Intellecting the Intellected: An Examination on the Interpretation of “the Second Intelligibles” in Islamic Tradition of Logic and its Reception during the Ottoman Period

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Abstract: The interpretation of the “second intelligibles” (al-ma’qūlāt al-thāniya/al-ma’qūlāt al-chawāni), as a term which is highly sophisticated and closely related to many philosophical disciplines, began with al-Fārābī and continued to expand its content especially in the literature of logic until the modern times. In this process, following al-Fārābī several philosophers such as Ibn Sinā, ʿUmar al-Šāwī, Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī, ʿUmar al-Kātibī, Shams al-dīn al-Samarqandī, Qūṭb al-dīn al-Rāzī and Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī became salient figures in interpreting the second intelligibles. The accumulated tradition including various approaches and transformations on the subject was transmitted directly to the Ottoman period, during which the second intelligibles were widely discussed with new concepts and issues. As it had been before, these interpretations and discussions found place in the literature of logic during the Ottoman period. In this article, I will examine the interpretations on the second intelligibles from al-Fārābī to Jurjānī while marking moments of change and development. Then I will examine how Ottoman philosophers and logicians approached the second intelligibles by comparing the commentaries of Burhān al-dīn Būlgārī, Kul Aḥmed (Ahmed b. Muhammad b. Khudr), Ṣadr al-dīn-zāda Mehmed Emin Shirwānī and Kara Khalil b. Hasan al-Tirāwī on Mullā Fanārī’s famous book on logic, al-Fawā’id al-Fanāriyya.

Keywords: First intelligibles, second intelligibles, subject-matter of logic, Islamic history of logic, logic in Ottoman period, commentaries on al-Fawā’id al-Fanāriyya.
The “second intelligibles” (al-ma’qūlāt al-thāniya/al-ma’qūlāt al-thawānī) have various applications in works on psychology, metaphysics and logic throughout the history of Islamic philosophy. Psychology as a philosophical discipline approaches to the second intelligibles for their perceptibility and for their psychic qualities whereas metaphysics looks at their modes of being and relations with the existence. In logic, the second intelligibles are treated especially for their usage to reach the “unknown.” The second intelligibles, which can be considered as a kind of meta-thinking, are closely related to many philosophical disciplines, but the examinations and interpretations on its meaning and characteristics usually revolve around the question on the subject-matter of logic.

While the second intelligibles had relatively limited usages in the early Islamic philosophy literature, it grew to be more frequently used term by later thinkers especially after Fakhr al-din al-Rāzī. This was a result of the debates in three fields: (i) the debates between philosophers, theologians and Sufis on whether certain concepts such as existence, thingness, absence, quiddity, contingency, creation, absolute etc were “mental constructs” or not; (ii) the debates on mental existence, and the characteristics of mental existence and the connection between the mental existence and external existence; and (iii) the debates following Afdal al-din Khunaji’s (d. 646/1248) alternative perspective on the subject-matter of logic.

In this article however I neither deal with the question on which general ontological concepts (al-umūr al-‘āmma) fall in the category of the second intelligibles nor the evolution of the subject-matter of logic from the “second intelligibles” to the “knowns” (al-ma’lūmāt al-tasawwuriyya wa al-taṣṭiqiyyya). Even though I will touch upon briefly these concepts, my main aim is to summarize the interpretations of the second intelligibles through certain foundational texts in the Islamic history of logic and examine how it was received by the Ottoman logicians in the context of Mullā Fanārī’s (d. 834/1431 or 838/1434-35) al-Fawā’id al-Fanāriyya and some of its super-commentaries.

For this, I will first outline the ways of interpretation of the second intelligibles existing in the literature of logic before Mullā Fanārī, then I will survey how the subject was treated during the Ottoman period through al-Fawā’id al-Fanāriyya

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1 As I will show below these explanations and interpretations follow certain phrases such as tafsīr, ma’nā, taṣfīr and taḥqīq of the second intelligibles. The word “interpretation” in the title refers at the same time to the usage of the word tafsīr in the literature.

and its super-commentaries. Therefore, I will seek to examine which processes and stages that the accumulated literature transmitted to the Ottoman thinkers passed through and how it was perceived and it evolved during the Ottoman period in the framework of Mullâ Fanârî’s mentioned text and its super-commentaries.

Al-Fârâbî (d. 339/950)\(^3\) seems to be the first thinker in the history of Islamic philosophy, and perhaps in the history of philosophy, who made a terminological formulation and explanation on “the second intelligibles”.\(^4\) The determination and analysis of the reasons that led al-Fârâbî to initiate this can be and should be the subject of another study. However, we can at least say that he aimed at establishing a scientific foundation for the discipline of logic, (and therefore for other disciplines), which had been operating on “meanings” that did not reflect any reality in the external world. He wanted to show that these intelligible meanings, no matter how they could be extended (for example “definition”, “definition of definition” or “definition of definition of definition” etc.), are knowable and at the same time they make other meanings knowable too. As a matter of fact, Al-Fârâbî, in his book titled *Kitâb al-ḥurûf*, refers to the logical/epistemological suspicions of the Greek philosopher Antisthenes (d. c. 365 BC), known as the founder of the Cynics, and criticizes him based on the second intelligibles.\(^5\)

\(^3\) Nematsara argues that it was Ibn Sinâ (d. 428/1037) who first used technically the terms, first intellii gibles and second intelligibles. This is however certainly not true. In addition, he also argues that Nasir al-din al-Ṭūsî first used the second intelligibles in the field of metaphysics/ontology, but as I will show below (see footnote 14) this is not true either. For Nematsara’s arguments see “Secondary Intelligibles: An Analytical and Comparative Study on First and Second Intentions in Islamic and Western Philosophy” (M.A. Thesis, McGill University Institute of Islamic Studies, 1994), p. 4, 5, 10. Nematsara focuses in this work actually on “universal/general concepts” and “meaning” with their various kinds. He cites Ibn Sinâ and Al-Ṭūsî for the views of Muslim philosophers on the second intelligibles, examines the “mental concepts” through Suhrawardî (d. 587/1191), then omits a long and productive period in post-Ibn Sinâ period and mentions Mullâ Şâdî (d. 1050/1640) and Persian origin philosophers after him in short sections.

\(^4\) Giorgio Pini states that Muslim philosophers took certain elements concerning the distinction between the first intelligibles and second intelligibles from thinkers of the late antiquity. According to him, the late antique thinkers discussed, on the one hand, about the first position terms like the categorical terms referring to non-mental objects, and, on the other hand, about the second position terms, referring to first position, terms such as “noun” and “verb.” Giorgio Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus: An Interpretation of Aristotle’s Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), p. 28. Considering al-Фârâbî’s distinction between the first intelligibles and the second intelligibles, the “antique distinction” seems to be primitive and simple and does not show directly any distinction indicating the level of intellection. Probably because of this, Pini asserts that Muslim philosophers took only certain “elements” of this distinction from the antique thinkers, not necessarily directly the whole distinction.

In this book, al-Fārābī clearly distinguishes the first intelligibles and the second intelligibles. He draws a framework for later discussions on the second intelligibles with these words:

The first intelligibles (awwal maʿqūl) are intelligibles that are derived from sensibles. (…) Besides, some attachments (lawḥaḥiq) accrue to these intelligibles, which are obtained from sensibles and formed in the soul, for their being in the soul. Thus, some of these first intelligibles become genus, some become species and some become those defined by some others. The meaning making the first intelligibles genus or species, through which they become predicate to many things, is an attached meaning to the intelligible because of its being in the soul. So is similar the relations attached to the first intelligibles such as some are more special or general than others. [In other words, these relations too are attachments and meanings annexed to the first intelligibles because of their being in the soul]. Similarly, the description of some of them by some others is also conditions and features attached to the first intelligibles due to their being in the soul. In addition, our statements concerning their [i.e. of the first intelligibles] “knowability” and “intelligibility” are attachments because they are in the soul. Actually, after their becoming in the soul, these attachments added to them [i.e. the first intelligibles] are also intelligibles. But [unlike the first intelligibles], these are not the kinds of intelligibles forming in the soul, which are obtained as representations of sensibles or as based on sensibles or from the things outside of the soul. Thus these are called the second intelligibles (maʿqūlāt al-thawānī).  

Al-Fārābī defines here the second intelligibles as attachments, meanings, conditions or features accrued to the first intelligibles and mentions as example for the second intelligibles some “relations” such as “more special” and “more general” in addition to “genus” and “species.” As can be seen, these examples, in accordance with al-Fārābī’s objective, are related primarily to logic and they are not ontological concepts which would be discussed by the later literature. Besides, it is worth noting that, unlike the later literature, al-Fārābī who does not mention “judgments” as a second intelligible considers “definitions” within the scope of second intelligibles. In addition, al-Fārābī implies that the second intelligibles do not have real forms in the external world by claiming that the second intelligibles “[unlike the first intelligibles], are not the kinds of intelligibles forming in the soul, which are obtained as representations of sensibles or as based on sensibles or from the things outside of

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6 Al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-hurūf, p. 64. Following these statements, al-Fārābī asserts that “the second intelligibles, if they become intelligible, may receive attachments like the first intelligibles; they may go through the process of categorization like genus, species and being defined by each other etc.” This assertion of his, as I will discuss below, can be considered as a source of inspiration for “the third and higher-order intelligibles” that emerged later. However, it is important to note that al-Fārābī does not mention “the third intelligibles” or “the fourth intelligibles”, which began circulating in later periods. Besides, al-Fārābī holds that the states attached to the second intelligibles are the states attached to the first intelligibles whereas the logicians of the later periods treat the states attached to the second intelligibles as new states and distinguish them from the states attached to the first intelligibles.
the soul.” As I will show below, this explicit statement is brought into focus by those following al-Fārābī.

