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RUSSIAN POLICY AND THE EMIGRATION OF THE CRIMEAN TATARS TO THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1854-1862

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To understand the Russian policy which produced the very substantial exodus of Tatars from the Crimea in this period it is necessary to keep in mind that since the annexation of the Crimea in the late XVIII century, there had been, among Russian officials, two conflicting views on the subject of the Tatars. After the Crimean War, the balance came down decisively in favor of the negative view; however, even when the massive Tatar exodus of 1860 was finally in progress, Russian policy moved in fits and starts. A brief survey of the history of Russian alternation between negative and positive views of the Tatars is necessary to understand these developments.

In the latter part of the eighteenth century, after the Russian annexation of the Crimea, large numbers of Tatars emigrated to the Ottoman Empire. The Russians, having just conquered the area, climaxing their centuries-long struggle with the Tatars, presumably saw this exodus solely in terms of a welcome diminution of a hostile element. Potemkin, Catherine's former favorite, who was active in the affairs of southern Russia, began the use of foreigners to colonize the Crimea¹ and Kochubei, Minister of the Interior, also took a hostile view of the Tatars. The latter wrote the governor of the Crimea in 1803 that those Tatars who wished to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire would probably be of no service to the Russian Empire and that it would be more profitable to settle the area with elements favorable to Russia. Kochubei also mentioned that the Tatars leaving at that time would be doing so on the basis of an agreement with the Ottoman government². At

1. «Pereselenie tatar iz Kryma v Turtsiu, iz zapisok G. P. Levitskogo,» *Vestnik Evropy* (1882), kn. 5, 599.

2. A. Z. Sosyal, *Z Dziejów Krymu*, Warsaw, 1938, 76. Neither Sosyal nor any other source supplies data on how many Tatars left at this time.

this point, the opposite view of the Tatars made its appearance in official circles. Richelieu, the governor-general of Novorossiia, made a tour of inspection and concluded that a massive exodus of the Tatars would have ruinous consequences for the area; departures were halted and passports which had been issued were recalled³.

War with the Ottomans on several occasions increased Russian apprehensiveness about the Tatars; during the war years, 1806-1812, however, since the lands occupied by the Crimean Tatars were not contiguous with any of the theaters of operations, the Tatars posed no significant threat. However, the Russians made some efforts to move a number of the Tatars away from the southern shore of the Crimea⁴. One extremely anecdotal source claimed that it was the presence of a Russian battalion which saved the Christian populace of the Crimea in 1812 from a revolt of the Tatars who had been incited by the Turks⁵.

The Tatars themselves were of two minds on the question of remaining in the Crimea. Their natural inclination was, of course, to remain in their native land. *But* the numerous hardships that they had suffered in the eight decades of Russian rule before the Crimean War were a potential stimulus to emigration. In general, throughout these decades, the Tatars had not become integrated into Russian society, or familiar with Russian law⁶. This

3 Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 619.

4 A. I. Markevich, «Pereselenie krymskikh tatar v sviazi s dvizheniem naseleniia v Krymu,» *Izvestiia akademii nauk SSSR*, 7. Seriia, Otdel gumanitarnykh nauk (1928), 390.

5 V. K. Kondaraki, *Universal'noe opisanie Kryma*, III, Chast' VIII. SPB, 1875, 120.

6 E. I. Totleben, «O vyselenii tatar iz Kryma ve 1860 godu,» *Russkaia starina*, (June, 1893), 534-535. Totleben's memorandum is preceded by a brief introduction by Shil'der, who had written a huge two-volume biography, well over 1200 pages, of Totleben (N. Shil'der, *Graf Edvard Ivanovich Totleben, ego zhizn' ideiatel'nost'*, 2 v. SPB, 1885-1889), and who mentioned that this memorandum was not available to him at the time he wrote the biography, but had now been made available to him by S. P. Zykov, a former aide of Totleben. The biography was apparently written for and appeared first in the *Inzhenernyi zhurnal* (1884-1889), the journal of the fortifications department of the government. It deals almost exclusively with the technical details of Totleben's activity as an engineer. There is no explanation of Totleben's presence in the Crimea at the time, or how he came to draw up this memorandum. From the fact that Totleben was head of the fortifications department (25 October 1858-25 November 1861) (Shil'der, *op. cit.*, I, 540), one assumes he was in the Crimea

left them vulnerable to various kinds of swindling. One of the most serious of these occurred in the sale of land. To General Totleben, the hero of the defense of Sevastopol, who in 1860 prepared a memorandum on the Tatar emigration surveying the period of Russian rule, it seemed clear that from a comparison of the amount of land the Tatars had held earlier with what they held at this time, they had suffered a great loss through signing documents which they did not understand⁷. Often the Tatars had no written proof of land ownership; in attempts to sort out disputes over land, governmental commissions had been established in the Crimea in 1810, 1816, 1819, 1822 and 1827⁸. The land holdings of the Tatars suffered further losses to the local gentry as a result of a law passed in 1833, which stated that lands held *de facto* for the previous decade now became the property of their holder⁹. In the course of the general survey of the Crimea in 1830, the surveyors did not make precise delimitations, but took generalized statements from whole *auls* (Tatar settlements) about the extent of their holdings. As a result, in 1837, after a severe famine which caused many deaths, the Ministry of State Domains, on the basis of a simple arithmetical ratio, reduced many villages' holdings¹⁰.

inspecting fortifications. Shil'der noted that Totleben was charged («*Totlëbenu Vysochaishim doveriem porucheno bylo...*»), with studying the emigration (Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 531), but does not explain the circumstances, and the mission is not referred to by the other sources. Moreover, by way of introducing the memorandum, Shil'der reproduces his discussion of the mission in his biography (*ibid.*, 531; *op. cit.*, II, 598-599, n. 1). However, in the book he stated Totleben received the order in 1861, whereas in the article he gave the date as 1860. Presumably the latter dating reflects more precise information.

