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AL-AMIDI AND FAKHR AL-DIN AL-RĀZĪ: TWO 13TH-CENTURY  
APPROACHES TO PHILOSOPHICAL KALĀM

ÂMÎDÎ VE FAHREDDİN RÂZÎ: XIII. YÜZYILDA FELSEFİ KELÂMA İKİ  
YAKLAŞIM BİÇİMİ

آراء الآمدى وفخر الدين الرازى حول الكلام الفلسفى فى العصر الثالث عشر

Heidrun Eichner\*

In the discussion of the relation between *kalām* and *falsafa* two different levels of analysis are to be distinguished. On one level, we may discuss how specific doctrines were interpreted by individual authors, and to which extent an individual author – e.g. Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī – held a position which stands closer to a position perceived as “typical *falsafa*” or as “typical *kalām*”. If we wish to avoid essentialist assumptions about the “nature of *falsafa*” and the “nature of *kalām*” we have to free our analysis of the historical development in these two traditions from the impact of globalizing sketches as many historiographical source-texts present them, and as they still provide a basis for many modern attempts at describing the two traditions. So, we first have to collect data from a representative sample of authors from which we can construct a somewhat reliable account of the historical development of a specific doctrine.

Even more complex is the problem on a second level of analysis, i.e. if we wish to understand how both *kalām* and *falsafa* as complete thought-systems have changed in the course of time, and how encounters between the two traditions have affected their conceptions. The 13<sup>th</sup>/7<sup>th</sup> century is a period where such encounters have taken place on a large scale. While in this context the

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importance of the period surrounding the activity of al-Ghazālī has received considerable attention, the importance of the 13<sup>th</sup>/7<sup>th</sup> century is a fact that only recently comes to the attention of researchers. From the point of view of trying to determinate how *kalām* and *falsafa* as whole systems have interacted, the situation in the course of the 13<sup>th</sup> century is even more complicated than at the beginning of the 12<sup>th</sup> century.

This has to do with several factors, one of them being the importance which the oeuvre of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī has had for the further development of *kalām* and for the interactions of *falsafa* and *kalām*. This is one of the reasons why Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī is so important for our understanding of the history of the interactions between *kalām* and *falsafa*: He stands very close in time to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and other than later critics of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī he stems from a period where alternative approaches to interpreting Avicennian philosophy still could draw on a continuous tradition. One or two generations later on, authors such as Na īr al-Dīn al- ūsī, al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī and Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī were articulating their criticism of specific Rāzīan doctrines in the context of a philosophical outlook that was largely based on the analytical framework by the very author they were attacking. Thus, in many instances, al-Āmidī's criticism of Rāzīan theorems has a specific philosophical value and is marked by a high amount of philosophical originality which in this form can not be encountered in other authors.

al-Āmidī's *Kashf al-Tamwihāt fī Shar al-Ishārāt* is the first in a series of critical discussion of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's commentary on Ibn Sīnā's *Shar al-Ishārāt*.<sup>1</sup> After al-Āmidī, Na īr al-Dīn al- ūsī wrote another commentary attacking al-Rāzī's exposition, and attempts at meditation between al-Rāzī's and al- ūsī's positions were made by Badr al-Dīn al-Tustarī (d. 1307) and Qu b al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Shīrāzī al-Ta tānī (d. 1364) who both wrote treatises known as 'adjudications' (*mu ākamāt*).<sup>2</sup>

al-Āmidī's reading of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and his discussion of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's argument is guided by a very precise awareness of discrepancies and inaccuracies in al-Rāzī's system. For substantiating this description

1 al-Rāzī's commentary has been edited recently by Alī Rī ā Najafzāda (Tehran 2006). I thank Hakan Coşar for the reference to this edition. An older lithograph edition contains only the part on *ikma*.

2 On the commentary tradition of the *al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbihāt* cf. Gutas, *The Heritage of Avicenna: The Golden Age of Arabic Philosophy* p. 88-89.

of al-Āmidī's importance by more detailed research, I am going to analyze a passage at the beginning of al-Āmidī's discussion on al-Rāzī's commentary on the *al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbihāt* (cf. appendix). Here we can observe, how a literary convention in the Avicennian text (i.e. a short invocation of God at the beginning of a text) is interpreted by al-Rāzī as referring to considerations relating to the systematical constitution of the human soul and its acquisition of knowledge.

