



SIYASAL İSLAM'IN YÜKSELİŞİ VE SÖNÜŞÜ: İSLAMCILIK VE İSLAMOFOBİ KONUSUNDA BİR DEĞERLENDİRME

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ÖZET

Panislamizm Batı değerlerine ve Batı çıkarlarına karşı bir tehdit olarak algılanmıştır. Buna ilaveten İslamcılık ve buna bağlı olarak yeşeren İslami hareketler; seküler Arap, seküler Fars ve seküler Türk rejimlerince tehdit olarak görülmüş ve kontrol edilmesi elzem olan bir sosyal olay olarak değerlendirilmiştir. İslamofobiya algılamasının 11 Eylül olaylarının ile başlamadığı ve bunun tarihsel olarak Haçlı Savaşları, Batı Liberalizmi ve son olarak Medeniyetler çatışması ile, İslam Batı toplumları için bir iç tehdit olarak tanımlanmıştır. 11 Eylül olaylarının Batı toplumlarında tutması ve bu politikanın sürekliliğinin olması toplumu tehdit olarak gösterilen İslam'a karşı Batı toplumlarının davranışı "Sistemi Gerçekleştirme Kuramı" cevap vermektedir. Bu çalışmada Müslümanların dini kimliklerinin coğrafyası tanımlanarak politik etki alanları belirlenmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu çalışma, İslami cemaatlerin uluslararası sistemin devamı olan İslam dünyasında ki seküler rejimler tarafından kuşatıldığı ve negatifleştirildiğini iddia etmektedir. Türkiye özelinde İslami hareketler toplumda militarist bir İslamcı anlayışı ve İran tarzı İslamcı devrimi önlemiştir. İslamofobiya karşı İslamcı tepki iki kısma ayrılmaktadır; militarist İslam ve dinler arası diyalog ve medeniyetler ittifakı alanında oluşturulan uluslararası platform gibi diyaloga açık olan akımlardır. Bu çalışma her iki akımı da ele almakta ve değerlendirmeye çalışacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İslamofobi, Siyasal İslam, İslamcılık, İran İslam Devrimi, Batı Liberalizmi, ve İslami hareketler.

THE RISE AND FALL OF POLITICAL ISLAM: AN ASSESSMENT FOR ISLAMISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA***

ABSTRACT

[Pan] Islamism is a [transnational] threat for Western values and societies and Islamism is an internal for state establishments, which characterizes legitimacy deficit regime in Muslim countries. Hence, Islamic movement classified as an internal threat, which is more dangerous than external threat that perception is another practice of Islamophobia in Muslim countries. There is a continuity of conflict

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between crusade [Christian Warfare] and Jihad [Muslim Warfare] understanding that produce anti-Western discourse in Muslim World and Islamophobia in West. Islamophobia is viewed a product of clash of cultural conflict or clash of civilization concept after the end of Cold War. Islamic movement is a product of nation state, and modernism. Hence, Islamism cannot be classified as a social movement demanding the civic society. It has been employed as continuity of patronage in use of state-society relations. Islamic (revolution in Iran) could not produce a civic society but create a political patronage putting regime survives in scope. Therefore, revolutionary movement in the Middle East does not reflect a revolution which rehabilitate state-society relations under the banner of social contract.

Key Words: Islamophobia, Political Islam, Islamism, Iranian Islamic Revolution, western liberalism, and Islamic movement.

Introduction

This paper investigates the impact of Islamism, Iranian Islamic revolution and Islamophobiain international relations. The analysis of these different variables provides an assessment about sarcastic relations between Muslims and West. The history of Islamophobia in the West is not a new concept; it goes back to the expansion of Muslims states towards Europe. Since the beginning, the norms and principles of Islam has challenged Eurocentric economic, political and sociatival system. Even though Islamic religion does not offer any economic and political system, it has been experienced progressive development in institutional form. Hence, the claims of Islamism and political Islam do not only deconstruct people's identity but also create a new economic and political system.

After the failure of Pan-Islamism project, which could not protect the Ottoman Empire from dissolution, British and French mandate system dominated Muslim countries politics and created an imaginary states and society in Arab Middle East. These colonial transform the tribal and patronage societies and then their post-colonial experiences introduced [Arab] secularism under banner of nationalism and authoritarian modernization.¹ Due to nature of legitimacy deficit leadership in Muslim countries, Islamism has been emerged as an anti-colonial or self-colonial opposite movement. Therefore, political leadership perceives Islamism and Political Islam as an internal threat for their regime survival, which has seen, more dangerous than external threat.² In fact, this is a new practices of Islamophobia has been experienced in the Muslim countries collaborated with colonizers. Therefore, Islamist does not only aim to destroy legitimacy deficit regimes in the Muslim countries but also to challenge the global capitalist system and its role type of man. However, Islamic movement failed to be a civic movement demanding free and wealthier society. It cannot be defined as a social movement against state hegemony.