7 Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 535. A. Umanets, whose rather folksy work clearly reflects popular anti-Tatar prejudices, pointed out that in the early nineteenth century, when the Tatars were allowed to sell their land, and it fetched low prices, they attempted to swindle Russians by selling the same land to several Russians. Even after having sold it, they would try to retain ownership through false documents, which being in Tatar, were not understood by the Russian administration. Sometimes the matter came before Tatar courts, in which case, Umanets implies, the Tatars had the advantage. *Istoricheskie razskazy o Kryme*. Sevastopol, 1887, 179.

8 *Krym, khrestomatia po istorii kraia*, P. V. Maslov, et al., ed., Chast' I. Simferopol, 1930, 110, 111. Although this work is a sort of textbook, the article on the 1860 Tatar migration was done by P. V. Nikol'skii, who had published other important scholarly works on the Muslim peoples of Russia.

9 Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 601-603.

10 Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 600.

Over a period of many years, gentry, *murzas* (Tatar nobles), Greeks, and colonists of many nations bought up the lands of Tatar villages. In many instances, the Tatars were expelled from the land they had lived on, or these new neighbors carried out boundary adjustments which worked to the disadvantage of the Tatars. The situation deteriorated so far that cases were reported in the area of Feodosia of Tatars having dwarf plots of one *desiatina*¹¹.

The Tatar peasantry, like all other peasants of the Empire, had obligations to fulfill, but again the facts that frequently there were no written contracts, and that the Tatars in many cases did not know Russian, often resulted in additional exploitation beyond the normal obligations. Another special problem for the Tatars was that, as one student of the subject points out, while the Russian peasantry tended to be under one lord, the Tatars constituted a kind of labor pool on which all the local gentry felt free to draw. One particular form of this exploitation was a service obligation called the *toloka*, whose ostensible justification was that since the livestock of the Tatars grazed on the surrounding lands of local gentry, the Tatars, in exchange, had to perform various services; the system was open to many abuses such as expanded demands for service and confiscation of livestock¹². In some cases, the lords assessed charges for grazing land, and held the peasants' draft animals as security for the payments; while holding the animals, the lords also worked them¹³. Among the more onerous services the Tatars had to perform was cartage («*podvod*»), which was very time consuming, and entailed considerable expense for the upkeep of the livestock on the job¹⁴. In the Crimea, an area with limited supplies of water, one particular hardship was created when the local lords appropriated water sources and then levied taxes on their use¹⁵.

Not only did the Tatars have their problems with the local gentry; but they also suffered at the hands of governmental authorities. Several obser-

11 Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 609, 610, 618.

12 Maslov, *op. cit.*, 110, 111; M. Goldenberg, «Krym i krymskie tatary», *Vestnik Evropy*, VI (1883), 71; Umanets, *op. cit.*, 179, 180; Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 616-617.

13 Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 615-616; Umanets, *op. cit.*, 179.

14 Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 612-613.

15 Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 613-614; Goldenberg, *loc. cit.*, 70, 71. Levitskii supplies tables showing the increases after the establishment of the Ministry of State Domains (presumably since 1837).

vers referred to one fundamental problem: the Tatars had to pay the state increasingly greater taxes (the rate of increase of these being even greater after the Crimean War) to support a continuously growing bureaucracy which afforded them very little benefit¹⁶. Abuses of official power (also facilitated by the Tatars' ignorance of Russian), involved unequal apportionment of taxes and extortion of sums above those stipulated by law, which the officials kept for their personal use. While non-Russian elements which had been settled in Southern Russia, such as Bulgarians and Germans enjoyed the benefit of a special administration (*popechitel'stvo*) which was part of the Ministry of State Domains, those Tatars living on state lands found the officials of the Ministry of State Domains such a burden that in one case they paid a large sum to be registered as townspeople of a nearby town simply to be rid of these officials¹⁷. One long-standing issue of contention between the Tatars and the Ministry, particularly in the southern wooded part of the Crimea, was the right of the Tatars to cut wood. The Tatars based their claims on maps from a survey made in 1800; the Ministry based its restrictions on wood cutting on a conservation program. The issue had been pending for years when in 1859 the Ministry imposed a tax on the Tatars, supposedly to cover the value of the wood they cut; the Tatars asserted that they were not taking wood, and only after vigorous protest succeeded in having the tax rescinded. The Ministry only made matters worse by offering the Tatars wood in compensation for forest land that the Ministry appropriated, and as payment for labor the Tatars performed on canal construction¹⁸. Finally, government enterprises in the Crimea, such as ship-building and canal construction, also placed heavy economic burdens on the Tatars¹⁹.

The record of the Russian administration in introducing improvements in the economic or educational life of the Tatars was extremely poor. Without the dramatic interruption in the life of the Crimea that the war produced there, it is quite possible that the previous trend of gradual worsening of the condition of the Tatars might have continued, perhaps with slight

16 Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 535; Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 614, 617.

