs. But there is very little interaction between these two

حسن الأمين, دائرة المعارف الإسلامية الشيعية, المجلد. 9 .
بيروت 2002 / 1423 .ص. 62-73 .İSAM 143880
-Taybnd

وعاداتهم وأحكامهم ومناقبهم وأصنامهم في الجاهلية، مع ذكر بعض الروايات الواردة في التوحيد، وذكر خصائص قريش وبني هاشم ومكة والمدينة والأخبار النادرة من روايات الشيعة وسواهم. . ويشمل هذا الباب خمسة فصول.

د. أحمد لواساني

تازة

ومعناها بالبربرية: الصخرة. تقع في شرق مدينة فاس بنحو ١٢٧ كلم في منتصف الطريق المؤدي إلى وجدة. وتمتاز هذه المدينة بموقعها الاستراتيجي الهام الذي جعلها منذ أقدم العصور مركزاً حربياً له خطورته، وذلك لأنها تقع فوق هضبة مرتفعة بين الأطلس والمتوسط وجبل الريف في ممر استراتيجي عظيم بين شرق المغرب وغربه، ولمكانتها الحربية اتخذها الحسن بن إدريس الثاني مقراً حربياً، وعني بها عبد المؤمن الموحدي فجعلها حصناً منيعاً. وفي أيام بني مرين اتخذها أبو يعقوب المريني قاعدة لغزو تلمسان والمغرب الأوسط. وفي أوائل هذا القرن كانت عاصمة للثائر بوحمارة. ولا تزال إلى اليوم مركزاً حربياً له أهميته.

وينسب إليها علماء كثيرون.

تايلاند[1]

- ١ -

يحدها جنوباً ماليزيا وغرباً بورما وشرقاً كمبوديا وشمالاً من جهة الشرق لاوس وبورما، وتطل على الخليج الذي اشتهر باسم (خليج سيام)، وأكثر الدول ارتباطاً بها ماليزيا ويكونان معاً على الخريطة الجغرافية شكل (الزهرة) فتمثل ماليزيا (ساق الزهرة) وتمثل تايلاند (رأس الزهرة). . . وهي بلد زراعي، وللصناعة في هذا البلد مستقبل زاهر، نظراً لكثرة المواد الأولية والمحاصيل الزراعية، والتي من أهمها الأرز (السيامي). وتقوم تايلاند بتصدير الأرز والقصدير والأخشاب والمطاط والحرير الطبيعي والتمر هندي والفواكه واللحوم المحفوظة، وتشكل السياحة نسبة كبيرة في دخل البلاد.

والعاصمة (بانكوك) مركز هام للمواصلات الجوية، وهي مدينة حديثة، تشتهر بكثرة جمال فنادقها، وسعة ونظافة شوارعها.

ورغم وفرة الدراسات التي تتعمق في تاريخ الإسلام بالشرق الأقصى، وكيف وصل إليه، ومن هم حملته، وكيف استطاع أن يقضي- بدون قوة عسكرية أو جيش محارب- على ممالك بوذية وهندوكية في تلك المنطقة ويقيم محلها دولاً وإمارات إسلامية في أندونيسيا وماليزيا. . إلاّ أن هذه الدراسات لا تتعرض بكثير لتاريخ الإسلام في تايلاند.

بينما نجد العكس عند الحديث عن الفلبين وأندونيسيا وماليزيا، أو ما كان يعرف في القديم بالأرخبيل الماليزي، فقد تحدث عن تاريخ الإسلام في تلك الجهات عدد كبير من المؤرخين من عرب وفرنجة وصينيين.

ومن المعلوم في بعض المصادر التاريخية أن الإسلام وصل إلى الصين في القرن الأول الهجري، وأن العرب كانوا يسلكون في السفر إلى الصين طريق كمبوديا، وهي متاخمة لتايلاند ولكن المراجع العربية عن تاريخ الإسلام في (تايلاند) تكاد تكون منعدمة، بينما يحظى الحديث عن تاريخ الإسلام في تايلاند باهتمام المؤرخين الغربيين من برتغاليين وهولنديين وفرنسيين وانجليز، وهم رواد الاستعمار الغربي لتلك المنطقة، أو بمعنى أصح الرواد الأوائل للتبشير المسيحي بها. . .

وفي الآونة الأخيرة بدأت تظهر بعض الدراسات التايلاندية وغالبها مترجم عن مصادر غربية، تتحدث عن تاريخ الإسلام في تايلاند. . . ومن أشهر المؤرخين

(١) كانت تعرف باسم سيام.

THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM (New Edition), Vol.III, 1971 LEIDEN, pp.

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INDJŪ. This name, properly speaking the term (Turkish *indjü*) applied to royal estates under the Mongols, is usually given to the dynasty which reigned *ca.* 703/1303-758/1357 in Fārs (Shīrāz), the founder of the dynasty, Sharaf al-Dīn Maḥmūd-Shāh, having been sent thither by Öldjeytü to administer the royal estates. According to the *Taʾrīkh-i Guzīda* he was a descendant of ʿAbd Allāh Anṣārī [*q.v.*]. Under Öldjeytü's successor Abū Saʿīd he not only retained his office but was able to extend his power so that by *ca.* 725/1325 he was practically the independent ruler of Shīrāz and almost the whole of Fārs. After the death of Abū Saʿīd, he was executed by the order of his successor Arpa Keʾün in 736/1336. According to the *Shīrāz-nāma* he had four sons: Djalāl al-Dīn Masʿūd-Shāh, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kay-Khusraw, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad and Abū Isḥāḳ Djamāl al-Dīn. The first named was already ruling in Shīrāz during his father's lifetime down to *ca.* 735/1335, when in his absence his brother Kay-Khusraw took his place, refusing upon his return to restore him his authority. Hostilities then broke out between the brothers ending only in 739/1338-9 with the death of Kay-Khusraw. Masʿūd-Shāh had imprisoned the third brother Muḥammad in Ḳalʿa-yi Safīd, but he managed to escape and enlist the support of the Čobanid Pīr Ḥusayn. The latter collected a Mongol army and advanced on Shīrāz with Muḥammad; Masʿūd-Shāh was forced to flee, and Pīr Ḥusayn entered the town. When, shortly afterwards, in 740/1340, he put Muḥammad to death, the population adopted so threatening an attitude that he found it advisable to withdraw, but only to return the next year at the head of fresh forces. On this occasion also luck was against him; he quarrelled with the Čobanid Ashraf and, when the two sides were drawn up in line of battle, was left in the lurch by his own men and sought refuge with Ḥasan-i Kūčak [*q.v.*], by whom he was put to death. Meanwhile, Masʿūd-Shāh had made his way to Luristān, where he allied himself with Yaghī-bastī, a brother of Ashraf, while Ashraf himself took the part of Masʿūd-Shāh's sole remaining brother Abū Isḥāḳ. Masʿūd-Shāh, with Yaghī-bastī's aid, succeeded in reaching Shīrāz, where he met the same fate as his brother Muḥammad: he was treacherously murdered by Yaghī-bastī in 743/1343. The latter then quarrelled, and was reconciled again, with Ashraf; and they were engaged in a joint attempt at the subjugation of Fārs when the news of their brother Ḥasan-i Kūčak's death caused their troops to disperse. Abū Isḥāḳ, who had previously received the town of Iṣfahān from Pīr Ḥusayn, now became the ruler of Shīrāz and the whole of Fārs. As he endeavoured to extend his rule over Yazd and Kirmān, he came into conflict with the Muẓaffarids [*q.v.*], with varying success. The final result was that Abū Isḥāḳ was not only driven from Yazd and Kirmān but was besieged in Shīrāz itself, which surrended to the Muẓaffarids in 754/1353. Before the surrender he had escaped to Ḳalʿa-yi Safīd and, receiving some support from Ḥasan-i Buzurg, made his way to Iṣfahān. Besieged once again, he was taken prisoner and handed over for execution to the relatives of a *shaykh* who had been put to death by his orders. This was in 758/1357. The Persian poet ʿUbayd-i Zākānī has commemorated his patron in a *marthiya* or elegy.


Bibliography: Abū Bakr al-Ḳuṭbī al-Ahari, *Taʾrīkh-i Shaykh Uways*, trans. J. B. van Loon, 157 ff.; Ḥamd Allāh Ḳazwīnī, *Taʾrīkh-i Guzīda*, ed. Browne, 622 ff.; Zarkūb Shīrāzī, *Shīrāz-nāma*, ed. Karīmī; Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, ii, 68-77, trans. Gibb, ii, 308-13; Dawlatshāh, 293. (J. A. Boyle)


INDOCHINA (Islam in). The union of Indochina, created by a decree of 19 October 1887, was definitively completed and organized under the governorship of Paul Doumer (February 1897-March 1902). Embracing a vast territory of 740,000 square km., with no geographical unity, extending from China to Siam and bordered by both the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, it ceased to exist in 1945, to become the states of Cambodia in the south west, Laos in the north west and Vietnam in the east.

The population of this region, estimated at 16 millions at the beginning of the 20th century, has grown considerably since then. In 1930 there were 2,500,000 Cambodians, 1 million Laotians and 17 million Vietnamese (7,500,000 in Tonkin, 5,000,000

2 3 NAZIRAN 1998

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تايلاند

بطاقة تعريف

الإسم: «سيام» كان اسم البلاد، وقد استعمل رسميًا من ١٨٥٦ إلى ٢٤ حزيران ١٩٣٩؛ وعاد واستعمل من جديد من ١٩٤٥ إلى ١٩٤٦ فقط.

