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نسخه سی (۱) فرانقدر .

برنجی سنه

هر لسانده هر نوع آثار علمیہ و ادبیہ
و اجتماعیہ متشکراً قبول و درج
اولونور

سنه لك آبونه بدلی هریر ایچون (۱۲) فرانقدر

ژاپون ایمپه ریال کاغدی اوزده رینه
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آیده بر دفعه نشر اولونور ، سربست ، مجموعه عثمانیه واسلامیه در

Outre ces assertions, il faut se rappeler que durant les califats de Bagdad et d'Égypte on donnait des fonctions de haute importance aux juifs et aux chrétiens; on se croyait en mesure de les contrôler plus que leurs coreligionnaires qui pouvaient réclamer l'égalité pour eux, ou bien à cause de l'énergie et du talent qu'ils avaient montrés.

Cette politique n'a jamais été abandonnée par les chefs d'Etat musulmans, comme la plus récente expérience le démontre; mais si on examine de près le motif, il est improbable qu'on puisse conclure par cela la moindre capacité des chrétiens. On doit convenir qu'au moment où les affaires et la politique se penchèrent vers l'Ouest, ceux qui, par leur religion étaient en contact avec les Occidentaux ont démontré probablement dans leurs procédés de l'intelligence et de la sagacité.

Mon expérience personnelle des musulmans, comme celles de plusieurs voyageurs, me montra des ouvriers honnêtes et laborieux, des personnes de caractère distingué et de principes élevés.

La théorie du professeur Vambéry, qui insiste constamment sur la différence de l'Européen et de l'Asiatique, me paraît plus en conformité avec les faits cités que ceux qui trouvent la différence d'aptitude entre les musulmans et les chrétiens; et encore selon l'opinion de M. Schuyler et autres, la différence de capacité entre Oriental et Occidental consiste dans leur développement: les musulmans, dans les pays tout à fait retirés, possèdent le degré de civilisation de l'Europe du quatorzième ou quinzième siècle, alors que ce pays était encore très arriéré.

Le professeur Vambéry dit que les principaux fléaux des pays musulmans sont: le mauvais gouvernement et le mauvais système d'administration; en effet, ceux-là paraissent concorder avec les faits énoncés. Il est vraiment curieux que ceux qui trouvent dans la religion de Mahomet la source de l'incapacité musulmane dépeignent aussi les chrétiens natifs ou bien les Européens résidents sous des couleurs plus noires que les musulmans; effectivement

les livres écrits sur Constantinople moderne traitent les Européens qui y habitent sans ménagement aucun; les voyageurs et les missionnaires en Afrique et en Asie sont disposés à représenter que l'influence des Européens comme des plus corruptives.



RÉPONSE DE FAIR PLAY FOREDOOM

In defiance of the well known injunction not to trouble about the mote in their brother's eye while neglecting the beam in their own, Christians are ever on the look-out for what they consider flaws in the religion of their neighbours, instead of first making sure that these flaws, if such they be, are not equally or even more prominent in Christianity thus, for instance, they delight in flattering upon Islam, as being peculiar to it, a view of predestination which is rather to be found in the collection of books they themselves deem inspired. It is only necessary to set the two teachings side by side to show the injustice of this Christian imputation; and as Kasimirski has marked the passages in his "Koran" which, according to him, contain fatalism, they may serve as a basis of comparison.

The first (*III. 139*) says that no one shall die without God's leave. Why in the name of common sense, should there be anything more fatalistic here than in the doctrine that his permission is necessary even for a sparrow to fall? If the death of a sparrow does not take place except according to Divine decree, why should that of a man, each of man each of whose hairs, the gospel declares, are numbered (*Matt. X. 29, 30, etc.*).

Another verse singled out by Kasimirski is that which attributes to God, not to the Mus-

lims, the death of their enemies at Badr (*VIII. 17*). This may be understood, from the context, to mean that he gave those fighting for their faith the requisite confidence and strength, and brought to naught the stratagems of their adversaries: if, on the other hand, the words be taken literally, they have biblical equivalents in plenty. Thus it is god who kills and makes alive, says Deuteronomy (*XXXII. 39*); it is because the Lord would slay them — notice the "fatalism" here, by the way — that the sons of heli hearkened not unto the voice of their father (*I Samuel II. 25*); the Psalms set down to God the slaying of the wicked, of mighty kings, etc. (*passim*); when the Lord hardens the hearts of certain cities, that they should come against Israel in battle, it is in order "that he might destroy" ciples are told to take no thought how or what they shall speak, since it is not they who shall do so, but the Divinity within them (*Matt. X, 19, 20*) etc.