17 Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 535-536; Goldenberg, *loc. cit.*, 70; Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 611-612. On the topography of the Crimea, A. U. «O zaselenii Kryma novymi poselentsami,» *Russkii vestnik*, LXIII (1866), 256.

18 Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 611, 617.

19 Goldenberg, *loc. cit.*, 70.

increases in intensity in response to distant Russo-Turkish wars, but without any significant response from the Tatars. But the war produced a major shift in Russian attitudes and policies towards the Tatars, who became more receptive to the idea of emigration.

Several developments of the Crimean War period further worsened the position of the Crimean Tatars: the initial Russian reactions to the possibility of treason on their part, such limited rebellious and collaborationist activity as the Tatars actually did engage in during the war, and the hostile and punitive attitudes and measures of the Russian government after the war. At the outbreak of the war, Russian suspicions about the loyalty of the Tatars, especially those on the southern coast of the Crimea, were aroused. Köppen, a leading Russian statistician of the period who was also particularly involved in the affairs of southern Russia, noted in April 1854 that Berlin newspapers were carrying stories that Turkish agents were active among the Crimean Tatars²⁰. After the declaration of war (4 October 1853) by the Turks, several proposals were advanced for dealing with the potential security threat from the Crimean Tatars. One entailed moving all «suspicious» Tatars north of Perekop out of the peninsula²¹. In October 1854, Köppen described a proposal of Prince Menshikov, the commander of the armed forces in the Crimea, for moving the Tatars away from the Evpatoria district so that they could neither serve the Ottomans as a labor force, nor supply them with livestock. The Tatars were to be moved to the mainland districts of the Tauridian province [possibly the Berdiansk and Melitopol districts, where there were Tatar settlements - M. P.]. Were this not possible, Menshikov suggested they be moved to the Kherson or Ekaterinoslav provinces. Köppen, to whom the administration of this project was offered, but who declined it for reasons of health, made the more drastic proposal that the Tatars be moved to Semipalatinsk(!), where he thought there were good sites for settlement²².

To keep the Tatars of the Evpatoria district under surveillance, the governor-general of the Crimea sent there an officer, Maksimovich, with a military detachment. Maksimovich proceeded to carry out raids on the Tatars and issue threatening warnings that soon the Russian army would

20 Cited in Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 393.

21 Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 394.

22 Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 394. Menshikov's proposal, to judge by its scope is presumably a different one from the «suspicious Tatar» one, although Mar-

come and kill all the Tatars—none of which was likely to increase the loyalty of the Tatars to Russia²³. A few cases of collaboration were reported. When the Allies made a surprise attack on Kerch, however, very few of the Tatars joined them²⁴. There were, however, disturbances among the Tatars of Yalta and Evpatoria and some attacks on Russian nobles²⁵. While opinions differ on the importance of Ottoman incitement for Tatar unrest²⁶; and the exact extent of Tatar collaboration with the Ottomans cannot be ascertained, it is significant that General Totleben, who certainly understood the military situation in the Crimea as well as anyone, asserted that whatever the extent of treason on the part of the Tatars, it had not been sufficient to influence Russian losses, and had been magnified by Russian officials²⁷. Moreover, some of the contemporaries felt that the government overreacted to such disloyalty as there had been²⁸.

kevich's account contains instances of references differing slightly in from, to the same event. This proposal by Menshikov is, however, almost certainly the same one referred to by Soysal, who describes it as a proposal made in 1854 by Menshikov to move a large number of Crimean Tatars into the interior of Russia (Soysal's «w. *glab Rosji*,» may also mean the depths of Russia,» in which case it would not correspond with the facts as stated by Markevich, but would be a rhetorical exaggeration). Soysal stated that the reason for the move was that the Tatars would not work on the lands of the Russian gentry. The places of the Tatars were to be taken by Russian serfs. He asserted that the operation was not carried out «undoubtedly» because of the outbreak of the Crimean War. Soysal gave no documentation for any of this; his translation of «*pomeszczikow*» (land holding gentry) as «*kolonistow rosynskich*» (sic) (Russian colonists) does not increase his credibility (Soysal, *op. cit.*, 76-77).

23 Soysal, *op. cit.*, 77; Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 532; Goldenberg, *loc. cit.*, 72.

24 Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 533.

25 Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 532; Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 393-394.

26 Kondaraki asserts that some Tatars who earlier had been persecuted by the Russians, and had left the country, returned with the Ottoman army, and made an appeal to Islamic martial sentiments of the Crimean Tatars (*op. cit.*, Chast' XIII, 141). Markevich much more cautiously asserts that it would be difficult to ascertain the role of Turkish incitement in producing the Evpatoria and Yalta disturbances (*loc. cit.*, 394).

27 Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 532. Other sources also deprecated the extent and significance of Tatar revolt during the war (Goldenberg, *loc. cit.*, 72; Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 603-604).

28 Totleben mentioned a General Korf, who exiled Tatars to areas north of Perekop, irrespective of whether or not they were guilty (*loc. cit.*, 533). Kondaraki asserts that Russian officials, finding the Tatars with old guns (pre-

Although some Tatars, particularly from the Evpatoria district emigrated to Turkey early in the war²⁹, most of the emigration occurred later, in conjunction with Allied military operations. One result of Maksimovich's action, for example, appears to have been that when the French offered the Tatars of the area their protection, approximately 20,000 accepted it³⁰. When the Ottomans began their fortification of Evpatoria, some of the Tatars helped, and so when the Russians encircled the town, many of the compromised Tatars left with the Allied forces, and some even tried to prevail on their families to join them³¹. Immediately after the war there was further emigration from the coastal zones. In April, 1856, 4,500 Tatars emigrated to Turkey from Balaclava. Others left from Feodosia³². The total number of Tatars who emigrated during and just after the war has been variously estimated at 30,000 to 4,000³³.