قررت السلطات (في ٢٤ حزيران ١٩٣٩) تحويل إسم البلاد الأصلي من «سيام» إلى «موانغ تاي» (تاي أو «تائي») التي تعني باللغة السيامية «أرض الاحرار»، ومن ثم أصبح الاسم الرسمي للبلاد يتكون من شقين هما «تاي» و«لاند». و«التاي» أو «التائي» هي الإتنية الأكبر من مجموعات الإتنيات التي تكوّن شعب تايلاند، إذ تشكل لوحدها ٩٤٪ من مجموع السكان.

الموقع: جنوب شرقي آسيا. طول حدودها ٣٧٢٠ كلم. تحيط بها بورما (طول حدودها معها ١٥٠٠ كلم)، لاوس (١٢٠٠ كلم)، كمبوديا (٦٠٠ كلم)، ماليزيا (٤٢٠ كلم). أما طول شاطئها على خليج تايلاند ١٨٧٤ كلم، وطول شاطئها على المحيط الهندي ٧٣٩ كلم.

المساحة: ٥١٣ ألف و١١٥ كلم م..

العاصمة: بانكوك. أهم المدن ناخون راتشازيما، شيانغ مي، خون كاين.

THE ENCYCLPAEDIA OF ISLAM (New Edition). Vol.X(Fasc. 169-170), 1999 LEIDEN. pp.

almost due west of the port of Djubayl on the Arabian Gulf (see General map, Potts, *Arabian Gulf*, xx). Located in Wādī al-Miyāh, the site covers an area of about 990 m by 825 m and lay on the trans-Arabian route linking southern Arabia with 'Irāḳ, and in Islamic times both al-Hamdānī and Ibn Khurradādhbih mention the route, called by the 7th/13th century traveller Ibn al-Mudjāwir (214) *Ṭarīḳ al-Raḍrāḍ*, the "Gravel Road". It has in recent years been suggested that the ancient emporium of Gerrha was Thādj (see e.g. Beeston, *Observations*, 7 n. 5, and Potts, *Thaj*, 87-91). The published Hasaitic inscriptions (written in the Monumental South Arabian script, but in the north Arabian language) are listed by Potts, *Arabian Gulf*, 70-1.

Potts (*Arabian Gulf*, 34-5, after Mandaville, *Thaj*, 15-19) also lists in neat chronological order the mention of Thādj by the pre-Islamic and early Islamic poets and in the Arabic works of geography and travel. Water and stone structures are commonly alluded to as being found at the settlement: "the flowing wells of Thādj" of 'Amr b. Kulthūm (pre-Islamic), Rashīd b. Ḳays b. Shihāb al-Yashkurī's "a castle of stone" (pre-Islamic), etc. Thādj is variously described in these works as being in the area of al-Yamāma (al-Aṣma'ī, 2nd-3rd/8th-9th century), on the outskirts of al-Baḥrayn (Abū 'Ubayda, 3rd/9th century), a village in al-Baḥrayn (al-Bakrī, 5th/11th century) and a spring several nights' journey from al-Baḥrayn (Yāḳūt, 7th/13th century). Abū 'Ubayda adds that the taxes of Thādj were sent to al-Yamāma and that it belonged to Banū Ḳays b. Tha'laba and 'Anaza b. Asad.

Bibliography: Ibn al-Mudjāwir, *Ta'rīkh al-Mustabṣir*, ed. O. Löfgren, Leiden 1951-4; J.P. Mandaville, *Thaj, a pre-Islamic site in Northeastern Arabia*, in *BASOR*, clxxii (1963), 10 and n. 8; A. Jamme, *Sabaean and Ḥasaean inscriptions from Saudi Arabia*, Rome 1966, 72, 76-82; A.F.L. Beeston, *Some observations on Greek and Latin data relating to South Arabia*, in *BSOAS*, lxii (1979), 7 n. 5; D.T. Potts, *Thaj and the location of Gerrha*, in *Procs. of the Seminar for Arabian Studies*, xiv (1984), 87-91; idem, *The Arabian Gulf in Antiquity*, Oxford 1990, ii, 30-8, 70-1, 87-8, 197-203.

(G.R. SMITH)

THAGHR [see AL-THUGHŪR].

AL-**THAGHRĪ**, ABŪ SA'ĪD YŪSUF b. Muḥammad al-Ṭā'ī, 'Abbāsid commander of the middle decades of the 3rd/9th century, who presumably derived his professional *nisba* from service along the Byzantine frontiers (*thughūr* [*q.v.*], sing. *thaghr*; al-Sam'ānī, *Ansāb*, ed. Ḥaydarābād, iii, 136-7, gives two scholars with this same *nisba*, connected respectively with Tarsus and Adana). Nothing is known of him beyond the fact that he was the patron of his fellow-Ṭā'ī, the poet al-Buḥturī [*q.v.*]. (ED.)

THAILAND (formerly Siam), Islam in. Thailand is now and has always been overwhelmingly Buddhist (about 90% of the population). Islam is the second largest religion, although data on numbers are difficult to establish with certainty. The best estimate seems to be that there are about a million and a half or perhaps more in Thailand. Of these about half are ethnic Malay-Muslims, concentrated in the four southern provinces [see PATANI]. The remainder is made up of a number of disparate groups, of which we may identify the following. First, the Muslim-Thai, i.e. those who are ethnically Thai and culturally Thai in all respects except that they are Muslim. Second, the Cham [see ČAM] from western Cambodia, who are mainly concentrated in the east coast districts and in Bangkok. Their numbers have increased from the 1970s with the refugee exodus from Cambodia. Third, the West Asian group, comprising Persians and Arabs. This group is prominent in business and also in Muslim administration, having close ties with government and government officials. Fourth, there is a heterogeneous group of South Asians, mainly from the Pandjāb and Bengal. Finally, there are the Thai-Malay, i.e. ethnic Malays who have acculturated themselves into Thai society, speaking Thai and taking Thai wives. Over the course of time, they will probably assimilate with the Muslim-Thai. Apart from the Persians, the great majority are Sunnī Shāfi'īs, though the Ḥanafī school also has adherents.

Thailand is often described as a "bureaucratic polity," and this is demonstrated in the national system for the administration of Islam. There is a three-tier system of control.

(i) The Mosque Committee. The functions of the Committee are specified in fairly detailed legislation (the Mosques Acts of 1947, 1955, and Regulations of 1948, 1949). The main duties are to manage the mosque and its property according to Islamic and state law, to ensure the proper observance of Islam, and to provide for and maintain the registration of the mosque. Registration is not compulsory, but without it a mosque is not entitled to government financial aid. The great majority of mosques (well over 2,000) are registered.

(ii) The Provincial Committee for Islamic Affairs. Each of the provinces of Thailand has such a Committee. Primarily, it has two functions: first to supervise the competence and practice of the mosque committees, and, second, to act as adviser to and liaison with the secular provincial authorities.

(iii) The Central Committee for Islamic Affairs. This Committee, located in Bangkok, is the apex of the Islamic administration system. It is headed by the Chulamontri (Sheikhul Islam), the King's adviser on matters relating to Islam. He is appointed directly by the King, on the advice of the Minister for the Interior, and can only be removed by the King. His tenure is for life. The Committee is located jointly in the Ministry of Interior (Dept. of Local Authority) and Ministry of Education (Dept. of Religious Affairs). The Committee has responsibility for the overall supervision of mosques, provincial committees, and for the allocation of finance. It also has attempted a number of translations from Arabic to Thai with variable success. However, its primary function is to incorporate Islam and the Muslims into the state administration, again with varying degrees of success, especially in the south [see PATANI].

The main problem for Muslims, or for any other minority in Thailand, lies in government policy. This oscillates between integration and assimilation. While a good degree of religious freedom has always been permitted, a plurality of culture has never been accepted. So far as Islam is concerned, it will be of little concern to the Thai authorities, provided that individual Muslims have achieved a reasonable degree of assimilation. On the other hand, where Islam is identified with a non-Thai culture, as in the Malay-Muslim south, then conflict is inevitable.

Bibliography: Omar Farouk, *The Muslims of Thailand*, in Lutpi Ibrahim (ed.), *Islamika*, Kuala Lumpur 1981, 97-120; R. Scupin, *Cham Muslims of Thailand*, in *Jnal. of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*, x (1989), 486-92.

(M.B. HOOKER)

AL-**THĀ'IR FI 'LLĀH**, ABU 'L-FADL DJA'FAR b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Shā'ir, Zaydī 'Alid ruler of Hawsam [*q.v.*] 319-50/931-61.

His mother was a daughter of his paternal grand-

Pattani

Economic growth, however robust, has a hard time eradicating the country's rural poverty and urban squalor, particularly here in Thailand's deep south. Narathiwat is only 840 kilometers (520 miles) as the crow flies from the capital Bangkok – but it might as well lie in another country in terms of race, religion, culture and even language.

"The Muslims are the poorest people in Thailand," imam Ahmad says. "We need government assistance." Eighty kilometers (50 miles) to the northwest, Chamnong Koomrak, governor of Pattani province, replies, "We're trying.... Our budget is growing by 10 percent a year. We give special privileges to Muslims to enter university and we want to develop the south, in fisheries, food-processing and tourism."