Ibn Sinā who generally follows al-Fārābī discusses the term “second intelligibles” in al-Shifā’s section on al-Ilāhiyyāt while he defines the subject matter of logic:

The subject matter of logic, as you know, is second intelligible meanings (al-ma‘āni al-ma‘qūlāt al-thāniya) which are based on first intelligible meanings. Logic examines them [i.e. the second intelligible notions] not for their being intelligible and unrelated to any matter or related to a metaphysical matter, but for their nature of leading from the known to the unknown through themselves.9

Ibn Sinā does not explain the second intelligibles further in these statements that would be frequently discussed by later logicians and philosophers; he just asserts, like al-Fārābī, that they are “meanings.” However, he refers to one of his earlier books by the phrase “as you know” and this is most probably al-Madkhal of al-Shifā’s Mantiq. In his discussion of the subject matter of logic, without using the term “second intelligibles” he expalines its meaning and its connection with logic by saying:

Mental things (umūr) are either the things imagined in the mind by being taken from outside or the things that are accrued to these things in the mind [i.e. imagined things coming from outside] and these [accrued] things do not have anything which can correspond to them in the external world. Therefore, the knowledge on these two things

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7 Ibn Sinā, in some of his books, defines “the first intelligibles” as badihi intelligibles or awwaliyyāt that do not need acquisition such as “The whole is greater than piece” or “The things equal to the samething are equals to each other” and calls “the second intelligibles” as the new knowledge obtained by acquisition from these. (See Ibn Sinā, Kitab al-Najāt, ed. Muhammad Taki Dānishpājūh. Tehran: Dānishgāh-ī Tehran, 1379, pp. 334-335.) But these are not related to the second intelligibles, the subject of this article, or to Ibn Sinā’s rendering of the subject-matter of logic as ‘second intelligible notions.” Therefore, Dimitri Gutas’ view on that the subject-matter of logic is the second intelligibles that have been obtained from the first intelligibles as awwaliyya and badihi knowledge is wrong. (See Dimitri Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna’s Philosophical Works, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014, p. 5, fn. 1. “al-Ma‘qūlāt al-badīhiyya... These are the primary intelligible concepts, the awwaliyya, upon which depend the secondary intelligibles that form the subject matter of logic.”) Similarly, although Amos Bertolacci accurately interprets second intelligible notions as the subject-matter of logic according to Ibn Sinā’s perspective, he seems to mistake the first intelligibles as “categories.” (See Amos Bertolacci, The Reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Avicenna’s Kitab al-Šifā: A Milestone of Western Metaphysical Thought, Leiden ve Boston: Brill, 2006, p. 273. “They [the secondary intelligible notions] are based on the ‘first intelligible notions’, namely the categories.”)

8 For the influence of Ibn Sinā’s distinction between first intelligibles and second intelligibles and his view taking the second intelligibles as the subject-matter of logic on Latin philosophers and logicians, see Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus, p. 28, 32ff.; Dag Nikolaus Hasse, “Influence of Arabic and Islamic Philosophy on the Latin West”, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/arabic-islamic-influence/>.

belong to one art. Then, one of the two becomes the subject of the art of logic for an accident affected to it. As for the question of which one is the subject of the art of logic, it [i.e. the subject-matter of the art of logic] is the second one. As for the identity of the accident accrued to it, this [i.e. the aspect that makes the second thing the subject of the art of logic] is its being transmitter to another intellectual form that have not existed in the soul and its obtaining benefit at the point of transmitting or its inhibition of this transmitting.  

In the same book, Ibn Sinā renders another explanation including examples for the things imagined in the mind:

The quiddities of things sometimes exist in the external world, sometimes in the mind. Therefore, there are three conceptions concerning them [i.e. quiddities]: Firstly, the quiddity is regarded for its being this quiddity, so [in this conception] the quiddity cannot be accrued to any of the two beings and, because of this, to those accrued to quiddities. Furthermore, the quiddity is regarded for its being in the external world. In this conception, accidents particular to its being are accrued. Lastly, the quiddity is regarded for its being in mind. In this conception too, certain accidents particular to its being [i.e. its being in the mind] are attached. For example, "being subject (wa’d)" –among those to be learned–, “being predicate (ḥaml)”, “universality”, “particularity”, “being intrinsic”, “being accidental” etc. at being predicate. [These must be in mind], because the things in the external world as being predicate do not have the qualities of being intrinsic or accidental. Similarly, just like anything does not exists as “subject” or “predicate” in the external world, “premise”, “syllogism” etc do not exist either.

11 Ibn Sinā, al-Madkhal, p. 15. The famous physician and philosopher, Ibn al-Nafīs (d. 687/1288) makes verification (taḥqiq) of the second intelligibles as he discusses the subject-matter of logic in his commentary, Sharḥ al-Wurayqāt, on his own book of logic, al-Wurayqāt. Ibn al-Nafīs, who follows Ibn Sinā’s view that the subject-matter of logic is the second intelligibles, like Ibn Sinā’s al-Madkhal, explains the second intelligibles in regards to three aspects quiddity/reality. Besides, as Ibn al-Nafīs’s mathematical examples explaining the second intelligibles are quite different, his perspective is also different. He states in his aforementioned book that: “The verification of the second intelligibles is this: every reality has [certain] necessities in regards to ‘itself’ [bi-i’tibār nafsihā]; such as every triangle needs that ‘its three angles are equal to two right angles.’ Similarly, every reality has [certain] necessities in regard to its external existence; such as every triangle in outside world (a’yān) needs ‘to be in one direction.’ In addition, every reality has [certain] necessities in regards to its mental existence; for example, when intellected, the triangle needs to ‘be universal, to have a kind of isosceles and be a kind of plane. Thus, these examples are exactly the subject-matter of logic. Undoubtedly, following the existence of quiddities, their mental existence is to be second intelligible. We have stated that it is the subject-matter of logic, as logic deals (yanÛuru) with the things with definitions, syllogism and the thing with both of these. Both of these [i.e. definition and syllogism] are composed things and every composed thing are known after its individual things are known in regard to the composition. The individual elements of definition are things like genus and differentia. The syllogism is composed of premises, which are composed of individual elements. Logicians take these [i.e. individuals] in regards to their being subject or predicate whereas do the premises in regards to their being universal, particular or other aspects. These are the second intelligibles.” Ibn al-Nafīs, Sharḥ al-Wurayqāt fi al-mantiq, ed. Ammār Tālibī et al. (Tunus: Dār al-Garbi al-Islāmī, 2009), pp. 7-8.
As clearly seen, Ibn Sīnā does not differ significantly from al-Fārābī concerning his views on the second intelligibles. However, it is worth noting his additional assertion, which is also implicitly shared by al-Fārābī, that no correspondence exists for the second intelligibles in the external world. Ibn Sīnā’s addition would be influential to the later literature as I will show below and it became a matter of discussion in debates on the second intelligibles.

We see a more detailed definition for “the first intelligibles” and “the second intelligibles” by Ibn Sīnā in his *al-Ta’līqāt*. Ibn Sīnā, who states that the subject matter of logic is the second intelligibles which are based on the first intelligibles, explains the second intelligibles as such (*sharḥu dhālika*:)

One thing, or some of the things, has first intellibles like “body”, “live” etc. and second intelligibles which are based on these [i.e. the first intelligibles]. The second intelligibles are things’ being of universal, particular and individual. The investigation on proof of [the existence of] these second intelligibles is the subject of metaphysics. The second intelligibles that are taken into consideration in absolute terms without particular attention to the aspects of existence become the subject-matter of logic, because their absolute modes of existence such as whether they exists in the external world or in the soul can only be proved by metaphysics. [As for logic] they are treated for another aspect, which is to reach the unknown things from the known ones. (…) Therefore, the second intelligibles exists in logic. What I mean by the second intelligibles are universals such as genus, species, differentia and proprium, which are used in conception. The necessary, contingent etc are used in assent. But these universal terms become the subject-matter of logic when they are taken with this aspect, in other words, when they are used to reach the unknown things from the known ones.12

Ibn Sīnā, who distinguishes the metaphysical from the logical aspects of the second intelligibles, probably for the first time, emphasizes that they are universal concepts. He renders as example the concepts of “universal”, “particular” and “individual” and the Porphyrian tree and “necessary,” “contingent” etc.; and he underlines how these are used in logic.

Considering the examples, Ibn Sīnā seems to have developed the examples given by al-Fārābī. It is particularly important that he adds certain concepts like “necessary” and “contingent” to the category of second intelligibles.13 This means that

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13 Aḍud al-dīn al-Jī, in his book *al-Mawāqif fi ‘ilm al-kalām* (Beirut: Ālem al-kutub, n.d.), argues that Ibn Sīnā states in his *al-Shifā‘* that existence is second intelligible therefore nothing exists in the external world as “existence” or “thing” and the thing existing in the external world is (things like) “darkness” or “human being.” But we do not find such a statement of Ibn Sīnā. Although Ibn Sīnā, in *al-Maqūlāt*, states that “As you know, the existence has ‘ayns existing in the external world and they are all concrete,” this does not mean that Ibn Sīnā considers the existence among the second intelligibles. For these
since the second intelligibles do not have correspondence in the external world, they are only pure intellectual notions, which would be an important subject of discussion in later literature.\textsuperscript{14}

\section*{II}

In the post-Avicennian period, an important attempt to define the second intelligibles appears in \textit{al-Baṣāʿir al-Naṣīriyya fi 'ilm al-maṇṭiq} of ʿUmar b. Sahlān al-Ṣ̣āwī (d. 540/1145?) who also influenced later philosophers such as Suhrawardī and Nasīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. Al-Ṣ̣āwī who follows Ibn Sīnā on the “second intelligibles” as being the subject-matter of logic states the following on the second intelligibles:

