Prospects for Islamism, Post-Islamism and Representation of Muslims: Lessons from Pakistan

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Introduction

This article proposes that there can be a positive outlook and future for Islamism and post-Islamism if Muslims with different kinds of Islamic political thought accept that Muslims still need representation in today's society and are willing to engage in a discourse on topics relevant to their representation. Representation of Muslims has been the purpose of Islamist ideologies and movements from their beginnings and these ideologies still offer insights and perspectives that can be considered and reevaluated to possibly inform Muslims as they consider how they should represent Islam and themselves within the Muslim community and also to outsiders. These two categories, Islamist or post-Islamist, may be academic categorizations but these categories and analyses of them can help us to review and critique how representation can be more effectively pursued in consultation amongst various Muslim movements and groups.

The idea of post-Islamism is not without criticism, however, and as Garcia notes regarding post-Islamism, “both the definition itself and its applicability have led to an intellectual debate that may be partially deemed a failure.” Garcia describes of the Islamists (outside of Pakistan) an “extraordinary ability to mobilize society of the Islamist discourse, which has not only not been replaced by any others, but has also proved that it is hegemonic...it looks as if the victory of Islamism in recent elections will in turn strengthen its pragmatism.” Therefore it must be noted that Islamism is not being finished only to be necessarily replaced by post-Islamism. Rather, Islamism and post-Islamism exist as different

2 Garcia, “Post-Islamism, the Failure of an Idea: Regards on Islam and Nationalism form Khoumeini’s Death to the Arab Revolts”, p. 460
approaches to interpretation. What can also be seen from Garcia’s broad description of these movements is that, Islamism and post-Islamism are not monolithic and both major categories offer a plurality of perspectives relevant to the representation of Muslims. The de facto plurality presents a challenge for achieving more cohesive representation.

Why Representation Is Necessary for Muslims

As Islamist movements have been essentially movements to represent the interests of Muslims, this being visible in the case of Mawdudi and Seyyed Qutb, it is important to ask as to the necessity of representation for Muslims today. There are different reasons which can be outlined for why the issue of representation is a necessary concern for Muslims and needs to be addressed. The two main reasons that should be considered are the reality of the situation of Muslim populations being such that they often live in either post-colonial states or as minorities in non-Muslim countries. For those living in post-colonial states, the possible dangers presented by globalization are a concern. Providing examples of local resistance, Bush describes, “the more aggressive phase in American imperialism since the 1980s re-energized struggles against Western domination that have their roots in the earlier era of European formal empires and stimulated new resistances against global systems of power.” Bush also notes that, “as Barry Gills has observed, in the contemporary global era, as in the past, people will challenge ‘wild’ or ‘savage’ capitalism based on exploitation and denial of human rights.” Pakistani Islamists typically have been speaking with concern about certain injustices suffered by Muslims in these societies in the wake of historical globalization. In accordance with answering these injustices, Khurshid Ahmad has spoken for “intellectual decolonization.” It is common knowledge that political and economic concerns of

3 Garcia, “Post-Islamism, the Failure of an Idea: Regards on Islam and Nationalism form Khoumeini’s Death to the Arab Revolts”, pp. 451-466.
9 Bush, Barbara, Imperialism and Post-Colonialism, p. 205
11 Seyyed Vali Nasr (1996: 50) notes that, Khurshid Ahmad, referred to ‘intellectual decolonization” (Nasr cites Khurshid Ahmad’s talk at the University of South Florida and World and Islamic Studies Enterprise conference, Tampa, Florida, May 1993). See also Ahmad, Khurshid, Pakistan: Vision and
Muslims continue in Muslim majority countries and for Muslims in minority situations.

Unfortunately, even as globalization presents possible dangers, there have sometimes been failures internally of representation for Muslims in post-colonial states. The problem of post-colonial states for Muslims can be seen where Hasan Askeri Rizvi describes a situation where the state in much of the Muslim world was not a phenomenon that emerged at independence but was actually inherited from colonial administrations: it later approximated the previous colonial state, carrying on certain problems, such as lack of political participation and authoritarian political management.\(^{(12)}\) It can be said that the post-colonial administrations would appear to have often been a failure at representing their Muslim constituents. Representation will continue to be a concern for Muslims in post-colonial societies as it has been.