The truth is that there are few shortcuts to development anywhere. Both the government in Bangkok and the Muslim electorate in Thailand's southern provinces of Pattani, Satun, Narathiwat and Yala know that the key to prosperity is education. For the authorities, that means instruction in the Thai language. The people of the south agree – but they intend at the same time to preserve their religion and their culture.

The result is a fascinating renaissance of Muslim awareness spreading across the narrow, elongated arm of land that reaches down from the body of Buddhist Thailand in the north to the Muslim nation of Malaysia in the south. You see it everywhere, from the simple yet elegant central mosque in Pattani to the corrugated-iron mosques of the fishing villages along the eastern coast. You see it, too, among the 1,700 students who cram the classrooms of Narathiwat's Islamic Foundation for Education, built 20 years ago with a donation from the late King Faysal of Saudi Arabia. And you sense it in the faces of the tiny children learning Arabic from Jitsom bint Salih in a one-room *madrasa*, or Qur'anic school, in the sand-swept coastal hamlet of Ban Budi.



Muslim schoolgirls at Laem Pho elementary school. Opposite page, Pattani's new central mosque and (inset) a young worshipper.


So who are these Thai Muslims? To government statisticians they are one of Thailand's minorities, perhaps four percent of a population now numbering about 55 million, overwhelmingly concentrated in the far south. To their Buddhist compatriots they are known as *khaek*, a word that means "visitor" in the Thai language – though the Muslims came to the region several centuries before the Thais.

To any real visitor, however – a *farang* or foreigner from overseas – the ethnic identity of the Muslims is obvious: They are Malay, just like their neighbors and relatives in the northern Malaysian states of Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu and Perlis. The two groups dress the same way: patterned sarong and white skullcap or angular black *songkok* hat for the men, long-sleeved dress and *dawa* head-scarf for the women. They speak the same Malay language, although many of the fishing families have a dialect all their own. And, most of all, they worship God in the same way, recoiling from the ornamented figures of Buddhism, Thailand's state religion. The fact that they bear Thai, not Malaysian, citizenship has nothing to do with cultural affinity – but it has everything to do with the politics of the past.

The Malays originated on the island of Borneo, now divided between Malaysia's Sabah and Sarawak and Indonesia's Kalimantan. About 1,500 years ago they began an expansion that took them south and west through the islands of Indonesia and northward to the Philippines and the Malay Peninsula. Meanwhile, the Thais – originating perhaps in southeastern China – were expanding southward in competition with peoples like the Shans, Mons and the Khmers of today's Kampuchea. The inevitable meeting of Thai and Malay came around the beginning of the 13th century.

But this meeting was not a clash of nations in any modern sense. Southeast Asia nearly 800 years ago was a shifting patchwork of kingdoms, each vying for tribute and influence but not necessarily for conquest. The Siamese, as the Thais used to be known, had one kingdom – but so did the Khmers, while to the south there were the kingdoms of Majahapit and Langchia. Just as the medieval Arab historian Ibn Khaldun theorized, when a state was vigorous, it expanded in territory and influence at the expense of weaker states – until the weak in turn became strong and led a fresh cycle of change.

Today's Muslim provinces of southern Thailand are the descendants of Malay kingdoms that in the Middle Ages paid tribute – in the form of *bunga mas*, or ornamental flowers of gold and silver – to the king of Siam. The payment of flowers showed a degree of loyalty to the king, and dependence on his protection against rival forces. It hardly mattered that the Siamese were purveyors of the region's Buddhist and Hindu tradition, while the Malays were 14th-century converts to Islam. What was at stake was power, not culture.



Makale "Peyland pazetinden"

John Anthony, "Islam in Southern Thailand from Singora Mosque to Minarets", ARAMCO XXXIX (5), Washington 1988

Southeast Asia

IMTIYAZ YUSUF

Aspects of Islam in Thailand Today

Thai Muslims and their co-religionists in Sri Lanka and Burma provide three examples of Muslim minority communities living in Theravada Buddhist majority countries. Two main groups comprise the Thai Muslim community: the 'native Muslims', or the Malays residing in the southern provinces, and the 'settled/naturalized' Muslims of different ethnic backgrounds residing across the country – hence the ethnic, linguistic, cultural and political variation within the Thai Muslim community. The southern Muslims make up the majority (approximately 700,000, or 80%) of the total current Thai Muslim population (approximately 5-7 million).

Islam is the second main religion in Thailand, with Muslims constituting the largest religious minority. Thailand's history of Islam dates back to the Ayutthaya Dynasty (1350-1767), when the country was still known as Siam. The independent Malay kingdoms to the south had not yet been incorporated. They were not to become part of Thailand until 1902. Islam arrived from various directions: the Malay-Indonesian archipelago, Yemen (Hadhramawt), Persia, India, Burma, China and Cambodia.

The establishment of Islam in Malacca, during the reign of Sultan Iskandar, led to the spread of the early syncretic Islam in the Southeast Asian archipelago, reaching Pattani by 1387. The upper southern Thai province of Songkhla marks the language border between Malay and Thai-speaking Muslims. There was minimal spreading of Malay Islamic religiosity beyond Songkhla. This was partly due to consolidation of the 'orthodoxy of Singhalese (Theravada) Buddhism, which had been introduced into the Indo-chinese Peninsula by the Mons of Burma and was disseminated further by the Thai'[1] already a century prior, following the decline of Hindu-Sanskrit culture and Mahayana Buddhism in the Menam and Mekong basins. One may remark that the encounter between Malay Islam and Thai Buddhism was one of two religious 'native type' orthodoxies founded on ethno-linguistic distinctions.

The other arrivals of Islam into Thailand were from various directions of the country, made up mostly of immigrant Muslims of different sectarian and ethnic backgrounds. The central plains of the country comprise Thai Muslims of Persian, Pakistani, Indonesian and Cham extraction. While those residing in the northern provinces of Lampang, Chiangmai and Chiang Rai are of Bengali, Burmese and Yunnanese (Chinese) origin, having migrated to Thailand for economic and political reasons (they were fleeing from religious persecution at the hands of the communists in China and the nationalists in Burma.).[2] There are also converts to Islam either through marriage or religious conversion. Most Thai Muslims are Sunnis, yet there is also a small Shia community belonging to both the Imami and Bohras/Mustali Ismailis sub-groups.

Apart from ethnic differences, there is also linguistic diversity within the Thai Muslim community. The majority of Muslims in the south speak Malay, while those residing in other parts of Thailand converse in Thai, both at home and in public. They are no longer familiar with the languages of their ancestors.

Islamic identity in Thailand

In Southeast Asia, religious identity is often linked to ethnicity: Malays are Muslim; Thais are Buddhist; and Chinese are either Christian or syncretic Taoist/Buddhist. Although ethno-religious constructs shape identities, it can be said that in Thailand, Muslims and Buddhists share nearly identical social manners, perspectives, formalities and practices. They share the Southeast Asian social demeanour and conventions of moderation, compromise and mutual consultation. Thai Muslims maintain, express and symbolize their identity through religious institutions such as the mosque, *pondok* or Madrasah and the office of the Chularatchamontri/*Shaikh al-Islam*,[3] as well as through Islamic festivals celebrated at the national level, including *Maulid al-Nabi*.

Islamic education in Thailand

Historically, the famous *pondok* system of Islamic education was instituted in Pattani and is noted for its celebrated scholars such as Ahmad bin Muhammad Zain al-Fatani and Daud al-Fatani, who played a pivotal role in the spread and development of Islamic education in Southeast Asia. Their intellectual influence has a left a lasting mark on the development of Islamic scholarship. Initially, the Thai state considered the educational programmes implemented by the *pondok* to be out-dated. Not recognizing their moral-cultural relevance, the idea was to streamline them along modern-secular educational lines.[4] Finally, upon Muslim protest, the religio-moral aspects of this demand for an integrated form of education as a means of maintaining Muslim identity and preparing the youth morally for modern professional life were recognized. This led to the setting up of Islamic Private Schools.

Contemporary Islamic education in Thailand is cultivated through both the *pondok*, which offers solely religious education, and the combined educational programmes disseminated by the Islamic Private Schools. These latter are under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. Both types of institutions are manned by graduates of religious seminaries and universities from Malay-Indonesian Archipelago, al-Azhar in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, India, Pakistan and Turkey.

Thai Muslims on the political stage

The Thai Muslim minority participated in the national political process during both its democratic and non-democratic eras. This engagement has earned Thai Muslims recognition within the political system. Thai Muslim politicians have represented different political parties in the various parliamentary elections that have taken place in the country since its emergence as a constitutional monarchy in 1932. This era also witnessed the southern Muslim struggle against the policy of 'Thai-ization'.

Thai Muslim politicians representing Muslim majority constituencies have long been concerned about developmental problems facing Muslims such as: educational amelioration, economic progress, cultural-religious freedom, and political recognition.

The political engagement of Thai Muslims has also undergone transformation since the recent rekindling of the democratic process. Until 1988, Thai Muslim politicians represented various constituencies on a personal basis. But this is now changing. The Democrat Party of Thailand, representing the middle class, has been the most popular political party in southern Thailand and has long been the main political voice of Thai Muslims. However, several long-time Thai Muslim politicians aligned with the Democrat party have withdrawn, complaining of the inadequate attention given by the party to specific Muslim matters and of the breaking of electoral promises. These disappointments caused them to form in 1988 a Thai Muslim political faction called the Wahdah (Unity), whose priority is to address developmental problems facing the Thai Muslim community. It has been described as an ethnic movement seeking to achieve the interests of the Thai Muslims from within the political system.[5]


The Wahdah sees itself as an independent political group ready to support any political party that promises to pay special attention to developmental issues and problems facing Thai Muslims. Since its inception, it has aligned itself with the New Aspiration Party (NAP) or Kuam Wang Mai (Thai) also known as Harappan Baru (Malay) established in 1990. The Muslim members of the parliament from the Wahdah have obtained cabinet posts for the first time in the three recently democratically elected coalition governments since 1992. However, the political alignment of the Wahdah could change in view of the implications that the current economic crisis may have for the next parliamentary election.

