The Debate on the Nature of the Science of Tafsīr in the Tradition of Sharḥs and Ḥāshiyas on al-Kashshāf

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Abstract: The sharhs and hashiyahs written on al-Zamakhshari’s (d. 538/1144) al-Kashshāf formed an effective writing tradition and are connected to each other in terms of influence, quotation, rejection, objection, and answering. However, the commentators often provided explanations of the information related in the previous works without citing any specific author. Therefore, these relations can only become apparent via chronological and comparative analyses. This study examines these texts, which are mostly in manuscript form, both chronologically and comparatively in the context of the nature of the science of tafsīr. Al-Zamakhshari explained his view on the nature of tafsīr in the introduction to his al-Kashshāf. This article, which presents a chronological study of the subsequent works in which these explanations were annotated, details how later scholars dealt with this subject. The selected section shows that the sharhs and hashiyahs do not reflect the widespread belief that such works were merely repetitions of each other, but that they were subjected to intense debates that matured over time. The following points are noted: There is no consensus on the definition of tafsīr, the critical approach is constantly in the foreground, and any serious study of the sharhs and hashiyahs on al-Kashshāf is only possible when one consults works of historical depth.

Keywords: The nature of the science of tafsīr, Definition of tafsīr, Tradition of sharḥs and hashiyahs, Sharḥs and hashiyahs on al-Kashshāf, the Mutaahhirīn period of Islamic thought.

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Introduction

The equivalence of the envisaged terms of the classic philosophy of science, such as subject (mawḍū‘), principles (mabādī), and matters (masāʾīl), to the science of tafsīr (Qur’ānic exegesis) is widely debated. This science analyses the Qur’ānic verses (āyāt) in relation to the occasions of revelation (as-bāb al-nuzūl), the abrogating and abrogated verses (nāsikh and mansūkh), siyāq and sībāq, reciting the Qur’ān in terms of manner and method of pronunciation (qirā‘a), pronunciation, lexical meaning, word structure, syntactic analysis, discourse, and intention/communicative intention. This analysis is connected to various scholarly approaches: history, prophetic history (siyār) and hadith from the perspective of a historical approach; to lexicography, etymology (ishtiqaq), the sciences of morphology and syntax (ṣarf and nahw) in terms of a linguistic approach; to ma’ānī (the semantics of Arabic syntax), bayān (the theory of imagery or the theory of figure of speech), and bādi‘ (the science of rhetorical figures) in terms of a literary approach; and to the sciences that use the Qur’ān as a source of knowledge, among them fiqḥ, theology, and Sufism in terms of determining the text’s intention. If we adjoin all these approaches, it is hard to refer to an exegetical activity per se. At this point, some questions arise: How did Qur’ānic exegesis acquire the qualifications to become an idiosyncratic science? How did it gather different matters related to various sciences under a single topic? What kind of principles does it have? How were these principles developed? These questions were revived during the period of Islamic intellectual history (i.e., the muta‘akhirīn), when for the first time they were transformed into doctrinal discussions within the sharḥ and ḥāshiya (annotation) literature. This genre has yet to find its deserved place in the field of contemporary exegesis historiography.

Zamakhshari’s (d. 538/1144) explanations of the nature of the science of the Qur’ānic exegesis, which appear in the introduction of his al-Kashshāf, have been broadly analysed in sharḥ and ḥāshiya literatures. Inserting some of the works used as a source for this debate carries these analyses a step further. During this process of evolution, it is remarkable to see how Quṭbuddin al-Rāzī (d. 766/1364) defines the science of tafsīr and introduces his views on the division between tafsīr and ta‘wil, how Akmaladdin al-Bābārtī (d. 786/1384) criticises Rāḍī’s definition and explanations; how Sa’duddin al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390) reviews Rāzī’s definition and offers another definition for tafsīr; how Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) adopts Taftāzānī’s definition; how Abdalkarim b. Abdaljabbār (d. 825/1421) responds to Bābārtī’s critics to Rāzī and he rejects it; how Molla Fanārī (d. 834/1431) challenges Rāḍī’s and Taftāzānī’s definitions; how Musannifak (d. 875/1470) dep-
recatorily rejects these views after quoting all of Fanārī’s explanations, and how he examines al-Tībī’s (d. 743/1342) explanations as well as Bābartī’s on tafsīr and ta’wil. However, it is hard to reveal the above-mentioned chronological relation between these sources, for the commentators (shāriḥs and muḥashshīs) involved in this activity did not refer to the authors while discussing the subject. As the names are mostly not stated alongside the aforementioned objections and responses, obtaining a deep historical knowledge of these sources involves subjecting them to a chronological and comparative reading.

In this article, al-Kashshāf’s sharḥs and ḥāshiyas will be examined chronologically and comparatively by framing the nature of the science of Qurʾānic exegesis, as the literature on al-Kashshāf created a strong tradition in this field. First, the main text will present the discussion on the nature of the science of tafsīr, which will be followed by two different grammatical analyses of this main text. Subsequently, the sharḥ and ḥāshiya sources involving the relevant discussion will be elaborated to demonstrate the extent of the interaction, recognition, rejection, objection, and response that occurred among these sources. Finally, to discover each source’s contribution to this discussion and to reflect the historical process holistically, we will mention other sharḥ and ḥāshiya works that make no contribute to this particular discussion.

1. About the Nature of the Science of Tafsīr in the Main Text

Zamakhsharī explains his views about tafsīr in the introduction of his al-Kashshāf, which can be divided into four parts with regard to the subject’s coherence: (1) ḥamdalah (a phrase in the meaning of “praise to God”), (2) ṣalwalah (the prayer for the Prophet), (3) about the Qurʾānic exegesis, and (4) the purpose of the work. Here, we are interested in the third part, in which he stated the significant aspects of ʾilm (science/knowledge) and ṣanā’ah (craft). According to him, acquiring knowledge about the generic subjects of a science does not require any special effort and capability. Accordingly, this does not lead to sharp distinctions among scholars. But in the field of sciences, there are fine and impressive precisions, exquisite meanings subjected to fine thoughts, and cryptic, mysterious secrets that can be understood only by few eminent persons.1 Zamakhsharī argues that such aspects, which exhibit the differences and capabilities, mostly fall into the systematics of

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Qur’ānic exegesis. After stating this, he explains the requisite qualifications that a person needs to reach before diving into this science:

Now, among the sciences, only *tafsīr* includes the impressive precisions that have not been unearthed; delicate secrets in sheltered places. *Tafsīr* is completely filled with things covering capabilities and the ideas prevailing within mature minds. As Jāhiz mentions Naẓmu al-Qur’ān, not every qualified scholar can throw himself into this science and contemplate upon it, even if a jurist takes precedence over his peers in the knowledge of *fatwā* and *ahkām*; or a theologian has an edge on the art of theology over everyone in this world; or someone memorises stories and reports far better than Ibn al-Qirriyya; or even if a preacher is far more impressive than Ḥasan al-Baṣrī; or someone is more competent than Sībawayḥ in syntax; or a lexicographer sets tongues wagging the words – none of them would be considered a connoisseur who takes to the roads to the Qur’ānic exegesis with the aim to immerse himself in the Qur’ān’s essence. The only one who can be connoisseur on this topic is he who has a voice in the two sciences particular to the Qur’ān (i.e., *ma’ānī* and *bayān*) and patiently pursues them for a long time. While working on both, this person undertakes exacting investigations and analyses the roots of *ma’ānī* and *bayān* in order to obtain the knowledge of the excellence of God’s argumentations (*ḥujja*) and works with passion to reveal the Prophet’s miracle. However, before starting this process, this person, who has already acquired [sufficient] knowledge of the other sciences, must conduct the abovementioned investigations with memorising, discuss [them] for a long time [with his peers], interact with qualified scholars and people, reject and be rejected in the debates, be the safeguard of the science of *‘irāb* (an Arabic term for the system of nominal, adjectival, or verbal suffixes of Classical Arabic), and be a prominent scholar who knows about *al-Kitāb* (by Sībawayḥ). In addition, his nature has to be prone to master the sciences and mild, be like a fire [with respect to comprehension], be sharp so that ideally he is able to understand a secret signification even if it is tiny, be alert to ambiguous implicitness, and neither be closed and cold or rough and unpleasant. He must know and use the style of poetry and prosaism, not an apprentice but a fully educated person with respect to producing results by the process of thinking. He must be one who has learned how to compose words and compile, and how to use the best stylistic devices for effective writing. He has so many times met with difficulties in writing [his opinions] and has faced up to many difficulties.2

According to this passage *tafsīr* is the leading science, one in which the person can demonstrate his mastery and capabilities. Zamakhsharī asserts that one must master the science of *balāgha* (eloquence or rhetoric) in order to develop more depth in the exegetical sphere. According to him, even someone who reaches the peak of knowledge in other sciences that contribute to *tafsīr* cannot become a leading figure in *tafsīr* unless he masters *balāgha*. Moreover, competence in *balāgha* is

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2 Ibid., I, 2-3.
not sufficient, for the *mufassir* has to become an expert in the science of syntax, study other sciences, and be educated and experienced in thinking and using the Arabic language. In addition to these obtainable qualifications, some innate (*wahbī*) qualifications that can be summed up as “being sharp and perspicacious” are also required.