In the half decade after the Peace of Paris (March, 1856), to the above mentioned grounds for dissatisfaction on the part of the Tatars, the Russians added new ones. The tone for much of the Russian postwar policy towards the Tatars appears to have been given by the new Emperor, Alexander II, whose views on the Tatar question may have been influenced, if not actually formed, by local officials in the Crimea. When Stroganov, the governor-general of Novorossia, reported to Alexander on the emigration of the Tatars in the spring of 1856, the Emperor stated that neither clandestine nor open emigration of the Tatars should be hindered since this emigration would rid the country of a «harmful element»; Stroganov transmitted this to the governor of the Crimea in June 1856, and as word of this attitude spread among the Tatars, it produced feelings of apprehension³⁴.

sumably of greater historical than military interest), sent them into exile in the area of Kursk (*op. cit.*, VIII, Chast' XIII, 141). Also cf. Goldenberg, *loc. cit.*, 72.

29 Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 395.

30 Tottleben, *loc. cit.*, 532.

31 Kondaraki, *op. cit.*, VIII, Chast' XIII, 141.

32 Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 395; Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 604; *Journal de Constantinople* (hereafter «*J de CP*»), in its characteristically saccharine style asserted that the Crimean Tatars received added encouragement from what they had heard from relatives already settled in the Dobruja (*J de CP*, 3 October, 1861).

33 Maslov, *op. cit.*, 113; *J de CP*, 20 April 1861.

34 Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 395. Markevich was of the opinion that Stroganov was the one most responsible for the subsequent larger migration, since by his reports he had instilled in the Tsar the view that the departure of the Tatars was beneficial for the Crimea. *Ibid.*, 402.

The Tatars were made to feel their second class status soon after the war, when the government, distributing compensation to the Crimea populace for war losses, did not make good at all on promises of compensation for certain categories of losses, and in other categories, gave the Tatars a lower rate of compensation³⁵.

In the late 1850's, several events and some disturbing rumors made the Tatars very apprehensive about their future. In 1858 and 1859, new measures for schools and the spreading of the Russian language had been promulgated; the apparent threat of russification made the Tatars feel that the Russians would be happy to see them leave³⁶. Whereas they had always done their military service in the Crimea, it was rumored at this time they would be put on the same footing as the rest of the population with respect to military service³⁷. The establishment of a new eparchy in Melitopol (1856?) and the publicity given to the creation of a society for the spread of Christianity in Dagistan, after the Russian victories there in 1859, made the Tatars uneasy about the future of their religious life³⁸. Although during the war, only some Tatars had been deported to northern areas, rumors were current that there would be mass deportations to the north. These did not take place; however, when in June 1859, the central government began offering lands in the Orenburg area to the Tatars some interpreted this to mean that the Russians did not want them in the Crimea³⁹. Developments in the economic sphere were no more encouraging. Shortly after the war, the Ministry of State Domains proceeded to relieve the Tatars of «surplus» lands, reassess those still held by the Tatars, and levy new taxes⁴⁰. For some time, the Tatars on gentry land had been looking to the central government for amelioration of their condition, and in 1856 a commission was established to study the situation of these Tatars, but this resulted in cases of gentry forcing Tatars off their lands, lest the condition of the Tatars be improved at the expense of the gentry⁴¹.

35. Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 606-608; Goldenberg supplies figures on the differing rates of compensation (*loc. cit.*, 72-74).

36. Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 621.

37. Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 537; Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 405.

38. Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 536.

39. Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 536; Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 536; Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 395; Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 618.

40. Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 619-620.

41. Goldenberg, *loc. cit.*, 71.

Perhaps the most severe reverse that the Tatars suffered in the agricultural sphere at this time, one which almost certainly reinforced their feelings that the Russian administration was inclined to eliminate them from the Crimea, was the announcement in 1859 by the Ministry of State Domains that it was rejecting petitions of the Tatars that it grant them plots of land⁴².

The single event which appears to have triggered the emigration of the Tatars of the Tauridian province was the arrival in the Crimea of Nogai Tatars, on their way to the Ottoman Empire from the northern Caucasus and immediately adjacent areas. The background of this movement of Nogais constitutes the subject of a separate study; at this point suffice it to say that in the wake of military successes in the Caucasus in the spring of 1859, the Russian authorities had given these Nogais and some of the mountaineers of the Caucasus a choice between resettlement in the interior, in the Orenburg district, and emigration to Turkey. Some of the mountaineers went directly to Turkey. Reports of this choice which the Russian government offered the mountaineers and the Russian offer to the Crimean Tatars of land in the Orenburg district combined to suggest strongly to the Crimean Tatars that the Russian government was interested in moving them out of the Crimea. Then, in 1859, approximately 16,000 Nogais from the Caucasus left for the Ottoman Empire via the Crimean ports of Kerch and Feodosia. Because of the lateness of the season they were unable to proceed immediately to their destination and so wintered in the Berdiansk and Melitopol districts, just north of the Crimean peninsula. The vivid example of this movement, coming at the time that it did, appears to have been the decisive factor for the Tatars of the Crimea in setting off the emigration⁴³.