\begin{quote}
\textbf{14} Following Ibn Sīnā, we see that his student Bahmanyār b. Marzūbān (d. 458/1066) uses the term “second intelligibles” in the section on metaphysics of his work \textit{al-Taḥṣīl}. Bahmanyār mentions the second intelligibles while examining the relationship between “existence” and “thing” although he does not explain the characteristics of the term in his book. He says the following: “The ‘thing’ is a second intelligible depending on the first intelligibles, and its judgment is like universal, particular, genus and species. There is no existent ‘thing’ among existents. On the contrary, the existent (mawjūd) is either human being or heaven. Then, its intelligibility (maʿqūliyya) requires its being ‘thing’. The ‘essence’ is also similar. Likewise, the ‘existence’ is as such in respect to its parts. Bahmanyār, \textit{al-Taḥṣīl}, ed. Murtaza Mutahhari (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tehran, 1375/1996), p. 286. The important thing here is that while al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā use the term second intelligibles especially in the context of logic, Bahmanyār applies it to the metaphysics. More importantly, Bahmanyār examines as the second intelligibles certain logical concepts like “universal”, “particular”, “genus”, and “species” and also general ontological concepts like “thing” and “existence.” This means for Bahmanyār that thing and existence do not have external realities. It is also important to note that Bahmanyār considers “existence” as second intelligible in respect to its parts. Al-Suhrawardi, though does not directly uses the term second intelligible in his book \textit{Hikmat al-ishrāq}, he applies various synonymous ontological concepts like “mental notions”, “mental adjectives”, “mental attributes”, “mental considerations” and “mental things” etc. According to this, certain concepts and attributes such as existence, thingness, absolute quiddity, absolute reality and essence, oneness, contingency, impossible and absence are pure mental and they do not have external correspondence or there are no external existent to represent them; they only exist in the mind; see al-Suhrawardi, \textit{Kitāb Hikmat al-ishrāq}, ed. Henry Corbin (Tehran: Pejūhashgāh-i Ulūm-i Insānī wa Mutālaāt-i Farhangī, 1373/1993), p. 64ff. Also see al-Suhrawardi, \textit{Kitāb al-Taḥwīḥ (al-'ilm al-thālith)}, ed. Henry Corbin (Tehran: Pejūhashgāh-i Ulūm-i Insānī wa Mutālaāt-i Farhangī, 1372/1993), p. 4 ff. Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198) also examines the term “second intelligibles” in the context of logic in his book \textit{Tafsīr Mā ba'de t-tabiʿa} although it does not render a definition. “He [Aristotle] means by this the following: the name existent is called for the first intelligibles and the second intelligibles. The second intelligibles are logical things (al-umūr al-maṇṭiqiyya)”. Ibn Rushd, \textit{Tafsīr Mā ba'de t-tabiʿa}, I, ed. Maurice Bouygues (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1973), p. 306. Similar to these statements of Bahmanyār, Ibn Kammūna (d. 683/1284), without defining the second intelligibles, also states that existence and thing are from the second intelligibles depending on the first intelligibles. According to him, the existent things do not include “existence” or “thing”. On the contrary, the existent things are beings like human being, heaven etc. besides, according to him, their intelligibility should also be existent and thing. See Ibn Kammūna, \textit{al-Jadīd fi al-hikma}, ed. Hamid Nājī Isfahānī (Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy-Institute of Islamic Studies, Free University of Berlin, 1387/2008), p. 80 ff.
\end{quote}
The meaning of our word *second intelligibles* is this: the forms and quiddities of the things that exist in the external world are formed in the human mind. Then the mind operates on them by judging some of them with others, by attaching some accidents to them and by substracting some affections from them. The operations of the mind like making some of them judgement and some others the object of judgement (*mahkūmān 'alayh*), and substracting or attaching, are accidental states to these mental quiddities. Therefore, these quiddities are first intelligibles. The conditions that become accidentals after their formation in the mind are second intelligibles. These are knowable things like the quiddities’ aspects of predication, subject, universal, particular etc.\(^{15}\)

As seen above, al-Ṣāwī exemplifies the second intelligibles as being of quiddities, which are first intelligibles in the mind, “predication”, “subject”, “universal” and “particular” and etc. These have been seen in the thoughts of previous philosophers, principally of Ibn Sinā. However, the most important thing here is al-Ṣāwī’s association of the mind’s operation on the first intelligibles by judging, attaching and substracting with the second intelligibles and also his conception of the second intelligibles as meanings and conditions formed through this operation. Yet, the question how the judgment becomes a second intelligible still remains obscure. This issue, as I will show below, is clarified by Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī and more specifically by Ali b. 'Umar al-Kātibi (d. 675/1277).

Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī, who considers the second intelligibles as the subject matter of logic like Ibn Sinā and al-Ṣāwī, renders in *al-Mulakhkhaṣ* the following explanation on the second intelligibles, which influences the later literature of Islamic philosophy and logic:

The subject of a science is the accidents attached to the subject of the science only because of being itself. The subject-matter of logic is the second intelligibles, as they enable one to reach to an unknown from the known thing. The interpretation (*tafsīr*) of the second intelligibles is this: the human being first conceives the things’ realities (*haqā'iq al-ashyā’*), then makes judgements on some of these concepts by some of them with a restrictive or predicative judgement. In this manner, a quiddity’s becoming "*mahkūm alayh*" [in other words, the subject of a restrictive or predicative judgement] is, if and only if, an attachment after this [quiddity] turns to be known. Therefore, it is a thing at the second degree (*fi al-daraja al-thāniya*). When these conceptions are treated not for absolute terms but on the contrary for their quality of leading validly from the known to the unknown, the science [making this treatment] is logic. Thus, there is no doubt that the subject-matter of logic is these second intelligibles.\(^{16}\)

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Al-Kātibī in his *Sharḥ Kashf al-āsrār*, the commentary on al-Hūnajī’s book on logic, quotes verbatim this passage. He agrees with Ibn Sīnā’s view on the subject matter of logic in *al-Shifā* although he highlights that al-Rāzī detailed Ibn Sīnā’s words (*wa al-imām ayyālan dhaḥaba īlā hādhā fī al-Mulakhkhas illā annahā faṣṣalā hādhā al-kalām*), which seems to be true. He examines in detail both the subject matter of logic and the second intelligibles and brings new dimensions.


18 Al-Rāzī, in his *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, examines the second intelligibles in the context of the subject-matter of logic and makes the following statement: “Beware, people disagree on whether logic is a science or not. Actually this disagreement is nominal, because if what is meant by science is an image representing something existing in the external world, logic is not of this sort of science. The subject-matter of logic is the second intelligibles, which help us find the unknown. The second intelligibles are accidents attached to the quiddities when they exist in the mind. As widely known, they do not exist in the external world. Fakhr ad-dīn ad-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa al-tanbihāt*, 1, ed. Ali Riza Necezāde (Tehran: SACWD, 1384/2005), p. 5. Parallel to al-Rāzī, al-Ṭūsī, in his *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, mentions the second intelligibles in the discussion on the question of whether logic is a science and asserts that the second intelligibles are “accidents attached to the first intelligibles.” Al-Ṭūsī, who prefers to use “first intelligibles” to what al-Rāzī uses as quiddities in the mind, describes the first intelligibles as “intelligible realities and judgments of the existing beings.” See al-Ṭūsī, Nasir ad-dīn, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa al-tanbihāt*, 1, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā (al-Qāhirah: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1960), p. 168. Al-Ṭūsī, in his *Ta‘ḍīl al-mī‘yār*, a critical text to Athīr al-dīn ad-Abhari’s *Tanzil al-afkār*, states that the subject-matter of logic is the second intelligibles, then argues that certain concepts such as imagination”, “assent” “definition”, “syllogism” and the parts of syllogism (“universal”, “particular”, “subject”, “predicate”, “proposition”, “premise” and “result”) are second intelligibles. See Nasir ad-dīn ad-Ṭūsī, *Ta‘ḍīl al-mī‘yār fī nakdī Tanzil al-afkār*, in M. Muḥaqqiq-T. Izutsu (ed.), *Collected Texts and Papers on Logic and Language* (Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1974), pp. 145-156. Al-Ṭūsī, in *Tajrid*, uses the second intelligibles in the ontological context. He says he follows on “thingness”: “The thingness is second intelligible and it does not have stability (mutassasīl) in existence. The thing is not stable absolutely. On the contrary, it is attached to particularized quiddities.” Nasir ad-dīn ad-Ṭūsī, *Tajrid al-asrār*, ed. Abbas Muḥammad Ḥasan Suleyman (Egypt: Dār al-Ma‘ārif al-Jāmi‘yya, 1996), p. 65. Allāma al-Hilli (d. 726/1325) writes a commentary on *Tajrid al-asrār* of al-Ṭūsī who views the second intelligibles as the things lacking external correspondence and being attached to the quiddities existing in the mind. In his commentary, al-Hilli states the following: “Ibn Sīnā said this: ‘Existence is either mental or external. The thing common between these two is thingness.’ If he meant by this that the thingness is categorized as a common phenomenon and the usage of thingness is correct and valid, this is true. Otherwise, this is avoided. If you have understood this, let us say this: Thingness, essentiality, particularity etc are second intelligibles attached to the first intelligibles, because they can be intellected only when they are attached to quiddities beyond themselves. They don’t have stability –like animalness or humanity have existential stability. On the contrary, they follow others in existence. The thingness cannot have absolute existence. There is noting an absolutely stable thing, because being stable is only attached personalized and privatized quiddities.” Al-Ḥillī, Allāma, *Kashf al-murād fī sharḥ Tajrid a’l-i’tiqād* (Qom: Matbaat Qom, n.d.), p. 17. Iṣfahānī (d. 749/1349), who also writes a commentary on al-Ṭūsī’s text, examines the second intelligibles in a similar way. Besides, he renders the reason why the second intelligibles are called in that way: “The second intelligibles are accidents attached to the first intelligibles in the mind. There is no image in the external world appropriate to them. Since they are intellected at the second level, they are called as second intelligibles. They do not have stability in the external world like human being and other animate beings have. On the contrary, they depend on others standing as “affected things.” Maḥmūd al-Iṣfahānī, *Kitāb Sharḥ al-Tajrid*, Suleymaniye Library, Halet Efendi, n. 436, 20a.
We need to emphasize some aspects of al-Rāzī’s explanation. First, he calls the second intelligibles “mental constructs” as this is the preferred conceptualization by Suhrawardī (footnote above). Second, he emphasizes that these mental constructs, i.e. the second intelligibles, exists in the second degree of intellection. This emphasis that would appear more frequently in the literature after al-Rāzī can be seen as the reason why the second intelligibles are called second intelligibles. Thus does al-Kātibī think so. Third, another critical point concerning the second intelligibles is al-Rāzī’s characterization of the quiddities, which are first intelligibles, with their becoming subject of a restrictive or predicative judgement, or in other words his conceptualization of restrictive or predicative judgments as second intelligibles. According to al-Rāzī, the judgements of this sort are formed in the second degree of intellection after the quiddities as first intelligibles are known or intellected.

It was al-Kātibī who detailed al-Rāzī’s explanations quoted above and developed the concept of the second intelligibles by depending on al-Ṣāwī. In his commentary on al-Rāzī’s al-Mulakhkhaṣ, al-Kātibī first discusses al-Rāzī’s ideas on the meanings of restrictive judgments and predicative judgments. According to this, the “restrictive” judgment is a compound in which the first conception conditions the second imagination like in the example of “thinking animal” which is frequently used/judged for “human being.” The “predicative” judgment is to determine about a quiddity for its being “universal, particular, essential, accidental, genus, differentia, species, subject, predication etc.” or to attach something that does not exist in it or abstract some accidents that fell outside of its reality.

Therefore, this judgment, attachment and abstraction are attached to these quiddities after they have existed in the mind. Thus, these quiddities are first intelligibles. To have above-mentioned two judgments, restrictive and predicative judgments, to attach something that does not exists in themselves and to abstract something from them are, if and only if, the things that are attached after they have existed in the mind. Therefore, they occur in the second degree of intellection. So they are second intelligibles.