Misrepresentation is nothing new and much can be said of Western Orientalism generally, which has represented Muslims often in unacceptable ways.\(^{(13)}\) What we find is that it is not merely some anomalous recent Orientalists and/or a system of different interests that have represented Muslims poorly in recent history.\(^{(14)}\) This representation could appear to be also part of a longer and larger trend. Justin McCarthy notes that, "The missionary establishment and the British propagandists created an enduring 'Myth of the Terrible Turk'...the myth built on a dislike of Muslims that had developed for nearly a millennium before Americans adopted it".\(^{(15)}\) What McCarthy describes is at least a century old.\(^{(16)}\)

Examples of Muslims in a minority situations with representation concerns can be seen in Europe and North America. The reports from the Center for American Progress and the Muslim Public Affairs Council suggest for us that, there is a negative impact for American Muslims of deliberate bad publicity over time.\(^{(17)}\) Negative publicity in America about Muslims may be expected to potentially have

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\(^{(16)}\) The Turk in America: The Creation of an Enduring Prejudice, pp. 33-34.

\(^{(17)}\) See Not Qualified: Exposing the Deception Behind America's Top 25 Pseudo Experts on Islam, Washington DC., Los Angeles, CA, Muslim Public Affairs Council, MPAC.org. Muslim Public Affairs Council 2013: Wajahat Ali, Eli Clifton, Matthew Duss, Lee Fang, Scott Keyes, and Faiz Shakir, *Fear, Inc.: The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America*, Washington DC., Center for American Progress, August 2011: from the introductory pages of the publication, "This small network of people is driving the national and global debates that have real consequences on the public dialogue and on American Muslims...in September 2010, a Washington Post-ABC News poll showed that 49 percent of Americans held an unfavorable view of Islam, a significant increase from 39 percent in October of 2002."
negative effects, presenting a risk for the existence of the American Muslim community. This bad publicity could potentially complicate relations for Muslims elsewhere in the world.

Misrepresentation and negative publicity about Muslims can also be a disadvantage affecting policy-making regarding Muslims, seen with the example of Muslims in Europe. This can be seen described as Haddad and Golson write, “...governments in Western Europe have initiated bold and controversial new policies aimed at the institutionalization of a moderate, Euro-friendly Islam... European governments appear to be converging on a common solution to their Muslim problem—“religion-change” and the construction of an “acceptable” Islam”.

This above quote raises the question of who really represents Islam in minority situations in Europe and North America. It can be reasonably assumed that the majority of Muslims in minority communities are moderate. Before these above-mentioned policies to effectuate “religion-change” were enacted, most Muslims would probably not have been promoting anything other than an Islam that is essentially compatible with non-Muslims in the West. However, they will almost certainly be anathema to any outsider to the religion forcing an un-Islamic rewriting of their doctrines and imposing and coercing something that is Islamicly unacceptable for them. Alternatively most would also be suspicious of any groups within the Muslim community promoting positions which are extreme and would put their status as a minority and friendly relations with non-Muslims at risk. Therefore representation is not only a concern for Muslims in Muslim majority countries but is also a concern for Islamists and post-Islamists regarding Muslim minorities in the West.

The importance of the concept of representation can be seen when considering a debate in the West, sometimes flawed, about the phenomenon of Islamism. An example of the flawed nature of these debates is the inexactness of broad labels that are used to describe Islamic movements and groups, for example the term “fundamentalism” being used to refer to Islamic systems of thought and political movements that emerged from the eighteenth century onwards in various countries. Sometimes Western debates about Islamism and post-Islamism and other perspectives and viewpoints on what characterizes and defines Islamism in general are not very relevant or useful for Muslims discerning their needs for representation and formulating strategies for representation. Debates about movements and their ideologies can be examined for their statements pertinent to

19 Kramer examined the debate on Islamism outside of Pakistan that occurred mainly in the 1980s where the term Islamism has replaced the term fundamentalist: See Martin Kramer, Coming to Terms, Fundamentalists or Islamists?, Middle East Quarterly 10/2 (2003), pp. 65-77. Also at www.meforum.org/541/coming-to-terms-islamists-or-fundamentalists accessed 05/02/2016
representation of Muslims. Inexact labels do not get to the heart of the matter concerning what Muslims have to say about representation.