Despite differing approaches according to political party, the Thai Muslim members of the Parliament and the Senate agree upon the urgent need to address specific developmental matters such as the improvement of the infra-structure and economic development of the Muslim majority provinces within the IMT-GT (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand-Growth Triangle) programme. Other important matters include facilitating travel arrangements for Thai pilgrims to the Hajj, obtaining legal permission for Thai Muslim females to wear the *hijab* in public places (which has been granted) and the establishment of an Islamic bank as an alternative financial institution.

In the current Thai government led by the Democrats, the Foreign Minister is Dr Surin Pitsuwan, a prominent Thai Muslim member of the Democrat Party. Mr Wan Muhammad Nor Matta, member of the Wahdah and deputy leader of the NAP currently in opposition, is serving as elected speaker of the Thai parliament and is president of the National Assembly. Muslim support for the Wahdah faction is increasing in the south and is gaining popularity among Thai Muslims residing in other parts of the country. The next elections will be a test of the political popularity of the Democrat Party, the NAP and other parties among the Thai Muslims.

Over the decades, the Thai Muslims and Buddhists have come to understand and recognize their ethnic and religio-cultural identities. The enlightened of both communities have realized the need to move away from rigidity and exclusivity. Yet there remain several development issues, in the areas of education and economy of the Muslim sector, to be addressed – both publicly and privately.

The inter-religious dynamic in Thailand reflects the need for dialogue and negotiation. But most importantly, it reflects the ability on the part of the political authorities to recognize the ethno-religious variety. ◆



The 300 years old Masjid Talok Manok in Bacho district, Narathiwat, Thailand



A Surau (Musalla / Prayer house) at Natanjong, Yaring, Pattani district, Thailand



An old Muslim house in Thailand



Masjid Saiburi, Pattani district, Thailand

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E-mail: izyusuf@bunga.pn.psu.ac.th

Notes

1. G. Coedès, *The Indianized States of Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1971) p. 218.
2. Suthep Soonthornpasuch, 'Islamic Identity in Chiengmai City: A Historical and Structural Comparison of Two Communities', PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1977. Also David Wilson and David Henley, 'Northern Comfort: The Contented Muslims of Chiang Mai', *Bangkok Post*, 4 January 1995, pp. 33,40.
3. Imtiyaz Yusuf, 'Islam and Democracy in Thailand: Reforming the Office of Chularajamontri/Shaikh al-Islam', *Journal of Islamic Studies* (Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies) vol. 9 no. 2 (July 1998): 277-298.
4. Hasan Madmarn, *The Pondok & Madrasah in Patani* (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsan Malaysia, 1999).
5. Suria Saniwa bin Wan Mahmood, 'De-Radicalization of Minority Dissent- A Case Study of the Malay-Muslim Movement in Southern Thailand', Master's thesis, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia, 1998.

02 NISAN 1991

PATANI (also Pattani), city and ancient kingdom of the Malay Peninsula, now in southern Thailand. Early Patani owed its importance to its position at the mouth of the river draining an extensive rice plain and as the eastern terminus of an overland trading route across the peninsula. Under the name Langkasuka it entered into trade relations with China by the sixth century CE and was an early center of Buddhism and Indian religion. As a trading port it was among the objects of the naval expeditions of Rajendracola (1017–1025). In the thirteenth century it was brought under the sway of the rising Thai Buddhist state centered on Nakhon Si Thammarat.

Patani's Malay population was converted to Islam probably in the fifteenth century, and to this day it remains a major center of Islamic teaching and scholarship. The state's independence and trade grew in the wake of the Portuguese capture of Melaka in 1511, and Patani became a leading South China Sea port for Asian and European trade with Japan and China. As the Thai kingdom of Ayudhya attempted to control this trade in the seventeenth century, Patani was drawn into conflict with the Thai and succumbed to Thai control in 1785. After rebelling against Bangkok, Ayudhya's successor, in 1817, Patani was subdivided into seven small provinces and thereafter was too weak to successfully challenge the growing power of Siam. Further rebellions against the imposition of Bangkok's authority in 1901–1902 and 1946–1948 were ineffective, but Muslim Malay resentment of Thai control in Patani remains strong.

[*See also* Ayudhya; Bangkok; Langkasuka; Melaka; *and* Nakhon Si Thammarat.]

A. Teeuw and David K. Wyatt, *Hikayat Patani: The Story of Patani* (1970).

DAVID K. WYATT

PATEL, SARDAR VALLABHBHAI (1875–1950), a leader of the Indian National Congress and deputy prime minister of India from 1947 to 1950. A barrister practicing in Ahmadabad, Gujarat, Patel was drawn into an active role in the Congress during the Bardoli *satyagraha* movement in 1922. He rose in the party to become Congress president in 1931. Outside of India he was the least known of the three major leaders (the others were Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru), but in the party he was recognized as the strong man in the organization. His pragmatic acceptance of partition in 1947 was crucial to Lord Mountbatten's plan. He entered the Interim Cabinet in 1946 as home minister and retained that post as well as the deputy premiership after independence until his death. Among his major achievements was the successful integration of the princely states. He was generally more conservative than Nehru as well as more pragmatic than Gandhi. His death removed a possible conservative challenge to Nehru.

[*See also* Indian National Congress; Princely States; Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand; *and* Nehru, Jawaharlal.]

Durga Das, ed., *Sardar Patel's Correspondence, 1945–50*, 10 vols. (1971–1974). K. L. Punjabi, *The Indomitable Sardar* (1962).

CRAIG BAXTER

PATENOTRE TREATY (1884). Signed on 6 June 1884 and ratified in May 1885, the treaty established the French protectorate over Vietnam, Tonkin coming under more direct supervision while the court at Hue theoretically had more control over Amnam. In large part because of the conflict with China over French policy toward her vassal, the final version of the treaty somewhat softened the original Harmand Agreement of 1883, particularly where Hue's sovereignty over certain provinces was concerned. Other clauses of the treaty dealt with the status and rights of the French in the protectorate, as well as various aspects of internal administration. [*See also* Harmand, François-Jules.]

BRUCE M. LOCKHART

PATERNO, PEDRO (1858–1911). Born to a wealthy Manila family of mixed Tagalog, Chinese, and Spanish origin, Paterno was among the most prominent *ilustrados* of his time. Highly educated (B. A., Ateneo, 1871; LL.D., Madrid, 1880), he was a prolific writer whose large body of works reflects his participation in the reform movement and expresses his views on Filipino national heritage. In 1897 he negotiated the Pact of Biaknabato, the agreement ending the first phase of the Philippine Revolution against Spain. Although at first reluctant, Paterno supported the 1898 republic, serving as a personal aide of Emilio Aguinaldo until his capture by the Americans in late 1899. Subsequently, Paterno was unable to achieve the recognition and position he so desperately sought, finding himself displaced by a younger generation of political leaders. [*See also* Ilustrado; Philippine Revolution; *and* Aguinaldo, Emilio.]

MICHAEL CULLINANE

PATHAN. *See* Pakhtun.

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASIAN HISTORY, c-3, s-220, 1988, New York

One Thousand Questions (1572) and the most recent copies, from the early twentieth century, preserved in Malay and Javanese. These years span fundamental changes in the region among which the domination of colonial European powers over local political and economic systems is no doubt pivotal.

These different types of links that establish a literary network—whether of a single story, a corpus or an array of related texts—create a kind of meta-intertextuality that extends distances both great and small. The distance is not necessarily geographical, since many worlds can exist in one place at one time, as when Muslim and non-Muslim Tamils shared sacred pilgrimage sites and derived inspiration from texts using similar literary conventions but calling upon different divine powers for mercy.[68] The distance can also be physically or temporally vast, as when Ibnu Salam's tale of conversion was recounted in different languages and during different centuries in India and Java. All such connections—in their multiple dimensions—were elements in an on-going process that gave rise to a shared cosmopolis of ideas, beliefs, idioms and stories.

IRCICA Ktp.

MADDE YAYIMLANDIKTAN SONRA IADE EDILMEMELIDIR

[68] An example of the former is the tomb shrine of the prominent Muslim 'saint' Shāh al-Ḥamīd (d. 1570 in Nagur, Tamil Nadu), the most frequently visited in the region and attracting Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Many genres of writing in Tamil are shared across religious communities. On Tamil-Muslim works written in these genres see M. M. Uwise, *Muslim Contribution to Tamil Literature* (Kilakarai: Fifth International Islamic Tamil Literary Conference, 1990): 151–64.