The passage in the *al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbihāt* on which al-Rāzī comments runs:

*a midu llāha alā usni tawfiqihī wa-as aluhū hidāyata arīqihī wa-ilhāma l- aqqi*

al-Rāzī uses this short formula for providing a sketch of an epistemological theory which can integrate elements of the mystical tradition and its epistemology in a philosophical system. al-Rāzī's exegesis relies on the traditional distinction between 'theoretical philosophy' and 'practical philosophy'. While - according to al-Rāzī's interpretation - 'theoretical philosophy' (as represented by the 'theoretical faculty' of the 'rational soul') includes elements of a *kalām* epistemology as well, his conception of 'practical philosophy' equates it with elements pertinent to an epistemology that uses elements typically associated with the mystical tradition: This epistemology includes ethical commands, i.e. refinement (*tahdhīb*) of the outward ( *āhir*) and of the inward (*bā in*), and finally it leads to an immediate manifestation (*tajallī*) of truth.

al-Rāzī's approach is a very early example of a specific hermeneutic method. The strategy to interpret a short remark or a single term in the introduction to a book as a programmatic statement resembles very much what is familiar to us from much later commentaries on philosophical and other texts: The text underlying a commentary is used as a starting-point - or rather as a pretext - in order to develop a complex theory allegedly alluded to but actually not discernable in the text.

al-Rāzī's commentary on the formula *a midu llāha alā usni tawfiqihī wa-as aluhū hidāyata arīqihī wa-ilhāma l- aqqi* identifies three elements which he interprets as representing two paralleling epistemological systems for the

acquisition of knowledge – one being ‘theoretical philosophy’, and the other being ‘practical philosophy’. Later on we will see how al-Āmidī carefully criticizes al-Rāzī’s approach. As we will see, al-Āmidī points out the systematic inaccuracy of al-Rāzī’s account, and he does not accept the system of stages (*marātib*) which al-Rāzī builds up so persuasively. As will be seen by a comparison of al-Āmidī’s text with al-ūsī’s commentary, al-Āmidī’s engagement in the criticism of al-Rāzī’s interpretation is much more serious and painstaking than that of the nowadays more famous philosopher al-ūsī.

al-Rāzī identifies three elements in Ibn Sīnā’s text which he understands as allusions to stages in the acquisition of knowledge. These elements are (1) ‘success’ *usn tazwīq* (2) ‘guidance’ *hidāya* (3) ‘inspiration’ *ilhām*. al-Rāzī’s text provides the following equations, both in the context of a system of theoretical and of practical philosophy:

	theoretical philosophy	practical philosophy
(0)	<i>al-nafs fi mabda al-fi ra takūnu khāliya an kull al- ulūm</i>	
(1) <i>usn al-tazwīq</i>	<i>isti māl al- atwāss li-ktisāb al- ulūm al-arūriyya</i>	<i>tahdhīb al- āhir</i>
(2) <i>hidāyat ariqihī</i>	<i>tartīb al- ulūm al- arūriyya wa-tarakkubuhā bi- aythu tata addā minhā ilā al- ulūm al-na ariyya</i>	<i>tahdhīb al-bā in</i>
(3) <i>ilhām al- aqq</i>	<i>wu ūl ilā al-natā ij</i>	<i>ta liyat al- aqq wa-tajallī al- uwar al-mujarrada an al-mādda</i>

Other than al-Āmidī, al-ūsī’s commentary does not literally quote al-Rāzī but rather paraphrases him. Guided by al-ūsī’s paraphrase we might assume that al-Rāzī’s interpretation refers to stages of the Avicennian theory of an actualization of human intellect,<sup>3</sup> i.e. (0) ‘material intellect’ (*al- aql al-hayūlānī*) – (1) ‘intellect in habitu’ (*al- aql bi-l-malaka*) – (2) ‘actual intellect’ (*al- aql bi-l-fi l*) – (3) ‘acquired intellect’ (*al- aql al-mustafād*). More or less in accordance with the standard Avicennian theory, al-ūsī defines the stages