Shams al-dīn al-Shahrazūrī (d. after 687/1288), a philosopher from the illuminationist school of Islamic philosophy, examines the meaning of second intelligibles in his comprehensive book (Rasā’il al-Shajara al-ilāhiyya)’s chapter on the subject matter of logic. Before asserting his view, he states that Ibn Sīnā and Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī thought (za’ama) that the subject matter of logic is second intelligibles. Then he states the following on the “meaning of their concept of second intelligibles”:

20 While giving al-Rāzī’s statements quoted above al-Kātibī, in his Sharḥ Kashf al-asrār, gives the example of “human being thinks.” See al-Kātibī, Sharḥ Kashf al-asrār, 7a.
Initially you can imagine the realities of things like humanness and animateness. Then you judge about them on their being of universal, particular, essential, accidental, genus, differentia, species, subject and predications. What we first imagine as realities like being of human, animate, horse and body are first intelligibles. The judgments that we attach them are second intelligibles. The reason for this [i.e. the reason for naming them by this] is because they occur in the second degree of intellection.22

These statement of Shahrazūrī, on which the influences of Ibn Sinā, al-Rāzi and al-Kātibī are clearly seen, shows that the perspective, starting with al-Ṣāwī developing with al-Kātibī, on the second intelligibles as “judgments” on the first intelligibles, has grown to be a transmitted tradition. It is important to note that Shahrazūrī uses the term second intelligibles with ease not only in sphere of logic but also in that of ontology. As a matter of fact, like Ibn Kammūna, he asserts that the existence and thingness are second intelligibles based on the first intelligibles and that nothing as “thing” or “existent” exists in the external world but these are the concepts based on mental construct.23

An important mathematician, astronomer, theologian and logician, Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 702/1303), in his commentary, Sharḥ al-Qisṭās fī ʿilm al-miqyās, on his own book on logic, Qisṭās al-āfkār fī taḥqīq al-asrār, first adopts the subject-matter of logic as the second intelligibles and then he raises the understanding of the second intelligibles to a more sophisticated level as he states the following on their meaning and characteristics:

The second intelligibles mean this: when quiddities and realities in themselves are imagined without any judgments, these become first intelligibles. When we judge upon them with restrictive or predicative judgments such as “this is universal”, “this is essential” and “this is accidental”; to become as such is second intelligible. If we judge upon the second intelligibles with restrictive or predicative judgments, to become as such is third order intelligible. Similarly, if we judge upon the third intelligibles, to become as such is the fourth order intelligible and so on and so forth. Logical investigation (baḥth) occurs in third-and-higher order intelligibles, because logic examines intrinsic accidents of the second intelligibles. Logic studies the second intelligibles’ being of genus, differentia, proprium, general accident, definition or description as well as their being of proposition, converted proposition, opposite proposition, syllogism, analogy etc. (…) This is what earlier and later scholars agreed.24

23 See Shahrazūrī, Rasāʾil al-Shajarat al-ilāhiyya, III, p. 27.
24 Shams al-dīn al-Samarqandī, Sharḥ al-Qisṭās fī ʿilm al-miqyās, Staatsbibliothek (Berlin), Landberg, n. 1035, 8a.
As we see here the influence of Fakhr al-din al-Rāzī on al-Samarqandi through al-Kātibi, it is worth noting that al-Samarqandi distinguishes the first intelligibles from the second intelligibles as while the former does not have any judgment the latter does have restrictive or predicative judgments. He also gives many examples for what he calls as the intrinsic accidents of the second intelligibles. However, the more important thing is that al-Samarqandi includes third-and-higher order intelligibles to his discussion. By this, al-Samarqandi intends to differentiate the subject matter of logic and problems of logic clearly.

According to al-Samarqandi, who argues that the subject matter of logic is the second intelligibles at the position of “principles” and that its scope of research is the third-and-higher order intelligibles attached to the second intelligibles, some logicians have lately argued that the second intelligibles such as “universal”, “particular”, “essential” and “accidental” are not the subject matter of logic but rather its research sphere. However, according to him, the second intelligibles constitute the subject matter of logic. Thus, logic studies certain accidents attached to them by considering them accepted so these accidents are the problems of logic. This is the reason why al-Samarqandi argues in the quotation above as that “Logical research (bāḥth) occurs in third-and-higher order intelligibles” and also his reference to the “third intelligibles” which we are not sure whether he invented the term or not.

III

Quṭb al-din al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī (d. 766/1365) who receives directly the influence of al-Samarqandi, in his comprehensive commentary, Lawāmi’ al-asrār fī sharḥ Maṭāli’ al-anwār, on Sirāj al-dīn al-‘Urmawi’s (d. 682/1283) book on logic, Maṭāli’ al-anwār, gives the following description on the second intelligibles (taṣwir al-ma’qūlāt al-thāniya) in his discussion of the subject-matter of logic:

Logicians think that the subject-matter of logic is the second intelligibles. (…) The description of the second intelligibles is this: Existence (wujūd) stands in two ways as external and mental. Just as when the things exist in the external world some accidents such as blackness, whiteness, movement, stagnation etc are attached to their external beings, when the things are imagined in the mind, certain accidents, such as universality and particularity, are attached to them just because of the imagination, although nothing (amr) that corresponds to them in the external world. These are called second intelligibles, because they are intellected in the second order (li-annahā fī al-martaba al-thāniya min al-ta’aqqu). The reason for their being subject is this: logic studies essential and accidental states, species, genus, differentia, proprium, general accident, definition, descrip-

25 al-Samarqandi, Sharḥ al-Qistās, 8b.
tion, categorical and conditional proposition, syllogism, induction and analogy for their mentioning. No doubt that they are second intelligibles. Thus, they are the subject-matter of logic. The sphere of research for logic is the third-and-higher order intelligibles (wa baḥṭuḥu ‘an al-ma&qūlat al-thālītha wa mā ba’dahā).²⁶

Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī (d. 816/1413), in his glosses on Quṭb al-dīn al-Rāzī’s text quoted above, quotes some explanations on the second intelligibles from the “draft” of the commentator, which are important for our subject.

In the text of the commentary that is not extant today, Quṭb al-dīn al-Rāzī classifies the second intelligibles in a certain way. According to this, the second intelligibles are principally in two groups. (i) Some of these do not function as leading us reach to the unknown. For example, some intelligibles like “necessity”, “contingency” and “impossibility” are of this kind. When certain meanings (al-hay‘āt) comes to mind in relation to the external existence, some accidents are attached to these meanings, but these accidents do not have external correspondences. These, i.e. the accidents, are second intelligibles. When we make judgments such as “the necessary is this” or “the contingent is that” these judgments do not lead us to reach the unknown. This condition does not change even if they can be extended or transited to the first intelligibles. (ii) Some second intelligibles can lead us reach the unknown. These are too divided into two. (ii.a) Some of them are the sort of second intelligible that do not contain the first intelligibls and that their judgments are not applied to the first intelligibles. The descriptions of necessity, contingency and impossibility are of this sort. Although they are from second intelligibles and can lead us to the unknown, they do not contain and transit into the first intelligibles. (ii.b) Some other kinds of second intelligibles do contain the first intelligibles and their judgments can be applied to the first intelligibles. For al-Rāzī, logic studies these second intelligibles. According to him, when the fact that “the universal” is restricted to five sections is known, so is known that “the animate” is one of them. When we make judgments on “genus” and “differentia”, we would include “animate” and “thinking” to these situations. Therefore, according to al-Rāzī, these are the judgments given on the second intelligibles that are applied to the first intelligibles and these judgments constitute the scope of logic.²⁷

Quṭb al-dīn al-Rāzī’s these statements and his passage quoted above concur previous views on the second intelligible. It is easily understood that his conception

of “third intelligibles” and “higher order intelligibles” and distinction between the subject-matter of logic and scope of logic are directly inspired from al-Samarqandi. Like al-Samarqandi, the reason why Quṭb al-dīn al-Rāzī needed to make these explanations is the growing debate on the subject-matter of logic and scope of logic. Both al-Samarqandi and Quṭb al-dīn al-Rāzī argue that most of the later logicians (akthar al-muta’akhkhirīn) held that the second intelligibles are not the subject-matter of logic but rather its problems. However, such an appraisal cannot be maintained.28

Another important aspect concerning the relationship between the second intelligibles and the subject-matter of logic is the detailed and vigorous response given to the question how the second intelligibles become the subject-matter of logic. Even though early texts repeat that they “lead to the unknown,” Quṭb al-dīn al-Rāzī seems to have developed this statement. According to his perspective that would influence later logicians through Jurjānī, the second intelligibles whose conditions and characteristics are examined should possess two qualities: (i) they should actively lead to the unknown and (ii) they should contain the first intelligibles and apply their judgments on the first intelligibles.

Jurjānī who argues that the second intelligibles are attached to the first intelligibles for their existence in the mind and that there is no correspondence or reflection to them in the external world,29 in his super-commentary on Quṭb al-dīn al-Rāzī’s abovementioned commentary, explains further the intelligibles “conception” of and order of intellections.

According to Jurjānī’s important exposition on the second intelligibles and third intelligibles, when the concept of “universal” among the second intelligibles exist in the mind and when it is compared to particulars that stand beneath it, the “essentiality” is accrued to a quiddity regarding the aspects of universals that are also included in the quiddities of these particulars; the “accidentality” is accrued because of their exclusion from them; the “species” are accrued because of their being themselves. The thing on which the essentiality is accrued becomes “genus” regarding the variety of its individuals and becomes “differentia” regarding another aspect. Similarly, the thing on which accidentality is affected becomes either “proprium” or “general accident” regarding various reasons. When the essential and the accident

28 Quṭb al-dīn al-Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Maṭāli’, v. I, p. 77. Khojazāda, Muḥli‘uddin (d. 893/1488), a famous Ottoman philosopher and scholar, similar to al-Samarqandi and Quṭb al-dīn al-Rāzī, argues that the subject-matter of logic is “the second intelligibles that have no external correspondence” and the problems of logic is the states of the second intelligibles. (fa-innahū bāḥith ‘an aḥwal al-ma‘qīlat al-thāniyat allatī lā-wujūda lahā fī al-khārijī). Khocajāda, Ḥashiyā ‘ala Sharḥ Hidayat al-hikma li-Mawlānazāda, Marmara University Faculty of Theology Library, Manuscripts, n. 394, 1b.