Journal of Islamic Studies 21:1 (2010) pp. 29–58 doi:10.1093/jis/etp026

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND REFORMIST ISLAM IN THAILAND'S SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES: THE ROLES OF HAJI SULONG ABDUL KADIR AND ISMAIL LUTFI JAPAKIYA

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S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University

Tayland
15 MAR 2012

INTRODUCTION

The topic of Islamic education in southern Thailand has been the subject of relatively extensive academic inquiry. However, most of this scholarship has centred on the relationship between the Thai state and the Malay community of Pattani,[1] Yala, and Narathiwat, commonly referred to in the literature as the southernmost border provinces of Thailand. From the prevailing literature, a number of assumptions can be gleaned that inform the state's perception of the Islamic schools in these provinces.[2] First, schools are often seen to encourage separatism by perpetuating Malay culture in an insular and exclusivist manner. Second, the system of Islamic education privileges religious over academic and vocational training, and by that token does not prepare students for modern Thai society. Concomitantly, this has resulted in the widening of the gulf between communal and national identities. Finally, many

[1] This paper uses 'Patani' to denote the historical Malay-Muslim kingdom, and 'Pattani' as the current administrative province in southern Thailand.

[2] Uthai Dulyakasem, 'Education and Ethnic Nationalism: A Study of the Muslim-Malays in Southern Siam', PhD diss. (Stanford University), 1981; Surin Pitsuwan, *Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of the Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand* (Bangkok: Thai Khadi Research Institute, Thammasat University, 1985); Wan Kadir Che Man, *Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990).

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purposes for which such *waqf* was made.

It is estimated that the present yearly income is approximately 5,800/- Malaysian dollars. Income from the date of commencement of this *waqf* in 1360 A.H. up to 1367 A.H. without deducting expenses such as land rent, *ex-gratia* payments to person(s) looking after the land and other miscellaneous items amounted to 104,304.21.

Expenditure not including land rent, miscellaneous items and *ex-gratia* payments:–

1	Purchasing of *padi* land	$ 33,703.00
2	Tables and chairs for students of college.[74]	3,764.50
3	Library	1,504.25
4	Scholarship[75]	10,680.37
5	Scholarship	8,307.54
6	Prayer mats (rubber)	600.00
7	Gestetner machine	800.00
8	Two school clocks	160.00
9	School bell	250.00
10	Donation for Muslim Welfare	200.00
11	Loan (for a student to further his studies)	3,000.00
	Total	$ 70,969.66

From the above figures, although they are not up-to-date, it appears that *waqf* in Kedah were composed exclusively of lands. There are only two mosques under *waqf*, namely, the mosques at Akar Peluru and Gurun;[76] nevertheless, the *Majlis* is the sole trustee of all mosques in the State.[77]

As far as the institution of *waqf* in the State of Kedah is concerned, there is no evidence whatsoever to indicate whether this Department has been able to meet adequately the needs of those who should benefit by *waqf*. It is almost certain that there are a lot of known *waqf* in the State of Kedah including mosques and Muslim Cemeteries which have not been officially registered. Such *waqf* should be looked into seriously in order to be or benefit to the Muslims. As far as we are concerned, the mosques should become *waqf* by themselves whether they are registered or otherwise. Therefore, it is incredible that there are only two mosques under *waqf* in the State of Kedah.

Apart from the fact that the figures given above are not up-to-date, nothing too has been done to upkeep the institution of *waqf* as required by the Islamic law. The present paper must be considered merely a preliminary survey of the subject. Perhaps it will help to stimulate interest in the subject.

D 1572

74 College stated in the *waqf* instrument.
75 Scholars' names have been made available to the author.
76 *Jabatan Hal Ehwal Ugama*, Kedah, of 1st December, 1968.
77 Kedah, *Administration of Muslim law Enactment*, 1962, s.104.

Islamika, 1981, 1981 Kuala Lumpur, s. 97-120

The Muslims Of Thailand†

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POLITICALLY as well as numerically the Muslims are a significant minority group within Thailand. Hitherto, relatively little has been written on their national role in Thailand. Invariably, much of the available literature seems to be mainly confined to describing or discussing their position in the Thai-Malaysia border region.[1] Whilst it is true that the Muslims of the Malay ethnic group predominate the southernmost provinces

† This paper is based on excerpts from my doctoral thesis entitled 'The Political Integration of the Thai-Islam,' submitted to the Department of Politics and Government, Faculty of Social Sciences, The University of Kent at Canterbury, England, November, 1980. Field-work for the doctoral research in Thailand was carried out in August/September, 1975, December/November 1976–1977, and March 1979.
Although in the official Thai parlance, the terms 'Thai-Islam' and 'Thai-Muslim' are used interchangeably, in this paper, unless otherwise stated, the former will be used to refer to the general Muslim population of Thailand as a whole, whilst the latter is designated to describe only the Thai-speaking Muslims of Thailand who have internalized much of Thai culture bar the Buddhist religion. The term 'Malay-Muslim' on the other hand, is used to describe the Malay-speaking Muslim population of Thailand who have generally resisted assimilation into Thai society and culture. By 'Muslim Provinces' is meant the Thai provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathivat and Satun, which are sometimes collectively referred to as the 'Four Southern Border Provinces of Thailand'. By 'Malay-Muslim Provinces' is meant the provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathivat.

1 Some of the major works include: Thomas M. Fraser, Jr., *Rusembilan: A Malay Fishing Village in Southern Thailand*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1960 and *Fishermen of South Thailand: The Malay Villagers*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., USA., 1966; Patya Saihoo, 'Social Organisation of an Inland Malay Village Community in Southern Thailand with Emphasis on the Pattern of Leadership,' D. Phil Thesis, Oxford University, England, 1974; Khacadphai Burutphan, *Thai-Muslim*, (in Thai), Samnagphimphraephittaya, Bangkok, 1976; Mohamed Abdul Kader, *Ryang sasanaa isllaam le' chaaw thaj muslim naj sii changwat phaagtaaj*. (Islam and the Muslims in the Four Southern Provinces) (in Thai), Haanghun suan camkad, Bangkok, B.E. 2520; Kasem Rangsiyokrit, 'Ittipon khong sasanaa isalaam to kaan cad kaanpokrong changwat chaajdeen phaagtaaj,' (The Impact of Islam on the Governmental Administration of the Border Provinces of South Thailand) (in Thai), M.A. Dissertation, Thammasat University, Bangkok, 1976. A great deal more has been written in the form of articles. Some of these worth looking at are: Nantawan Haemindra, "The Problem of the Thai-Muslims in the Four Southern Provinces of Thailand," (Part One), *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. VII, No. 2, Sept. 1976, and (Part Two), *JSEAS*, Vol. VIII, No. 1, March 1977. Astri Suhrke, "Irredentism Contained", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 2, January 1975, "The Thai-Muslims: Some Aspects of Minority Integration" *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XLIII, No. 4, Winter, 1970–71; Dennis Walker, "Conflict between the Thai and Islamic Cultures in South Thailand, 1948–1970" *Studies in Islam*, Vol. IX, No. 3–4, July–October 1972, Indian Institute of Islamic Studies, New Delhi. A few notable exceptions to the above trend of focusing on the Border Provinces can be found in the following works: Raymond, Scupin, 'Thai-Muslims in Bangkok Islam andModernization in a Buddhist Society, Ph. D. Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbera, 1978, and "The Politics of Islamic Reformism in Thailand" *Asian Survey*, December 1980, Vol. XX, No. 12, University of California Press; Suthep Soonthornpasuch, 'Islamic Identity in Chiengmai City: A Historical and Structural Comparison,' Ph. D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1977.

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presentations; magazine, discussion, and 'advice' programmes; and regular news of government Islamic activities (entitled 'From the Pusat Islam'). International Islamic events of consequence were well represented, including rebroadcasts of, for example, *hajj* proceedings from Saudi Arabia.

IX

The reductionist approach to Islamization that I have adopted in this essay obviously omits consideration of a great deal that is important. What, for the individual rather than society, *is* 'Islamization' and how is it to be measured? What are and have been the effects of the kinds of Islamization I have described on the 45 per cent of the Malaysian population that is neither Malay nor Muslim? What more might be said of contestation within the Muslim community itself?[35] What of the international context, beyond the few remarks that I have ventured here? These larger questions must be addressed, but cannot be embarked upon in the compass of a short essay that has sought simply to discern and trace some of the more evident patterns of change during the past century in Malaysia's Islamic body politic and civil society.

[35] Many of these questions are raised in Norani Othman (ed.), *Shari'a Law and the Modern Nation State: A Malaysian Symposium* (Kuala Lumpur: Sisters in Islam, 1994), in which see especially the editor's essay, 'The Sociopolitical Dimensions of Islamisation in Malaysia: A Cultural Accommodation of Social Change?', at pp. 123–43.

07 NISAN 1999

Journal of Islamic Studies 9:2 (1998) pp. 229–258 Oxford-UK.

MUSLIM ACCOMMODATION IN THAI SOCIETY

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Theravada Buddhism, along with other early Brahmanic and animist spiritual practices, is accepted by about 95 per cent of the approximately 62 million citizens of Thailand. Muslims comprise the largest religious minority in Thailand, approximately 6 per cent of the population. About 4 million Thai citizens profess the Islamic faith and maintain over 2,700 mosques. The Muslims in Thailand comprise two broad self-defined categories consisting of 'Malay Muslims', who speak the Malay language and reside primarily in south Thailand in a number of provinces bordering on Malaysia, and 'Thai Muslims' or *Thai Isalam*, who reside in central and north Thailand. The Malay Muslims of south Thailand make up over 70 per cent of the population in that region. In contrast, the Thai Muslims of central and north Thailand reside as smaller ethnic and religious minorities in those regions. Historically, the Muslims of south Thailand resided in a cultural region imbued with a Malay-Indonesian Islamic political and religious cultural ethos, whereas the Muslims of central and north Thailand have been influenced by the political-religious culture of Brahmanic, animist, and Theravada Buddhist traditions. Recently, however, because of the administrative practices and policies of the Thai state during the twentieth century, all Muslims in Thailand have been greatly affected by the dominant Buddhist-Brahmanic-animist political and religious culture. This essay will focus on how Muslims in Thailand have accommodated to the dominant political culture that has circumscribed the Islamic beliefs and practices in this South-East Asian country.