3 For a comprehensive (albeit partially outdated) survey on theories of intellection in the Arabic tradition and its connections with Greek and Latin theories see Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect*. Ibn Sīnā’s theory is dealt with pp. 74–123. Among Ibn Sīnā’s Islamic successors, Davidson briefly deals with al-Ghazālī and al-Suhrawardī (cf. pp. 127–179).

of intellection alluded to by al-Rāzī as follows: 'Material intellect' is pure disposition (*isti dād ma* ); 'intellect in *habitu*' is a disposition for perceiving primary intelligibles, i.e. intuitive [intelligibles] (*al-ma qūlāt al-ūlā, a nī al-badīhiyyāt*) by using the senses ( *awāss*); 'actual intellect' perceives secondary intelligibles, i.e. acquired [intelligibles] (*al-ma qūlāt al-thāniya, a nī al-mukta-saba*); 'acquired intellect' are certain convictions (*al- uqūd al-yaqīniyya*). In the case of the stages in the perfection of the practical part of the soul, al- ūsī's paraphrases completely the Rāzīan text.

On closer analyses however, we can discern that al- ūsī's paraphrase is misleading. al-Rāzī's three stages resemble the Avicennian theory of the actualization of intellect only superficially at best. al-Rāzī's distinction between 'necessary knowledge' (*al- ulūm al- arūriyya*) and 'knowledge based on deliberation' (*al- ulūm al- arūriyya*) rather goes back to a distinction used in the context of Ash'arite *kalām*. Not only the distinction, but also the very conception of 'necessary knowledge' which he applies derives from this context. In the philosophical tradition, 'intuitive knowledge' is exemplified by basic logical necessities only such as e.g. that "the whole is more than a part of it", or that "two things which are equal to a third thing are equal to each other".<sup>4</sup> The inclusion of sense-perception as an instance of 'necessary knowledge' is an feature of Ash'arite epistemology.<sup>5</sup>

4 Cf. the description of 'primary intelligibles' in Ibn Sīnā's *K. al-Najāt* p. 334,15-335,2. By 'primary intelligibles' I mean premises (*muqaddamāt*) that necessitate assent (*ta dīq*) without prior acquisition, or because the one who has assent has [sensual] awareness (*yash ūr*) of them, and without the possibility that he does not have this assent at some time. An example for this is our conviction that "the whole is more than a part of it", or that "two things which are equal to a third thing are equal to each other". Ibn Sīnā's description explicitly excludes *shu ūr* as a source of intuitive assent. In the following, references to the shorter exposition in the *K. al-Najāt* will be given. The theory of the *K. al-Najāt* is largely identical with that of the *K. al-Shifā*.

5 Cf. e.g. al-Bāqillānī, *K. al-Tamhīd* p. 9,8-11,13: The acquisition of 'necessary knowledge' falls into six parts. In addition to the five senses, several subtypes of knowledge exist. Their necessity "originates in the soul without that it is existent by the senses". al-Juwaynī's *K. al-Burhān* (§ 50, 1:107,5-108,12) provides a more detailed list of 10 "traditional" grades in the certainty of knowledge. He distinguishes between (1) self-awareness (2) necessary knowledge such as immediate insight into logical impossibilities (3) knowledge of objects of sense-perception. Note, however, that al-Juwaynī rejects this basic distinction of traditional Ash'arite epistemology and thus prepares the grounds for the integration of philosophical logic by later Ash'arites such as his student al-Ghazālī.