Sometimes debates and perspectives about Islamists and amongst Islamists can offer an alternative perspective, useful critiques, and/or ideas for strategic planning. Islamism is not monolithic. Evidence to suggest that Islamism has varied objectives can be seen described by Yvonne Yazbek Haddad. Haddad describes in her paper on pluralism that different Muslim scholars and activists have argued in different ways about participation in politics; in other words, Islamists generally, despite having some common values and characteristics, are not all of the same mind when it comes to their ideologies and political objectives.\textsuperscript{21} This implies ideological variegation and differentiation amongst Islamists, at least concerning issues of political participation. The description of Islamism will change and shift for different groups as they have adopted different strategic objectives and purposes. Because of ideological or doctrinal differences, they will necessarily have differences in their strategies for representation. Nonetheless, these varied movements may have a role to play in representation and they can, as Fuller describes, be part of or constitute “a religious-cultural-political framework for engagement on issues that most concern politically engaged Muslims.”\textsuperscript{22} The outside analysis of Islamism provides some perspective on what constitutes the differences between varieties of Islamists and historical aspects of their development. This analysis can be important for attempting to achieve more cooperation on representation of Muslims, possibly providing more options for representation or showing what prospects exist for more united representation. If we consider the broad definition of Islamism offered by Graham Fuller, it may be observed that there are multiple variants of Islamism and Islamism’s objectives may vary.

What is Islamism?

The argument in this paper is that Muslims who could be described as either Islamists or post-Islamists both could contribute to a constructive future purpose of representation for Muslims. One definition of an Islamism is the concise and narrower definition of Irfan Ahmad, who means an Islamist to be an activist who regards Islam as a complete system of life and believes in founding a shari’a state as his foremost duty.\textsuperscript{23} Consistent with the definition by Irfan Ahmad, “Islamism” can be understood to be an ideology that maintains that Islam is not merely a religion but also a political system with the ultimate strategic objective of establishing an Islamic society.\textsuperscript{24} Alternatively, Graham Fuller more broadly

\textsuperscript{21} Haddad, Yvonne Yazbek, *Islamists and the Challenge of Pluralism*, Occasional Papers, Washington DC, Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies and the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, 1995, pp. 3-21

\textsuperscript{22} Fuller, Graham E., *The Future of Political Islam*, Basingstoke, UK; New York, Palgrave MacMillan 2003, p. 193


\textsuperscript{24} Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza,, *Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama’at-i Islami of Pakistan*, Berkley,
describes Islamism as, “...therefore not an ideology, but a religious-cultural-political framework for engagement on issues that most concern politically engaged Muslims.”²⁵ What Fuller terms “engagement” could also be called “representation,” which is or should be a core concern for all Muslims, whether they are called Islamists or post-Islamists. This definition by Fuller could appear to include many more Muslims than the one that includes only a particular ideology. We can see the phenomenon of Islamism and post-Islamism as actually containing strategies for representation and these are interesting as Muslims have real continuing needs for representation as briefly described above. The relevant question of Islamism and post-Islamism should be what Islamism and post-Islamism have to say about how Muslims should be represented and as to how their ideas could be engaged by other Muslims to address concerns.

What is Post-Islamism?

If we follow the inclusive definition by Graham Fuller of Islamism, the idea of post-Islamism being separate from Islamism would tend to appear artificial or even invalid. Nonetheless, Asef Bayat provided the following description of post-Islamism: “in each of these cases post-Islamism denotes a departure, however varied in degree, from an Islamist ideological package characterized by universalism, monopoly of religious truth, exclusivism, and obligation...post-Islamist movements acknowledge in other words, ambiguity, multiplicity, inclusion, and compromise in principles and practice...”²⁶

To better illustrate this differentiation between Islamists and post-Islamists, in his description of Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, Husnul Amin creates also a description of post-Islamism vis a vis Islamism.²⁷ This would be, “an assertive shift from Mawdudi’s political Islam (read ‘Islamism’) to a post-Mawdudi understanding of Islam (read ‘post-Islamism’).²⁸

Ghamidi’s thinking appears to be differentiated from the Mawdudi ideology of traditional Islamists of Pakistan on certain key points. According to Muhammad Khalid Masud, “... according to Ghamidi, the formation of an Islamic state is not a basic religious obligation for Muslims...Ghamidi not only differs from Mawdudi insofar as he regards the establishment of an Islamic state as the primary obligation of Muslims, he also criticizes Mawdudi’s ascription of jihad to political

action and strategies...”

