THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN F.C.S. SCHILLER’S PRAGMATIC HUMANISM AND THE CAUSALITY CONCEPT OF HUME

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Abstract
It can be claimed that humanism is in close relation to the philosophy of Hume to oppose absolutist structures. The fact that pragmatism has an empiric structure is important in order to establish the soundness of this relationship. However, it should be kept in mind that the philosophy of Hume is fundamentally separated from humanism because of its skeptic and intellectualist tendencies. In addition, it is seen that humanism is trying to get rid of Hume’s criticism of causality and activity. Because F.C.S. Schiller, one of the proponents of pragmatic humanism, can be said to criticize the philosophy of Hume in terms of inadequacy and inconsistency. It can be stated that he tried to dominate a method where the will is taken from the center. Pragmatic humanism claims that Hume, who put forward his own psychology by asserting the inconsistency of rationalism, has many dichotomies in his claims about reality. If the ultimate goal is to achieve a testable, changeable and relative reality, it may be possible to adopt a voluntary structure. In order for such a structure to occur, a method where the human being is in the center should be built.

Keywords: Pragmatic Humanism, F.C.S. Schiller, Hume, Reality, Truth.

E.C.S. Schiller’in Pragmatik Hümanizmi ile Hume’un Nedensellik Anlayışı Arasındaki İlişki
Öz
Pragmatik Hümanizmin mutlakçılık yapılara karşı olma hususunda Hume’cu düşüncede ile yakın ilişki içerisinde olduğu iddia edilebilir. Pragmatizmin empirist bir yapıya sahip ol-

KAYNAKÇA
ması bu ilişkinin sağlamlığını tesis etmek açısından önemlidir. Ancak Hume’cu düşün-
çenin septik ve entelektüel eğilimlerinden dolayı pragmatik hUMANizm'den esaslı bir
şekilde ayrıldığı da unutulmamalıdır. Bu nedenle pragmatik hUMANizm'in Hume’un
nedensellik ve hareket hakkındaki eleştirilerinden kurtulma çabaı içerisinde olduğu da
görülmektedir. Zira pragmatik hUMANizm'in savunucularından F.C.S. Schiller'in söz
konusu düşüncüyi yetersizlik ve tutarsızlık açısından eleştiride tabi tuttuğu, Hume’yu
felsefeyi olumsuzlayan rasyonalizmin çıkılmasıının farkına vararak iradenin merkeze
alındığı bir yöntemi hakim kılmaya çalıştığı ifade edilebilir. 
Pragmatik hUMANizm, rasyonalizmin tutarsızlığıni ileri sürerek kendi psikolojisini orta-
ya koyan Hume’un da gerçekliğe dair iddialarında pek çok dikotomiye sahip olduğunu
iddia eder. Eğer test edilebilir, değişebilir ve rolatif bir gerçekliğe ulaşmak nihai amaç
olsona, iradeci bir yapının benimsenmesi mümkün olabilir. Böyle bir yapının oluşması
 için de insanın merkezde olduğu bir yöntemin inşa edilmesi gerekir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Pragmatik HUMANizm, F.C.S. Schiller, Hume, Gerçeklik, Doğ-
ruluk.

Introduction

Humanism, from a philosophical point of view, represents an under-
standing that extends to sophists in Ancient Greece. This under-
standing has continued to exist by the Sophists, especially Protagoras, by pri-
oritizing the changeable rather than the absolute. The basic argument
of this idea is that any understanding that man is in the center cannot
have an out-of-date character. This claim arises from the fact that the
present being cannot be absolute, rather than the impossibility of the
absolute. However, the existence of humanist tendencies maintained
on a dusty ground until the modern period, as Plato argued that the
Sophists denied the absolute in his Protagoras, Theaetetus and Sophist
dialogues. The introduction of the subject, which began with Descartes
in the modern period, opened the door to a skeptic field of the realm
of reality by criticizing Hume’s unchanging and this situation has become
a source of the fundamental problems of contemporary philosophy under
the influence of Kant.

The Relationship Between F.C.S. Schiller’s Pragmatic
Humanism and the Causality Concept of Hume

Human beings are very stable in creating resistance to innovation. This
feature of human makes it difficult to get a place in the life of dif-
ferent ideas that arise in every field including science. Nevertheless, it is
seen that an innovation, which has made itself known to human beings,
is subject to a category among existing ones rather than being evaluated in a separate medium. Because man’s desire to perceive nature as a systematic structure is related to the fear of chaos and the unknown. It can be argued that this issue is more pronounced in scientific activities and that the scientist has provided order by accepting the innovations that cannot be included in the existing classification under an existing scheme despite their ambiguous features. At this point, it is important to note that the scientist who makes such classification includes innovation as close as possible to a category. The aim of this study is to reveal the relationship of pragmatic humanism which has an important place in contemporary philosophy with Hume philosophy and to analyze whether any discipline is reduced to the other branch of the other.