In the quotation above, both the second sentence and the ones after it are subjected to various grammatical analyses in the tradition of *sharḥ-hāshiya*. We prefer the analysis that leads to the above translation, namely, there is no quote from Jāhiz (d. 255/869), and the sentence starting with “namely…” until the end belongs to Zamakhshāri. In the *sharḥ-hāshiya* tradition, many significant commentators express their opinions to show their preference for this one, among them Tibī, Sirājuddīn al-Qazwīnī (d. 745/1345), Imāduddīn al-Yamanī (d. 750/1349), Qutbuddīn al-Rāzī, Taftāzānī, Jurjānī, Abdal-karīm b. Abdaljabbār, Musannīfak, and Hasan Chalabi (d. 886/1481). Nevertheless, Taftāzānī and Jurfānī did not report their exact opinion: “The author’s statements contain transmission from Jāhiz’s statements. This is not a secret to those who are even slightly familiar with the discourse”. There is definitely no transmission made from Jāhiz’s statements.

According to those commentators who adopt the second analysis, such as Fahruddīn al-Chāpardi (d. 746/1345) and Bābartī, the transmission is made from Jāhiz’s *Naẓm al-Qur’ān*, which has been lost. Accordingly, the statements should be understood as: “… is the science of *tafsir*”. Not every scholar can dive into this science and contemplate upon it. As Jāhiz mentions in his *Naẓm al-Qur’ān*, if a jurists comes to fore in the science of *fatwā* and *ahkām* in comparison to his peers…”. Various opinions are presented on the extent to which Jāhiz’s statements have been continued to discuss. After all, for us the debate on whether or not there is a quotation is not significant because those who support its existence see the abovementioned...
tioned statements as a reflection of Zamakhshhari’s views. Moreover, discussions about the nature of the science of *tafsīr* appear within the notion “the science of *tafsīr*”, as stated in the first sentence.

II. The Nature of the Science of *Tafsīr* in the *Sharḥ* and Ṣḥāfiya

As noted above, Faḥruddīn al-Chāpardī is the first commentator of *al-Kashshāf* to embrace the section above. According to the chronological order among the commentators, Ibn al-Munayyir’s (d. 683/1284) and ‘Omar al-Sakūnī’s (d. 717/1317) critic-based *sharḥ* and Quṭbuddīn al-Fālī’s (d. 678/1279-80) critic-based compendiums do not cover the abovementioned text in the introduction; rather, they start with Sūra al-taşfi. Although Quṭbuddīn al-Shirāzī (d. 710/1311) passed away before Chapardī, he wrote his *sharḥ* on *al-Kashshāf* after Chapardī. Also, Shirāzī limited himself to the ṣhamdala and thus did not mention any of the explanations related to the nature of the science of *tafsīr*. On the other hand, instead of developing his own views into a debate, Chapardī only elaborated upon Zamakhshhari’s statements in terms of lexicography, word structure, and syntactic analysis. Chapardī’s interpretation only deals with the relationship between *tafsīr* and *balāgha*. He explains the analysis of *ma’ānī* and *bayān* as two Qur’anic sciences and states that applying them to the divine revelation, which is a literary miracle, will reveal deep meanings that cannot be obtained by investigating other texts. Apart from this, Chapardī narrates the author’s statements without deleting a single word from the main text, thereby making the entire text, in terms of its lexicography and sentence structure, understandable at a literal level.

Tībī, the next commentator, wrote his annotation later than Chapardī (note: Tībī died three years before him) used Chapardī’s annotation but explains the part being studied in more detail. He quotes Wāhidī’s declaration that, as regards the notions of *tafsīr*-ta’wil, one is not allowed to express his opinion about relying upon *ra’y* (personal judgement/opinion). Proclaiming this an extreme statement, he

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8 Ibnu'l-Munayyir’s work is entitled *al-.INTIṣāf fī-r-rad‘ ala l-Kashshāf*; Sakūnī’s work is entitled *al-Tamīz li-mā waqa‘ahā al-Zamakhshhari al-Kashshāf mina'l-I’tizal*.
9 This compendious is named *Taqrību'l-Kashshāf*.
12 Chārpardī, *Sharḥu‘l-Kashshāf*, f. 7v-8b.
13 Ibid., 8b.
broadly discusses the issue of ra’y in Qur’ānic exegesis. After compiling the textual evidences supporting the idea that ra’y has no place in the exegetical process, Tibi introduces quotations from the works of scholars who argue the exact opposite position: the Iḥyā’ by Imām al-Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111), Zād al-Masīr by Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1200), Ma’ālim al-Tanzil by Imām Baghawī (d. 516/1122), Jāmi’ by Ibn al-Asir (d. 606/1310), and Kawāshī (d. 680/1281). According to his denotation:

Given that the four Imams and the distinguished scholars deduce fiqh, uṣūl al-fiqh, kalām, nahw, ma’ānī, akhlāq, and the other sciences from the Qur’ān, how can we prohibit all of them [the sciences]? Those who assert [this prohibition] did not hear what they all state, [because] prohibiting intellectual deduction (istinbāt) would cause a major gate in the religion to close.

According to Tibi, the essence of this discussion is that tafsīr is based on ri-wāyah (report) and ta’wil is based on dirāyah (reasoning/personal opinion). thus, the reports precluding ra’y from tafsīr should be interpreted appropriately.

When dealing with the Zamakhsharī’s explanations of Zamakhsharī of ma’ānī and bayān, Tibi also separates ma’ānī from bayān and describes both of them. According to him, just because they pertaining both to the Qur’ān does not mean that they are restricted it. He therefore, tries to explain that ma’ānī and bayān have been applied to the Qur’ān in an entirely unique way. If the one wants to penetrate to the Qur’ān’s mysteries, he is extremely indebted to them. By quoting from Sakkākī’s al-Miftāḥ and al-Kashshāf, Tibi indicates a commentator’s obligation to master both sciences. Apart from elucidating the tafsīr-ta’wil and tafsīr-balāgha relationships in Tibi’s annotation, the author mainly adopts a word-to-word approach to the main text. Thereby, this annotation is one of the works demonstrating a deep literal investigation of the text. Almost every subsequent annotation benefited from Tibi’s explanations.

Sirājuddīn al-Qazwīnī also wrote an important annotation on Kashf al-Kashshāf by referring to Tibi. Although this commentary became an important source for significant theological debates, it is irrelevant to the matter under discussion here. In general, his comments are also at literal level. Moreover, Tibi’s commentary recapitulates the rest of them.

16 Ibid., I, 650.
17 Ibid., I, 661.
18 Ibid., I, 661-62.
19 Qazwīnī, Kashfu’l-Kashshāf, f. 2b-3a.
The next *sharḥ* belongs to 'Imāduddīn al-Yamanī, who mostly based his work on Tibi's *Futūḥ al-Ghayb*. Over the time, this work transformed itself to a compendium upon Tibi's commentary. However, Yamanī distinguishes himself from both Tibi's work and the rest of the *sharḥ* and *ḥāshiya* tradition by adopting the Mu'tazilite position in the theological discussion. If we look at that part in the *sharḥ*, including the subject of the science of *tafsīr* 20, we see that he summarised most of Tibi's arguments and that his own contribution are few and unremarkable. One reason for this could be that the commentators were discussing this particular subject were not interested in theological debates. Therefore, he might not have felt the need to distinguish himself from Tibi's *sharḥ*.