29 For example, see Jurjānī Sharḥ al-Mawāqif, I, Istanbul: Dār al-Tibā‘at al-‘Āmira, 1311.
are composed individually or mixed (mukhtalît), the qualities of “definition” and “description” are attached to this composition. According to Jurjānī, “these meanings”, i.e. the universal’s being a particular of the quiddity and being external to the quiddity or being the quiddity itself or similar to the quiddity, cannot stand among the external existences. On the contrary, these are accidental things attached to the universal natures that exist in the mind. The same rule is true for a proposition’s being “categorical” or “conditional” and for a proof’s being “syllogism”, “induction” or “analogy”. Therefore, all these notions are attached to the predicative judgments in the mind –either individually or while being together with others.30

Jurjānī develops further his ideas on the relations between the second intelligibles, third-and-higher order intelligibles through his example of “proposition.” According to him, the proposition is a second intelligible, the thing that is being investigated is its “division” (inqisām), “contradiction” (tanāquḍ), “reflection” (in’ikās) and “result” (intāj). Therefore, “division”, “contradiction”, “reflection” and “result” occur in the third-order intelligible. For example, in logical research, when we make a judgment on one of the “sections” or one of the “contradictory” things, this judgment occurs in the fourth-order intellection. In this context, Jurjānī puts forward a possible rejection by saying “Just as the concept of proposition is attached to the nature of predicative relations without existing in the external world, “the division” and others too are attached them there, so in what respect could they be third intelligible without this concept?” Then he responds to this by saying “This is because the mind conceives first this concept’s attachment on the mentioned relations, then these conditions’ attachment to them. This rule is also true for other orders. If the mind could conceive the attachment of some of them to the nature in the second order, they could become second intelligibles.”31 Therefore, Jurjānī emphasizes that the concepts of second intelligible and third intelligibles vary according to their level of intellection and when they are conceived for intellection.

Jurjānī, in this super-commentary, discusses Quṭb al-dīn al-Rāzī’s statements with particular focus on his examples for the second intelligibles and third intelligibles. According to Jurjānī, al-Rāzī considers “essential”, “accidental” and “species” as the second intelligible. However, they are parts of a second intelligible “universal.” Besides, al-Rāzī counted “genus”, “differentia”, “proprium” and “general accident” as second intelligible though the first two are parts of “essential” and the latter two are parts of “accidental.” Therefore, these should be considered as third intelligibles. According to Jurjānī, al-Rāzī mentions them elsewhere as third intelligible. Then, why

does al-Rāzī do this? How can we understand his inconsistent views? For Jurjānī, the reason for al-Rāzī’s views is the presence of people “who think that all intelligibles higher than the first order are ‘second intelligibles’ no matter whether their intellection occur at the second or third order.” Therefore, because of some thinkers considering all intelligibles higher than first order as second intelligible, al-Rāzī too explained his statement above further. Thus, according to Jurjānī, al-Rāzī agrees with those thinkers in this mentioned texts.32

Jurjānī, in his super-commentary (Ḥāshiya al-Ta‘jrid, Ḥāshiya ‘alā Sharḥ al-Ta‘jrid or Ḥāshiya ‘alá Tashyīd al-qawā‘īd fi sharḥ Tajrīd al-aqā’īd) to the commentary of Shams al-dīn Iṣfahānī’s commentary (Tashyīd al-qawā‘īd fi sarḥ Tajrīd al-aqā’īd) on al-Ţūsī’s Tajrīd al-aqā’īd, explains clearly the first and second intelligibles. It is important to note that Jurjānī’s explanations parallel to his views outlined above are especially quoted, referred and sometimes criticized by Ottoman writers.33 He states the following in his commentary:

The first intelligibles are the very natures (tābā‘ī) of their imagined concepts. The thing that is attached to the first intelligibles in the mind while they are being free from anything with no external correspondance such as universality, essentiality etc. is called second intelligible. For example, universal, essential etc. are of this sort [i.e. second intelligible]. The reason for this naming is because they are intellected at the second order of intellection. For instance, intellecting the “universal” is possible after the intellection of something in the mind to which the universal can be attached while no external correspondance exists for the universal just as ”the intellected darkness” has no external correspondance. When the concept of universal is intellected at the second order and when its direct application is thought to be possible, another universality is attached to this concept of universal, which happens at the third order of intellection. Somebody calls these as third intelligibles. Similarly, fourth-and higher order intelligibles follow them. Some others call totally all intelligibles higher than the first order as second intelligibles. In summary, two aspects are considered for the second intelligibles. First is their intellection at higher than the first order. Second is the absence of an external correspondance for them. Therefore, everthing that is intellected at the first level –irrespective to their being existent or non-existent or being simple or complex– is first intelligible. Similarly, everything that has external correspondance, even if they function as accident to others, is first intelligible. For example, “relations”34 are first

33 For example, for an Ottoman famous philosopher Kemalpashazāda (d. 940/1534)’s criticism on Jurjānī’s perspective on the second intelligibles, see Kemalpashazāda, Risāla fī Bayān ma‘na al-ja‘l wa taḥqiq anna nafs al-mahiyya maj‘ūla, Istanbul Muftulük Library, Manuscripts, n. 276, 47a-48b.
34 We need to note that al-Fārābī considers “relations” as second intelligibles in his work where he discusses the second intelligibles whereas Jurjānī views them as first intelligibles provided that they have external realities. In the text from the Ottoman period we discuss below, relations become an issue of discussion and the authors of these texts consider relations as first intelligibles provided that they have external correspondance.
intelligibles when their external correspondances are justified. The “thingness” is second intelligible. It does not have external correspondence like “animal” which exists in the external world. So existence, general contingency and conceptness as well as thingness are second intelligibles. They are intellected only as accidents to the first intelligibles in the mind. No external correspondence exists for them, because only specific things, such as human being and horse, exist in the external world. When these specific objects are intellected, the concept of thingness is attached to them as accident [in the mind]. Unlike external accidents, no external correspondence exists for them.35

As I have tried to outline, a significant literature accumulated from al-Fārābī to Jurjānī on the second intelligibles. Al-Fārābī drew the general framework and furnished a formula for “the second intelligibles”, Ibn Sinā extended their scope and more importantly put forward the emphasis on the absence of their external correspondence as being just mental notions. As Bahmanyār applied the term in metaphysics, Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī and al-Kātibī developed it by explaining their intellelction as “judgments” and in “the second level.” With al-Samarqandi, Quṭb al-dīn al-Rāzī and Jurjānī, the discussion on the subject-matter of logic and issues of logic as well as the relations between the second intelligibles and “third-and-higher order intelligibles” became prominent. Besides, Jurjānī seems to present a comprehensive, systematic and clear interpretation on the subject, which could be an important reason for the references in the literature during the Ottoman period to his works.

These debates and interpretations emphasize two basic aspects of the second intelligibles. First, the second intelligibles are intellected at the second level while depending on the first intelligibles. Second, they are only mental notions or relations with no external correspondence. These two aspects became standard both in the traditions of Peripathetic and Illuminationist philosophy and in the theological schools. The thinkers from the Ottoman period, as I will show below, inherited the previous tradition on the second intelligibles with these two aspects through al-Kātibī, Quṭb al-dīn al-Rāzī and Jurjānī.

IV

One of the founders of Ottoman tradition of thought and science, Mullā Fanārī, like many previous logicians, discusses the second intelligibles in the context of the subject-matter of logic in his commentary, al-Fawāʿid al-Fanāriyya, on Athir al-dīn al-Abhari’s book on logic, Isāghūjī (al-Risāla al-Athiriyya). He makes the following

statement in his *al-Fawā'id al-Fanāriyya* which is taught in Ottoman madrasa and on which numerous commentaries are written:

We say the following: [1] logic, for its first aspect [i.e. its essential unity], [a] studies essential accidents of conceptions and assents for their help in reaching the unknown. Or logic [b] studies the essential accidents of the second intelligibles, which do not have external correspondance, for their encompassing of the first intelligibles, which have external correspondance. [2] Logic, for its second aspect [i.e. its accidental unity], is the law through which we distinguish the sound and unsound ideas. In the first aspect [1a and 1b], the knowledge of the subject-matter of logic is given according to two schools of thought (*’alā al-madhhabayn*) whereas in the second [2], the knowledge of the objective of logic is given.⁶⁶

Mullâ Fanārî introduces here two definitions of logic in respect to its subject and objective and he adopts the definition in respect to subject from two views (1a and 1b) he has inherited from previous Muslim logicians as he refers this with “according to two schools of thought” towards the end of the quotation. The word “or” between in the middle of the first definition (between 1a and 1b), like some scholars indicate,⁶⁷ does not contain some doubt, nor does it mean the existence of two definitions for the same aspect. On the contrary, he wants to identify the definition of logic, and so the subject-matter of logic, “as such according to one approach and as that according to another approach.”

Fanârî, who is acquainted with the—abovementioned—discussions among Muslim philosophers and logicians, does not explicitly prefer any perspective. However, his phase of “the second intelligibles, which do not have external correspondance,” shows that he adopts directly an Avicennan approach here. In addition, his phrase “the second intelligibles (...) for their encompassing of the first intelligibles” in the context of the subject-matter of logic indicates that he relies on Qūṭ al-dīn al-Rāzî.