al-ūsī's commentary is simply content with identifying al-Rāzī's stages with the standard Avicennian terminology. It does not point out inconsistencies between the two systems. al-Āmidī takes another approach. He does not try to identify al-Rāzī's stages with the Avicennian theory of actualization of human intellect. Rather he engages in a systematic criticism of the role which al-Rāzī ascribes to sense-perception in this process. al-Āmidī points out that the perception of particulars (*idrāk al-juz iyyāt*) may be considered as activity of a lower stratum in the human being, i.e. the animal soul (*al-nafs al-ayawāniyya*) instead of the human rational soul. This objection, of course, is in accordance with the Avicennian theory which distinguishes three layers in the human soul, i.e. the 'vegetative soul' (*al-nafs al-nabātiyya*), the 'animal soul' (*al-nafs al-ayawāniyya*) and the 'rational soul' (*al-nafs al-nā iqa*).<sup>6</sup> According to the Avicennian theory, the activity of the senses is associated to the 'animal soul'. It is divided into five 'internal senses' (*al-awāss al-bā ina*) and five 'external senses' (*al-awāss al-āhira*).<sup>7</sup> The 'internal senses' are responsible for the abstraction of universal forms (*uwar*) from particulars, a process which involves brain-activity.<sup>8</sup> This process of sensation, however, is to be kept separate from intellection, a process associated to the 'rational soul' and exclusive to human beings, not present in other animals. How precisely we have to understand the cooperation of soul and intellect, and which role bodily organs play in this is a major problem in the interpretation of the Avicennian theory.

al-Āmidī's commentary not only points out that al-Rāzī has neglected the role of the 'animal soul' but he further clarifies that - if we accept sensation of particulars as a first stage - we have to add a second stage which is the abstraction of universals (*kullīyyāt*) from particulars (*juz iyyāt*). So, according to al-Āmidī, if we accept that sensation forms part of the stages relevant to the 'human rational soul' (and not to 'animal soul') we have to assume four stages: (1) perception of particulars; (2) abstraction of universals; (3) composition of universals so that 'knowledge based on deliberation' results; (4) conclusions.

al-Āmidī further points to another problem in al-Rāzī's theory, i.e. that al-Rāzī describes 'the manifestation of immaterial forms and the awareness of

6 Cf. the discussion of the division of the soul in Ibn Sīnā's *K. al-Najāt* p. 318-320. The parts of the soul are dealt with to closer detail in subsequent chapters.

7 On the five 'internal senses' cf. Ibn Sīnā, *K. al-Najāt* pp. 327-330. The theory of the 'internal senses' is one of the topics in Avicennian philosophy whose impact on Latin philosophy has been investigated in many studies.

8 On problems in Ibn Sīnā's theory of mental abstraction cf. Hasse, *Avicenna on Abstraction*.



them' (*tajallī al- uwar al-mujarrada wa-l-shu ūr bihā*) as a stage of the 'practical faculty'. As he points out, even though the purification of the soul may be a step which is a precondition for such a manifestation, this does not mean that we have describe it as a specific stage. Again, al-Āmidī's commentary shows that he discerns very precisely that al-Rāzī's sketch is not coherent. When al-Rāzī associates the awareness of abstract forms exclusively to the 'practical faculty' of the soul, this can not be reconciled with the role which the abstraction of forms has in the Avicennian theory of intellection. In fact, al-Rāzī sketch of the stages of the 'theoretical faculty' does not include a theory of how universals and particulars relate to each other, nor does this sketch explain how 'forms', 'universals' and 'knowledge and awareness' (as a result of a process of intellection) can form part of a process located in the 'theoretical faculty'. In modern research-literature no consensus has been achieved how insight resulting from instantaneous inspiration is to be accommodated in an Avicennian theory of knowledge and intellection. However, an exclusive association between a manifestation of immaterial forms and the 'practical faculty' as suggested by al-Rāzī's account certainly can not be reconciled with Ibn Sīnā epistemology, especially when dealing with phenomena like inspiration and prophecy.<sup>9</sup>

In fact, this account suggests that the manifestation of forms and – as al-Āmidī interprets this – an awareness (*shu ūr*) of them results from a process of external and (internal) spiritual exercise. This stands in a marked opposition to Ibn Sīnā's theory of intellection in which awareness (*shu ūr*) is a characteristic of the most perfect stage of actualization, i.e. the 'acquired intellect' (*al- aql al-mustafād*).