Another commentator, Quṭbuddīn al-Rāzī, wrote a distinctive and effective commentary. He introduces a brief in his work on the part related to our interest:

Shortly and precisely, the idea is that those who are competent in the science and craft are close to each other or at the same level in terms mastering the principles of the sciences and the origins of the crafts in which they are interested. The differentiation and superiority among them come into question within the sphere of refinement and impressive precision. Only those who are unique individuals and pioneers recognise this refinement and impressive precision. Only those who are unique individuals and pioneers recognise this refinement and impressive precision. Only those who know the sciences of *ma'ānī* and *bayān* and who study hard in order to apply both to the matters stand out from the rest of the scholars. 21

After mentioning this, Rāzī indicates that while Zamakhsharī talks about “those who are condemned by attitude of imitation”, he refers to scholars and craftsmen in general and also perhaps to some *mufassirs*. Indeed, some of the *mufassirs* confine themselves to reports because they do not allow reasoning and personal opinion. After introducing the well-known report for this prohibition, Rāzī starts to criticise them:

The Qurʾān was revealed with the stylistic features of spoken Arabic [at that time]. Arabic has [verified] methodologies and principles for the sciences of *syntax*, *ma'ānī*, *bayān*, and jurisprudence. *Ra'y* and speaking according to reasoning is only prohibited if one speaks according to his personal perceptions. This [reasoning] should be not prohibited, if [we] base [our arguments] on Arabic’s methodology and principles. Otherwise, most of the [produced] sciences would be void. Namely, each book written about this science was not completely transmitted by the Prophet’s Companions, but they are full with the deductions of scholars based upon Arabic’s principles. 22

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20 Yamanī, *Ḥāshiya 'ala'l-Kashshāf*, f. 3r-4r.
21 Rāzī, *Ḥāshiya 'ala'l-Kashshāf*, f. 3v.
22 Ibid., f. 4r-4v.
In the following part, and for the first time in the *sharḥ* and *ḥāshiya* tradition, he describes the science of *tafsīr* and then moves on to the subjects of *tafsīr* and *ta’wil*:

*Tafsīr* is the science that searches for the will (*murād*) of God almighty in the Qur’ān. It is divided into *tafsīr* and *ta’wil* because the Qur’ān is expounded either by transmitting (*riwāyah*) the explanation of what the Prophet (p.b.u.h.) and his Companions (r.a.) meant (*tafsīr*) or explained by Arabic’s principles (*ta’wil*). In short, *tafsīr* is connected to *riwāyah* and *ta’wil* is connected to *dirāyah.*

Quṭbuddīn al-Rāzī was the first commentator who worked within the *sharḥ*-*ḥāshiya* tradition to introduce a compact distinction between *tafsīr* and *ta’wil* by describing *tafsīr*. His views were later reviewed and completed by Alāuddīn Ali Pehliwān and Taftāzānī, criticised by Bābartī and Molla Fanārī, and defended by Abdaljabbār and Mussanifak.

After his description of *tafsīr*, Rāzī attributes the reason of why *ma‘ānī* and *bayān* are peculiar to *tafsīr* to the concept that both attested to the Qur’ān in terms of reaching the level of ‘*ijāz* (inimitability of the Qur’ān) with *balāgha*. In contrast to other commentators, he then dwells broadly on the definition of *ma‘ānī* and *bayān*, as well as the differences between them, so they can be subjected to individual research. Abdalkarīm b. Abdaljabbār later criticised him for doing so.

After Quṭbuddīn al-Rāzī, Alauddīn Ali Pahliwān wrote a more concise *sharḥ* with the benefit of his follower’s annotation. Although the exact date of Pahliwān’s death is unknown, we do know that he wrote his annotation after Rāzī. In fact, it is highly likely that he wrote it before Taftāzānī and Jurjānī wrote their works. In it, he adds to Rāzī’s definition of *tafsīr* as “a science by which the will of Allah almighty in the Qur’ān is searched”. Pahliwān wrote “a science by which the will of Allah almighty in the Qur’ān or His possible intention is searched” to include the notion of *ta’wil* mentioned in the *tafsīr*-*ta’wil* division. Hence, he remarks that the definition’s first part indicates *tafsīr* based on *riwāyah* and that its second part is *ta’wil* based on *dirāyah*, which means that the divine will cannot be exactly determined.

23 Ibid., f. 4b.
24 Ibid., f. 4b.
25 Ibid., f. 4b-6a.
27 This work refers to Rādī’s annotation. See Pahliwān, *Ḥāshiya ‘ala’l-Kashshāf*, Sulaymaniya Library, Yeni Cami nr. 145, f. 6; cf. Rādī, *Ḥāshiya ‘ala’l-Kashshāf*, f. 7. The books written after Taftāzānī and Jurjānī include references to both. The same cannot be seen in Pahliwān’s work, as its style resembles that of the early annotations.
28 Pahliwān, *Ḥāshiya ‘ala’l-Kashshāf*, f. 4b.
29 Ibid., f. 4b.
Pahliwān’s annotation contains no other comments on this subject. As will be seen below, these additional words will appear in Molla Fanārī’s definition of *tafsīr*.

Bābartī wrote an important annotation on *al-Kashshāf* by considering the commentaries Tibī, Kazwīnī, and Rāżī. In the part related to our subject, he quotes Rādī’s explanations on *tafsīr* with reasoning word-by-word, as stated above. In his definition of *tafsīr*, the eye-catching first point is his use of *ma’rifa* to verbalize particular knowledge instead of ‘ilm, which connotes universal knowledge. Moreover, Bābartī’s student Molla Fanārī argues that *tafsīr* is not a science as that term is commonly understood, and thus prefers to use *ma’rifa* instead of ‘ilm when defining *tafsīr*. According to Bābartī, *tafsīr* is a tool by which the things (shay’) connected to the Qur’ān can be known (*ma’rifa*). In addition to his definition, he quotes from Rādī: “*Tafsīr* is a science by which the will of Allah the almighty in the Noble Qur’ān is searched. It is qualified with *tafsīr* and *ta’wil*.” He criticizes this quotation as follows:

This declaration is void, because a *mufassir* searches the meanings of the Qur’ān by means of both *riwāyah* and *dirāyah*, and not the will of Allah the almighty. Indeed, the will of Allah cannot be cognised. Another reason for this mistake is that dividing a thing into itself and into other elements [at the same time is impossible].

Bābartī distinguishes between searching for the meanings of the Qur’ān and the will of Allah the Almighty. In the exegetical field, research is based on the former because the divine will cannot be cognised. Later, Molla Fanārī will bring up the same explanation. The second objection opposes the separation between *tafsīr* and *ta’wil*. Bābartī argues that considering *tafsīr* an integral part of “itself” (which is again *tafsīr*) is problematic.

Taftāzānī participated in this discussion primarily by using the ideas of Tibī, Kazwīnī, Rāżī, and Bābartī in his own annotation. If we consider this work, along with Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī’s criticisms of Taftāzānī, one can argue that the *sharḥ-hāshiyah* tradition now faces a turning point because the beginning of this tradition of annotating the commentaries of *al-Kashshāf* can largely be traced back to the works of Taftāzānī and Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī.

Taftāzānī concisely explains Zamakhshari’s arguments on the nature of science of Qur’ānic exegesis at the literal level and gives important preferences.

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31 Ibid., f. 4b.
32 Ibid., f. 4b.
33 Molla Shamsuddīn al-Fanārī, *’Aynu’l-a’yān* (Istanbul: Darsaadat,1325), 5.
34 Taftāzānī, *Hāshiya ‘ala’l-Kashshāf*, f. 7-8a.
Rāzī, similar to Pahliwān and Bābartī, also introduces the definition of *tafsīr*, into which he inserts the phrase “the science of *tafsīr*”: “*Tafsīr* is a science that investigates the circumstances of Allah’s words in relation with signifying the will [of Allah]. This science embraces [both] *tafsīr* connected to *riwāyah* and *ta’wil* connected to *dirāyah*.”

This definition is closer to Rāzī’s than it is to Bābartī’s, who considers *tafsīr* to be a partial sphere of knowledge. However, Taftāzānī interferes in his predecessor’s definition by stating that one engaged in exegetical activity cannot directly search for Allah’s will in the Qur’ān, a view that Rāzī also holds. Instead, the divine word is investigated in terms of its signification to the will. As Tashkopruzāda would confirm later on, the new definition transforms Rāzī’s definition into a condition of “in terms of... (*min haythu...*)”. Subsequent to this definition, Taftāzānī describes *ma‘ānī* as a science by which one learns how to establish speech according to contextual requirements (*ḥāl*), and *bayān* as science by which the circumstances of *tashbih* (simile), *majāz* (tropes), and *kināya* (parable) are explored. He qualifies *tafsīr* with both of them based upon his argument that the Qur’ān’s secrets and inimitability can be cognized only by knowing both.