Rumors spread among the Tatars that those who did not leave within the next three years, would be forced to leave and be resettled in Orenburg, Samara, or some other province in the interior⁴⁴.

42 Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 625; Goldenberg, *loc. cit.*, 71.

43 Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 397-398; Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 537; Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 618; Goldenberg, *loc. cit.*, 72-73.

44 Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 626. Levitskii implies that parties interested in the exodus of the Tatars had started these rumors. Frequent mention has been made here of rumors current among the Tatars; whether the substance of the rumors was even remotely true is of little importance. Since this was what many heard and believed, they are of considerable importance. Levitskii points

The earliest consulted document (for dating the beginning of the Tatar migration) is an Ottoman order to the governor of Varna, in early December 1859, mentioning the presence of 12,000 refugees from the Crimea, temporarily housed in the coastal districts of the Dobruja⁴⁵. (Available Russian sources provide no assistance in determining the chronology.) Whether these were Crimean Tatars, or refugees from the Caucasus who came to Turkey via the Crimea, is not clear from the document. In any event, the violence of the Black Sea between December and March tended to keep the traffic to a minimum⁴⁶. One contemporary stated that rumors about the emigration began to circulate in March and April, and that emigration actually began mid-April⁴⁷. The exodus assumed such proportions that by September, it was estimated that 100,000 *revizskie dushi* (taxable persons) of the Tatar population had left⁴⁸. In addition, in that part of the Tauridian province just north of the Crimean peninsula, there had been 46-50,000 Nogai Tatars, almost all of whom emigrated in the course of 1860⁴⁹.

A precise chronological account of this period is difficult to reconstruct,

out at this time, Alexander's order of 1856, that Tatar emigration was not to be hindered, was still in effect (*ibid.*, 625). In general, the rarity of statements by the government, and the tardiness with which it issued statements in response to developments, left the field open for rumors to have all the more effect. On the role of local officials in tarting rumors which encouraged emigration, cf. Goldenberg, *loc. cit.*, 73.

45 *Dokumenti za b'lgarskata istoriia*, P. Dorev, ed., III (hereafter, *D.B.I.*, III). Sofia, 1940, 388.

46 N. Shcherban', «Pereselenie krymskikh tatar,» *Russkii vestnik*, XXX (1860), 227; Tottleben, *loc. cit.*, 548.

47 Shcherban', *loc. cit.*, 211, 215.

48 Tottleben, *loc. cit.*, 542. Figures for the total population of the Crimea and the emigration are provided in the statistical resumé later in this article.

49 Markevich cites Köppen's estimate that in 1850 there were as many as 50,000 Nogais (*loc. cit.*, 390). He cites also Skal'kovskii figure for 1859 of 46,229 Nogais, and his suggestion that this particular emigration was «provoked by instigations of the Turks, and by fear of the French» (*sic*) (Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 396-397). Markevich offers no explanation for this last statement.

The Nogais in the Berdiansk district also began their emigration in the spring of 1860. A dispatch from the Ottoman consul in Odessa reported that these Nogais who were leaving for Turkey wanted to know where the Ottomans would settle them, if they had to proceed to Istanbul, or might they cross the Balkans in wagons (Hariciye Arşivi, Ottoman Foreign Ministry Archive) (hereafter «HA A.»), Carton 175, Dossier: Emigration de Circassiens en Turquie, Difficultés soulevées par les autorités russes, Demands d'émigration, «Di-

since most of the accounts utilized (Levitskii, Goldenberg, Shcherban', and Totleben) were the work of contemporaries writing for a readership which was fairly familiar with the events, and so did not require exact dates. A more detailed reconstruction would require either work in the archives of Odessa and Simferopol or publication of documents from these archives on this episode. Given the «un-nation» status of the Crimean Tatars since the end of World War II, and the attitude of the Soviet authorities to the Tatars in the last few years, both contingencies are extremely remote⁵⁰. But from what can be pieced together, the events of the first year of the Tatar migration (fall 1859 - fall 1860), the period presents a picture of rapid alternation of the two Russian approaches to the question of the Tatars, to retain them or to expel them.

When the Tatars began to leave, presumably the directive which Alexander II had issued in 1856 on the subject of the Tatars was still in force. The officials in the province made no attempt to check the preparations for emigration while the movement was in the early stages in which small numbers of Tatars were involved. On the contrary, by publicizing the edict offering the Tatars the choice of remaining or emigrating to Turkey, and by calling for the preparation of lists of emigrants by *uyezd* (county), *volost'* (district), and commune, the local officials appear to have further stimulated emigration. Only when the emigration began to assume very large proportions, and the Tauridian Nogais began to join the Crimean Tatars, did officials begin to try to halt the migration⁵¹. The ambivalence of Russian policy was brought out sharply in March 1860. In that month the governor

vers affaires concernants les émigrés, 1860-1870, Hava (Odessa) to Fuad, No. 382, 23/5 May 1860. (The heading notwithstanding, this dossier includes material on the Tatar emigration. All dispatches in this section, with a very few exceptions which will be so marked, came from this dossier. Otherwise «HA A.» will be followed only by the heading of the dispatch.) There is no answer to this dispatch in the file, but can be seen from our study of the Ottoman colonization of the Tatars in Rumili after the Crimean war (in Proceedings of the Seventh Congress of the Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1970) the Ottoman government used Istanbul as a central dispatch point for many of the immigrants. In the preparation of that study no mention was encountered of any contingent moving from the Tauridian province overland to the Ottoman Empire.