Evaluating al-Āmidī's criticism of al-Rāzī we can see that he identifies very precisely inconsistencies in al-Rāzī's theory. Other than al- ūsī, he does not simply gloss over these deficiencies by providing a more "correct" Avicennian terminology as an alternative. Rather, he engages in a serious discussion and evaluation of the text. Neither does he follow al-Rāzī's account or the Ash'arite epistemology underlying it, nor does he return to a purely Avicen-

9 An important notion in this context is 'intuition' (*ads*) whose importance for the development of Ibn Sīnā's thought has been pointed out repeatedly by D. Gutas. Cf. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian tradition* pp. 159-175; Gutas, *Intuition and Thinking: The Evolving Structure of Avicenna's Epistemology*. See also Adamson, *Non-Discursive Thought in Avicenna's Commentary on the Theology of Aristotle*.

nian framework. This approach attests the originality of al-Āmidī's thought, and it shows that the process of the adaptation and reception of Avicennian philosophy by authors active as *mutakallimūn* is a complex phenomenon. If we wish to analyze the impact of philosophical thought on the Islamic theological tradition we have to be aware that philosophical originality and commitment can not be measured solely based on an analysis to which extent an author affiliates himself to the philosophical tradition. Rather, the case of al-Āmidī shows the importance of authors who engage in developing an interpretation which takes into consideration both the traditions of *kalām* and *falsafa*.

### Appendix:

a) The Arabic text of the passage from al-Āmidī's *Kashf al-Tamwīhāt* (ms. (Berlin) Pm 596 (Ahlwardt 5048), fo. 2a,10ff):

قال الشيخ الرئيس أبو عبد الله الحسين بن سينا عفا الله عنه: أحمد الله على حسن توفيقه وأسأله هداية طريقه وإلهام الحق بتحقيقه.

قال الشارح: أقول ستعرف أن النفس الناطقة عالمة وعاملة. ويمكن حمل هذه الخطبة على المراتب الواقعة المرتبة في كل واحدة من القوتين. فأما مراتب القوة النظرية فذلك لأن النفس في مبدأ الفطرة تكون خالية عن كل العلوم. ثم يحصل لها العلوم الضرورية بسبب إحساس الحواس بالجزئيات. ثم أن بتلك العلوم الضرورية تكسب النفس سائر العلوم النظرية. فاستعمال الحواس لاكتساب العلوم الضرورية هو المرتبة الأولى. وترتيب الضرورية وتركيبها بحيث تتأدى منها إلى العلوم النظرية هو المرتبة الثانية. والوصول إلى النتائج هو ٢b/ المرتبة الثالثة. ولا شك أن التوفيق من الله تعالى هو الأمر المقرب إلى السعادة الأبدية. ولما كانت الحواس هي المبادئ لحصول تلك العلوم التي هي أسباب السعادة الأبدية لا جرم كانت الحواس توفيقاً من الله تعالى. وهو المعنى بقوله أحمد الله على حسن توفيقه. وأسأله هداية طريقه إشارة إلى الدرجة الثانية وهي الانتقال من تلك الضرورية إلى النتائج. وذلك لا يتم إلا بمداية الله تعالى. وإلهام الحق بتحقيقه إشارة إلى المقام الثالث وهو الوصول إلى النتائج. وإنما جعل ذلك إلهاماً لما ثبت في الحكمة أن الأفكار ليست أسباباً موجبة للصورة العقلية من واهب الصور.

وأما حمل هذه المراتب على درجات القوة العملية فذلك لأنَّ أوَّل المراتب تهذيب الظاهر. وذلك إنَّما يتمُّ بالتوفيق على استعمال الشرائع الحسنة الإلهية والثانية تهذيب الباطن عن الأخلاق الرديَّة وهي الطريقة المحمودة المرضية وثالثها ما يحصل بسبب تجرُّد النفس عن العلائق الدنيَّة البدنيَّة وهو أن يتحلَّى تحليَّة الحقِّ ويتجلَّى له الصور المجردة عن المادَّة وهو المراد بقوله وإلهام الحقِّ بتحقيقه.