In the line of annotation tradition to *al-Kashshāf*, Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī follows Taftāzānī. Although Jurjānī largely grounds his annotation on Taftāzānī’s work, he nevertheless frequently criticises the latter’s preferences. These criticisms in particular gained acceptance, and thus many works have been produced to defend these two scholars. In his section on the nature of the science of *tafsīr*, Jurjānī offered condenses information that both encapsulates former opinions and gives detailed information about a number of other subjects, such as the distinction between science (*‘ilm*) and craft (*ṣanā‘ah*). By showing that *tafsīr* embraces both divine knowledge and practical rules, he argues that it can be indicated through one of these names. However, it is better to call it a *science* because that particular term is more widespread and respected. In his work, and without referring to the source, Jurjānī cites Taftāzānī’s definition of *tafsīr* and subsequently states his opinions about both the *tafsīr-ta’wil* division and *tafsīr* by means of reasoning.

35 Ibid., f. 7b.
37 The upcoming part will mention the difference between two definitions with relation to Molla Fanārī’s objections.
38 Taftāzānī, *Ḥāshiya ‘ala’l-Kashshāf*, f. 8a.
Tafsir is a science by which the words of Allah the almighty’s circumstances are explored in terms of indicating His will. It splits into [two as] tafsir and ta’wil. Tafsir holds that the one can be comprehend only by reports, which means that it is connected to riwāyah – for instance, the occasion of the revelation and qiṣṣas (stories of the prophets in the Qur’ān). Ta’wil, however, can be comprehend via the principles of the Arabic language, which means it is connected to dirāyah. In the former, it is [a significant] mistake to comment [about anything] without a report. Again, in the latter, commenting [about anything] by relying on personal opinion is [considered a] mistake. This will not change, even if the person reaches the right conclusion on both occasions. Deducing meanings by principles of the language is considered a virtue and perfection.

In this section, he repeats Taftazānī’s definition of tafsir and explains the tafsir- ta’wil divide at length. In his annotation, we come across other information about the nature of the science of tafsir beyond the above explanation.

Majduddīn al-Fīrūzābādī (d. 817/1415), the author of Nughbat al-Raṣṣāf min Ḥutba al-Kashshāf, follows Jurjānī. His annotation, which is limited to al-Kashshāf’s introduction, nevertheless stands out due to the information it provides in terms of lexicography and linguistics. Fīrūzābādī, in contrast to the other commentators, analysed the phrase “the science of tafsir” only from the perspective of linguistics:

\[\text{Tafsir is bayān. It is used in the form of ”fasarahū-yafsiruhū-yafsuruhū-fasran”. This is similar to the examples ”ḍarabahū-yaḍribuhū and naṣarahū-yanṣuruhū”. [The muḍāri form] of fasarahū is yafsiruhū, it means ”he explained”. Later, this word entered common usage and the meaning became recognized whenever it was used.}\]

He explains the other parts of the discussion on the nature of the science of tafsir from the same perspective. Although his style is unique, his work provides no important information on this discussion.

The next commentator, Abdalkarim b. Abdaljabbār, contributes to the literature on al-Kashshāf with his Muḥākamāt, which reviews Jamāladdīn al-Aksarāyī’s objections to Quṭbuddīn al-Rāzī’s annotation, and with his own annotation of al-Kashshāf. Because Aksarāyī does not object to al-Rāzī’s opinions on the nature of the science of tafsir in his ‘Itirāḍāt, Abdalkarim’s Muḥākamāt says nothing about it.

In his annotation, Abdalkarim nicely reflects the former discussions on this subject by quoting frequently from Tībī, Qazwīnī, and Bābartī and using Taftazānī and

40 Ibid., I, 13.
41 Majduddīn al-Fīrūzābārdī, Nughbatu’r-rashshāf min khutbat’l-Kashshāf, Sulaymaniya Library, Shahid Ali Pasha nr. 331, f. 30b.
Jurjānī’s annotations. His investigation is presented in the section related to our subject. While mentioning the discussion on *tafsīr* based on reasoning and *tafsir-ta’wīl*, Abdalkarīm mostly narrates word-for-word Tībī’s view (stated above). While summarizing the authors’ statements; he quotes from Rāzī’s expression (mentioned above). His definition of *tafsīr* is taken word-for-word from Jurjānī’s annotation.

Here, after Abdalkarīm introduces Jurjānī’s definition as if it were his own (it is actually taken from Taftāzānī): “*Tafsīr* is a science by which the circumstances of Allah’s divine speech are searched in terms of indicating His will”. He transmits Rāzī’s definition and Bābartī’s objection to it: (1) during the exegetical process, the meanings of the Qur’ān, as opposed to the will of Allah the almighty, are searched for, as the divine will cannot be known, and (2) the division of a thing into itself and into other elements [is impossible]. Abdalkarīm responds to both objections:

To the first objection, we could respond by saying: According to the scholars of *bayān*, the meaning of *murād* the will is: the one who understood from the indicated and sorted meanings of the speech, which can be derived from the qualifications given by the means of the science of *ma’ānī*. Obviously, in relation to the meaning stated just above, scholars can completely comprehend the will of Allah the almighty in the Qur’ān – all except for the *mutashābihāt* [unclear/resembling] verses. [Indeed] the debate is over *mutashābihāt*. As the lexicographers argue, [the term] will/intention is a thing that the speaker intends by his utterance. According to some scholars, this can be known through the reports of the Prophet (p. b. u. h.) Some scholars exclude the *mutashābih*; others include it. Maybe the source of this doubt is that according to some the Mu’tazilites, it is impossible for a human being to comprehend completely the will in Allah’s words, because this would mean [that he understood] all of the intentions and aims [which is not possible], as [mentioned in] the report of Ali (r.a.). [Even] the commentary of *şura al-Fātiha* involves many sciences. But this is only an apprehension, because this statement of the commentator does not completely encapsulate the whole context of the will. On the contrary, [this is about] investigating the will, and you know what this means. Other than that, it is possible to comprehend the complete will of the speech of Allah the almighty. This is a literal debate, because those who claim that comprehending is possible with “the whole [context of] intention” seek to consider the things clear in the indication of words in terms of adding and extracting according to the context. These indications are covered by the science of *bayān*. Otherwise, the aim is not to cover all of the will and purpose. Therefore, the author of *Miñ̄ūh* [Sakkākī] says: “In our argumentation, we draw the attention to the one who [aims to] completely grasps the will of

42 Abdalkarīm b. Abdaljabbār, Ḥāshiya ‘ala’l-Kashshāf, f. 9b-10a.
43 Ibid., f. 10a.
44 Ibid., f. 10b.
45 Ibid., f. 10b.
46 Abū Yakūb Sakkākī, Miñ̄ūh’l-‘ulūm (Beirut: Dāru’l-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1407/1987), 162.
al-Hakim the almighty is extremely dependent upon both sciences [ma’āni and bayān]. What a shame for those who dive into tafsir [the exegetical activity], although they are short of both sciences.” The response to his second objection is: It is the science of tafsir that is divided, not the tafsir itself. This [argument] does not generate the conclusion that a thing is divided both into itself and its external elements.47

Above, Abdalkarim examines Bābarti’s view concerning the divine intention by highlighting the lexicographers’ perceptions and balāgha on the will. In short, he claims that each word, which can be linguistically and literary compiled, can be understood as long as they have acquired the tools of the science of balāgha. He contends that Bābarti’s second argument is mistaken because he does not distinguish the science of tafsir from tafsir. If this distinction is comprehended, then the problem will automatically be solved.

After Abdalkarim narrates Taftāzānī’s definition of the sciences of ma’āni and bayān without naming him, he complains about Quṭbuddīn al-Rāzī’s long useless discussion on this subject.48 Abdalkarim clarifies why ma’āni and bayān is peculiar to tafsir by making use of Taftāzānī’s annotation. As opposed to the other commentators, he draws attention to the purpose of compiling these two sciences is the Qur’ān.49

The next commentator who embraces the section on the nature of the science of tafsir is Musannifak, a native of Khorosān who travelled to Anatolia. After working as a mudarris in Konya, Bursa, and Edirne, he moved to Istanbul at the invitation of Mahmut Pasha, one of Sultan Fātih’s viziers, and spent the rest of his life in there.50 In his annotation of al-Kashshāf, which is one of the most detailed, we can find almost all and even more of the discussions, all of which he verifies before presenting his own opinions. As one can observe in the scholars who come from the eastern and western parts of the Islamic world, he also defends Taftāzānī against Jurjānī’s critics.