Next comes the passage in which it is affirmed that the infidels would not believe even if the dead were made to speak (*XIII. 30*). What difference is there between this and the gospel's averment that those who do not listen to Moses and the Prophets would not do so even if a man were to rise from the dead (*Luke XVI. 31*)? Or, perhaps the charge of fatalism is based on what follows: that God, if he willed, could direct all men. It might with more justice be brought against the writer of the epistle, when he says: "Who them utterly" (*Joshua XII. 20*); Christ's dishath resisted his will?" (*Rom. IX. 19. Cf. 2 Chron. XX. 6* "None is able to withstand thee". *Job IX. 12 etc.*). That God, in spite of his omnipotence, should give man liberty to disobey him is surely a proof of human free will, not of the opposite. The same remark applies to the last of Kasimirski's texts, which runs thus: "And if God had willed, he would have made all men one people. But he will introduce whom he pleases into his mercy" — *Cf.* "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion

on whom I will have compassion" (*Rom. IX. 15*) — "while the wicked shall have neither protector nor helper" (*XLIII. 6*). Against this, moreover, we may set the more stern gospel pronouncement, the delight of Calvinists and of the Dominican school, especially, among Roman catholics: "Many be called, but few chosen" (*Matt. XX. 16, etc.*).

As Kasimirski further adduces, in support of his accusation of fatalism, chapter VIII and the verses he has collected under the heading "Predestination", it is advisable to follow him here, too; first, however, taking a glance at the biblical aspect of the question.

Speaking of the elect few, the epistle to the Ephesians says that they were chosen before the foundation of the world, "predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of His own will" (*Eph. I, 4. 11*), "created.... unto good works which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them" (*Eph. II, 10*). Their names, it is repeatedly taught elsewhere, are written before hand in the book of life: King David, for instance, asks that his enemies should be blotted out of the book of the living and should not be written with the righteous (*Ps. LXIX. 28*); it is "everyone that shall be found written in the book" that shall be delivered (*Dan. XII, 1*); "as many as were ordained to eternal life believed" (*Acts XIII, 48*); in the epistle to the Philip-pians allusion is made to several persons, then living, "whose names are in the book of life" — here, if anywhere, is "fatalism" pure and simple (*Philip. IV, 3*); none shall enter into the apocalyptic city "but they which are written in the lamb's book of life" (*Rev. XXI, 27*) etc.

The many who go in at the wide gate that leadeth to destruction (*Matt. VII, 13*), again, are subject to the same fore ordination. The wicked are estranged from the very womb (*Ps. LVIII, 4*); they share the fate of Esau, who was hated — as Jacob was loved — "being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil" (*Rom. IX, 11, 13*). Election

is "not of works... not of him that willeth or runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy"; and He only "hath mercy on whom He will" (*ibid.* XI, 16, 18): moreover, as in the case of Pharaoh, who was merely raised so that the Divine power might be shown in him (*ibid.* 17), and whose heart, according to prediction (*Exod.* VII, 3), was hardened so that he hearkened not (*Exod.* IX, 12, *etc.*), so the supreme Being hardens men at pleasure ("whom He will He hardeneth"; *Rom.* IX, 18), makes them err ("why hast Thou made us to err from Thy ways"; *Isa.* LXIII, 17, *cf.* *Job.* XII, 24, 25, P; *CVII.* 40, *etc.*) and blinds them ("the rest were blinded"; *Rom.* XI, 7: "He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their hearts; that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be converted, and I should heal them"; *John* XII, 40).

It should at once be explained that commentators understand the hardening of Pharaoh's heart — and the something evidently applies to kindred Oriental modes of expression, such as that God blinds, or darkens the eyes that they see not (*Ps.* LXIX, 23) — to mean, not that God positively hardened the Egyptian ruler's heart, but that He did so negatively, by not softening it as He could have done. This rule of interpretation disposes of a large part of the other passages upon which Kasimirski's case rests: those, for instance, where it is said that God directs whom He pleases and causes whom He pleases to err" (*XIV.* 4, *XXXV.* 9, *etc.*), that He does not guide those whom He has made to wander (*XVI.* 39) and that He makes the heart of the wicked indifferent (*XVIII.* 27). The import of these expressions is that God, negatively, desists from directing the obstinate and leaves the heart in its indifference (*cf.* *Rom.* I, 24, 26, 28. "God also gave them up to uncleanness... God gave them up unto vile affections... God gave them up to a reprobate mind") — and the context shows that this abandonment only takes place after benediction free will has been exercised in reject-

ing the messages sent and treating the messengers as impostors.