قلت: أما استعمال الحواسِّ لإدراك الجزئيات إنَّما يكون من مراتب القوة النظرية الخاصة بالنفس الإنسانية إن لو كان الحاكم في هذه القوى في أبدان الناس هو النفس الإنسانية وهو غير مسلم من غير دليل. بل لقائل أن يقول الحاكم فيها إنَّما هو النفس الحيوانية ولا مانع من الاجتماع ٣٨/ بينهما في بدن الإنسان كما هو مذهب كثير من الحكماء الأفاضل. ولهذا كانت النفس الحيوانية مستقلةً بذلك في غير الإنسان. فلا يكون استعمال الحواسِّ لإدراك الجزئيات من مراتب القوة النظرية. ثمَّ وإن كان ذلك داخلا في مراتب القوة النظرية فلا يخفى أنَّ أوَّل المراتب إنَّما هو استعمال الحواسِّ لإدراك الجزئيات. ثمَّ استتراع الكلِّيات من الجزئيات مرتبة ثانية. ثمَّ تأليف البعض إلى البعض ليتأدَّى منها إلى العلوم النظرية مرتبة ثالثة. ثمَّ الوصول إلى النتائج مرتبة رابعة. فالمراتب رابعة لا ثلاثية. وأما تجلَّى الصورة المجردة له وشعوره بها وإن كانت بسبب تصرف القوة العملية في تصفية النفس عن العلائق الدنيَّة البدنيَّة فليس ممَّا يوجب جعل ذلك من مراتب القوة العملية. بل غايته أن يكون متوقفاً عليها كما أن استتراع الضروريات من الجزئيات بالقوة النظرية متوقَّف على إدراك الحواسِّ للجزئيات. فلو كان كلُّ ما يتوقَّف حصوله على شيء يجب أن يكون من مراتب ذلك الشيء فيجب أن يكون استتراع الضروريات من الجزئيات المحسنة من مراتب القوة النظرية وهو خلاف ما أشار إليه.

#### b) Translation:

The Shaykh al-Ra'īs Ibn Sīnā says: I praise God for good success and ask Him for guidance on His way and inspiration of truth by His verification.

The commentator says: I say: You will know that the rational soul is knowing and acting ( *ālīma āmila*). It is possible to interpret this preface as referring to stages which are arranged in both of these faculties. As to the stages of the 'theoretical faculty' [we say]: Originally at the beginning (*bi-mabda al-fi ra*), the soul is devoid of all knowledge. Then, 'necessary knowledge'

(*al- ulūm al- arūriyya*) is there in it because the senses perceive particulars. Then, aided by this 'necessary knowledge', the soul acquires the remainder of 'knowledge based on deliberation' (*al- ulūm al-na ariyya*). Thus, using the senses for acquiring 'necessary knowledge' is the first stage. Arranging 'necessary knowledge' and composing it so that one comes to 'knowledge based on deliberation' is the second stage. Arriving at conclusions is the third stage. Undoubtedly, 'success from God' is what brings someone close to eternal happiness. Since the senses are the principles for the being-there of that knowledge (which is a cause for eternal happiness) the senses are 'success from God'. This is what is meant by "I praise God for good success". And "I ask Him for guidance on His way" is a pointer to the second stage, i.e. the transfer from 'necessary knowledge' to conclusions. "Inspiration of truth by His verification" is a pointer to the third station, i.e. arriving at conclusions. He has called this 'inspiration' because it has been affirmed in philosophy that thoughts are not necessitating causes for the intellectual forms from the 'giver of forms'.

As to applying these stages to the 'practical faculty' [we say]: This is so because the 'refinement of the external' (*āhir*) is the first stage. This is completed only by success for using good Divine prescriptions (*al-sharā i al- asana al-ilāhiyya*). The second stage is 'refinement of the inward' (*bā in*) from evil traits of character. This is the praiseworthy way which is agreed upon. The third is what is there because the soul is abstracted from the lower bodily attachments. This is, that it is adorned by truth, and the immaterial forms are manifest for it. This is what is meant by 'inspiration of truth by His verification'.

I say: Using the senses for the perception of particulars belongs to the stages of the 'theoretical faculty' of the human soul only if the decisive [part of the soul] for these faculties in the bodies of human beings would be the 'human soul'. This can not be accepted without a proof. Rather one might say that the decisive [part of the soul] for this is the 'animal soul', and why should not both of them [i.e.: the 'human rational soul' and the 'animal soul'] come together in the human body, as many eminent philosophers teach? Therefore, in this [action], the 'animal soul' in animals other than human beings is independent. So, using the senses for the perception of particulars does not belong to the stages of the 'theoretical faculty'.