Amin also notes that, the debate has moved away from a discussion of an Islamic versus a secular state to a “democratic” state, away from Islamizing the state to re-Islamization of individual and society and also on the question of Shura (consultation).

This can be seen in Ghamidi’s own words,

“At that time, no effort or struggle is needed to achieve the supremacy of Islam at the collective level; Islam automatically manifests itself through the social, cultural and political mannerisms and attitudes of people. Thus if in the shari’ah of God, there is any directive related to the society, they are prepared to implement it without any hesitation....This is an Islamic government. When it comes into existence in this way, it becomes a manifestation of God’s mercy on earth; however, if it does not come into existence, even then one should not be worried because the objective of Islam is not the formation of an Islamic government but the attainment of tazkiyah (self-purification). Its call is to the kingdom of God which people will attain on the Day of Judgement as a result attaining this tazkiyah.”

What could be a better future of Islamism and Post-Islamism?

To offer an optimistic prognosis concerning whether or not there is a future constructive purpose for Islamism and post-Islamism, it can be useful to consider some of their criticisms by outsiders. To assess Islamism, we can think about the original purpose of Islamism. Choueiri hints that the last “radicalist” attempt to establish a totalitarian Islamic state was bound to time and place, using the “bricks of a demolished castle” and influenced by European fascist notions.”

Pakistani Islamism is seen thereby to be an ideology and a product of that time and that political situation.

Not only was this Islamist ideology bound by time and place but it is also seen by some as moribund. Olivier Roy maintains that, the Islamist theoretical model has broken down, in terms of texts (all pre-1978), in terms of concepts (reaching a dead end), and in terms of action.”

This breakdown might tend to be explained by the pragmatic reality faced by Islamists that Sayyid and Nasr describe. Bobby Sayyid provides a critique with the observation of Islamic government and attempts at shari’ah implementation

face pragmatic realities in action. Sayyid further notes that Islamists are willing to make pragmatic choices with their programmatic discourses.

However, this would tend to be consistent with the observation by Seyyed Vali Nasr that “protracted involvement in the political process, while it elicits certain concessions in the form of new laws and restrictions from the society, also creates barriers to growth of revivalism”...“it requires replacing a purely ideological orientation with an accommodation of pragmatic politics.” Involvement by Islamists in politics leads to their ultimate neutralization.

If we consider the above criticisms to attempt to formulate a response, they describe an outcome that leaves the major concern of Muslims for representation unanswered. Choueiri sees Islamism as a local and temporal phenomenon, and that time and context has changed. Roy sees Islamism breaking down in concepts, reaching a dead-end, and breaking down in action. Sayyid and Nasr see Islamism failing pragmatically over time. All of the above criticisms would tend to signal a looming crisis in Islamism and that a new approach is needed by Islamists and post-Islamists if they are not to be in crisis. Muslims still have needs for representation, even if the current political and economic situation of Muslims has changed and even if ideologies become irrelevant or break down. In consideration of these different above-mentioned criticisms, we can ask what can be done that Islamisms and post-islamisms could become more effective at representing the interests of Muslims, instead of becoming irrelevant or even disintegrating.

This response could be achieved by finding a new approach, engaging in formal and informal dialogue with each other, despite differences and disagreements, major and minor, to find points of common interest. This dialogue would work towards more unified cooperation in representation for Muslims. A possible cooperation and utilization of Islamist ideological content for representation could struggle to overcome any crisis of relevancy of Islamism described by critics above. Husnul Amin reached a conclusion about Islamists and post-Islamists that post-Islamists and Islamists could possibly have intercommunication, ideas flow between them, and elites discuss. Asef Bayat states concerning Islamism and post-Islamism, “in practice, however, Muslims may adhere simultaneously to aspects of both discourses...the advent of post-Islamism does not necessarily mean the historical end of Islamism...what it means is the

37 Choueiri, Youssef M., *Islamic Fundamentalism*, XI-XX.
38 Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, p. 60.
birth, out of the Islamist experience, of a qualitatively different discourse and politics.” The “qualitatively different discourse and politics” could be a pragmatic new dialogue with a purpose of cooperation in representation to address the concerns and needs of all Muslims.