Burhān al-dīn b. Kamāl al-dīn Bulgarî (d. ?), in his *al-Fawā'id al-Burhāniyya*, one of the first and influential commentaries on Mullâ Fanârî’s text, starts discussing the second intelligibles by examining Fanârî’s phrase of “which do not have external correspondance.” According to Bulgarî, this phrase is an adjective identifying (*ṣifa kāshifa*) the “reality” of the second intelligibles and it indicates this: “The second intelligibles such as ‘universal’, ‘essential’, ‘accidental’ are intelligibles that do not have external correspondance because they cannot be attributed to objects in the external world.” According to him, these cannot be applied for external beings, because everything in the external world, in other words, every external beings, is

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⁶⁶ Mullâ Fanârî, *al-Fawâ'id al-Fanâriyya* (İstanbul: Şirket-i Sahâfiyye-i Osmâniyye Matbaası, 1322), pp. 4-5.
particular. Fanārī’s phrase, on the first intelligibles, of “which have external correspondence” explains the reality of the first intelligibles and it indicates this: “The first intelligibles are the intelligibles that have external correspondence because they can be attributed to objects in the external world.” For example, “human being”, which can be attributed to Zayd, Amr and Bakr, is first intelligible. According to Bulgari, the difference between the first intelligibles and the second intelligibles is the attribution of the former to external beings while the attribution of the latter only to mental forms. For example, “live” as a first intelligible can be attributed to the human individuals existing in the external world. Yet, “universal and its parts” as second intelligibles are qualities of mental forms not external beings, because all external beings are particular.38

Bulgari clarifies at the same time the phrase regarding the second intelligibles as encompassing the first intelligibles. According to him, this means that the second intelligibles can be applied to the first intelligibles through a syllogistic synthesis. For example such a syllogism can be proposed: “Animal” can be attributed to many things with various realities. The thing that can be attributed to many things with various realities is genus. Therefore, animal is a genus.” Being genus here is the essential accident of the “universal” second intelligibles, so by way of this syllogism– it is attributed to “animal.” Bulgari also reminds a possible objection but he leaves it unanswered. He formulates the objection as such: “In this case, the conception should be obtained from assent, just as, for example, to know ‘human being’ depends on its definition as ‘the speaking animal.’ Its definition as ‘the speaking animal’ depends on the assent of its animalness. Therefore, to know human being depends on the assent of that animal is a genus.”39

It is interesting to note that Bulgari asserts that the only difference between the first intelligibles and the second intelligibles depends on whether they have external correspondence or not. Therefore, Bulgari adopts the definition of Ibn Sīnā and he consciously ignores the differentiation of the “level/order of intellection” that finds a significant place in post-Avicennan philosophy through the influence of al-Rāzī. His disregard of the level of intellection in discussing the realities of the first intelligibles and the second intelligibles and his interpretation of Mullā Fanārī’s statements in this line became a point of criticism by some commentators as I will show below. However, Bulgari’s description of the second intelligibles as “the quali-

38 Burhān al-dīn b. Kamāl al-dīn Bulgārī, al-Fawā’id al-Burhāniyya, Marmara University Faculty of Theology Library, Manuscripts, n. 935, 4b-5b.
39 Bulgārī, al-Fawā’id al-Burhāniyya, 5b-6a. The question that Bulgārī raises, al-Fawā’id al-Fanārīyya’s this commentary has also the same statement: Mahmūd Nashāba, Nesr al-darārī ‘alā Sharḥ al-Fanārī (İstanbul: Matbaatü’l-Ālem, 1312), p. 33.
ties of mental forms” and his criticism on the second intelligibles’ encompassing of the first intelligibles seem to be important.

Ahmed b. Muhammed b. Khidr (d. c. 950/1543), known as “Kul Ahmed,” in his important and influential commentary, Kul (Qawl) Ahmed, on al-Fawā'id al-Fanāriyya, examines Mullā Fanārī’s statements in the light of previous literature. In this context, Kul Ahmed defines the first intelligibles that are affected by the second intelligibles as “the very imagined natures (tabā’i’) of concepts,” which concurs the definition of Jurjānī.  

It seems that by “the very natures” he means the quiddities in the mind by disregarding any attachments. According to him, the second intelligibles are those things that become accident to the first intelligibles in the mind and that have no external correspondance or if they are of the kinds of things by which “nothing can be qualified when they stand as external correspondance of something.” For example, concepts like “universal”, “particular”, “essential” and “accidental” are of this kind. Unlike Bulgarī, Kul Ahmed who follows rather post-al-Rāzian tradition and especially Jurjānī, paraphrases Jurjānī’s statements, though without citing him, and attributes the reason for the naming “second intelligibles” to their intellection at the second level/order. “[For example] to intellect the ‘universality’ is possible after the mental intellection of a concept to which universality becomes accident.” Besides, no external correspondance exists for the universality.

40 An Ottoman scholar and philosopher Kara Seyyidi-i Ḥamīdī (d. 913/1507), in his work titled Risāla fi al-Wujūd al-dhihnī, alludes the definition first seen in Jurjānī and then Kul Ahmed and he states that as a result of the human soul’s mental operation on some particular objects in the external world, “the universal natures of species and genuses” come to be ready to overflow towards it and asserts that all of these are called “first intelligibles. He argues that the reason for such a naming is that no intellection before them exists. Similarly, according to Hamīdī, their overflowing depends only on senses (al-ihsās faqat) not on another intellection. However, the second intelligibles are different. They can be intellected after the first intelligibles and they do not have external correspondance. See Mehmet Aydın, “Kara Seyyidi-i Hamidi ve Zihnî Varlık Risalesi: Tahkik ve Değerlendirme”, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, 37 (2013), p. 85, 87. As Hamīdī examines in his work the structure of propositions made of second intelligibles, he also discusses certain questions like how the ‘contingency’ as prerequisite of the external and mental quiddity is also considered second intelligible as only being accidents attached to the things in the mind. See Aydın, “Kara Seyyidi-i Hamidi”, pp. 93-94.

41 Al-Ḥāfīz b. Al-ʿImādī, Ḥāshiya ‘alā Kul (Qawl) Ahmed, Marmara University Faculty of Theology Library, Manuscripts, n. 975, 74a.

42 Al-ʿImādī (d. ?) makes the following statement in his commentary on Kul (Qawl) Ahmed: “We need to make this explanation: The existence is in two kinds, external and mental. Just as when objects exists in the external world, certain things such as blackness or whiteness become accident to their external beings, similarly when they are represented (tamaththalat) in the mind, certain accidents like universality, particularity and essentiality which have no external realities are attached to their mental representations. For example we know first that the animal is a body growing, sensing and moving with will’ and so this is from the first intelligibles. Then we intellect the aspect ‘that does not inhibit commonality’ [i.e. universality], and this is from the second intelligibles. Then we intellect that it is ‘essential’ and so this is from the third intelligible. Thus, it continues upward in this pattern. Here what is meant by the second intelligibles is that it is not intellectated at the first level. Therefore, it is not important whether it is intellectated at the second, third or fourth level.” Al-ʿImādī, Ḥāshiya, 74a.
On the other hand, “the intellected darkness” can have an external correspondence. “In summary, two aspects are considered for the second intelligibles. Firstly, they are not intellected in the first level of intellection and they are intellected as accidents to the another intellected thing in the mind. Secondly, no external correspondence exists for them.” By emphasizing Jurjānī’s statements underlining these two aspects, Kul Aḥmed who seems to criticize Bulgari, argues that everything intellected in the first level is first intelligible and this fact does not change with its being existent, non-existent, simple or complex. Similarly, the thing intellected as accident to others is also first intelligible if it have an external correspondence. For example, “relations” are of this sort for the one who supports their verification in the external world.43

In the text mentioned above, Kul Ahmed develops the usage of “second intelligibles” and tells about two kinds of its usage: (i) literal and (ii) technical. According to this, in the literal usage, the “things intellected at the second level” are considered whereas in the technical usage, “two aspects regarded” are considered. Therefore, in Mullā Fanārī’s phrase of “the second intelligibles that have no external correspondence” means the literal meaning of the second intelligibles. Otherwise, the phrase of “that have no external correspondence” would become unnecessary, therefore, the literal usage is here meant by the second intelligibles. Thus, the condition that they “have no external correspondence” refers to all “second intelligibles” in the technical usage of the term. Thus, it is impossible to categorize the second intelligibles in terms of its technical usage and it is also impossible to think the phrase “like someone [Bulgarı] suppose they do not have external correspondence” as a definition rendering full reality of the second intelligibles, because this definition can be nullified by a first intelligible “non-existent.”44 No external correspondence exists for such a non-existent. According to Kul Aḥmed, the same rule applies to the statements on the first intelligibles.45

Among famous Ottoman scientists and philosophers, Šadr al-dīn-zāda Mehmed Emin Shirwâni (d. 1036/1627) provides a relatively more comprehensive exposition on the second intelligibles through commenting on Mullā Fanārī’s texts. He

43 Al-ʾImādī, following to his examples for relations such as “fatherhood”, “sonness”, “distance” and “proximity,” states the following: “Philosophers argue that they are accidents which have external correspondence. Theologians do not accept their external realities, on the contrary, they argue that they are mental constructs.” Al-ʾImādī, Ḩāshiya, 74a.

44 Al-ʾImādī, asserts that this argument is questionable, because according to him such an argument depends on the necessity that the adjective giving the reality of something (al-ṣifa al-ḵašifa) is to identically describe the described. Yet, this is called apodictic. Even one should think seriously on the necessity that the descriptor is to be equal to the described. See Al-ʾImādī, Ḩāshiya, 74b.

45 Ahmed b. Muhammed, Kul (Qawl) Ahmed, pp. 5-6.
starts his commentary, *Sharḥ ‘alā Jihat al-waḥda li al-Fanārī*, on *al-Fawā'id al-Fanāriyya*, with a general definition of the second intelligibles: “The second intelligibles are states that become accidents to something for its mental existence.” For Shirwānī, this means the second intelligibles’ becoming accident to something is closely connected with the mental existence of the thing (*ma'rūd*) that is being affected with accident.\(^{46}\) He also explains this with the following statements on the second intelligibles: “They are only intellected in the mind as accidents to other intellected things and [these mental accidents] are called second intelligibles. The reason for this, as seen in universal, they are intellected at the second level. Don’t you see that the universality can only be intellected after the intellection of a concept to which the universality is attached.” In fact, “particular” is also similar. Therefore, the origin of the qualification of something as universal or particular is only “the mental construct.” According to Shirwānī, particular, an essential accident, cannot be accident for an external existent. The meaning of the statement “Everything that occurs in the external world is particular” means if something that exists in the external world happens to occur in the mind, it cannot be particular and common. This statement does not mean that something existing in the external world becomes particular only for its being in the external world.\(^{47}\)

Shirwānī starts a new debate by arguing that it should not be seen as problematic that universal and particular are both intrinsic accidents and second intelligibles. According to him, the universal means that “its attribution to multiple things is not impossible when a concept occurs in the mind whereas the particular means that its attribution to multiple things is impossible when a concept occurs in the mind.” According to Shirwānī, this state of “being” is accident to that concept not in the mind but in the “thing-itself.” This state does not depend on the occurrence in the mind and not even on the contingency of happening in the mind. In this perspective, while its occurrence in the mind is impossible, it is accepted that God’s special essence is “real particular.”\(^{48}\)

Shirwānī who expresses his thoughts on where the second intelligibles come into place, supports his argument by this: The characterization of a concept with both universal and particular takes place in the thing-in-itself, which is impera-

\(^{46}\) Among a logician that Shirwānī influences, Eskijizāda Ali b. Hüseyin Edirnevi (d. 1243/1827-28), in his work *Sharḥ Isaghiyya*, without citing, paraphrases Shirwānī’s these views in his discussion on the second intelligibles; see Eskijizāda, *Sharḥ Isaghiyya* (Edirne: Edirne Vilâyet Matbaası, 1287), p. 27 ff.