It can be stated that the existing systems have difficulty in adopting the new one as logical reasons as well as psychological reasons. Although not at a sufficient level, the presence of this ratio has an important place in understanding the relationship between the new and the old. From this point of view, it can be argued that there are many similarities between pragmatic humanism and Hume’s philosophy in the period until the emergence of contemporary philosophy. The first is that they both have an empiric structure. As it is known, Hume represents the peak of the transition from God to man starting from the sixteenth century. For, the attempt to explain the universe initiated by Galileo and Newton, along with Descartes, continued through an intellectual system in which man was at the center. In the eighteenth century, the door, in which the metaphysics was completely denied, was opened to its fullest by Locke, and finally, Hume opened the door to a new place by taking the human mind to the center rather than a divine mind. Humanism, on the other hand, has taken on a divine character

2 Galileo, Newton, Descartes, Locke, Malebranche, etc. all of the philosophers agreed that this mind would make the divine one understandable. However, rejecting such a ground, Hume evaluated the human mind in the same category as other creatures. This evaluation means that both the human mind and the things are separated from the divine. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* ed. Peter Mil- lican (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), IX.
during the Renaissance period, although it was not dealt with by the Protagoras in relation to the divine. As a matter of fact, in this period where humanism spread over a wide area, Italy became a country based on a Christian-centered study.³

Such a structure naturally led to both expressing a close understanding of metaphysical orientations. Accordingly, dogmatic considerations were criticized by pragmatic humanism and Hume’s philosophy because they had ambiguous and obscure claims. It should be recognized that this criticism raises skeptic ideas in both perspectives. For Hume’s reduction of all the perceptions that existed in the mind to ideas and impressions has made a complex the problem of the foundation of the external world that emerged in the representation epistemology of Descartes. It can be argued that pragmatic humanism, which sees this foundation problem as one of many metaphysical problems, tries to abandon non-solutionable concepts which are not equivalent in the practical field. The most important of these concepts is undoubtedly the “absolute” concept.

Hume claims that absolutist ideas such as the concept of substance, God and the immortality of the soul cannot be theoretically justifiable after his criticism of the causality law. It can be argued that this claim aimed at displacing dogmatic thought has fallen into skeptic dilemmas. In fact, Hume claims in his book A Treatise of Human Nature that experience and habit are decisive in the imagination of man and hence the memory, the senses and the ability to understand are based on the vitality of such an image. According to him, this situation causes the human to ground the external world through the cause and effect relationship. This results that the ability to understand analyzes any event until it reaches the first principle. Hume expresses the outcome of this process as follows:

“Such a discovery not only cuts off all hope of ever attaining satisfaction but even prevents our very wishes; since it appears, that when we say or desire to know the ultimate and operating principle, as some-

thing, which resides in the external object, we either contradict ourselves, or talk without a meaning." 4

Hume, who criticizes absolute concepts through the evaporation of the substance, claims that they cannot secure the future because they do not consider the possibility of change in the absolutist ideas that are based on human nature. This claim implies that the rationalization of logical judgments to human nature will bring about such a change. However, pragmatic humanism 5 aims at transforming these concepts into a changeable form rather than displacing it, although it expresses a parallel understanding with Hume in terms of the immutability of the absolute. The fact that dogmatic ideas interpret such a transformation as a form of classical skepticism 6 raises the problem of confining pragmatic humanism into a skeptic space. This implies a misunderstanding of pragmatic humanism. Although pragmatic humanism is in line with skepticism at the point of opposition to absolutist structures, it differs from skepticism by accepting the existence of any truth. However, pragmatic humanism adapts to socially civilized management systems by giving one person the right to vote for the achievement of truth. This situation has been considered dangerous by religious and philosophical considerations that believe in the sanctity and absoluteness of truth and by the system of absolutist management systems. Because such a


5 Pragmatic humanism is a philosophical thought that “It brings truths into connexion with the minds which formulate them. It brings the various attitudes of various minds towards them into connexion with the personal character of the various thinkers. It brings their cognitive activities into connexion with their powers of feeling and acting. It emphasizes the unity and all-pervasiveness of personality.” This attitude of pragmatic humanism means the solution to many puzzles. The man understands that other individuals have independent and different experiences and that they exhibit quite other behaviors. When one thinks deeply, he sees that there is no mind independent of the judgments. The way to minimize problems is to always be aware of these prejudices. If one is aware of his prejudices, he always emphasizes peace in his interpersonal relationships. In this context, it can be argued that pragmatic humanism has a constant view of the individual as much as possible, as far as possible to be isolated from prejudices and to be honest with oneself. F.C.S. Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx, (London: Swan, Sonnenschein, and Co., 1891), 143.