Even though Muslims are fully aware that UN has done nothing to stop preemptive attack of U.S. led war in Afghanistan and Iraq or control the outburst of Islamophobia or to safeguard the ordinary rights of the Muslims who are suffering on a daily basis due to the actions being taken by Western governments in pursuit of the war against the threat posed by terrorism. For Turkish cases, to understand the management of Islamic movement in Turkey and state-society relations, it

¹ Faisal al-Afai, "The Death of Arab Secularism" *The National*, 3 November 2012, available from <http://www.thenational.ae/authors/faisal-al-yafai>, internet; accessed 13 November 2011.

² David Steven R, *Choosing sides: alignment and realignment in the Third World*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).

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requires to analyze Turkey's dependency relations with U.S. government. It can be defined as patron-client relationship in the framework of collective security organization in NATO. The comparative outlook provides necessary evidence to find out institutionalization of Islamophobia to imply racialization issue of Muslims in globe. The connection between Global War and terror and 28th February Process is still disputable. The Islamism in Turkey has been viewed through the lens of Islamophobia during the 28th February Process and equalized with savage mind and terrorism by image creation in media. The secular establishment and its cohorts have contributed towards reinforcing Islamophobia for holding onto their power in order to protect their self-interests, even at the expense of the masses.

From methodological and theoretical perspective, there are four assumptions will be analyzed and some theoretical application has been employed to understand state- society relations in this paper.

Assumption 1. [Pan] Islamist idea has been perceived a [transnational] threat for Western values and interest

Assumption 2. Islamism is an internal threat and more dangerous threat than external one for secular regime and oligarchies in the Muslim countries.

Assumption 3. Islamophobia is a product of clash of cultural conflict or clash of civilization concepts rooted from Western liberalism emerged again with the end of Cold War.

Assumption 4. Islamophobia encourage securitization in domestic politics by prioritizing the state's security, which is more important than people's security.

In order to test these four assumptions, we put some restriction to codify three variables [Political Islam, Iranian Islamic Revolution and Islamophobia] to continue consistency in major framework. In so doing Islamic movement cannot be explained by Gramsci's concept of "historic bloc" against hegemonic powers,³ but JurgenHabermas' concept of "public sphere" can explains the pathologic relationship between centre and periphery in Muslim countries.⁴ In addition to this, the concept of "opportunity space" gives the operational measurement that would be applicable in Turkish cases. After the Arab Spring, it is time to revisit the prejudices against Islam and Muslims either in Muslim countries or in other non-Muslim states. System Justification Theory will explain the success and continuity of politics of "Islamphobia" in this research.

Development of Contemporary Political Islamic Thinking

The geopolitical importance of Muslim world has been declined since the 17th century. The "Great Game" between Russia and Great Britain resulted in demarcation of Afghanistan with Durand Line agreement between Afghan government and British India in 1883.⁵ The major transition occurred after the failure of Pan-Islamist policy of Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1909 and lost of Ottoman power in 1918.⁶ The second demarcation of Muslim land has been experienced in Turkistan (including Central Asia and Xinjiang region) and new mapping of former Ottoman territory in the Balkans, North Africa and Middle East. The demarcation of India and creation of Pakistan in the territory of Afghanistan create continues power struggle between colonial project states which were most of them established after the WWI and WWII. Politically weak structured states and illegitimacy deficit leadership has invited the foreign power penetration into Muslim

³ Simms Rupe. "Islam Is Our Politics? A Gramscian Analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood (1928--1953)", *Social Compass*, 49/4(2002): 563-582.

⁴ Habermas Jürgen. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry Into a Category Of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge: Mass MIT Press, 1989).

⁵ Holdich Thomas Hungerford, *The Gates Of India, Being And Historical Narrative* (London: Macmillan, 1910).

⁶ Türköne Mümtazer, *Cemaleddin Afgani* (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfi 1994).

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countries. Consequently, Muslim world lost their representation and their voice in international relations.

The main figures of Islamism

In order to restore the political power, parallel to Arab nationalism, Muslim intellectuals have looked for a renewal of Islam to rejuvenate Islamic societies. Intellectual history of political Islam provide a wide range discourse produced by Afghani, Abduh, Rashid Rida and Hasan al-Banna and Mavdudi. Pan-Islamism first introduced by Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani (1838-1897) who struggle for unity of Muslims, independence of Muslims states, and modernization of governments against Western imperialism and corrupted regimes. His fellow student Mohammad Abduh (1849-1905) worked for renewal of reopening gates of interpretation (Ictihad) and emulates Western modernization by reinterpreting authentic original sources of Islam. In the same framework, Rashid Rida (1865-1933) supported the idea of caliphate and democracy and modernization while he was critical to the West.⁷ Hassan Al-Banna (1906-1949) who was founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is considered as the first social movement has developed political Islam. In India Abu'lKalam Azad tried to keep united India and mobilized Indian Muslims under the Caliphate Movement but failed to do so.⁸