⁵⁰ Ozenbaşlı's small study, which contains excerpts from Russian sources might have helped fill some of the gaps, but it was not accessible. (Ahmet Özenbaşlı, *Çarlık Hükümetinde Kurum Faciası Yahud Tatar Hicretleri*. Simferopol, 1925).

of the Tauridian province informed the local officials of the Ministry of State Domains that in accordance with an order of the Committee of Ministers on the subject of Tatars who wished to emigrate to Turkey, and in accordance with a declaration by the Minister of State Domains, the officials were not to hinder those Tatars who wished to leave, but rather were to furnish all information needed for acquiring passports. He again reminded them of Alexander's position of 1856 on Tatar emigration. The Tsar's statement was circulated through all levels of the administration in the Crimea. At the end of the month, however, the governor issued orders which, while confirming the authorization for the Tatars to leave, also stipulated that they must complete all the passport formalities (proving that they were not wanted for crimes, and that they had paid all their taxes, etc.), after which they were to wait in their place of residence until they received their passport⁵². These procedures would make the Tatar exodus a more gradual process but not bring it to a halt.

Another order issued by the central government in March 1860 stipulated that only one tenth of any Tatar commune might emigrate⁵³. At the end of April, Stroganov placed a further restriction on the emigration with an order that the emigrants could leave only by sea, and from the port specified in the passport⁵⁴. However, counteracting these intended restraints

51 Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 627; Kondaraki, *op. cit.*, III, Chast' XIII, 143.

52 Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 537-538; Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 398.

53 Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 627, n. 1. Levitskii gives no precise date for this order. Totleben (writing in November 1860) described how Stroganov presented this matter to him in the spring (again no precise date is given); Stroganov, considering the emigration was proceeding so rapidly as to ruin the country, asked the capital for permission to limit it to one tenth of the Tatar population. Some time later (unspecified), still not having received permission to impose such a limitation, he was asked by the central authorities if he had in fact imposed this quota. He answered that already more than one tenth of the Tatars had left and that in his opinion, emigration should be limited to one fifth. Since he received no official answer to this either, on his own authority, presumably in the summer, he halted the issuing of passports altogether. [My dating is based in part on the time that would have had to elapse for all this correspondence, and in part on the fact that Totleben then continued his narrative with the arrival in August of Gerngross, an official of the Ministry of State Domains. M.P.]

54 Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 398; Shcherban', *loc. cit.*, 215. Kondaraki mentions that the emigration took place through four ports, Kerch, Feodosia, Sevastopol and Evpatoria (*op. cit.*, VIII, Ch. XIII, 148). It is not clear whether or not this too was the result of an administrative decision.

on the emigration were the renewed publicity given Alexander's decree of 1856, and the numerous abuses committed by Russian officials in the process of clearing the Tatars for emigration, abuses which appear to have strengthened their resolve to leave. Officials demanded large sums of the Tatars for the stamped paper and the testimonials (*svidetel'stva*) required for petitioning for passports, and overcharged the Tatars for passports. Local lords and communes demanded large payments supposedly the equivalent of several years of taxes in advance, and commutation payments for service obligations. Some officials who were profiting by the emigration, encouraged it further by spreading rumors about relocation to the north, military service, and conversion to Christianity⁵⁵. Higher ranking officials were negligent in checking abuses by the lower officials. Dismissals by the government of some of the official culprits failed to improve the situation.

Another order issued in June, also presumably aimed more at moderating the flow than closing it off, stated that the Tatars were to be informed that, in accordance with a proposal by the Russian mission in Istanbul, Tatars who emigrated to Turkey would not be given passports to return to Russia⁵⁶. In mid-summer of 1860, when the loss of labor had reached very serious proportions, the authorities ceased issuing passports. In early August, at a meeting of the local nobility called to consider the emigration, there were two points of view: forbid any further emigration or allow it to continue, but in conjunction with more vigorous encouragement of colonization of the Crimea. The latter view prevailed, and a report was submitted to the central government, calling for colonization by peasants from over-populated Russian provinces and encouragement of foreign colonists. Very shortly after this, Gerngross, a high ranking official from the Ministry of State Domains, arrived in the Crimea⁵⁷.

⁵⁵ Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 627-629, 618; Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 538, 539. The sources do not give precise dates for these abuses, but the descriptions apparently apply to the spring and summer of 1860. Totleben mentions also that Greeks in the area seeking to buy land cheaply, were also active in encouraging the Tatars to leave (*loc. cit.*, 538).

⁵⁶ Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 398. Curiously enough, the decree also stipulated that while the land of the departing Tatars might be sold to Karaim, it could not be sold to Jews. *Ibid.*, 398.