Further, even if this would fall under the stages of the 'theoretical faculty' then it does not remain hidden, that the first stage is 'using the senses for the perception of particulars'. Then, 'abstraction of universals from particulars' is a second stage, and 'composition of them with each other so that one comes to 'knowledge based on deliberation' is the third stage. Then, 'arriving at conclusions' is a fourth stage, and then there are four stages, not three. Even if the manifestation of the abstract form and the awareness of it takes places while using the 'practical faculty' for cleansing the soul from lower bodily attachments this is nothing which makes it necessary to count this among the stages of the 'practical faculty'. Rather the outmost [what this necessitates] is that it is based on it like the abstraction of 'knowledge based on deliberation' from particulars in the 'theoretical faculty' is based on the perception of particulars. If everything which is based on something else would have to belong to the stages of this thing, then the abstraction of 'knowledge based on deliberation' from sensible particulars would belong to the stages of the 'theoretical faculty'. This is in contradiction to what he has pointed to.

c) Paraphrase of al-Rāzī's passage in al- ūsī's commentary (cf. Na īr al-Dīn al- ūsī, *Shar al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt* 1:164,5-20):

أفاد الفاضل الشارح أنّ هذه المعاني يمكن أن تحمل على كلّ واحدة من مراتب النفس الإنسانية بحسب قوّتها النظرية والعملية بين حدّي النقصان والكمال. أمّا النظرية فلأنّ جودة الترقّي من العقل المهيولانيّ الذي من شأنه الاستعداد المحض باستعمال الحواسّ إلى العقل بالملكة الذي من شأنه الاستعداد لإدراك المعقولات الأولى أعني البديهيّات لا يكون إلّا بحسن توفيقه تعالى. وجودة الانتقال من العقل بالملكة إلى العقل بالفعل الذي من شأنه إدراك المعقولات الثانية أعني المكتسبة لا يتأتّى إلّا بمدايته تعالى إلى سواء الطريق دون مضلّاته. وحصول العقل المستفاد أعني العقود اليقينية التي هي غاية السلوك لا يكون إلّا بإلهامه الحقّ بتحقيقه. فإنّ جميع ما يتقدّمها من المقدمات وغيرها لا يفعل في النفس إلّا اعداداً ما لقبول ذلك الفيض من مفيضه .

وأما العملية فلأنّ تهذيب الظاهر باستعمال الشرائع الحقّة والنواميس الإلهية إنّما يكون بحسن توفيقه تعالى . وتركيبه الباطن من الملكات الرديّة تكون بمدايته تعالى . وتحلية السرّ بالصور القدسيّة يكون بإلهامه .

d) Translation of the passage in al- ūsī's commentary:

The eminent commentator gives to know that these notions can be interpreted as referring to each of the stages of the human soul according to its two faculties, i.e. the 'theoretical [faculty]' and the 'practical [faculty]' between the two extremes in deficiency and perfection.

As to the 'theoretical [faculty]': [This is so] because (by using the senses) the good quality in ascending from 'material intellect' (which is pure disposition) to the 'intellect *in habitu*' (which perceives the primary intelligibles, i.e. the intuitive ones) takes place only aided by 'good success' from God. A good quality of the transfer from 'intellect *in habitu*' to 'actual intellect' (which perceives the secondary intelligibles, i.e. the acquired ones) is [achieved] only by guidance from God on the right path without going astray. The being-there of 'acquired intellect' (i.e. certain convictions which are the aim of the way) is [achieved] only because God inspires truth by His verification. All preliminaries etc. that went before effect in the soul only some kind of disposition for receiving this emanation.

As to the 'practical [faculty]': [This is so] because the refinement of the external by using good (read *asan* instead of ed. *aqq*?) prescriptions and Divine laws is only by 'good success' from God. The purification of the inward from bad dispositions is by His guidance. Adorning the secret [inward] by saintly forms is by His inspiration.

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