The Phases of Islamism

There is no clear-cut separation between Pan-Islamism and Political Islam. There appear some continuity and change Islamist ideology and mobilization of Islamic movement in Muslim World. This essay claim that either Pan-Islamism or Political Islam has been emerges as a political movement against western military and cultural imperialism. Pan-Islamist ideology dominated seven zones of Muslim world indicated below until dissolution of Ottoman Empire and removal of Caliphate institution in 1924.⁹ Despite having some continuity and change between Pan-Islamism and Political Islam; there was a major shift in doctrine of Islamism with rediscovery of IbnTaymiyya (architect of Selefi Doctrine). The mobilization of Islamism has not much strong social background but most of them acted elitist and demand Islamic Government. For instance, Ihvan-i Muslim in Arab World and National Movement in Turkey acted against secularist regime. Despite having a certain success, some scholar such as Oliver Roy has viewed political Islam as a failed project.¹⁰ The fallacy of using Islam, rooted, as an ideology from in religious and historical terms is that the actual practices shaped by modernity. Hence, Political Islam reflects some problematic context. It is renewed attention with Islamic Revolution in 1979 and especially after 11 September 2001. From secularist and western point of view, Islamism has been seen a sources of threat, anti-democratic movement, anti-modern and anti-western movements which is now equal to terrorism.

Is IslamistGroups a SocialMovement?

Although the Muslim Brothers in Egypt (1928-1954) is considered as first modern Islamist movement, the rise of Pan-Arab nationalist movement in other word Arab secularism under the management of GamalAbdunnasir in Egypt and Baath Party in Iraq and Syria changed the balance of power in the region. After the failure of Pan-Arabism with the catastrophic consequences of Six Days War in 1967, Islamism rose again and then replaced with Arab nationalism since late 1960s.

⁷Keddie Nikki R. *An Islamic Response to Imperialism : Political and Religious Writings of SayyidJamāl Ad -Din Al-Afghānī*(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).

⁸DoğrulÖmer Rıza, *AzadAbülkalām: ÖLümsüzMüdafaa* (İstanbul: Yöneliş Yayıncılık 1959).

⁹DemirciSevtap and Mehmet Morali, *BelgelerleLozan: TaktikStratejikDiplomatikMücadele : 1922-1923* (İstanbul Çağaloğlu: Alfa, 2011).

¹⁰ Roy Olivier, *The Failure of Political Islam* (Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 1994)

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Instead of the identity gap being filled by loyalty to individual states, a substitute, trans-state identity, Islamism came to dominate among populations and movements.

As we mentioned above, the establishment of Islamist movement cannot be classified as a social movement. In fact social movement is defined as “A sustained series of interactions between power holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, in the course of which those persons make publicly visible demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those demands with public demonstrations of support.”¹¹ In a sense that Islamism is contentious collective action and making demands expressing grievances and less institutionalized as such political parties. Together with Islamism, the aim of political Islam is to provide cultural authenticity and regain the dignity of Muslim people against the Western cultural and military superiority. The Islamists struggle for autonomy/independence against Western dominance and intervention. The other aim of political Islam is to remove corrupt rulers and authoritarian regime, but Islamic movement play essential role as agent between state and society, hence it has been controlled and managed by central government directly or indirectly.

Management of Islamism in Turkey

As mentioned, Islamism is viewed as internal threat for leadership of secular regime and Arab monarchies. Steven David explains the internal threat is more dangerous threat than external one. Hence the management of internal threat in Muslim countries is another question needs to be analyzed.¹² There are two kind of theoretical approaches that explain the importance of Islamism in foreign policy making. These are neo-utilitarianism and constructivism.

Neo-utilitarianism presumes that material structures between state establishment (core) and periphery determine interests/threats. In fact, Islamic movement grown up in the periphery and introduces an alternative discourse against leadership (core). With the rise of Arab Spring, Turkey’s experience with Islamic movement captures international attention. Turkey’s engagement with the west provided an opportunity to the peripheral identities to find an “opportunity space” to flourish. The construction of the Turkish religious identity is based on various roots, which are completely different from the Messianic roots of Islam in Shiism. Turkish authoritarian modernization also provides a new form of Turkish Islamic Synthesis in which these reformation programmes from above generate religious groups integrated with secular state establishment. These Islamist groups provide a great contribution to the modernization of Turkey. However, Kemalist republican nationalism could not replace the multi-level appeal of Islam. It had to bandwagon with traditional Islam to balance the threat emerging from the radical Islamic movements. The relations between Islamist groups and the secular establishment resembled the metaphor of mistress relations. The amazing explanation which signifies the relation between Islamic groups and the state came from Ismail Amasyali who is one of the decision makers of the Suleymanci Islamist groups in Turkey, which has domestic and international networks. He said that “Islamic groups are not a party or Sufi groups but they are established for the social needs of Turkey by intelligent and wealthy people and they aim to live as part of the state regime and system.”¹³ Therefore Islamic groups never go to conflict with the military and constitutional organizations.