⁵⁷ Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 401; Goldenberg, *loc. cit.*, 75; Shcherban', *loc. cit.*, 214. None of the sources gives precise dates for either the passport stoppage or the special meeting of the gentry. Shcherban', who came closest of any of the sources to dating the events, mentioned that the special assembly of the

Some confusion surrounds Gerngross' mission. A usually well-informed contemporary stated that Gerngross had been sent on behalf of the Ministry to buy the lands of Tatars who had emigrated, but it is not clear whether he had in fact done so⁵⁸. According to Totleben, Gerngross had come to arrange for the settlement of the vacated gentry lands⁵⁹. Gerngross presumably arrived favorably disposed towards the emigration. Totleben suggested that those nobles who saw the problems the emigration would pose, were unable to convince him, because of their lack of polish (Totleben described them as «*menee svetski obrazovannye*»), and because of a lack of data on both the problems of the region and on the difficulties in getting new colonists⁶⁰. After several days of touring a part of the Crimea, Gerngross pronounced the Tatars worthless, and expressed the opinion that the area would quickly be repopulated through the measures already adopted by the Ministry⁶¹. On 20 August, Gerngross expressed these views to a session of the «Committee for the Settlement of the Crimea,» re-enforcing his position with a reference to Alexander's pronouncement of 1856 on the emigration⁶². A few days later, on 26 August, Gerngross reversed himself on

gentry occurred at the beginning of August, at which time, it appears from his account, the passport stoppage also occurred. Support for the view that the order came from the capital, however, comes from the fact that according to several of the sources, Gerngross later, issued a statement (which presumably would have been in the name of the central government), that the stoppage of passports was a temporary measure, to remain in effect until the gap in the labor force could be filled by state peasants. On the extent of the desolation, Shcherban', who favored the emigration of the Tatars, stated that by August the Simferopol and Theodosia districts were largely deserted (Shcherban', *loc. cit.*, 213).

58 Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 402. Markevich cites Köppen, without supplying the documentation he usually does when citing Köppen's correspondence. He also cites Köppen's assertion that some of the magnates, such as Vorontsov and Kochubei were buying up the lands of the Tatars (*ibid.*, 402). A possible confirmation of Köppen's view of Gerngross' mission is provided by Levitskii's assertion that the Ministry attempted to have the principle established (unfortunately no precise date is given, but presumably in the summer or fall of 1860) that private persons could not buy Tatar land until the Ministry had had the option to purchase it and rejected it (*loc. cit.*, 635-636).

59 Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 538.

60 Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 540.

61 Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 539-540.

62 Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 402. Apparently (again the chronology is far from precise), it was at this point that he stated that the check to emigration was

the emigration. He asked the marshal of the provincial nobility to send a circular to all districts of the province, calling on the Tatars to remain. Two days later, the governor of the Tauridian province issued a circular stating that he had repeatedly given orders that it be impressed on the Tatars that they could safely remain where they were, and that they ran no danger of being relocated to interior provinces, and consequently, there was no need for them to hasten to secure passports for Turkey, as some ill-intentioned persons, intent on personal gain, were urging. To put an end to this, local officials were instructed to apprehend those who were spreading such rumors. Officials were to inform the Tatars that they would be free later to emigrate to Turkey, if they so desired; the stoppage of the issuing of passports was merely a result of the condition that more had applied for passports than the officials could cope with for the moment, and it reflected the government's intention to keep the Tatars from undue haste in selling their property, and excessive expenditure in obtaining passports⁶³.

Although without archival documents, it is impossible to sort the chronology of the period too precisely, one suspects that with all the documents, the picture would remain one of confusion. Orders crisscrossed, from the capital to the province and back, local developments moved more rapidly than local and central authorities could really cope with them. One contemporary observed that the central government was handicapped by the poor quality of the reports it received from local officials⁶⁴. As an illustration of this, one might cite the case described by another contemporary. After the order that no more passports be issued, when the capital asked for reports on the situation from local authorities, the latter reported in favor of the emigration, that the Tatars were enemies of the state, a view which was in line with the sentiments of the nobility⁶⁵.

only temporary and it would soon begin again (Goldenberg, *loc. cit.*, 75). This «Committee» was presumably the body elected by the nobles at their earlier meeting (cf. Shcherban', *loc. cit.*, 214).

63 Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 540; Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 402, 398-399. Totleben does not supply any information as to the content of Gerngross' circular, except to say that if it had been issued earlier, before the emigration had acquired such scale and impetus, it might have done some good (*loc. cit.*, 539-540). Markevich, summarizing the circular in one clause, does not date it any more precisely than to say it was issued in August, after Gerngross changed his mind. Presumably both sources were referring to the same document.

64 Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 629.

65 Goldenberg, *loc. cit.*, 74-75. The order on passports may well have been

In September, the Russian authorities were more active along two lines, halting emigration and trying to accelerate new colonization. Stroganov and the governor of the Crimea toured the province, attempting to reassure the Tatars that the government had no intention of expelling them, but were unsuccessful in prevailing on them to remain⁶⁶. The Tatars probably had very little faith in the Russian officials. Totleben reproduced what was supposedly a typical conversation with a Tatar on the question of emigration. Even when the conversation ended in apparent success, in convincing the Tatars to remain, the majority of the «convinced» later turned out to have left⁶⁷.

The economic difficulties became greater and the search for solutions was on. As the marshal of the Crimean nobility was to indicate in his report of September, in four months (April through August) 100,000 Tatars had left. In the absence of adequate manpower, the value of land had fallen from twenty to six and even three rubles per *desiatina*⁶⁸. Gerngross had brought with him a code of rules (*pravila*) which had been drafted in the capital, to govern the settlement of state peasants on private lands in the Crimea. He circulated these among the local gentry for consideration in district (*uyezdnye*) committees⁶⁹. To the extreme difficulties the landowners of several districts responded at the beginning of September with extreme proposals for encouraging colonization. They asked that they be allowed to receive state peasants on their lands with the status of freemen («*na polozhenii vol'nykh liudei*»)⁷⁰. Some nobles in the Crimea asked the central government that they be allowed to offer colonists who would settle on gentry lands, concessions twice as great as those offered colonists on state lands, and that foreign colonists settling in the Crimea also be eligible for such concessions (and of course the exemption from military recruitment which foreign colonists had always had). Since the steppe area of the province now was quite desolate, and the mountainous part was in danger of becoming so in the near future, the nobles asked also that the departure of Tatars from

the longawaited response from the capital to Stroganov's long correspondence discussed above.