The last text is not specified by Kasimirski except as being met with in the eighteenth chapter, among whose hundred and ten verses, dealing with a variety of subjects, he tells his readers to look for fatalism. Verse 27 must be the one he had most prominently in his mind when giving this advice, since it must have seemed to him, ignorant as he apparently was of the rule just mentioned, to afford him the best grounds for his accusation. He clearly failed to take into account the very next verse, in which it is written: "Truth is from your Lord... let him who chooses believe and let him who chooses disbelieve" — if this is not the doctrine of free will, what is? — and to the exclamation, a little further on (v. 53): "What prevents people from believing, when guidance has been given them, and from asking forgiveness of their Lord? Are they waiting for the end of their predecessors?" *etc.* Moreover, it is taught in the same chapter that those whose hearts and ears are — in the sense explained above — rendered irreceptive of the truth, so that it is useless calling them to it*, are they who have previously turned away from it and impugned it (verses 54—56); and that the Lord will not do injustice to any one (v. 47). And indeed, as appears elsewhere, God will not impose any soul a burden greater than it can bear, and what it has done, good or evil, is what it shall be judged by (II. 286). Man shall receive nothing but what he has striven for, his efforts shall be justly appreciated and he shall be scrupulously rewarded (LIII. 40-42). The mercy of God must not be despaired of, for He forgives all sins; but the sinner must repent before punishment comes upon him — for afterwards he will find no aid —, before the soul cries: "If God had directed me I should have been virtuous". Then the answer will show that it was not guidance. That was wanting, for the soul had indeed been given signs, but had treated them as false (XXXIX, 54-59).

Neither is man's liberty denied in the remaining passages given by Kasimirski under the heading "Predestination" — when they are relevant, that is, for one of them (LIII, 33) merely affirms the Divine foreknowledge of man's inmost thoughts, whilst another (XXXII, 12, 13) refers to the state after death of those who had disbelieved during their lifetime. Their is "an appointed time to man upon earth" *Job. VII, 1, cf. "His days are determined, the number of his months are with Thee, Thou hast appointed his bounds that he cannot pass" Job. XLV, 5)*, at the end of which his day shall come to die" (*1 Sam. XXVI, 10, cf. Gen. XLVII, 29, Deut. XXXI, 14, Ps. XXXVII, 13, etc.*); and the first (III, 148) alludes to the inevitableness of death when "the measure of his days" (*Ps. XXXIX, 4*) is filled. The next (VI, 35) affirms that God, if He willed, could bring all men into the right way: a text to which the same remarks apply as to XIII, 30, already dealt with. That the Divine law is foreordained (XXXIII, 38) has surely nothing to do with predestination. As little has the case of the people of Saba (XXXIV, 19): on the contrary, it is written that it was they who wronged themselves, and that the tempter had no power over them, his action merely serving to distinguish those who believed from those who did not. That no calamity happens which has not been written in God's book from all eternity (LVII, 22) does not affect man's free will: is there not biblical authority, moreover, for believing that no calamity shall befall even a sparrow unless as Divinely ordained? (*cf. Ps. LVI, 8, CXXXIX, 16, etc.*).

Kasimirski, in a word, before he attacked the teaching of Islam on predestination, might profitably have compared it with that accepted by Christians, say with the famous simile of the potter, than which nothing more "fatalistic" has perhaps ever been penned in any language. As the potter, says the epistle, is at liberty out of the same lump of clay to make "one vessel unto honour and another unto dishonor", without the things formed

having any voice in the matter, so God divides mankind into vessels of mercy which He had afore" — "before the foundation of the world", as the same writer explains elsewhere (*Eph. I, 4*) — "prepared unto glory", and into "vessels of wrath fitted to destruction" (*Rom. IX, 20-23*). It is in vain that Kasimirski has torn texts from their context or has considered them apart from other passages where the same subject, treated more fully, assumes an entirely different complexion: he fails to produce anything like this. In itself it is not so incapable of satisfactory explanation as it looks — its author was too consummate a master of dialectics to have written what could not be made good —; it is Christian straining at Muslim gnats, beside which this and other uncompromising biblical expressions appear very camels, that causes whatever difficulty there may be in the defence of the latter, since the outcry raised by christians against the milder sayings in the Scripture of Islam recoils with redoubled force upon their own. They would do far better to recognise that the same standards apply in both cases, giving one weight, especially, to the Oriental character of the books and to the circumstances under which they appeared. If they did this conscientiously they would find no more warrant in Islam than in the dispensations that went before it for a Calvinistic dogma of predestination.

Fair PLAY.