On the other hand, the other Islamic groups (associations/communities) constitute the traditionalist Islam and political Islam which is considered within this category and pro-Sunni Islamic radical group, IBDA-C (The Islamic Great East Raiders’ Front) is exceptional in Turkey

¹¹ Tilly, Charles, *Social Movements, 1768-2004* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2004),306.

¹² David Steven R, *Choosing sides*.

¹³ Hurriyet, 22 May 2007:3

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but they have not found any logistic support from society so far.

It can be claimed that political Islam and Islamic groups have grown up under protection of secularist establishment as the agent of the state to modernize society in the periphery, as Kemalism could not penetrate to the layers of society in the periphery but the management of Islamic groups to modernize peripheral identities provide a perpetual political transition in Turkey. With the failure of military governments, secularist establishment had to re-adjust Turkey's domestic and international politics by expanding "opportunity space" in favour of peripheral identities. In this line, the victory of Justice and Development Party (JDP) in parliamentary elections in November 2002 was a seismic event in Turkey, culturally as well as politically. The nature of Turkey's policy changed under the banner of 'New Activism' of JDP, which is an off-shot of Erbakan's politically oriented Islamic parties. Turkey's new 'emancipatory' approach to security affairs in the form of both internal or external threat perception differentiated from the previous governments, which changed Turkey's relations with centre-periphery relations. It might be identified that opportunity space impedes the radicalization of Islamic movement in Turkey and blockades expansion selefi type of Islamic understandings and Iranian Islamic Revolution. It can be said that neither religious political ideology nor militarist type of Islam model could be accommodate in the Turkish Islamic model of understanding. Turkish Islamic synthesis has not produced Islamist radicals but introduced by journalist, writers and poets.

In a sense, there is no difference on realist understanding of state in Muslim countries but the major difference between nation states in the West and Muslim countries is that they are less transparent and pursue state/group/individual interests. On the one hand, constructivism gives more credibility to identities, including Islam, does matter (not just material factors) in shaping actors' ideals of their interests. In fact, Islamism is constantly constructed and re-constructed in different ways depending on the contexts. Hence, political Islam has a variety of strains, some are modernist, and whether it takes an anti-Western or violent form depends on context.

The Political and Religious Zones of Islam

Unlike Bernard Lewis's new geo-cultural definition and then Huntington's homogenous religious or civilizational entity termed 'Islam', Hakan Yavuz argues that there are seven diverse ethno-cultural zones are Arab, Persian (Shi'a), Turkish, South Asian (Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan), Malay-Indonesian, African and Minority (Diaspora) zones.¹⁴ I believe that we can divide this diverse ethno religious zone into two different categories; Turko-Persian and Arab Zone including Wahhabis or Shiite and Sunnite zones. There are some certain differences within Twelve Shiism about political involvement of Shia clerics, especially Shiite in Iran and Iraq, including Bahrain, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia. Whilst Iranian Shiism rooted from Usuli school of thought, most density of Arab Shiism originated from al-Akhbari school of thought.¹⁵ This religious diversification can also introduce another zone of Political Islam. Each zone has different policy agenda and therefore follows nationalist foreign policy that give different meaning to the concept of *ummah* as a distinctive national forms. For instance Arab states views that rather than representing whole Muslim unity, they imply that the *ummah* means the unity of Arab nations. Due to absence of interdependence relations between these religious zones, there is no functionality of Organization for Islamic Conference (OIC), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Arab League. It has no epistemic community to think about inter-governmentalism and functionalism for multi-

¹⁴Yavuz M. Hakan, " Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere". *Journal of International Affairs*. 54/1 (2000), 21.

¹⁵ Newman Andrew J. "The Nature of the Akhbārī /Uṣūlī Dispute in Late Ṣafawid Iran". Part 1: 'Abdallāhal-Samāhijī's "Munyat-al-Mumārīsīn". *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, (University of London) 55/1(1992): 22-51. And Newman Andrew J. " The Nature of the Akhbārī /Uṣūlī Dispute in Late Ṣafawid Iran", Part 2: The Conflict Reassessed", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* (University of London) 55/2 (1992): 250-261.

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layered governance of Muslim countries. In general it is expected that Pan-Islam constrain states to pursue a common Islamic interest and generate Islamic power in world politics.

Graham Fuller emphasizes that foreign policy differences between Muslim nation states. He calls that Political Islam, or purist Islamic foreign policy is opposed Western dominance of the international economic order, but accept capitalism (if with some moderate redistribution of wealth to benefit the poor) and oppose Western (individualistic) definition of human rights as universal principles. Some of them follow hardline policy towards Israel and look for a WMD deterrent or equal arms control for all states in the area such as Iran. Due to having priority about national interest and their interdependent relations with U.S., even where Islamic movements have seized state power such as Erdogan's party in Turkey and Mursi's government in Egypt, they have not been able to act together to advance an Islamic agenda or Islamic power in world politics. For instance, there is an uneasy relationship between Sunnite and Shiite Islam since the conversion of Iran from Sunni fold to Shiite religion. This was one of the examples of religious nationalism between Ottoman Turkey and Safavid Iran. A new version of Islam was devised by innovators such as Ali Shariati (mix Islam & Marxist revolution) and Khomeini who infused it with populism, anti-imperialism that expressed the interests of dissatisfied social strata and Third World states. Despite having flexibility in religious and political doctrine, much greater authority and role of the clergy, the supreme leader's (Velayat e-Faqih) ultimate authority has been identified as a ruler of the jurisprudential play essential role in Iranian politics.