democratic tendency towards truth seems inevitable to be a rival to the Platonic philosopher–king, the first ruler of absolutist structures.\textsuperscript{7}

Based on the above characteristics, Schiller recognizes that pragmatic humanism is understood as a continuation of skepticism and Hume’s philosophy. However, it should be stated that firstly, humanist philosophers are quite omnipotent in their business rather than in an alleged amateur. Secondly, it should be kept in mind that although humanists adopt a skeptical approach while rejecting absolutist ideas\textsuperscript{8}, in the final analysis, they make a progressive understanding that contributes to the advancement of philosophy. Finally, it should be recognized that the emergence of pragmatic humanism\textsuperscript{9} is an important step for the philosophy that has been reduced to the metaphysical problems between idealism and skepticism.\textsuperscript{10}

It can be said that pragmatic humanism and Hume’s philosophy, which located in an empiricist structure, claims that the events in the flow give some information to the human and that suggest the impossibility of absolute empiricism, are separated from each other in a considerable proportion despite such an association. In fact, the main reason for such a distinction is that both ideas impose different meanings on the concept of experience. Hume agreed on Locke’s tabula rasa and gave all his knowledge to experience. In this thought, the existence of any information other than the impression that comes from experience in the mind is not accepted. Hume refers to this issue as follows:

\textsuperscript{7} F.C.S. Schiller, Humanism: Philosophical Essays, p.230.

\textsuperscript{8} While the criticisms against the absolute and immutable up to the time of Kant were limited to the metaphysical area, the criticisms that started with Kant became empirical. According to Schiller, although Kant was replaced by a major blow to the metaphysics, his system was no different. Kant’s concept of a philosophical method, which was a rationalist, removed the old metaphysical structure from its throne but replaced it with a younger version of a similar structure. Therefore, Kantian thought did not cut the metaphysical roots of traditional rationalism. F.C.S. Schiller, “The Place of Metaphysics”, The Journal of Philosophy and Scientific Methods, Vol. 17, No: 17, 1920, s.458-459

\textsuperscript{9} According to Schiller, the fundamental problem of pragmatic humanism is to address the human mind that seeks to comprehend the world of experience with the resources of the human mind. Kenneth Winetroub, F.C.S. Schiller and the Dimensions of Pragmatism, (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1967), 62.

\textsuperscript{10} Schiller, Humanism: Philosophical Essays, 230-231.
“All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call Impressions and Ideas. The difference between these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions: and under this name, I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion.”

These statements show that psychological data in Hume’s philosophy is obtained in a sensory field in which the cooperation is central. In this understanding, the will caused an apriorist vein to be shaped because it was not of sufficient importance. The adoption of such an idea by pragmatic humanism does not seem possible. Because pragmatic humanism asserts that any postulate is the product of an expectation of nature before being experienced. It should be noted that this assertion pays attention to the will as it emphasizes the importance of the assumption before the proof. Based on the above-mentioned classification problem, it can be argued that the humanistic voluntarism, which takes the center of experience into consideration, makes a meaningful connection between apriori and postulate. Schiller argues that such a link will reveal a third way of eliminating the gap between empiricism and apriorism. According to him, when both concepts are examined in detail, it is seen that many concepts are ambiguous. For example, empiricists did not reveal any approach to whether this experience is passive or active, even though they suggest that all knowledge derives from experience. On the other hand, the rationalists who claim that our knowledge is based on an apriori basis have uncertainty about whether the apriori concept is a congenital category in mind or a conscious act of faith. The pragmatic humanism, which is different from these two approaches, takes apriori

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knowledge with a voluntary approach and always builds a structure that maintains its functioning by updating itself.\(^\text{12}\)

It is seen that pragmatic humanism has been separated from Hume’s philosophy in terms of denial of causality other than experience. As it is known, Hume makes a distinction between reasoning and perception while examining the causality law which is the basis of science. For him, the mind moves from reason or perception when comparing two objects. Perception occurs when the mind accepts both objects with their relations, but the reasoning arises in the absence of one or both of these two objects. This distinction of Hume shows that causality is the subject of senses rather than reasoning. He then claims that the notion of causality from the senses is simply a habit, and therefore there is no necessary connection between the two events.\(^\text{13}\) Indeed, Hume refers to this issue as follows:

“Every effect necessarily pre-supposes a cause; the effect being a relative term, of which cause is the correlative. But this does not prove, that every being must be preceded by a cause; no more than it follows, because every husband must have a wife, that therefore every man must be married. The true state of the question is, whether every object, which begins to exist, must owe its existence to a cause: and this I assert neither to be intuitively nor demonstratively certain and hope to have proved it sufficiently by the foregoing arguments.”\(^\text{14}\)

Hume, in his research to reveal the connection between the ideas, found that the law of causality had an important place in the foundations of the realm of reality. But for him, the lack of a lively impression that corresponds to the idea of causality suggests that this law does not exist in the realm of reality. Such a situation makes it almost impossible to produce any information about the realm of reality that exists outside the human mind. Because when the existence of any information other than the impressions and ideas in the mind is not accepted, an unbreakable gap appears between an object in the realm of reality and

\(^{12}\) Schiller, Humanism: Philosophical Essays, 231-232.