Musannifak is interesting because he dwells on the distinction between science and craft in detail.51 He objects to Tibi’s claim that prohibiting reasoning in exegetical activity is extreme and says that he will explain his arguments later.52 The most

47 Abdalkarīm b. Abdaljabbār, Ḥāshiya ‘ala’l-Kashshāf, f. 10b.
48 Ibid., f. 11a.
49 Ibid., f. 11a-11b.
51 Musannifak, Ḥāshiya ‘ala’l-Kashshāf, f. 16b-17a.
52 Ibid., f. 20a.
remarkable of his views appear in his annotation on the subject of “the science of tafsir”. He cites Quṭbuddīn al-Rāzī’s definition of tafsir and the expositions related to it as if they are his own. He adds only the last sentence, after which he devotes considerable space to this discussion:

Tafsir is the science by which Allah the almighty’s will is searched for in the Noble Qur’ān. It is qualified to two parts: tafsir and ta’wil. Because the meanings of the Qur’ān are explained by the transmissions either by the Prophet (s.a.w.s) or his Companions (r.a.), this is tafsir. If they are explained by the principles of the Arabic language, then this is ta’wil. In short, tafsir is related to riwāyah, and ta’wil is related to dirāyah. A dignified commentator has voiced these views, and another commentator, who made a name for himself with his skills and mastery of the science in the land of Rūm, has objected to him from these angles...53

In this quotation, the “dignified commentator” refers to Quṭbuddīn al-Rāzī, and the objector who is described by the phrase “his skills and mastery of the science in the land of Rūm” is Molla Fanārī. Because the latter’s annotation to al-Kashshāf starts with the interpretation of Šura al-Baqara, it does not include the part that deals with this particular discussion. Instead, he places the Musannifak’s objection in the introduction of Šura al-Fatiḥa in his tafsir: ‘Ayn al-A’yān. Fanārī challenges Rāzī’s and Taftāzānī’s definition of tafsir, whereas Musannifak responds to him with a long quotation from Fanārī’s objections.

As Musannifak reports, Molla Fanārī contends that Rāḍī’s definition (i.e., tafsir is a science by which the will of Allah the almighty is searched for in the Noble Qur’ān) does not touch all of the bases and thus does not involve all of the subjects of tafsir. This definition emphasises the search for the divine will. However, the analysis based upon this science can be also based upon the circumstances of the wordings, such as, in the field of qirā’a (e.g., maliki and māliki), or in the article on which words are nāsikh-mansūkh, the circumstances of the revelation, or the revelation order of the wordings and whether they are categorised as Makki or Madani. His definition does not completely cover all of these points, although all of them are related to this exegetical activity. Furthermore, Rāzī’s definition does not exclude subjects that are irrelevant to tafsir. In fact, Allah’s will about the decisive subjects of faith in the Qur’ān is analysed in the science of kalām, and His will about practical subjects is analysed in the science of fiqh. In this case, the intellectual search for the will of Allah the almighty is not only confined to tafsir.54

53 Ibid., f. 20b.
54 Molla Fanārī, ‘Aynu’l-a’yān, 4; Musannifak, Ḥāshiya ʿala’l-Kashshāf, f. 20b.
After mentioning and criticising Rāzī’s definition of *tafsīr*, Molla Fanārī examines the reviewed version of Taftāzānī’s definition that, according to him, states: “*Tafsīr* is a science that searches the circumstances of Allah’s word in terms of signification to will”. In this way, he seeks to solve the problems resulting from Rāḍī’s definition, such as not embracing the things that belong to *tafsīr* and embracing the things that do not belong to it. The addition of “the circumstances of wording” includes the subjects that do not appear in the former definition. The condition of “in terms of signification of wording to the will” excludes the other sciences that examine the divine will as it appears in the Qur’ān, such as *fiqh*, *kalām*, and *balāgha*. Although these sciences also search for the circumstances of the divine will, they do not analyse such things from the perspective of searching utterly for the signification of the divine word, but rather according to the different perspectives related to their field.55

Although Taftāzānī did remove some of the problems from Rāzī’s definition, his own definition has its own problematic aspects. For example, his definition also excluded various elements related to the science of *tafsīr*. If the research for the circumstances of Allah’s words is confined to the will’s determination, many notions related to *qirā’a* will be automatically excluded, among them *tafhkhīm* (pronouncing rough or thick), *imāla* (reciting with an open vowel), *madd* (prolonging the vowel’s sound), *qaṣr* (shortening the vowel), and *iṭāla* (prolonged pronuncitation). In other words, his definition leaves out the notions of *qirā’a*, which do not interfere with the word’s meaning. Molla Fanārī foresees the probable response to this objection. At this point, we could argue that *qirā’a* is considered a separate science and that Taftāzānī might have introduced his definition after treating *qirā’a* as a separate science. According to Molla Fanārī, this would mean that Taftāzānī’s annotation contradicts the relevant content of *al-Kashshāf*. In fact *al-Kashshāf* in the context of *tafsīr*, analysed subjects unrelated to meanings. For instance, it mentions two different pronunciations of *alḥamdulillah*: one with two *ḍamma* (u; alḥamdulillah) and another with two *kasra* (i; alḥamdilillah).56 Or, he explains how two *hamzas* can be read differently,57 “a-anzartahum”.58

According to Fanārī, Taftāzānī’s definition also failed to exclude non-exegetical elements because he did not qualify the notion of “will”. Taftāzānī’s definition, namely, that “*tafsīr* is a science by which the circumstances of Allah’s words are

55 Molla Fanārī, *‘Aynu’l-a’yān*, 4; Musannifak, Ḥāshiya ‘ala’l-Kashshāf, f. 20b.
57 Ibid., I, 48.
58 Molla Fanārī, *‘Aynu’l-a’yān*, 4; Musannifak, Ḥāshiya ‘ala’l-Kashshāf, f. 20b-21b.
searched in terms of the indicating will”, also does not qualify this notion. If the author is trying to use “will” without confining it, then his analysis of it will enter the sphere of balāgha. Saying that “will” is qualified by the notion of “divine” gives rise to another problem, because the science of tafsīr does not analyse the divine will in itself (in nafs al-amr). In fact, tafsīr is usually based on āḥād ḥkabar or on dirāyah linked to the Arabic language. As both of these are considered ẓannī (speculative, ambiguous) knowledge, everyone understands it in his or her own way.

Therefore, leading scholars advised qualifying one’s intention when reciting the kalima shahāda in order to avoid any confusion. The divine will in nafs al-amr cannot be revealed by the mufassirs. If one claims that the divine will means the mufassir’s understanding of the concept of “His will”, then two problems arise: (1) the science of tafsīr should change according to each mufassir and (2) it can be easily deduced that the first meaning that comes to mind is the divine will in nafs al-amr.59

As one can see, Molla Fanārī argues that the notion of will “in terms of indicating the will”, fails to exclude the science of balāgha from the definition. However, he contends that this problem would not be solved even if the notion of will were qualified with divine because the divine cannot be determined via the limited search within the exegetical activity. In fact, one can only reach some possible meanings regarding the divine will via ta’wil in the exegetical activity. Fanārī’s teacher Bābartī pointed to a similar aspect. While Fanārī argues that the divine will in nafs al-amr cannot be known within the tafsīr framework, his Hanafite teacher, who was a legal theorist, must have influenced him along with the tradition of wahdat al-wujūd that he adopted. Molla Fanārī’s explanations on the definition of tafsīr and his quotations of Musannifak are followed by a third objection to Taftāzānī’s definition: in the definition, the notion ma’rifa should be used to express partial (juz’ī) knowledge instead of ʿilm, which is used to indicate infinite (kullī) knowledge. His teacher Bābartī also held this view. Fanārī states that “it is a science” used for methods, principles, and skills toward them, whereas in the science of tafsīr one rarely come across infinite principles based on partial issues. By relying on this, he claims that ʿilm is not to be used in the definition.60

At the end of Musannifak’s quotation, Fanārī again targets Rāzī’s views on the tafsīr-ta’wil distinction. Rāzī mentions that tafsīr is separated into two parts by tafsīr (based on riwāyah) and ta’wil (based on the Arabic language [dirāyah]). Bābartī criticised this view, whereas Taftāzānī, Jurjānī, and other commentators

59 Molla Fanārī, ‘Aynu’l-a’yān, 5; Musannifak, Ḥāshiya ‘ala’l-Kashshāf, f. 21a.  
60 Molla Fanārī, ‘Aynu’l-a’yān, 5; Musannifak, Ḥāshiya ‘ala’l-Kashshāf, f. 21a.
adopted it. Fanārī objects to all of these views by claiming that in exegetical activity, one can reach a conclusion by reasoning without depending on either riwāyah or Arabic, because determining one of the possible meanings by reason excludes riwāyah and dirāyah. For instance, saying that what is impossible (mūḥāl) is not subjected to power, while interpreting the Allah the almighty’s expression “Allah has power over all things”61. As a matter of fact, no report or a grammatical principle deals this point.62 Thus, Fanārī clearly disputes the claim that Arabic is the only source of dirāyah.