Containment of Iranian Islamic Revolution

In aspect of theoretical framework, Khomeini's critics of Westphalia's nation state and nationalism accused them of playing an imperialist game of divide and run, to exploit the Islamic countries' natural sources—an essential paradigm of the Third World country politics. He believes that the unity of Muslim nations is one of the essential elements of Islamic religion.¹⁶ Therefore, the revolution was seen as necessary not only for Iran but also as an essential step for the other (Islamic) nations. Khomeini ensured that Iran did not aim to control other Islamic countries but rather to support any struggle against imperialism. As part of such an imperialist bloc, the revolutionaries aimed to establish a military, economic and political bloc against Christendom.¹⁷ This religious political rhetoric is the new expression of pan-Islamist policies of the Ottoman state in 19th century but is more factual than the previous one and forms a challenge to the capitalist and communist regimes in the international system.

However, United States launched the counter-revolution, which refers to a policy of trying to reverse a revolution, and by extension, to policies designated to prevent revolutionary movements that have already gained some momentum from coming to power¹⁸ During the Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988, the activities encompassed reversal, demolition, suppression, containment in the region to manipulate the Islamic character of regime and marginalized Iran in the Middle East. The CIA spent \$30 Million in the mid 1980's, founding the anti Khomeini groups in the region, while the Saudis poured \$25 Million into a failed coup attempt in 1982 and between 1979 and 1982 Baghdad squandered \$150 million to overthrow the Khomeini regime late in the Iran-Iraq War.¹⁹ In 1990s a commitment to international militancy fostered clashes between Iran and the United States, thus Iran was cast as a rogue state by United Nations and it has done so by applying the dual contentment policy. In the 2000s, Iran sustained its international status quo as an "axis evil" member for the West.

¹⁶ZenginBahri, *İslam YolundaSavaş* (Ankara, Iran Islam Cumhuriyeti, KültürMerkezi Yayınları, 1988).

¹⁷ZenginBahri, *İslam YolundaSavaş*.

¹⁸Halliday Fred, *After the Shah* (Washington: Institute of Policy Studies, 1979).

¹⁹Crenshaw Martha, *Terrorism in Context*, (University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).

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On the one hand, even though Iran did not apply any systematic revolutionary politics towards Turkey, but supported the small groups whose personal connections did not have a place in Turkish society. Iran's revolution also diminished the expansion of the Soviet regime in the Middle East and strengthened Turkey's position in the Western security system. Turkish secular state-establishment feared that the new regime of Iran inspires /establishes ties (with) the reactionaries (irticacilar) to weaken Turkey's western outlook. Instead of religious arguments by Iran, this young radical Islamic movement in 1990s subscribed to the political version of Iran's revolution. This different rhetoric and perceptions signify that neither the Turkish state nor Turkish Islamists understand the realities of Iran or the Middle East. Using the religious symbolic term to challenge Turkey's alliance, such as putting forward the Greater Satan for the United States and Lesser Satan for Israel and attacking the Turkey's symbolic secular establishment (Ataturk), the issue of headscarves, the Selman Rushdie Affair and Jerusalem Night provided a critical understanding of Turkey-Iran religious and ideological confrontation. The Turkish religious establishment does not allow any revolutionary interference with society. The only Islamist who applauded the Iranian Islamic revolution was the Radicaller (Fundamentalist) in 1980s and 1990s. These small Islamist groups number about 300 in Turkey and that some of the group members financed the Jihad in the Afghanistan and Chechnya. Most of them generally rejected the traditionalist Islam identity construction of state, Sufi-based Islam and other religious traditionalist groups, but Turkish state had allowed them the necessary Sunni fundamentalist resources or books as such Sayyid Qutb's *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (Milestones) to impede the Shia political rhetoric in Turkey. Though some claim that political Islam ended after 1990s, the reality of ideological absence bases on their marginal and anarchical complex identity. Hence, the groups could not survive in the Turkish community and its account vanished in the Islamic environment in western part of Turkey after the 28th February process in 1997. Thus, Turkish Sufi oriented and Islamist positivist theories of Said Nursi and the liberal Islamic model of Hizmet (Gulen) groups could not permit the promotion of any revolutionary or Selefi militant political models in Turkey. Iran has no influence on Alevi society, which differentiates, in the space of society as a distinguished religious identity form. The connection to the radicals was also cut off by the Khomeini's death. Hence, only Twelver Ja'feri groups are now open to Iranian religious influence in Turkey--but they are under supervision by the state and are forced to go Najaf for religious training rather than Qum.