THAI POLITICAL CULTURE

A number of recent scholars have emphasized how Thai nationalist leaders and bureaucrats have constructed an image of Thailand as a culturally homogeneous nation, whereas in actuality there are many

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and bank financing. The other Islamic financing developments involving government and commercial paper, factoring, and offshore services are very limited in scale, and of doubtful *Sharī'a* acceptability.

Islam may not have aided Malaysia's economic development, but there is no evidence that it has hindered it. Mahathir Mohamad's stress on invigorating Malaysian Islam may have been unnecessary. Islam is likely to be a continuing factor influencing politics, but as far as Malaysian development is concerned, the influence of conventional economics on Islam may be greater than the impact of Islam on economic policy.

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ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY IN THAILAND: REFORMING THE OFFICE OF *CHULARAJMONTRI/SHAIKH AL-ISLĀM*

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The recent economic transformation of South-East Asia, the resulting boom, and the current crisis have made a major impact on the region.[1] The religio-political manifestations of these events include the rise of new Buddhist religious movements in Thailand[2] and the political recognition of Thailand's Muslim minority; the emerging role of Islam on the Indonesian political scene;[3] the central role played by the Catholic Church and liberation theology in Philippine politics;[4] the Islamic claims of UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) and PAS (Parti Islam SeMalaysia), the two major political parties of Malaysia;[5] and the recent banning of the Mahdist-oriented religious group, Darul Arqam, also in Malaysia.[6]

[1] Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, *Political Change in Southeast Asia: Trimming the Banyan Tree* (London: Routledge, 1996); Christopher Lingle, *The Rise and Decline of the Asian Century: False Starts on the Path to Global Millennium* (Barcelona: Editions Sirocco, S. L., 1997); David I. Hitchcock, 'Cultural Changes Gnaw at Heels of Asian Tigers', *Christian Science Monitor: International Section*, 30 December 1997; Editorial, 'Turning Asia's Failures into Success', *Business Week*, 8 December 1997, p. 64.

[2] David Gosling, 'New Directions in Thai Buddhism', *Modern Asian Studies*, 14 (1980), 411–39; Henrich Dumollin, *Buddhism in the Modern World* (New York: Macmillan, 1976).

[3] Douglas E. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance* (London: Routledge, 1995).

[4] W. Scott Thompson, *The Philippines in Crisis* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992); Joseph Collins, *The Philippines: Fire on the Rim* (San Francisco, CA: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1989); Eleazer S. Fernandez, *Towards a Theology of Struggle* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1994); Gretchen Casper, *Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995).

[5] Hussin Mutalib, 'Islamisation in Malaysia: Between Ideals and Realities', in *Islam, Muslims and the Modern State*, ed. Hussin Mutalib and Taj ul-Islam Hashmi (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994), 152–73.

[6] Johan H. Meuleman, 'Reactions and Attitudes towards the Darul Arqam Movement in Southeast Asia', *Studia Islamika*, 3:1 (1996), 43–78.

Compiled and edited by A.N.M. ABDUR RAHMAN , Dhaka-1986. s. 399-420. IRCICA: 20306.

and speak less and follow the good examples of men who behave exactly as they think to transform words into actions.

Let's move on to the Da'wah Islamiyah with the strong spirit of Jihad. Since Islam is my religion and our religion, we, Muslims should not stand on the other side of Da'wah. This is to be the only strategy for the future.

I pray Allah, the Almighty that our efforts may be crowned with success.

05 ARALIK 1995

ISLAMIC MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES AND THEIR PROBLEMS IN THAILAND

M. H. DAMAK

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THAILAND AFTER VIETNAM: AFTER VIETNAM THAILAND?

The directions of Thai diplomacy in 1975

ROGER KERSHAW

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FOR THOSE who had eyes to see, the complete communization of Indochina was not an altogether surprising consequence of the Paris Agreement of 1973.[1] Indeed the essence of America's strategic revision has been the adoption of a lower and less costly profile in South-East Asia and the fostering, simultaneously, of a greater sense of security in Peking, so that the US could face up to the USSR and maintain the "central balance" with greater efficiency and credibility. The loss of Vietnam was certainly a price that US strategy was prepared to pay: only the suddenness of the collapse was unwelcome.[2] Among the states of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), too, communist victory was presumably an outcome that was considered possible. The reduction of American power is the central implication of the Nixon Doctrine, and in the past few years there has been a search for new formulas of security – especially by Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore.[3] Ironically, both Thailand's caution towards neutralization and its search for a new relationship with communist neighbours before 1975 reveal fears of a less than ideal conclusion of the Third Indochina War. There thus seemed to be no immediate reason to expect foreign policy reappraisal, in Thailand or other ASEAN states, after the communist victories. This is not to say that the chosen formulas of security are necessarily *adequate* to preserve the social system and political structure of the states in question. The virtues of conciliation are especially problematic. But when one's principal ally reveals itself as a paper tiger such formulas may be the best available and if this is the case there is no basis for anticipating dramatic changes.

Since Thailand is in the most exposed position of all the ASEAN states (and since the writer had the opportunity during July and August 1975 to observe the Thai diplomatic and political scene at first hand)[4] this article focuses chiefly upon that exciting and in many ways bewildering country. Given the previous diversity of the ASEAN states' assessments of their strategic interest, it was not expected that Thailand's response – whether revised or unchanging – to the new communist ascendancy would necessarily be representative of reactions elsewhere in the region. But it has always been apparent that if Thailand's response proves inadequate, the other ASEAN state with a foot on the mainland (Malaysia) will find itself in the same situation of exposure as that which now characterizes Thailand. Thus Thailand's situation may not for long be peculiar to itself. It is noteworthy, indeed, that before 1975 Malaysia had already pursued

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ZAMAN
21 MART
1991

21 MART 1991

Burada da Müslümanlar baskı altında. Dinî eğitimlerini yeterince yapamıyorlar. Direnenler utanç verici şekilde öldürülmektedir. Müslüman isimleri değiştirilmekte

Tayland ve Pattani Müslümanları

İŞKENCENİN HER TÜRÜ

Bu ülkede Müslümanların biraraya gelmesi konan kanunlarla yasaklanmış durumda. Kurban Bayramı'nda kurban kesmek yasak, hacca gidecekler belirli bir süre gözaltında tutulmakta

MESUT ÜNLÜ


Güneydoğu Asya'da yer alan Tayland Krallığı'nda Budizmden sonraki ikinci büyük din İslâm'dır. Ülkenin başlıca 4 güney eyaletinde 5 milyonu aşkın Müslüman yaşamaktadır. Ayrıca diğer eyaletlerde yaşayan Müslümanlar da vardır ve toplam nüfusun yaklaşık % 10'unu teşkil ederler. Ancak, **resmen Budist olan Tayland yönetimi yıllardan beri sürdürdüğü asimilasyon politikasının bir tezahürü olarak Müslümanlar'ın oranını % 4 olarak göstermekte ve ülkedeki İslâmî faaliyetlere engel olmaktadır. Özellikle Müslümanlar'ın çoğunlukta olduğu güneydeki Pattani bölgesinde yapılan eziyet ve zulümler 200 yıldan beri İslâm dünyasının kanayan bir yarasını oluşturmaktadır.**

PHUKET'TE CAMİDEN ÇOK PLAJ VARDI

Bir gazeteci arkadaşımla birlikte geçen yıl Kuala Lumpur'a yaptığımız seyahatin sonunda Allah'ın lütfuyla Tayland'a da uğradık ve İslâm dünyasının bu yetim evlatlarıyla tanışma imkânı bulduk. Bizzat müşahede ettik ki asırlardır nihayetsiz baskılara maruz bırakılan, serbestçe ibadet ve dinî eğitim imkânları ellerinden alınan, Müslüman isimleri Tay isimleriyle değiştirilen, diri diri gömülen ve insanlık adına utanç verici bir şekilde şehid edildikten sonra ibret-i alem için tankların arkasına bağlanarak cesetleri dikenli taşlı yollarda paramparça edilen (11 Aralık 1985'te 2'si öğrenci 6 Müslüman bu şekilde şehid edilmişlerdir.) bu kardeşlerimiz bizlerden manevi bakımdan çok şey bekliyorlardı. Öyle ki 70.000 Müslüman'ın' yaşadığı (şehrin % 40'ı) Phuket şehrindeki camilerin sayısı plajların sayısından ne yazık ki daha azdı.

İSLÂM'I 10. VE 11. YÜZYILLARDA ARAP TÜCCARLAR GETİRDİ

Tayland Müslümanları'nın çoğu Malay asıllıdır.