\(^{47}\) Shirwānī, *Sharḥ ‘alā Jihat al-waḥda*, p. 18-19. As an example for the influence of Shirwānī’s these statements and similar explanations on later literature see Abdûnnaﬁ İffet, *Fenn-i Mantı: Terceme-i Burhan-i Gelenbevi*, I, İstanbul: Matbaa-i Āmire, 1304, p. 70 ff.

tively impossible to happen in the external world and so is in the mind. The role of the mental existence on these two things’ being accidents does not mean that the mental existence becomes a condition in the subject by making the proposition “attributive” (in other words, in the proposition first the subject is qualified and then the predicate is attached to it). On the contrary, it means the mental existence is “corrector and criterion”\(^{49}\) for something to be accident. Therefore, the affected thing (\(\textit{ma’rūḍ}\)) is the very concept (or the concept for its being a concept) with the condition that it is a mental existence. As Shirwānī, who distinguishes the kind of being accident in the second intelligibles and other kinds of being accident, asserts that movement for body, burning for fire, lightening for the sun is of the sort on which the mental existence does not have an effect and they happen as accidents in the external world. Therefore, these are called “the necessity of existence.” When both mental and external existences do not affect the appearance of certain conditions, these conditions are called “the necessity of quiddity.” These are accidents to the quiddity and conditions that characterize that quiddity as long as the quiddity exists. For example, “being even” for “four” is of this kind.\(^{50}\) Wherever the quiddity of four exists, being even becomes accident to it.

Shirwānī continues his discussion by interpreting Mullâ Fanârî’s phrase of “the second intelligibles for which no external correspondance exists”. According to him, this phrase, which argues that when something exists in the external world that thing cannot be described by second intelligibles, asserts the reality of the second intelligibles and it applies the technical usage of the term. It seems that Shirwānī agrees with Bulgari and has a position against Kul Aḥmed. Therefore, Shirwānī paraphrases Mullâ Fanârî’s statements in the following way: “The second intelligibles are the conditions by which a thing with an external correspondance cannot be described. Besides, the second intelligibles, are accidents attached to things for their mental existences.” According to Shirwānī, the negation in the definition (i.e. the one in the condition that cannot be described) refers to the condition, the phrase of “external.” Thus, such a definition, unlike Kul Aḥmed’s argument, cannot be nullified by a first intelligible, “non-existent.” The non-existent as first intelligible is like hypothetical universals and is not mental accident for a thing or a concept. Hypothetical universals are the kind of species that do not have hypothetical individuals. Therefore, they are intrinsic universal and cannot be conditions or adjective. Obviously, the absolute non-existence (\(\textit{al’-ādām al-muṭlaq}\)) can only be intellected as accident to another thing and nothing in the external world exists for being de-

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\(^{49}\) Eskijizāda also states the same thing; see Eskijizāda, \(\textit{Sharḥ Isāghūjī}\), p. 27.

\(^{50}\) Shirwānī, \(\textit{Sharḥ ‘alā Jihat al-waḥda}\), p. 19.
scribed by absolute non-existence, as explained also in the commentaries on *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd*. Yet, it is from second intelligibles. Therefore, Kul Ahmed’s argument that the phrase “the second intelligibles for which no external correspondence exists” is not a definition rendering the true character of the second intelligibles and that otherwise it can be nullified by a first intelligible non-existent shows his lack of understanding the subject.51

Following these explanations, Shirwānī continues to discuss the characteristics of the second intelligibles. According to him, “The second intelligibles are conceptually known things that become accident to ‘things for their mental existences’.52 This does not change with these things’ being of conceptual or assertive.” This can be exemplified with the concept of universal as being accident to the concepts of animal and human being; and with the concept of proposition as being accident to the phrase “human being writes.” Shirwānī, who underlines that the second intelligibles are in general “obvious necessities” (*lawāzim bayyina*), argues –unlike some scholars– that like the known things, the second intelligibles cannot be separated into two categories as conceptual and assertive.53 Shirwānī does not here cite the scholars who categorize the second intelligibles as conceptual and assertive. However, he firmly oppose the approach, which seems to have developed as a result of the developments after Fakhr al-din al-Rāzī, and never approves to categorize the second intelligibles as such.

Shirwānī holds that the things to which the second intelligibles become accidents (the things affected by the second intelligibles) are called “first intelligibles” because they are intellected at the first level/order. In this context, just as the particular stands under the scope of the universal, the first intelligibles stand under the scope of the second intelligibles. The concept of genus of the concept of animal and the concept of species to the concept of human being can be examples for this. In this context, like Bulgarī, but in opposition to Kul Ahmed, Shirwānī holds the view arguing that Fanārī’s phrase for the first intelligibles as “the things that have external correspondence” stands as the adjective describing the characteristics of the first intelligibles. Therefore, external conditions/qualities and necessities of quiddity are first intelligibles. Similarly, “relations” are first intelligibles when the quiddities are described by them for their external existences. The non-existent that is intellected at the first level is also first intelligible. If an external eality is qualified with it, “Anka” could be an example for this. “Anka” is also accepted as a universal

52 Eskijizāda also similarly states that the second intelligibles are composed of imaginative knowables and confirmative knowables are not included in the second intelligibles; see Eskijizāda, *Sharḥ Isaghiyī*, p. 25.
whose individuals are contingent. Besides, thingness, existence, contingency etc as well as quiddity, impossible and absence are considered second intelligible. According to Shirwānī’s narrative, Jurjānī says the following in his Ḥashiyā al-Taṣrij: The thingness as a second intelligible is an absolute thingness whereas the things in the external world are concrete (makhṣūs) things. On the other hand, we should not think that the absolute animalness does not exist in the external world and that concrethearimals exist in the external world, therefore that it is also second intelligible, because the “animalness” is not “only the thing that is attached to others as accident.” Shirwānī continues to his explanations:

If you say that it is a natural body and it needs matter in both forms of existence, I say the following: The dependence on the matter in intellection does not require “necessarily the intellection as being accident to others” [Besides] the following cannot be argued either: How could thing, contingent, existent etc. be considered second intelligibles while the existence of their individuals stand in the external world; the existent as being divided into the categories of external existent and mental existent is also similar. [This cannot be maintained], because we argue the following: A concept’s being of a second intelligible and, on behalf its assumed individuals, its being accident to things in the mind do not contradict the existence of its external individuals and its predication to them univocally (mutawaṭī). Thus, this concept becomes second intelligible for its assumed mental individuals whereas it becomes an external existent on the other hand. Similarly, Allāma Dawwānī too explained it as such.54

It seems that Shirwānī emphasizes certain aspects of the second intelligibles and initiated new debates through some new formulations. It is necessary to underline especially these four points: (i) the second intelligibles are “conceptual knowables” and they do not include “assertive knowables”; (ii) as it is seen in the examples of “universal” and “particular”, the characterization of a concept with second intelligibles does not occur in the mind or in the external world, but does in the thing-in-itself; (iii) a second intelligible’s being accident for a concept depends on the mental existence, which plays the role of corrector and criterion; and (iv) a second intelligible’s being of second intelligible can only be possible with “its being accident to another intelligible.”

An Ottoman scholar and philosopher Kara Khalil b. Ḥasan al-Tirawī (d. 1123/1711) wrote in 1105/1693-94 a famous and comprehensive commentary titled al-Risāla al-‘Awnīyya fi Ḣāl al-Ḥashiya al-Ṣadriyye on Shirwānī’s text where he examines the subject of second intelligibles and criticizes Shirwānī. Kara Khalil mentions some of the sources that Shirwānī alludes without mentioning their names, so Kara Khalil also brings them into the debate.

Kara Khalil writes this treaties that can be considered as a commentary on *al-Fawāid al-Fanāriyya* where he begins the discussion with a description of the first intelligibles. Like Jurjānī and Kul Aḥmed, he defines the first intelligibles as “the very natures (*ṭabā‘i‘*) of the conceptual concepts” and exemplifies this with the concept of “animal” as “a body moving by will, having senses and growing.” According to him, this very concept is first intelligible. To define the second intelligibles, he reproduces Jurjānī’s a paragraph in Ḥāshiya al-Tajrid quoted above, from the sentence “the first intelligibles are the very natures (*ṭabā‘i‘*) of imagined concepts” to the sentence “relations’ are first intelligibles when they are considered to have external correspondance.”

Therefore, Kara Khalil, departing from the path of Bulgarī, Kul Aḥmed and Shirwānī, returns to the third-and-higher order intelligibles, an issue which has been seen in the literature since Shams al-dīn al-Samarqandī –in the form Jurjānī presents. Besides, like Kul Aḥmed, he continues to emphasize two aspects concerning the nature of the second intelligibles.

Kara Khalil partly elaborates the issue of what Shirwānī calls the “origin of being accident.” According to this, the “origin” of the second intelligibles’ being accident is the existence of an affected thing in the mind. Therefore, anything whose origin of being accident is the existence of an affected thing in the mind cannot have external reality. In addition, it needs to be intellected at the second level and thereby it becomes second intelligible. In this case, the origin of “relations” being accident is not the existence of their affected things in the mind. Therefore, relations cannot be in the category of second intelligibles. As a result, “what is meant by the second intelligibles is the thing whose ‘condition’ for being accident is only mind.”

Kara Khalil also discusses Shirwānī’s views on the place (*nafs al-amr*) for universal and particular as second intelligibles to attach a concept and criticizes him on this issue. He first discusses the issue of place/habitat/space (*mawṭīn*).