Abrahamian pointed out that Khomeini does not qualify as a fundamentalist because he both implicitly and explicitly accepts the existence of the territorial nation state by talking in terms of the Iranian land and Iranian nation.²⁰ Ehteshami suggested that his utilitarianism placed Islam in service of Muslim community's temporal needs rather than the supreme spiritual dictates of Islam.²¹ Similar to Abrahamian and Ehteshami's argument, the doyen of Iranian Foreign policy, Ramazani points that the legitimate means for exporting the revolution was unclear.²² Despite its universalistic discourse, the critics of Menashri suggest that Khomeini's Islamic Government concept did not present a blueprint for the unification of the whole Muslim people nor did Khomeini lay down specific guidelines for a new scheme of foreign relations.²³ The adventure of revolutionary policies of Iran is eventually adapted to the changing global developments and the internal economic, political and social constraints in Iran.²⁴

Iran actively support to the Shiites in Yemen, Bahrain, Kuwait and Hezbollah in Lebanon

²⁰ Abrahamian Ervand, *Khomeinism: Essays on The Islamic Republic*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993)

²¹ Sidahmed Abdel Salam and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, *Islamic fundamentalism* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1996).

²² Ramazani Rouhollah K, "Iran's Hostage Crisis: International Legitimacy Matters", *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*. 25 /2 (2005): 273-278.

²³ Menashri David, *Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society, And Power*, (London: Frank Cass, 2001).

²⁴ Başer Alev Erkillet, *Orta Doğu'da Modernleşme ve İslami Hareketler*, (Ankara: Hece Yayınları, 2004).

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in framework of Shiite sphere of influence. Whilst United State lost an important ally in the region, the Islamic Revolution created as alternative political theory to impede the expansion of Soviet Union.²⁵ Post-Khomeini decline of ideology attempts at export of revolution inflicted high military and economic costs a more pragmatic foreign policy in supporting of HAMAS and Kurdish nationalist PKK.

Saudi –Wahhabism

The collation between Wahhabi family and Saudi Monarchy introduces a Sunni fundamentalist Islamic revivalist movement (strict interpretation of Sharia), has adopted the rule of ‘Defender of Islam’, and advocate of Islamic solidarity (vis-à-vis the external world) in wider Muslim world. This Islamic identity, the basis of regime legitimacy, dictates that Saudi distance itself from the West. However, geo-political insecurity and oil-driven economic integration into the Western capitalist world drew it into alignment with the West (e.g. against Iran, against Iraq). Saudi’s support for Sunni Islamist groups in the region against secular regimes / Shiites and support for Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Syria challenges the regional governments. Recruiting and financing Mujahedeen for Afghanistan (with CIA) and Chechnya has been seen as a Saudi penetration into Turko-Persian and Russian political zones served in the same direction of regional competition.

Eurocentric Approach to the Muslim World

According to orientalist, Islamism is an unchanging, and uniform culture, which is naturally anti-modern, cause of Middle East instability, violence and under-development. Islamism is also considered as a driving force in a clash of civilizations against the West. For instance, Bernard Lewis claims that Islam’s hostility to the West is not a matter of legitimate grievances, but an irrational reaction of an ancient rival against a more advanced civilization.²⁶ Emmanuel Sivan argued Islamism is centrality of war in the Muslim world.²⁷ Besides that Judith Miller sees Islamism as anti-democratic and anti-human rights.²⁸

On the one hand, anti-Orientalist critique provides another outlook for the nature of Islam. For instance, Edward Said proclaims that Orientalists have a political agenda and nearly all are Zionist publicists who dominate the media and shapes U.S. public opinion toward Islam, especially in time of crisis.²⁹ Similarly, Ernest Gellner assumes that Islam does not contradict modernity, but is the great faith closest to seek a modernity that does not exclude religious values.³⁰ In addition to these, Graham Fuller views that radical Islam is rooted in real grievances against Western behavior, not a clash of culture.³¹ One must accommodate moderate Islamists and their grievances in order to marginalize the violent terrorists. Nowadays, civilizational conflict, above all between the West and militant Islam, has replaced the East-West ideological cleavages as the main axis of world politics. For Benjamin Barber claims that Western globalization “McWorld” provokes a reaction from the threatened culture (Jihad).³² Evidence of this is the polarization of opinion, about Islamism. Islamophobia in the West associated with terrorism that dramatically improve negative

²⁵ Halliday Fred, *After the Shah*.

²⁶ Lewis Bernard, *Cultures in Conflict: Christians, Muslims, And Jews in the Age of Discovery*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

²⁷ Sivan Emmanuel, *Interpretations Of Islam: Past And Present*, (Princeton, N.J.: Darwin Press. 1985).

²⁸ Miller, Judith, *God Has Ninety-Nine Names: Reporting From A Militant Middle East*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996)

²⁹ Said Edward W, *Orientalism*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

³⁰ Gellner Ernest, *Islamic dilemmas: reformers, nationalists, industrialization : The southern shore of the Mediterranean*, (Berlin: Mouton Publishers, 1985).