Pattani Camii

M.S. 500 ile 1500 arasında bugünkü Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti'nin Yunnan bölgesinden gelerek bölgeye yerleşmişlerdir. Uzun yıllar Budizm veya Brahmanizm dinine mensup olan bu insanların İslâm'la tanışmaları miladi 10. ve 11. yüzyıllarda Arap tüccarların vasıtaları ile olmuştur. İlk olarak güneydeki sahil bölgelerde yayılmış ve gittikçe daha da rağbet bularak bölgedeki bazı adalar halkı da İslâmiyet'i kabul etmiştir. Ayuttahaya'da Kral Narari zamanında Müslümanlar çok zengindiler. 17. yüzyılda Kral Narari'yi ziyaret eden bir Fransız hükümet temsilcisi yabancı uyrukların içerisinde en çok Müslümanlar'ı beğendiğini söylemişti.

BUDİST YÖNETİMİN YARDAKÇISI ŞEYHÜLİSLÂMLAR

Bu usulle seçilen ilk Chula... Şeyhülislâm Tuan Suwanasasna idi. Şeyh Tuan, Kur'an-ı Kerim'i Tay diline çeviren ilk kişidir. Ancak onun yerine geçenler Müslümanlar'dan Tay hükümetine bağlılıklarını sürdürüyorlardı. Bununla birlikte birçok Müslüman liderlerinin krallığa bağlılığını, iç ve dış siyasette karışmama prensibini kabul etmemekteydiler. Nitekim Müslüman liderlerden İbrahim Kureyşi bir Bangkok gazetesinde şunları ifade etmişti: "Bu makamlar bazı ibadetleri yaptırmak için kullanılmaktadır. İslâmiyet bir hayat tarzıdır ve bir sürü manasız merasimler dinî değildir. İslâmî faaliyetin kapsamını merasimlerle sınırlamakla hükümetin, ülkenin en büyük azınlığı olan Tay Müslümanları'nın durumunu iyileştirmeye niyetli olmadığını göstermiştir" Tay hükümetinin İslâm'a karşı bu negatif tutumundan doğan huzursuzluk bazı Müslüman grupların gerilla faaliyetleri düzenlemelerine kadar yoğunlaşmıştır.

Özellikle Tayland hükümeti ile Müslümanlar arasındaki asırlık anlaşmazlığı da unutmamak lazım. Ülkenin güney eyaletlerinde, 1900'lerin başlarına kadar müstakil İslâm sultanlıkları hüküm sürüyordu. Ancak Avrupalı müstemlekecilerin de yardımıyla Tayland asır başında bunları hakimiyeti altına aldı. Sonra bölgede asimilasyon çalışmalarına başladı. Bölgeye Budist Tayland vatandaşlarını yerleştirdi. Huzursuzluklara yol açan bu durumlar neticesinde bilhassa Pattani'de teşkilatlanan Müslüman gerillalar hükümet kuvvetlerine karşı silahlı mücadele açtılar.

1932 yılında Tayland hükümeti Pattani'de İslâmî kurumların tüm faaliyetlerini yasakladı ve 1944'te geniş çapta İslâmî eserleri imha planına girişti. Bu yıllar Pattani Müslümanları'nın kendi idarecilerini belirleme ve iç işlerinde yarı bağımsız hareket edebildikleri yıllardır. 1948'de ise Pattani Sultanı Muhammed Suluh üç evladı ile birlikte önce tutuklanmış ardından da Budist yönetim tarafından öldürülerek Sunkala Körfezi'ne atılmıştır. Aynı yıl içinde toplu imha hareketi sürmüş, yalnız Bulikor Samik bölgesinde 125 Müslüman aile diri diri yakılmıştır. 11 Aralık 1985'te ise ikisi talebe altı Müslüman'ın şehid edilmeleri, cesetlerin tankların arkasına bağlatılarak, sürüklenerek parçalattırılması sonrasında kısa sürede bütün Pattani'yi kapsayan gösteriler başladı.

DERS KİTAPLARINDA PEYGAMBERİMİZİN RESMİ


1985'te Tayland Eğitim Bakanı, Peygamber Efendimiz ve sahabilerin resimlerini ders kitaplarına koydurdu. Ardından Müslüman üniversiteli kız öğrencilerinin başlarını örtmeleri yasaklandı. Toplu olarak Müslümanlar'ın biraraya gelmelerini engelleyici kanunlar yürürlüğe konuldu.

BAYRAMDA KURBAN KESMEK DAHİ YASAKTI

Pattani Ulusal Kurtuluş Cephesi Lideri İzzeddin Abdurrahman Tayland Müslümanları'nın uğradığı diğer eziyetleri de şöyle anlatıyordu: "Tayland'da hacca gidebilmeniz için belli bir süre gözaltında tutulmanız, bu gözaltı sonrasında belirli kişilerin kontrolü altında yola çıkmanız gerek. Namaz kıldığınız mescitlere her an saldırılar düzenlenebilir. Cami cemaati sürekli sayılır ve kontrol altında tutulur. Kurban Bayramı'nda kurban kesmeniz yasaktır. Zekatı devletin kendisi sizden almak ister."

Gerçekten, Budist Tayland yönetiminin Müslümanlar'a çektirdiği bu eziyetler belli başlı 3 gerilla örgütünü faaliyete geçirmişti. Bunlardan PULO Kabir Abdurrahman liderliğinde 1968 yılında kurulmuştur. Pattani Sultanlığı'nın 4 Müslüman bölgesinin bağımsızlığına kavuşması için mücadele etmektedir. Diğer bir grup olan Barisan Devrim Milleti (BRN) Tayland Müslümanları'nın Malezya ile birleşmesini istemektedir. 1974'te Hacı Kerim'in liderliğinde kurulmuştur. 3. grup ise Pattani Ulusal Kurtuluş Cephesi'dir (BNNP). 1977 yılında ölen Tunku Jalan tarafından kurulan BNNP Pattani Sultanlığı'nın yeniden kurulmasını ve Kuzey Malaya devletçilikleriyle birleşmesini istemektedir.

Tayland Müslümanları'nın en yakın zamanda, ellerinden alınan hak ve özgürlüklere kavuşması Yüce Rabb'imden (c.c) dileğimiz.



Tayland'da namaz kıldığımız ilk camideki Tay dilinde yazılmış vaaz programı çok ilgimizi çekti.

MÜSLÜMAN HALKI TEMSİL EDEN BİR CEPHE

PATTANİ

Pattani Millî Kurtuluş Cephesi Müslüman Pattani halkını temsil eden ulusal cephedir. 1960 yılında kurulan cephenin temel hedefleri şunlardır:

1— Tayland'ın güney bölgesinde (PATTANİ) yer alan Müslümanlar'ın işgal altındaki topraklarının kurtarılması.

2— Bu bölgede bağımsız Pattani İslâm devletinin kurulması.

3— Pattani Müslüman topluluğunun manevi ve maddi açıdan kendine yeterli hale gelebilmesini sağlama.

4— İslâmî esasların Pattani'de tatbikini sağlama.

5— Uluslararası örgütlerde Pattani halkının yasal temsilcisi olduğunun kabulünü sağlama.

Ulusal Kurtuluş Cephesi'nin hedeflerine varabilmek için tesbit ettiği programda aşağıdaki hususlar tesbit edilmiştir:

1— Pattani kurtuluş savaşının başarıya ulaşabilmesini sağlamak için Müslüman savaşçıların ve Müslüman halkın tek bir örgüt içinde örgütlenmesini temin etme.



Tayland'daki Taoist Çinliler atalarının ejderhadan geldiğine inanıyorlardı.

2— Halkın siyasi ve İslâmî açıdan şuurlanabilmesi için eğitim çalışmalarında bulunma.

3— Silahlı İslâmî cihadı gerçekleştirebilmek için her türlü vesileyi kullanmak.

4— Silahlı mücahidlerin her yönden eğitimlerini sağlama.

5— Tayland yönetimi tarafından işgal altında bulunan Pattani topraklarındaki düşmana ait her türlü iktisadi ve askeri merkezlere karşı saldırılar düzenleme.

6— Pattani savaşını dünyaya duyurarak başta İslâm ülkeleri olmak üzere ulusların yardım ve desteğini temin etme.

7— Millî bağımsızlık hareketleri ile çeşitli ülkelerde bulunan temsilcilikleri vasıtası ile temas etmek, onlarla işbirliğine girmek.

8— Pattani bağımsız İslâm devletini kurabilmek için çeşitli ülkelerde istişare toplantıları düzenlemek.

Hem Fransız okulunda, hem de Kur'an kursunda büyük başarı gösterdi

Fransa, bu çocuğu konuşuyor



ÜZEYİR LOKMAN ÇAYCI-PARİS

Ispartalı Ceylan Demirağaç'ın küçük oğlu Kadir Demirağaç Paris'te başarı üzerine başarı kazanıyor. Hem Fransız okulunda, hem de Kur'an kursunda başarı gösteren 9 yaşındaki Kadir Demirağaç şunları söylüyor: "Babamı Paris'te herkes Ceylan Hoca diye tanıyor.

Bir sorumuz üzerine Demirağaç şunları söyledi: "Türkiye'yi çok seviyorum. Oraya gittiğimizde gürül gürül ezan okunuyor. Çeşmelerden buz gibi tatlı sular akıyor. Gerçi oradaki çocuklar sen Almanyalısın diye benimle oynamak istemiyorlar ama ben yine onları seviyorum. Çünkü namaz kılıyorlar..."