According to Kara Khalil there are three place (*mawṭīn*): Thing-in-itself, ex-

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55 For a later usage of the same description see Mahmud Nashāba, *Nesr al-darārī*, p. 31.
58 Kara Khalil explains the “nafs al-amr” as such: “The meaning of the thing-in-itself is ‘the very itself of something.’ What is meant by ‘amr’ is the very itself of the thing. For example, when we say ‘the thing exists in the thing-in-itself, this sentence comes to mean this: it actually exists. The meaning of its actual existence is that its being does not depend on the consideration of the one considers or the assumption of the one assumes. On the contrary, it exists even without any kind of consideration and assumption. This existence is either essential [external] or shadowy [mental]. Therefore, the thing-in-itself includes (*yatanāwalu*) external and mental beings. However, the thing-in-itself is absolutely more general than the external world. Everything in the mind does not exists in the thing-in-itself. If some-
ternal world and mind. In reality, they are considered in two categories as external world and mind, because the thing-in-itself can be divided into two and it is limited to them. The qualifying of one thing to another thing unavoidably requires a place. We already know that universal and particular are mental accidents not external accidents. Therefore, the place for qualifying universal and particular is the mind not the external world. When qualifying happens in the mind, the qualified should also be in the mind even if it is shadow existence. However, the essence of God creates a problem here, because while it is impossible for a qualified thing to exist in the mind, His essence can be qualified with particular. According to Kara Khalil, Shirwānī tries to solve this problem by considering it as the accidents of the thing-in-itself rather than as the mental accidents of universal and particular. Yet, this is questionable, because the thing-in-itself is restricted to the mind and external world. According to him, Shirwānī’s this perspective comes from his lack of understanding the meaning of the thing-in-itself and its being restricted to mental and external worlds. According to Kara Khalil, if Shirwānī questioned the essence of God’s qualifying with particularity and opposed this, he would have more appropriate view.59

Kara Khalil opposes Shirwānī and Bulgari by saying that the phrase of “that do not have external correspondance” does not describe the characteristics of the second intelligibles. His point of departure as parallel to Kul Ahmed is the idea that two aspects should be considered about the second intelligibles. While the phrase of “that do not have external correspondance” is a necessary condition, it is not sufficient condition, because in this case the true characteristics of the second intelligibles, which is their intellection beyond the first level and as an accident to another intelligible, could be neglected. As for Kara Khalil, “while the blindness [as lacking the sight] does not exist in the external world, it is still not second intelligible. As stated above, the origin of being accident in the second intelligibles is their being mental existences.” At this point, Kara Khalil openly asserts the inaccuracy of Bulgari’s perspective and states that “the blindness etc.” nullifies this view. Besides, by citing the commentary of Kul Ahmed whom he calls “our master”, Fanārī’s intention by the “second intelligibles” is not its technical usage, but rather its literal usage which emphasizes “the things intellected at the second level” 60

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60 Kara Khalil, _al-Risāla al-‘Awniyya_, p. 111-112.
As seen in this survey, Kara Khalil in general positions himself along with Kul Ahmed against Bulgari and Shirwānī. However, on the debate where Kul Ahmed proposed that the phrase of “that do not have external correspondance” is not a sufficient definition giving the full characteristics of the second intelligibles, because a first intelligible “non-existent” could nullify this phrase as no external correspondance exists for such a non-existent” and Shirwānī criticizes Kul Ahmed, Kara Khalil seems to support Shirwānī’s position.

According to Kara Khalil, Shirwānī’s treatment of the second intelligibles as “mental accidents attached to things for their mental existences” prevents his mentioned definition from being nullified by “non-existent,” which is a first intelligible. In other words, according to Kara Khalil, Kul Ahmed’s “argument of non-existent as intellected at the first level” is irrelevant for Shirwānī’s statements, because Shirwānī underlines the dimension of mental existence in his discussion on the second intelligibles. As Kara Khalil discusses the issue in detail, his following statements shows the invalidity of Kul Ahmed’s argument as well as clarifies his views on first and second intelligibles:

When we imagine the very quiddities and realities, they are first intelligibles. When we consider (i’tabarnā) accidents for these first intelligibles, -like being genus and essential for "animal"-, or when we make certain judgments upon them,-like "It is universal" or "It is essential", these accidents and judgments are second intelligibles. They are intellected at the second level of intellection. The verification of this is the following: The quiddity has two existences: external and mental. Accidents particular to every kinds of existence are attached to this quiddity. The second intelligibles are accidents that are attached to the natures of things for their being themselves while they do not have external correspondance. Therefore, the second intelligibles are accidents and judgments that exist only in the mind. Otherwise, external accidents would also become second intelligibles. They are however not second intelligibles.61

As Kara Khalil asserts a clear definition for the second intelligibles in the passage quoted above, it is important to note that he emphasizes judgments along with conceptions among the second intelligibles. We can consider this perspective as a deviation from Shirwānī who prefers to view the second intelligibles only as “conceptual knowables.”

We need to note also that Kara Khalil criticizes Shirwānī for his inclusion of the first intelligibles under the second intelligibles. According to Kara Khalil, Shirwānī bases the second intelligibles’ inclusion of the first intelligibles on –if we look at his wording- the second intelligibles’ being accident to the first intelligibles. However,

61 Kara Khalil, al-Risāla al-‘Awniyya, p. 113-114.
being accident does not require the “inclusion” (al-indirāj), because, for example, the universality becomes accident to “animal”; but animal does not stand under the universal although it is affected by the universal. Therefore, it is not correct to build the connection between the first intelligibles and the second intelligibles for their being accidents.62

As seen above, Kara Khalil in his commentary on Shirwānī’s texts discusses and analyzes the second intelligibles in detail and as a general perspective criticizes Bulgarī and especially Shirwānī. Besides, he positions himself along with Kul Aḥmed in the debates between commentaries. Although he develops Kul Aḥmed’s views further and occasionally seems to find Shirwānī’s view more reasonable.

V

In conclusion, the term second intelligibles, which is first defined by al-Fārābī in the history of philosophy, has been discussed and developed by certain philosophers such as Ibn Sinā, al-Ṣāwī, Fakhr al-din al-Rāzī, al-Kātibī, al-Samarqandī, Quṭb al-din al-Rāzī and Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī and it grows in time to include contents that many disciplines become interested. To sum, following al-Fārābī, Ibn Sinā’s description and emphasis on that the second intelligibles do not have external correspondence has a foundational effect in later periods. Ibn Sinā who separates clearly the metaphysical and logical aspects of the second intelligibles adds the concepts of “necessary” and “contingent” into the category of the second intelligibles, which becomes important for the expansion of the scope of the term especially by the contributions of Bahmanyār. It should be considered an important development that Al-Ṣāwī associates the first intelligibles with the second intelligibles through “judging, attaching and subtracting” and he takes the second intelligibles as notions coming into place through this operation. In this framework, he seems to have been influential on Fakhr al-din al-Rāzī and al-Kātibī.

Al-Rāzī who discusses the second intelligibles relatively in detail developed some new dimensions. His emphasis on the fact that the second intelligibles are intellected at “the second level” became one of the important subjects of later discussions on the second intelligibles. In addition, al-Rāzī’s consideration of restrictive and predicative judgments as second intelligibles is also an important development that has changed the direction of discussions. It was al-Kātibī who develops al-Rāzī’s ideas by relying on al-Ṣāwī. Sahrazūrī’s taking of the second intelligibles as “judg-

62 Kara Khalil, al-Risāla al-‘Awniyya, p. 119.
ments” and al-Samarqandi’s differentiation of the first intelligibles and the second intelligibles, according to which the former does not have judgment while the latter has restrictive or predicative judgments, were significantly critical developments. However, more importantly, al-Samarqandi includes third, forth and higher order intelligibles into the discussion. Jurjâni appears as an important figure and a point of reference in analyzing, developing, systematizing and guiding the discussions through the possibilities in Quṭb al-dīn al-Rāzī’s texts.

This literature on the second intelligibles developed since al-Fārābī is inherited by the Ottoman philosophers and logicians through al-Kātibi, Quṭb al-dīn al-Rāzī and Jurjâni and the discussions continue with new debates, criticism and analyses until the modern period. During the Ottoman period, the second intelligibles appears in the metaphysics with ontological concepts as well as in the debates on the mind and mental existence. As it is the case in previous periods, it can be said that the subject is treated in the works on logic during the Ottoman era. For this reason, the commentaries on Mullā Fanarī’s work on logic, titled al-Fawāid al-Fanārīyya stand as representative works on the examination and analysis of the second intelligibles.

In the texts examined above where we observe the continuation of the inherited tradition with new syntheses, the mentioned Ottoman philosophers and logicians seem to discuss the second intelligibles by focusing principally on three issues among others: (i) the question of the second intelligibles’ reality, (ii) the origin of their being accident to concepts in the mind, and (iii) the place (mawṭin) of mental concepts’ qualifying by the second intelligibles.

In this framework, Bulgari, who focuses on the first issue, appears to put forward that the reality of the second intelligibles (that he describes as “the characteristics of mental images”) is “the absence of any external correspondence for them” and thereby to keep an Avicennan argument and emphasis.

Kul Aḥmed, who seems to rely on the school after Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī and especially Jurjâni by criticizing Bulgari, stresses “two conditions” in which the first of the realities of the second intelligibles is their intellection at the second level and

63 For example, see Mullā Fanarī, Miṣbāḥ al-uns, ed. Muḥammad Khwājawi, (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Movla, 1374), p. 150, 151-152; Tashkoprızāda, Risalat al-Shuhūd al-‘aynī fī mabāḥith al-wujūd al-dhīhīn, Suleymaniye Library, Esad Efendi, n. 3709, 149b.

64 For example See Chavushzâdah Ahmed, Risāla fī al-Ma’qūlāt al-ūlā wa al-thāniya, Koprülü Library, Meḥmed Asım Bey 704, 26b-28a. Although this treatise is devoted only to the second intelligibles, it is considerably small and its content is limited in comparison to the commentaries we examined above.
the second is their lacking of an external correspondeance. Besides, his distinction between the literal and technical usage of the second intelligibles brings a new dimension to the discussions.

Shirwâni, a scholar whose exposition is more comprehensive and initiated new conceptualizations, agrees with Bulgarî and criticized Kul Aḥmed on the reality of the second intelligibles. As he makes an important contribution by saying that the second intelligibles are only conceptual knowables not assertive knowables, Shirwâni views the origin of the second intelligibles as “mental occurence.” Shirwâni argues that the second intelligibles’ being accident to a concept depended especially on the mental existence which plays as “corrector and criterion.” In addition, he asserts the place of the mental concepts’ qualifying by the second intelligibles is the thing-in-itself not the mind or the external world.

Kara Khalil who generally criticizes Bulgarî and Shirwâni positioned himself along with Kul Aḥmed whom he called “our master.” Like Kul Aḥmed, he opposes Bulgarî and Shirwâni by emphasizing on “two conditions” on the reality of the two intelligibles. Kara Khalil seems to agree with Shirwâni by elaborating his view on the origin of the second intelligibles’ being accident. On the third issue (place), unlike Shirwâni, he asserts that the place is the “mind” not the thing-in-itself. Besides, it is worth noting that Kara Khalil emphasizes that judgments as well as certain concepts are second intelligibles.

Lastly, we also need to note for the Ottoman period that there were two different perspectives in the above-mentioned commentaries of al-Fawā’id al-Fanāriyya on the second intelligibles. The first is the perspective of Bulgarî supported by Shirwâni; the other is the perspective of Kul Aḥmed supported by Kara Khalil. Could we also talk about these perspectives on various issues? If we talk about these perspectives, who else were involved in these discussions and to what extent were these perspectives extended? We need to expect new research to answer these questions.

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