³¹ Fuller, Graham E, *The Future of Political Islam*, (New York: Palgrave, 2003).

³² Barber Benjamin R, *Jihad vs. McWorld*, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996).

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image of Islam and Muslim countries. Therefore, the Muslim world sees itself as under siege (Fuller and Lesser) of western imperialism.³³

With the collapse of Soviet Russia in 1991, as such previous empire proclaims their political system is eternal, Fukuyama argues that Western liberalism is the only global model with ideological appeal in globe.³⁴ These Western values are transmitted by trans-state networks, which link the West and Western-educated, English-speaking, Muslim upper class (i.e. the people who dominate Muslim states). In tandem with U.S. hegemon under W.G.Bush administration sought to coercively 'export' liberalism. However, Huntington rejects that liberalism will not triumph after the death of communism; there were other ways to modernity (e.g. Islamic, Confucian).

One the one hand, some scholar see that Islam as 'grass-roots counter-hegemony' and is only counter-balancing ideology against neo-liberal capitalism after communism. Clash of Civilizations has been seen in three ways in international relations: (a) Demographic weight Islam has a billion adherents, majorities in 40 states, likely to be 1/3 of the world population by 2050. (b) Muslims is strategically located on the world's oil reserves. (c) Its Diaspora in the West numbers in the millions. Islamism found one way another to mobilize Muslim society has not lost its power to secularization.it has been more integrated into society than other religions. Islamists use modern technology to engineer a global flow of Islamic information and funds, creating 'post-modern' trans-state networks (virtual society, by-passing states) countering Western ones. Mujahedeen Asymmetric warfare in Afghanistan brings on Soviet collapse and in southern Lebanon forces Israeli withdrawal demonstrates the mobilization power of militant Islam. Debates over the role of Islam is another way of understanding the nature of Islam and contents it gives to foreign policy behavior in IR.

Clash of Geo-cultures/Civilizations

Huntington relies on a homo Islamicus, akin to homo-economicus (i.e. capitalists, men driven by economy) as an independent variable, which determines behavior, but this seems to be simple-minded. Islamic identity does not translate directly into (anti-Western or Islamic) foreign policy, which is often driven by state or by class interest, more than by identity.³⁵ Huntington ignores the diversity and fluidity of Islam. Yet, the Muslim world does not just reject Western technology or culture, but rather selects much and rejects some. Even radical Islamists don't reject modernization but want to separate it from Western secularism, materialism, and immorality, which destroy (patriarchal) family life, the cornerstone of civilization.

Most of the tensions with Islam can be explained by conflicts of interests (e.g. over oil, Israel, Western penetration) not over values. Even most of militants are not necessarily anti-Western on cultural grounds. Cultural differences do not automatically lead to a clash of civilizations. Hence, Huntington ignores the possibility of inter-civilizational dialogue. Clashes on interest only get elevated to civilizational conflict when emotive views become self-fulfilling prophecies. 'Gross mishandling of the relationship with Islam can ideologize a divergence of interests'. The US neo-cons and al-Qaida constructing a clash of civilizations, demonizing each other, using violence against each other, but this was by no means inevitable.

³³ Fuller Graham E and Ian O. Lesser, *A Sense Of Siege: The Geopolitics Of Islam And The West*, (Boulder: Westview Press,1995).

³⁴ Fukuyama, Francis, *The End Of History And The Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

³⁵ Agāmī, Fu'ād. *The Arab predicament*, 1981.

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Institutionalization of Islamophobia

They are many multiple faces of Islamophobia³⁶ and rich literature, especially conference papers in two decades.³⁷ There have been continues military attack [crusade] and liberal discourse attacking Islam directly. For instance, Edmund Burke and Earl Gray resembled Islam as a savage culture, which destroyed the ancient Greek civilization.³⁸ Gladstone attacking the Quran and called it as a cursed book creates a storm in Muslim World in late 19th century. Even though the fear of Islamism has such long historical background, the term of 'Islamophobia' has began to use in international relation in at the end of 1980s. Islamophobia has been increasingly used to describe the fear of Islam and of Muslims as a social group. Furthermore, various studies and reports have reported a rise of Islamophobia in many Western media. Since then, Islamophobia is an unfounded hostility towards Islam and multiculturalism. Today in the West, Islam is seen as the most transruptive, the culture/civilization that resists (although through it different and variegated national and cultural expressions) to Western values, challenges the Western concept of democracy, refuses to acknowledge the European exclusive Judeo-Christian heritage. In other words, Islam becomes the culture/civilization that 'never the less refuses to be repressed'. To create a multicultural society is not enough to allocate a space for the 'other', but also to accept the transformations that the cultural contacts and cultural interchanges with the 'other' may cause.