After this, Fanārī introduces a new definition, one that does not involve the problems that he mentions: tafsīr is “to know (ma’rifa), in proportion to human power, the circumstances of Allah’s words in terms of being the Qur’ān and of the indication to the known or supposed-to-be known regarding Allah’s will.”63 “In terms of the Qur’ān” includes the subjects related to qirā’a; “the will of Allah” qualifies the will, meaning that the science of balāgha, which analyses only the wording’s intention, is excluded; “indication to the known” includes absolute meanings based on riwāyah and reason; “supposed-to-be-known” involves meanings based on āḥād reports and possible meanings based on reason; “in terms of indication” leaves out other sciences (e.g., fiqh, kalām, analysing the Qur’ān from different aspects); “the circumstances of Allah’s wording” includes all kinds of research from the perspective of qirā’a and other Qur’ānic sciences; “in proportion to human power” emphasises that the knowledge contained in the tafsir is not the essence, but rather an outcome, of one’s limited human potential; and, finally, using “to know” (ma’rifa) instead of ‘ilm refers to the idea that tafsir is not a science, upon which all infinite principles are imposed.64

Mussanifak, who was not interested in this definition, cites his critics one by one and then begins his response without even mentioning Fanārī’s definition. Apart from the reviewed definition of Taftāzānī, he defends Rāzī’s definition as unproblematic. Another attention-grabbing point is his use of offensive terms for Fanārī (i.e., the scholar from Rūm) and Bābartī (i.e., the scholar from Egypt).

Musannifak begins his explanations by proclaiming Fanārī’s objections to be void on the grounds that he could not comprehend that searching for the divine will differs from achieving results with respect to it. The word being analysed either

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has a single meaning or possible conflicting meanings. In the former the intention is declared, whereas in the latter only one of the intended meanings is declared. Thus, the will is revealed in both cases. What kind of means are used in this process and whether they are useful or not have nothing to do with these investigations of the will. Thus, they have to be evaluated separately. In this case, the objection against Raḍī’s and Taftāzānī’s saying that “what is examined in tafsīr is the will” is unjustified. Indeed, the analysis of the verses being Makki-Madānī, näṣīkh-manṣūkh, identifying the occasions of revelation, space and time, and other subjects are included in the scope of examining Allah’s will. Therefore, in some respects the will comes into light with these approaches because all of them contribute to and have an effect on declaring, completing, and investigating the will. In this case, when Rāzī says that he analysed the will of Allah the almighty in his tafsīr, this does not mean that he left out other Qur’ānic sciences and other subjects of tafsīr. In fact, he indirectly includes all of the subjects. Musannifak thinks that Taftāzānī’s revision of Rāzī’s definition of tafsīr is therefore unnecessary because there is no need to change “analysing the will of Allah the almighty” to “analysing the circumstances of the wording of Allah in terms of signifying His will”.

Musannifak claims that Rāzī’s definition embodies fiqh and kalām is obviously void on the grounds that both sciences obtain their explanations regarding the intention of Allah the almighty in the Qur’ān from tafsīr, the matters of which belong to the principles of both sciences. By claiming this, Musannifak argues that the divine intention in the theological (kalāmi) and practical aspects (’amālī) appearing in the Qur’ān are indeed obtained from the science of tafsīr. Consequently, fiqh and kalām use this given knowledge.

Fanārī asserts that Taftāzānī’s definition leaves out qirā’a and other matters related to wording. He remarks that if Taftāzānī considers qirā’a an individual field, then he contradicts Zamakhshari, who approaches the analysis of wording as a part of tafsīr. According to Musannifak, this assertion is absurd. First of all, the subjects regarding wording cannot be considered part of exegetical activity, for it is natural for tafsīr to bring matters of other sciences to the table. The matter about the wording in al-Kashshāf should be considered in this manner. Moreover, any feature in the word somehow reflects its meaning. The aforesaid matters related to wording contribute to declaring the will and completing the meaning.

65 Musannifak, Hāshiya ‘ala’l-Kashshāf, f. 21a.
66 Ibid., f. 21a.
67 Ibid., f. 21a.
68 Ibid., f. 21a-21b.
According to Musannifak, Fanārī’s claim that the divine will cannot be known in its essence is incorrect. The aim of using “Allah the almighty’s will” is to reach that will by analysing the evidence through riwāyah and dirāyah. If we can determine their accuracy, then there will be no debate that it is His will in nafs al-amr. Also, this would never require that the will be diverse, as the varieties of interpretation and perception produced by the science of tafsīr, for the valid point is the species-truth (al-ḥaqīqa al-nawiyya), not the people and their attributions.69

Fanārī remarks that the riwāyah-dirāyah division is not inclusive because it excludes the idea of determining one of the possibilities by reason. According to Musannifak, this objection is more invalid because mentioning Arabic’s grammatical rules as dirāyah is only possible through representing some of the aspects of tā’wil, not because ta’wil is confined by Arabic’s rules. The leading scholar of the land of Rūm has failed to take the example as the main (asl).70

Musannifak says that a more unusual objection came from a person who had made a name for himself with his skills in Egypt, namely, Bābartī, who also objected to Rāḍī’s tafsīr-ta’wil division and proclaimed the forthcoming two points invalid. According to him, this division means dividing something into itself and into other elements. Again, a mufassir investigates the Qur’ān’s meanings either by riwāyah or riwāyah and dirāyah. In other words, he is not searching for the will of Allah the almighty, for this cannot be known.71 Musannifak does not even respond to these last objections, but rather announces that he despises the scholars of Rūm (i.e., Fanārī) and Egypt (i.e., Bābartī): “Let’s, oh smart gemeinschaft, look at the land of Rūm and Egypt and see their skills! Imagine their situation when they make use of the sciences (‘ulūm)!”72

After this, Musannifak widely embraces the issue of tafsīr-ta’wil and rejects Tibi’s views on tafsīr with reasoning and Molla Fanārī’s three objections regarding tafsīr-ta’wil by reviewing them. He first cites the reports about prohibiting tafsīr with reasoning and the scholars’ views related to it. Subsequently, he prioritizes those reports and views on the necessity of ta’wil. According to Musannifak, the way to bring the reports together is to divide the science of tafsīr into tafsīr (i.e., reports about prohibiting tafsīr with reasoning) and ta’wil (i.e., reports that support the use of reason). Because Tibi could not exactly understand this point, he considered Zamakhsharī’s criticism of imitators too extreme. He likened this to

69 Ibid., f. 21b.
70 Ibid., f. 21b.
71 Ibid., f. 21b.
72 Ibid., f. 21b.
Wāḥidī’s extremism, namely, that *tafsīr* with reasoning is forbidden. According to Musannifak, neither Zamakhshari’s nor Wāḥidī’s views are extreme, for one concerns *ta’wil* and the other one concerns *tafsīr.*