Overcoming Marginalization and Achieving Relevance

A shift in strategy away from the official sphere or not only focusing on the official sphere but additionally including the public sphere could be indicated by findings of research by Charles Kurzman and Ijlal Naqvi which drew the following conclusions about Islamists generally. These provide some scope for the future of Pakistani Islamists in politics,

“Islamic parties have won very few elections. In a broader sense, however, the efforts to suppress these parties are failing. The evidence suggests that suppression of Islamic electoral options only makes them more popular with voters. According to the World Values Survey, support for shari’a is highest in the countries with the lowest levels of political freedom, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Kurzman and Naqvi cite the World Values Survey, 4th and 5th waves; available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.) By contrast, when Muslims are given the opportunity to vote freely for Islamic parties, they have tended not to do so.”

This could mean that Islamists will probably be marginal in politics but can be expected to continue to have a voice in the public sphere, where they still have prospects for influencing representation. This public sphere will be where both the post-Islamists are and where the Islamists will be making their representations. It can also be a place to influence more people.

Peter Mandaville states,

“..... Here being an Islamist has as much to do with lifestyle -how one consumes, studies, spends leisure time- as it does with joining a political movement.” Clearly this is describing life in the public sphere, not the official sphere. On the same webpage, Mandaville also states, “The pluralization of Islamic socio-political space and the Muslim Brotherhood’s loss of monopoly over the claim to articulate an Islamic social order is hence a major force shaping the future of Islamism.” Islamisms then face the reality of existing in a plurality of groups and movements and must find a way to have a beneficial representation and impact.

If in the present or future, the Islamist movements of Pakistan would not be in any kind of position of real power in the government, and would be more marginalized, so they would be representing their ideas and arguments, not in the official sphere but in the public sphere. This is essentially where the post-Islamists are also. The public sphere is one place where cooperation between Islamists and

41 Bayat, Asef, "What is Post-Islamism?", p. 5
44 Mandaville: “Is the Post-Islamism Thesis Still Valid?”
post-Islamists could be carried out, to achieve better representation for Muslims. Both the Islamists and the post-Islamists can engage in a discourse in the public sphere, making their representations.

Because the end goal of an Islamized society appears to be essentially the same between Islamists and post-Islamists, they would have common ground for discussion. This would mean that there are actually some de facto common strategic end goals amongst the Islamists and post-Islamists within the scope of achieving an Islamized society. An attempt could be made to find ways to cooperate on representation despite necessary differences of achieving common goals. Husnul Amin’s conclusion that, the purpose of a post-Islamist project would be, “...to transform the political and social macro-structures by inculcating new vision and consciousness into individuals and society” provides some scope for an achievement of Islamist-post-Islamist dialogue.

Common Ground for Representation

As stated earlier, Muslims in post-colonial Muslim majority countries and minority Muslims need representation. In this respect, we can consider what Islamists might have to talk about with others, such as post-Islamists. We can consider the words of Abu-Rabi’ regarding the Arab world, that, “official Islamic discourse often doesn’t deal with immediate issues facing the Muslim world” (poverty, illiteracy, oppression) and “Islamism today challenges with an attractive formulation of religious problematic.” Abu-Rabi also describes different types of discourses in the contemporary Arab world but sees the others in Arab society refusing to allow Islamists into the discourse. This exclusion of Islamists in the Arab world, (and elsewhere) in theory, could be changed to a dialogue in the public sphere on relevant issues between Islamists, post-Islamists and others who are concerned with the welfare of Muslims.

A dialogue amongst Islamists and post-Islamists, despite necessary disagreements, could effectuate a reconsideration of many of the ideas of earlier Islamists regarding their applicability and relevance to issues, as Abu-Rabi noted, of “poverty, illiteracy, and oppression” facing Muslims. In Pakistan, if a dialogue could be effectuated, a reconsideration of earlier foundational ideas would lead to an assessment of their utility with respect to issues concerning Muslims in the current situation and also have a purpose of working towards Islamizing the society. The dialogue would be a form of representation reexamining foundational ideas and concepts of Islamism in reference to relevant issues and matters of

The whole purpose of the dialogue would be to achieve relevance and make the foundational ideas of Islamism more current and workable as opposed to being marginalized or forgotten.