Global War on Terror

President Bush ratcheted up the rhetoric, grouping all mainstream and militant Islamists together under the phrase "Islamofascists." He called on Americans to be prepared for a global war on terror, the "inescapable calling of our generation." The global war on terror aim to eradicate the threat of Islamic-radical terrorism (again, a loose and incoherent term) and target rogue states that sponsored terrorism or offered lodging to terrorists. With sweeping, ideological language, Bush and Cheney's crusade set the stage for the American-led invasion of Afghanistan and occupation of Iraq, which was costly in blood and treasure and damaging to America's moral standing in the world. The corruption has become systemic, as to now be institutionalized, a way of doing business, a fact of life. They justify their actions and dismiss critics who do not understand the culture, who do not know that this is how we do things here. There is a thread of ego-justification here that is fed by the group dynamic, not guilt by association, but the lack of guilt by association. System Justification Theory explains the continuity of securitization in internal politics in the West. Muslim minorities in the West perceived as a potential internal threat equalized with terror. The image creation of the Global War on Terror used the image of radical Islamist figures in order to show the violent faces of Islam, which is truly imagined, or false identity definition. The humiliation of Muslim identity with cartoon accidents and broadcasting movies, which humiliate the prophet Islam, measures the voice of Muslim that has been viewed as a subaltern in the West. This is somehow sacrificing of western liberalism due to fear about Islamic terror. The behavior of Western man can be understood with System Justification Theory. The motivational component of system justification means that its effects are exacerbated when people are under psychological threat, or when they feel their outcomes are especially dependent on the system that is being justified. According to system justification theory, people not only want to hold favorable attitudes about themselves (ego-justification) and their own groups (group-justification), but they also want

³⁶Crosfogue Ramon, "The Multiple Faces of Islamophobia" *Islamophobia Studies Journal, Volume, Issues 1, Fall (2012):9-34*. And "Islamophobia, European Modernity and Contemporary Illiberalism" of the journal *Politics, Religion&Ideology*, vol. 14/2, 2013

³⁷ International Conference on Islamophobia, organized by the Union of NGOs of Islamic World at the Istanbul Center of Grand Cevahir Congress, 8-9 2007, Fourht Annual Conference: From Theorizing Islamophobiato Systematic Documentation, organized by Center for Raceand Gender at the University of California, Berkeley. April 19thand 20th 2013.

³⁸ Cobden, Richard, *The political writings of Richard Cobden*, (London: T.F. Unwin, 1969).

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to hold favorable attitudes about the overarching social order (system-justification). A consequence of this tendency is that existing social, economic, and political arrangements tend to be preferred, and alternatives to the status quo are disparaged. System Justification Theory differs from the status quo bias in that it is predominately motivational rather than cognitive. Generally, the status quo bias refers to a tendency to prefer the default or established option when making choices.³⁹

Concluding Remarks

Pan-Islamism, Political Islam and Islamic Revolution are controversial concepts since the last two centuries. Western political superiority and cultural dominance enforced the Muslim government to modernize state and societies. Hence, these three concepts have been considered as a product of nation state and modernization since last two centuries. In tandem with, this research had reached five findings in follow. *Firstly*, Pan-Islamism is defeated with WWI and the project of Political Islam has failed to reach Islamic government in the Muslim world. Despite having exceptional character, Iranian Islamic Revolution has been contained either great powers or regional powers since the last three decades. The management of Islamic movement is viewed another policy underpinning the centralization policies of nation states, which aims at attaining of organic society. *Secondly*, this research had been viewed that Islamophobia has been employed by secularist regime of Muslim countries in order to contain Islamist movement's influence in the society. Unofficial alliance relationship between state-establishment and peripheral Islamic identities blockade the creation of civil society and provide the continuity of patronage in the Muslim societies. *Thirdly*, Islamophobia in West has two folds; (a) Islamophobia rooted from western liberalist discourse, which define Islam as a savage type of mind and lifestyle. It takes another form after the Global War on Terror. It has been carried out Cold War in domestic and global politics in order to isolate Islamic identity from the major framework of international system. (b) Due to fear of expansion of Islamism, Western government has to sacrifice western liberalism, which has been gained with long struggle against religious and political authorities since the middle age. Securitization of domestic politics in the Western societies reached some certain success because people felt under psychological threat from unseen enemy. This fear and threat perception encourage continuing policy of Global War on Terror in the framework of System Justification Theory. *Fourthly*, Islamophobia is a product of clash of civilization or clash of cultural conflict demonstrate a sarcastic relation in the international politics. Although this understanding [George W. Bush] define Iran as rogue state and "an axis of evil", Iran could not introduce a free society but create a political patronage by putting regime survive in scope. Therefore, revolutionary movement in the Middle East does not reflect a revolution which rehabilitate state-society relations under the banner of social contract. *Fifthly*, we conclude that Islamic movement is a product of nation state, and modernism. Hence, Islamism can not be classified as a social movement demanding the civic society. It has been employed as continuity of patronage in use of state-society relations during the modernization process.

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³⁹Jost John T and Orsolya Hunyady, *The Psychology of System Justification and the Palliative Function of Ideology*. (Stanford, CA: Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 2002)

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