\(^{13}\) Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 56-57.

the representation of the object in our minds. It is clear that such a gap brings with it a skeptical approach to the realm of reality.

Hume’s reduction of causality to habituate rather than necessity is not an approach consistent with Schiller’s pragmatic humanism. For pragmatic humanism accepts the mechanical structure that exists in nature rather than accepting/rejecting the law of causality, as long as it depends on humanitarian purposes and benefits human. It can, therefore, be argued that pragmatic humanism cannot be condemned to a naturalist or deterministic worldview. In addition to this, Hume claims that causality is not obligatory from the point of view of impressions, and a skeptic understanding of reality is expressed, while pragmatic humanism claims that the impressions are the result of a volitional causality. According to this, it can be argued that Hume does not provide a valid understanding because he did not give any information about how the causal effect was formed while explaining the relationship between events.

Another distinction between pragmatic humanism and Hume’s philosophy is the evaluation of any judgment from a theoretical and practical point of view. This can be read through the fact that both ideas take care of practical advantage rather than the theoretical aspect of any judgment and try to correct the problems in theory from practice. According to Wiley, Hume put forward an attitude that precedes the practice by claiming that it is an indissoluble distinction between theoretical and practical. He even classed painting and anatomy through theoretical and practical understanding and described anatomy representing practice as better and more beneficial. However, as emphasized above, Hume, who denies necessity and causation, appears to have portrayed a skeptic understanding, especially in terms of the grounding of the metaphysical area.

Schiller argues that Hume, who implies a skeptical understanding, is not pragmatically sincere. Hume’s philosophy contributes to the scientific field rather than philosophy and religion and it is important to

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prove the truth of such an idea. This point shows that although Hume’s philosophy has a pragmatic point of view, it is inadequate to close the gap between practical and theoretical in the final analysis. It is clear that pragmatic humanism, which makes a more intense effort to solve this gap, is a comprehensive understanding that cannot be reduced to the sub-branch of Hume’s philosophy. Schiller, therefore, argues that Hume’s philosophy and rationalism have partly similar views in terms of intellectual, activity, and causality, but that there are significant differences between the two ideas. For example, it can be said that pragmatic humanism has sharply separated from both the Hume philosophy and rationalism because of its voluntary approach to intellectualism. It should be noted that this distinction usually arises from the concept of feeling. In fact, it can be argued that from Plato, the concepts of feeling and sensation have been reduced to each other, and the volition of the human beings has been destroyed, and that the philosophy of Hume and rationalism are merely cognizant of the Platonic tradition because they adopt a mind that’s only cognition. The claim that a situation in which human action takes place exists in such a mind means that it is isolated by being limited to a cognitive area. In spite of this, pragmatic humanism argues that mind is not the only source in terms of both human action and value. Because, in addition to the mind, non-mindful factors such as desire, tendency and purpose are also effective in the formation of knowledge. This idea reveals that reality is always reconstructed by human actions, rather than cognition perceives a ready-made object in a passive way. Therefore, it can be said that pragmatic humanism differs from Hume philosophy and rationalism which do not take into account human actions as the scientific and metaphysical.

As a result, pragmatic humanism suggests that human activity affects the object of knowledge more than Hume expresses. Therefore, pragmatic humanism, regardless of whether it is reduced to habit, argues that the law of causality is insufficient to understand how the connec-
tion between the two events occurred, but that this law should be used as long as it benefits. According to this understanding, Hume did not accept the voluntaristic causality because it did not match his philosophy, rather than being it’s wrong. However, because all living things, including humans, have started their mental activities live, our humanism must be taken into account in causality. Another point is that the epistemological experience in pragmatic humanism, which suggests that knowledge of the causal effect occurs after the experience, has far more influence than Hume’s suspicions. Experience is not only a result in the cause-and-effect relationship but also determines both the cause and the result actively in the whole process. One such feature of experience reveals that Hume cannot destroy the volition and activity in the context of reality. Finally, it can be argued that pragmatic humanism, which has an anthropomorphist structure and begins from human sequences of experience, is more useful and useful than Hume’s philosophy, which treats the experience indirectly, ignores the human character of the mind, and therefore obstructs its own system. Because, when Hume’s predecessors are taken into consideration, it is seen that the information we will acquire about ourselves cannot be more than what we have gained about someone else, which does not contribute to us. In such a case, it can be said that the ideas put forward because they remain indeterminate and artificial are nothing more than a completely opaque world.  

If we still try to defend this idea, we must deny ourselves.

References


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