Musannifak deals lastly with Molla Fanārī’s objections. According to Musannifak’s claim, the pre-eminent person of Rūm’s first objection is against Imam Baghawī and other *mufassirs’* views regarding the *tafsīr-ta’wil* division. According to Fanārī, Baghawī is wrong when he states: *Tafsīr* is the declaration of occasions of the revelations, situations of the verses, *qiṣāṣ,* and the communities meant in the verses, which can be obtained only by hearing. On the other hand, *tawīl* means to give one of the possible meanings to the word in the line with *siyāq* and *sibāq,* the Qur’ān and Sunna. A word with only one meaning, which is assigned for this meaning and is used with this one meaning, and there is no report about it, falls beyond these two classifications. Musannifak declares this objection invalid on the grounds that the intention of the first part of Baghawi’s statement is related to hearing and transmission. The second part points to *dirāyah* and rules. However, in both of these he mentions the things that are the clearest in terms of their category. Besides this the word, which is determined by the language and has one intended meaning, is located within the category of *tafsīr.* The lexical meaning of words is based on hearing (*al-sam’*). Moreover, it is superior to those things based on hearing because others come after them. If the word with single meaning is used figuratively, the activity of comprehending it will fall under *ta’wil.*

According to Fanārī’s other objection, one cannot accurately claim that *tafsīr* is linked to *riwāyah,* and *ta’wil* to *dirāyah* because this relation can be broken via a word with a single meaning. When the word is assigned for this one meaning, and when this meaning is intended, declaring its literal meaning (*ḥaqīqa*) relies neither on *riwāyah* nor *dirāyah.* Musannifak, as stated before, limits himself to pointing out the incorrectness of this objection. As we can see in the previous example, he evaluates Fanārī’s remarks on the article of lexical meaning regarding *riwāyah* within the framework of *tafsīr.*

Fanārī’s other objection is that the scholars’ statements are invalid on the grounds that *tafsīr* is the result of *riwāyah,* and *ta’wil* is the result of *dirāyah.* Since

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73 Tībī, Futūḥu’l-gayb, 1, 649-650.
74 Musannifak, Ḥāshiya ‘ala’l-Kashshāf, f. 21b-22a.
75 Molla Fanārī, ‘Aynu’l-a’yān, 5; Musannifak, Ḥāshiya ‘ala’l-Kashshāf, f. 22b.
76 Musannifak, Ḥāshiya ‘ala’l-Kashshāf, f. 22b.
77 Molla Fanārī, ‘Aynu’l-a’yān, 5-6; Musannifak, Ḥāshiya ‘ala’l-Kashshāf, f. 22b.
78 Musannifak, Ḥāshiya ‘ala’l-Kashshāf, f. 22b.
it is possible to use *khabar al-wāḥid* in *tafsīr* and to apply *ta’wil* by referring to the clear texts (*al-nuṣuṣ al-muḥkama*) with absolute evidence, *tafsīr* is inferior to *ta’wil*. But since this idea would definitely contradict the consensus, it is void. This claim can be recovered only when it is attributed to Imam Māturidi’s words: “*Tafsīr* is a declaration, which testifies to the *riwāyah*. Thus, *tafsīr* speaks with knowledge, whereas other sciences speak with opinions”.\(^79\) Musannifak does not respond to this last objection; rather, he concludes this discussion as follows: “The (last) three objections belong to pre-eminent person from Rūm. His words are stigmatised with condemnation and corruption. From this can be seen the depth of his knowledge of the sciences! Here, we went around the bushes, because we saw how slippery the expert’s arguments were”.\(^80\)

Given that Musannifak is from Khorosān, he clearly has no positive opinions about the scholars from Egypt and Rūm. This might possibly be because when he came to Anatolia he found himself in a debate, the traces of which can be clearly observed in his criticisms of Bābartī and Molla Fanārī. Another point that captures our attention is that he disagrees with and rejects all ten of Fanārī objections beforehand. However, the way he represents his own objections is unconvincing.

If we shortly evaluate his objections, as Fanārī discusses, we have to undertake a much broader research than just analysing the intention within the various *tafsīr* works. Despite this, Musannifak had to apply to *ta’wil* when he claimed that all exegetical activity is related to analysing the will, whereas Fanārī’s offer to replace “*murād*” with “the circumstances which are related to the wording of Allah”, removes the need for *ta’wil*.

Moreover, Musannifak failed to prove his claim that the analysis of *qirā’a* is not included by *tafsīr* and that every analysis of the words contributed to determining the will. His view of *qirā’a* as an individual science can be accepted; however, looking through the *tafsīr* tradition reveals that the analysis of *qirā’a* is considered part of exegetical activity. At this point, Fanārī’s decision to insert this particular analysis into the definition of *tafsīr* with the condition “because it is the Qur’ān”, is correct. But his claim that each analysis of a word helps determine the will is unjustified. In fact, the *tafsīr* literature contains many chapters on *qirā’a* and linguistics, which only analyses the words’ tonal attributes.

Fanārī’s following argument also deserves our attention: Without any qualification, the will cannot be analysed in the exegetical activity because doing so would

\(^79\) Molla Fanārī, *’Aynu’l-a’yān*, 6; Musannifak, *Ḥāshiya ’ala’l-Kashshāf*, f. 22b.

\(^80\) Musannifak, *Ḥāshiya ’ala’l-Kashshāf*, f. 22b.
remove the boundaries between *tafsır*, *fiqh*, *kalām*, and Sufism. On the other hand, Musannifak claims that the divine will in the verses are determined by engaging in this very activity and that other sciences (e.g., *fiqh* and *kalām*) both utilise the results of this activity and acquire principles from it. *Ta’wil*, in its capacity as a tool for unveiling the divine will, is not applied just by moving from Qur’ānic words to their indications. This fact renders Musannifak’s claim controversial. Fanārī’s attitude to this topic can be summarised as follows: As *ta’wil* occurs through various information, sources, and methodologies, *tafsır* is the beneficiary of other sciences’ methodologies, principles, and data. In this formulation, *tafsır* is the one that takes the principles and supplies those principles. Within the distinction of *tafsır*-*ta’wil*, *tafsır*’s status as a principle supplier is related solely to *tafsır*. Within the framework of *tafsır*, the science of *tafsır* provides to other sciences a set of common data, namely, the language, *riwāyah*, and meanings obtained from the pre-exegetical process by historical data. Moreover, other sciences use the Qur’ān as the informative source in their attempt to reveal the divine will from the verses via their subjects, informative sources, and methodologies. At this point, *tafsır* as a science that examines the Qur’ān in a context limited to the indication of words and draws apart from other sciences that use the Qur’ān as a source of information. Although the methodological effort cannot be observed in *tafsır*, the contribution and the data produced by other sciences play a role in determining the *ta’wil* process in the exegetical activity.81

Musannifak rejects Fanārī’s argument “that the divine will cannot be known in its essence”, which relies on his contemplation in the sphere of epistemology and metaphysics, without examining it deeply. Exactly what this argument denotes within the sphere of epistemological and metaphysical discussions is another subject. However, Fanārī confines himself to drawing attention to the defect in cognition and methodology and adds “or supposed-to-be” to the expression “to be known as the divine will”, which strengthens the definition.

Fanārī’s opposition to *riwāyah* and *dirāyah* is also important. Before his annotation, all other *sharḥs* and *ḥāshiya*s claimed that *dirāyah* is based on Arabic’s grammatical rules. However, as he states, *dirāyah* can also be made operational without relying any linguistic rules. For instance, while interpreting (*ta’wil*) the verses on faith, rational evidence is not always attributed to linguistic rules. It can be clearly seen that scholars are concerned about limiting reasoning by basing *dirāyah* upon the Arabic language. However, this limitation does not reflect the actual case. Al-

81 For more information of Fanārī’s ideas, see Boyalik, “Molla Fenārî’nin Tefsir İlminin Mahiyetine Dair Tartışmasının Tahlili”, 79 et al.
though Musannifak agrees with Fanārī on this point, he continues to challenge him by claiming that dirāyah based on linguistics is the example for dirāyah. Therefore, he accuses him of assuming the example to be the principal.

Fanārī explains that a word’s literal meaning within the framework of lexicography is neither part of riwāyah nor dirāyah, a claim that can be considered reasonable. Although Musannifak views lexicography as part of riwāyah, he prefers not to investigate this contention in any depth. Even if we can consider the articles of lexicography part of riwāyah, we cannot say that they are within the scope of tafsīr. In fact, riwāyah in the context of tafsīr means the information reported from the Prophet (p. b. u. h.) and his Companions (r.a.).

We should emphasize that Fanārī has already responded to the forthcoming objections regarding his conception of tafsīr-ta’wil. Musannifak either did not see these responses or just ignored them. Fanārī’s definition of tafsīr, as well as his ideas on tafsīr-ta’wil, are deserving of attention, and yet Musannifak rejected all of these in advance without detailing his reasons for doing so.