Asian Affairs, c. XLVIII (51), s. 110 1961 (Germany)

as we know it was only established in comparatively recent times, while the present capital of Bangkok was selected by the first monarch of the dynasty (Ayudhya, which had been the capital for 417 years, was sacked by the Burmese in 1767). The earlier history of Siam was one of constant wars with neighbours to the east, to the west and to the north, in particular with what are now known as Burma, Laos and Cambodia, but in that respect it did not differ so much from history in other parts of the world. What is significant is that a system of absolute monarchy could survive until 1932 and thereafter be translated into a constitutional monarchy without undue upheaval; and that Siam, in spite of her vulnerability and comparative weakness, managed to retain her independence and her individuality. Even today Siam is very unlike the other countries of South-East Asia, and Prince Chula's book helps to explain why this is so.

E. D.

TAYLAND

Thailand. An Introduction to Modern Siam. By Noël F. Busch. Published by D. van Nostrand and Co., Ltd. Pp. 161. Bibliography. 12s. 6d.

The Asia Foundation found that there was a demand for a small informal book that would provide the casual reader with a picture of modern Siam, and this able, urbane little book by Mr. Busch, a skilled writer and journalist, does just that.

Reviewers are always keen on spotting inaccuracies in the books they review, but, after reading every page of *Thailand*, I can honestly say there is no major error, and the slips that do occur do not matter a row of beans. For instance, Mr. Busch puts the number of Siamese students in Britain at five hundred. It is, in fact, between fifteen hundred and two thousand. He refers to Phya Manoprakorn, one of the early Premiers of Siam after the revolution of 1932, as being, at that time, a judge of the Supreme Court. If I remember, Phya Mano, whom I had the pleasure of knowing—he was a polished, witty lawyer—was Chief Judge of the Appeal Court and not a member of the Supreme or Dika Court.

The only valid criticism of this book that ocuurs to me is that Mr. Busch, during his four years in Siam, fell in love with the people and the country, and he has not yet recovered from his pleasing infatuation.

This leads him not into mis-statement but certainly into presenting a very touched-up portraiture. One would imagine from these pages that the Siamese were sunny, Buddhist extroverts with a constant happy smile. They are, but they are not that alone. How dull they would be if they were. King Mongkut said: "My people is like an ass that trembles when you hold the halter but kicks his master when his back is turned." King Mongkut was a shrewd, good Siamese.

Again, when Mr. Busch has to refer to the Japan-Siam alliance in the last war, he says that the Japanese occupation was a gentle and restrained one. In fact, the Japanese had three active torture chambers in the city of Bangkok, one at Sala Daeng House, one at Sapatum Police Station and one at Japanese H.Q. The Japanese were only restrained with those who humbled themselves before them.

Curiously enough, Mr. Busch does not refer to the six-month British occupation of Siam in September, 1945, when 100,000 Japanese soldiers, still armed in Siam, were shipped back to Japan after the greatest land victory over the Japanese of the war by General Slim and his Anglo-Indian Army in Burma.

In a more pretentious book these disbalances might be fatal, but, in this book, they do not defeat its only object—to draw a simple rounded picture.

The talented drawings by Alan Thielkler I found fascinating and sensitive. Everyone interested in modern Siam should buy this book. I did not know that Phalukon's crest is still used by the Ministry of Finance in Bangkok. The type of *Thailand* is so clear that even middle-aged reviewers can read it without glasses.

GERALD SPARROW.

Bamboo Doctor. By Stanley S. Pavillard. Published by Macmillan and Co. Pp. 206. Maps. 18s.

A recent film entitled "The Bridge over the River Kwai" revived public interest in the story of human suffering endured by our prisoners of war and by thousands

ASIAN AFFAIRS, c. XIII (S. IV) p. 296, 1926 (Germany)

Siam is in a position to speak with authority on his subject, and his book shows evidence of mature judgment, and is not like the average book of travels written by one who has paid but a brief visit to the places described.

The book is very well illustrated with a large number of excellent photographs, and is one that can be confidently recommended as a thoroughly up-to-date and accurate description of North-Western Siam.

SIAM

A History of Siam. By W. A. R. Wood, C.I.E. $8\frac{3}{4} \times 6$; pp. 293; eleven illustrations and map. Fisher Unwin. 1926. 15s.

This is a very notable book, as it is the first that has ever been published in English dealing with the history of Siam as a connected whole. The author, having been very many years in Siam, and having an excellent knowledge of that difficult language, Siamese, has thus been able to study the native Phongsawadan, or Annals, and to correlate them with the various works extant in European languages dealing with various periods of Siamese history.

The present work deals in detail with the events of Siamese history up to the end of the reign of Phya Taksin, and there is a very brief summary of the chief events of the Chakri dynasty given in a supplement at the end of the volume.

The author must be congratulated on having produced so excellent a work, and it is to be hoped that he may at some future date produce a companion volume dealing with the history of modern Siam in similar detail. Mr. Wood has been very fortunate to have had the assistance of H.R.H. Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, who has devoted years of his life to the investigation of his country's past history.

The book contains a fair number of excellent illustrations, and can be recommended with confidence to those desirous of knowing something about the history of a little-known Eastern land.

Unter der Glutsonne Irans: Kriegserlebnisse der deutschen Expedition nach Persien und Afganistan. Oskar von Niedermayer. Munich: Einhornverlag in Dachan. 1926. $8\frac{1}{2} \times 5\frac{1}{2}$. Pp. 330. Map and illustrations. 7 Mark.

At a distance of ten years, the main events of the world war begin to assume a more historical aspect, even to the active participants. The most evenly balanced minds cannot fail to be influenced by skilfully directed propaganda, the very *raison d'être* of which is to bring the enemy into disrepute and, at the same time, to glorify the deeds of one's own country, however questionable they may be. Thus the action of Germany in proclaiming herself the champion of Islam in the waging of the Jehad raised a storm of indignant protest in this country, but not more so than that caused in Germany by our employment of coloured troops in France. Germany attempted to take advantage of our embarrassments in Ireland, but not to the same extent, nor with the same success, as the Entente powers encouraged the disaffection of the component parts of the Austrian Empire. Political stratagem is a legitimate weapon of warfare, however much it may be deplored, especially when it concerns the employment of Eastern nations by one European power against a fellow-white and fellow-Christian nation.

The story of the German political expedition to Afghanistan in 1915-16, told by its leader, is one of exceptional interest. It is a story of a difficult and dangerous mission, well, and in a measure successfully, accomplished in the face of almost superhuman hardships and trials. It is a story of adventure, well and

TAYLOR

Thailand. A political and social analysis. By D. Insor. London, Allen and Unwin, 1963. Pp. 179. Map. Illus. Index. 25s.

Of the many travel books dealing with S.E. Asian countries that have appeared in recent years, few provide the reader with more than a superficial understanding of the peoples of this area and of their current political and economic problems. These countries are in a state of rapid transition from a mainly agricultural economy and, with the exception of Thailand, colonial dependency, to a more industrialized economy and independence. They are destined to play an important part in the political, social and economic transformation of Asia which is unfolding before our eyes.

Mr. Insor's well-written, concise and admirably arranged book, while describing the outward charm and interest of Thailand, is more than a travel book. The author, who has lived several years in Bangkok and has travelled widely throughout the country and in the neighbouring states, has quite evidently made a close study of the problems of a rapidly changing society, and describes with sympathy and understanding the effects of the revolutionary changes of the past decade on both government and people.

The impact of political developments beyond Thailand's borders; the growth of nationalism throughout Asia; the influence of communism on the one hand and the ideas of western democracy on the other, and the historic rivalries and disputes between the various racial and political groups, are all described clearly and objectively against the background of the easy-going conservatism so characteristic of the Thai people.

The book has some excellent photographs and a rather poor map. A bibliography and a summary of historical dates will provide a comprehensive guide to the reader, whose interest in this most attractive country and people is whetted by the perusal of this readable and informative study.

C. H. Ellis.

Asian Affairs, c. 50 (S.3) s. 322 1963 (London)

03 Mayıs 2011
M.İ.D.D.E. YAYIMLANDIKTAN SONRA GELEN DOKÜMAN

3910 JITPIROMSRI, Srisompob & McCARGO, Duncan. The southern Thai conflict six years on: insurgency, not just crime. *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs*,32 ii (2010) pp.156-183. (The conflict in the far south is a political struggle concerning the extent to which Bangkok can exercise legitimate authority in the "Patani" region.)

Tayland 190443

3911 JOLL, Cristopher M. Religion and conflict in southern Thailand: beyond rounding up the usual suspects. *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs*,32 ii (2010) pp.258-279. (Investigates the Islamic credentials of the insurgency and distinguishes between the presence of jihadi rhetoric with a developed jihadi rationale, a recent development in southern Thailand.)

Tayland 190443.

3905 ASKEW, Marc. Fighting with ghosts: querying Thailand's "southern fire". *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs*,32 ii (2010) pp.117-155. [Conflict in the three majority-Muslim-populated provinces.]

3906 ASKEW, Marc. Thailand's intractable southern war: policy, insurgency and discourse. *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs*,30 ii (2008) pp.186-214. (Crisis in Thailand's Muslim-majority border provinces.)

Tayland 190443 Malezya 180218

3907 FUNSTON, John. Malaysia and Thailand's southern conflict: reconciling security and ethnicity. *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs*,32 ii (2010) pp.234-257.

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Tayland 190443

Tayland 190443

MADDE YAYIMLANDIKTAN SONRA GELEN DOKÜMAN

21 Eylül 2014

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HORSTMANN, Alexander. Living together: the transformation of multi-religious coexistence in southern Thailand. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 42 iii (2011) pp.487-510.

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