66 Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 541; Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 402.

67 Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 541.

68 Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 542, 543. Another source reported that 81, 240 Tatars left from Evpatoria alone during the summer of 1860 (*J de CP*, 3 October 1861).

69 Toteleben, *loc. cit.*, 542.

70 Shcherban', *loc. cit.*, 215; Goldenberg, *loc. cit.*, 75.

the mountainous part of the Crimea be permitted to take place slowly, at a rate coordinated with their replacement by other elements who were accustomed to «a mountainous locale, and (had) knowledge of gardening (*sadovodstvo*) and vintnery.» They also asked for long-term loans and the right of long-term mortgage, as was permitted in other more developed areas in the Empire⁷¹.

The report made by the marshal of the Crimean nobles, later in September, which embodied these proposals, contained also an attempt at explaining why the migration had occurred: although religious «fanaticism» had a role, problems created by the Russian administration were the main factor⁷². Various expedients were being tried early in the autumn of 1860, but were proving rather unsuccessful. Three thousand soldiers were sent by the government to help stave off immediate ruin, by doing field work, but as Totleben pointed out, they could only be used temporarily, since the government would not want them away from their military duties indefinitely⁷³. Then, too, there was the tremendous disparity in numbers, 3000 soldiers to replace whatever major fraction of the more than 100,000 departed Tatars had constituted part of the actual labor force. One could not even calculate the loss accurately since, as a contemporary put it, there was no effective way to ascertain the ratio of population to production⁷⁴. Gerngross, utilizing the authorization granted him, issued an order, early in September, for the dispatch to the Crimea from nearby over-populated provinces of up to 1500 families of state peasants⁷⁵.

But colonization by state peasants, too, presented difficulties which Totleben referred to in his memorandum. First, 600 families of state peasants on arrival at Perekop refused to become gentry peasants, and told Gerngross they refused to agree to such a change in their status. Totleben obser-

71 Toteleben, *loc. cit.*, 543-544; Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 402.

72 Markevich, *loc. cit.*, 402. Markevich also states that the gentry (apparently among themselves) mentioned both factors. From his formulation, it would appear that they gave them about the same weight (*ibid.*, 402). The Russian sources with great frequency use the word «fanaticism» in connection with the Tatar's attachment to their religion, or feeling of kinship with other Muslim peoples. This issue will be discussed separately in the conclusion of this article.

73 Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 547.

74 Levitskii, *loc. cit.*, 636.

75 Shcherban', *loc. cit.*, 215.

ved that now that Gerngross saw the difficulties in the solution he originally proposed, he changed his tack. He advocated settling state peasants only on state lands, giving gentry the option of hiring the state peasants to the extent that they proved to be surplus labor on the state lands. But this, too, Totleben observed, was no real solution for very simple reasons: four-fifths of the Crimea was gentry land, and only one fifth state land, and most of that was located in the northern part of the peninsula; moreover, there appeared to be little likelihood of an adequate surplus of labor on state lands or of an easy transfer of any surplus of state peasant labor to areas where it would be needed by private landowners⁷⁶.

Totleben made a series of recommendations at the end of his memorandum (November 1860). He urged that no more passports be issued after December 15, a limitation which would not be too difficult to impose, since the advent of winter naturally precluded any sizeable movement to Turkey until some time in March. He was aware of the difficulty of refusing passports to Tatars who wished to join members of their family who had already emigrated, or who had already sold their property in anticipation of emigration, but he felt that the losses these Tatars would suffer would be smaller than the hardships that awaited them in Turkey. From the Russian point of view, such a stoppage was imperative or else the province would be ruined. For the Tatars who remained, the government should provide special care, probably something similar to the *popechitel'stvo* created for the foreign colonists in southern Russia. The government should rid itself of the idea that the Tatars were enemies of the state, the notion which had helped trigger the emigration. To further the colonization of the areas left vacant, he favored a series of measures, such as government aid to the gentry and to the would-be colonists, as well as special concessions to the latter⁷⁷. These recommendations were to receive only partial implementation.

76 Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 546-547. His memorandum was dated 14 (26) November 1860. The deployment of the soldiers and state peasants would appear to have taken place in September or October. Levitskii, writing apparently later in 1861, estimated that private persons owned 2,000,000 desiatinas of arable land, and that the state owned (exclusive of forests) 450,000 desiatinas, to which it added in 1860 through purchase from the Tatars, 12,728 desiatinas more (*loc. cit.*, 635). A. Umanets, writing a few years after these events, stated that in the Crimea there were as much as 1,000,000 desiatinas of land which were opened for colonization, of which 27-30,000 desiatinas were state land, and the rest private land («A.U.», «O zaselenii» 261).

77 Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 547-550.

At the end of 1860, permission was again granted for emigration, albeit subject to severe restriction. Pressure for such renewal almost certainly came from all sides. Stroganov had described to Totleben how when he had first halted the issuing of passports, his residence had been besieged by crowds of Tatars insisting that they be allowed to leave⁷⁸.

(To be continued)
continued

⁷⁸ Totleben, *loc. cit.*, 539.