At this point, we have again researched chronologically whether the debate is continued by the following shāriḥs and muḥashshīs. Clearly, this debate followed the line of Rāzī–Pahliwān–Bābartī–Taftāzānī–Abdalkarīm b. Abdaljabbār–Fanārī. For instance, after Musannifak Ali Kushchu (d. 897/1474), who came to Istanbul from the East at the invitation of Sultan Mehmed, neither broadly discusses the nature of the science of tafsīr nor mentions Taftāzānī’s definition of tafsīr in his annotation of Taftāzānī’s al-Kashshāf. Following him, Hasan Chalabi b. Mehmed Shah al-Fanārī’s annotation (Fanārī’s grandson) of al-Kashshāf arouses our interest due to its affinity with Fanārī. However, a close examination of his writings on the nature of the science of tafsīr reveals that he does not get involved in the discussion, but prefers to confine himself to the definition of tafsīr first introduced by Taftāzānī and then by Jurjānī and to quoting the discussions on the tafsīr-ta’wil from the latter’s annotation. Hasan Chalabi inventively explains what it means to qualify tafsīr with ma’ānī and bayān on the basis of two possibilities. In the following period, Muhyiddin Hatibzāda (d. 901/1495) wrote an annotation on Jurjānī’s

84 Hasan Chalabi, Ḥāshiyatu’l-Kashshāf, f. 34a-53a.
85 Ibid., f. 34a-53a.
86 Ibid., f. 48a-48b.
annotation, and Mawlānázāda Hitāī (d. 901/1495) wrote one on Taftāzānī’s annotation. If we look at these two works, if we look at these two works, we see that both scholars neither examined the nature of the science of tafsīr in an individual subtitle nor were they interested in engaging in this debate.

Aḥmād b. Yaḥya b. Muḥammad b. al-Taftāzānī (d. 916/1510), also known as Ḥafīḍ al-Taftāzānī, wrote an annotation on his grandfather’s annotation. In the relevant section, he provides a short clarification on the nature of the science of tafsīr in which he challenges the claim that it is a compiled science. To justify his argument, Ḥafīḍ points out the need for the existence of a subject, a full self-attribute (zātī araz), and envisioned and confirmed principles. As he reports from Taftāzānī’s Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, philosophers asked for these conditions for the philosophical sciences and the religious sciences clearly do not include them. For instance, sciences such as fiqh and legal theory contain these conditions. But looking for them in sciences such as tafsīr would only be a forced attempt, for in tafsīr the infinite attributes deduced from the Qur’ān can be individually examined. This topic is limited to the Qur’ān due to its inimitability (i’jāz). Ḥafīḍ, who contents himself with giving place to his grandfather’s ideas, set forth nothing of his own understanding on the nature of the science of tafsīr.

Kamāladdīn Ismail al-Karamānī, also known as Kara Kemāl (d. 920/1514), wrote an annotation on Jurjānī’s work on al-Kashshāf in which he briefly explains what tafsīr is. According to him, in the definition of “analysing the circumstances of the Qur’ān”, “the circumstances” indicates the will of Allah the almighty. By analysing these circumstances, one can say that in al-ḥamd lillāh, the al-ḥamd means glorification. The lām in the al-ḥamd indicates the generic article, and in “lillāh” it indicates specialization. Allāh denotes the absolute God – the self (zāt) of the obligatory and inevitable existence of Allah the almighty. Subsequently, Karamānī quotes from Quṭbuddīn al-Rāzī’s views on tafsīr and ta’wil by mentioning his name. Except for these two examples, he is not involved in the discussions on the nature of the science of tafsīr.

90 Karamānī, Hāshiya al-a Ḥāshiyyati’l-Kashshāf li’l-Jurjānī, Murat Molla Library, Murad Molla nr. 270, f. 35a.
Ibn Kamāl Pasha (d. 940/1534) also wrote an annotation on Jurjānī’s work but did not mention the discussion on the nature of the science of *tafsir*.92 Tashkoprūzāda Aḥmad Efendi (d. 968/1561), in his annotation on Jurjānī’s work, emphasizes that his definition is the added-to version of Rāzī’s definition. He further opines that “it is the science by which the will of Allah the almighty is searched in the Qur’ān” corresponds to the condition “in terms of (min ḥaythu)” in Jurjānī’s definition.93 Moreover, he responds to Bābartī’s criticism of regarding the division of *tafsir-ta’wil* as dividing one thing at the same time into itself and into other elements. He argues that it is not *tafsir* that is divided, but rather the science of *tafsir*.94 We would like to remind readers that the origin of this response is Abdalkarīm b. Abdaljabbār.

Hāmid b. ‘Alī al-‘Imādī (d. 1171/1758), who commented on the part about the nature of the science of *tafsir*, also quotes from Taftāzānī and Jurjānī’s definition and briefly mentions Rāzī’s views on the *tafsir-ta’wil* by naming him.95 Again, this source does not go beyond the existing discussions on this subject.

**Conclusion**

This article discussed the chronological analyses of the important *sharḥs* and *ḥāshiya*s, including the debate on the nature of the science of *tafsir* in al-Kashshāf’s introduction. This research is based on more than twenty sources. The annotations to al-Kashshāf were written in relation to each other in a historical development process. Based on this process, this article argues that we can reveal the important debate process by embracing, both chronologically and comparatively, the literature contained within the Islamic intellectual tradition.

The commentators of al-Kashshāf (i.e., Chāpardī, Tībī, Kazwīnī, and Yamānī) do not approach the topic on the nature of the science of *tafsir* as a theoretical debate, although all of them comment on it. Among the commentators on al-Kashshāf, Quṭbuddīn al-Rāzī serves as the debate’s milestone, for his definition of *tafsir* and his arguments on the division of *tafsir* and *ta’wil* become a source for the subsequent commentators. The first one to review to Rāḍī’s definition, Alāudd-

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94 538-39.
din ʿAli Pahlīwān, completes Rāzī’s definition so that it covers the taʿwil process. Bābartī then challenges his definition and introduces his own by replacing “ʿilm” with “maʿrifa”, opposes Rāzī’s claim that tafsīr is a means to search the divine will, and also rejects the tafsīr-taʿwil division on the grounds that this means dividing the same thing into itself and into other elements. After Bābartī, Taftāzānī reviews Rāzī’s definition and argues that in tafsīr, the circumstances of Allah’s wordings are searched, not His will or the indications of these circumstances to the will. Jurjānī accepts this approach. The next commentator, Firuzābādī, confines himself to the linguistic analyses of the notion of tafsīr, whereas Abdaljabbar targets Bābartī and supports Qutbuddīn al-Rāzī. Molla Fanārī, on the other hand, challenges both Rāzī’s and Taftāzānī’s definitions and introduces his own. However, Musannifak both cites and then objects to Fanārī’s views and criticises Bābartī’s explanations. One of the remarkable cases is that Musannifak despises Fanārī by calling him “the scholar from Rūm” and also Bābartī by referring to him as “the scholar from Egypt.” As someone who travelled from Khorosān to Anatolia and who taught at Konya, Bursa, Edirne, and Istanbul, he expressed a truly insulting attitude toward these leading figures. This attitude should be investigated from the scope of historical approach.

The debate on the nature of the science of tafsīr reached another level with Musannifak’s objection to Fanārī. Although his critics draw the attention of researchers, we can say that they are not well justified. Fanārī’s objections to Rāzī’s and Taftāzānī’s definitions, as well as to their explanations on the tafsīr-taʿwil division, remained powerful even after Musannifak’s refutation. Despite all of these objections and debates, the arguments of both scholars can be deepened in order to establish two intellectual approaches to the science of tafsīr and the nature of the taʿwil process. However, this argument is beyond the scope of this article, which only seeks to demonstrate this debate’s historical developmental process. In terms of further research, we could suggest a comparative study between Fanārī and Musannifak focused on their understanding of taʿwil.

After Musannifak, other leading commentators made important contributions to the debate on the nature of the science of tafsīr, such as Ali Qūshjī, Hasan Chalabi, Hitāī, Hatibzāda, Ḥafīḍ al-Taftāzānī, Karamānī, Ibn Kamāl Pasha, Tashkopruzāda, and ʿImādī. However, their contributions did not occur within the tense debates in which Musannifak had been involved. Indeed, they lived at a time when writing annotations of Baydāwī was the thing to do. Hence, most of them preferred to write annotations of the present annotations instead of writing directly on al-Kashshāf.

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