With respect to the planning of inter-Muslim dialogue, it should be worth noting that there is one idea that could be appropriated from experience in interfaith dialogue and applied to benefit Pakistani Muslims. When there is long-standing unresolvable disagreement between religious movements, this disagreement can actually be strategically exploited to be very useful for stimulating intellectual inquiry into a religious tradition, including ideologies. More specifically, with respect to protocol, if we consider a dialogue between Islamists and post-Islamists that reaches necessary disagreement on certain issues there would be three parts to dialogue. The first part would be necessary preliminary intellectual preparation (religious, economic, political) before the dialogue: the second part would be the comparatively short dialogue itself, which actually draws attention to issues and points of concern: and the third part of the dialogue would be the necessary debriefing and followup with one’s own community and scholars after the dialogue, examining issues and points of interest. These three parts of an inter-Muslim dialogue are all ways to stimulate intellectual inquiry into important aspects of one’s own religious and intellectual tradition. To follow this logic, a dialogue between Islamists and post-Islamists could be a very useful and productive way to stimulate inquiry into the Islamic thought of original Islamists, such as Mawdudi, inquiring as to the relevance of such scholars’ (such as Mawdudi) ideas in a contemporary setting. It can be a long-term strategy to train younger scholars to think deeply about aspects of ideology. It is also a modality of representation.

This strategic planning of inter-Muslim dialogue and representation could be part of a long-term strategy of overcoming the criticisms of reaching a “dead end” and “failure in action” described by Roy. This logic would mean that repeated inter-Muslim dialogue and cooperation on representation could be a long-term stimulus for Pakistani Islamisms as they work to achieve their original intended purpose, an Islamized society. Muslims needed representation in the early part of the twentieth century when Mawdudi was authoring his works of Islamic thought and most Islamists will agree that Muslims still need representation today to address challenges of globalization. Inter-Muslim dialogue may be unwanted by some but, followed properly, it could also effectuate

50 This idea is suggested based on my own observation of interreligious dialogue. It is also described by Mehrdad Massoudi, A system theory approach to interfaith dialogue, Intercultural Education, 17:4, 2006, pp. 421-437.
51 Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, 60.
52 Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism, pp. 4-5.
a new phenomenon of revivification for the Muslims whom it represents. It can mean a major new reexamination and utilization of original Islamists’ ideas to benefit Muslims.

One important component is apparently missing from the ideologies of various Pakistani Islamists and post-Islamists. A committed long-term strategy to achieve a sustained effort with long-term dialogue leading to a new intellectual revivification and more cohesive representation with other Pakistani Islamic movements is not apparent. This could be addressed to achieve a more unified representation of Muslims.54 Constructing an ideology for cooperation in representation could be a new approach facilitating better representation of Pakistani Muslims. Lafraie describes how a generic model for Islamic ideologies can be constructed, relying on the Qur’an.55 Either a long-term strategy or a Qur’an-based ideology for inter-Muslim engagement and peace building would be useful if not necessary for establishing long-range planning for a cooperative effort amongst Pakistani Islamists and or post-Islamists at representation. This project of formulating a long-term strategy or ideology could also rely upon the work of Abu-Nimer who cites certain Qur’anic references that can be relevant for the purpose of peace-building amongst Muslims.56 According to Abu-Nimer,

"An Islamic peace-building framework, applied to a context of community socio-economic development, can promote objectives such as an increase of solidarity among members of the community; bridging the gap of social and economic injustice; relieving the suffering of people and spare human lives; empowering people through participation and inclusivity; promoting equality among all members of the community; and encouraging the values of diversity and tolerance."57

Abu-Nimer outlines certain principles inherent in his suggested peace-building framework, these being “the pursuit of justice, social empowerment by doing good (Khayr and Ihsan), the universality and dignity of humanity, equality, the sacredness of human life, a quest for peace, peacemaking, knowledge and reason, creativity and innovation, forgiveness, deeds and actions, involvement through individual responsibility and choice, patience, collaborative actions and solidarity, the Ummah (as a foundation for collective action), inclusivity and participatory processes, and pluralism and diversity.”58

Shafiq and Abu-Nimer (2007) provide Qur’anic terms and references which can be useful for planning any inter-Muslim dialogue, cooperation, and for representation of Muslims: Ta’aruf (49:13); Islah (4:114); Mujadalah (29:46);
These major points could also be considered in planning or approaching any common efforts at representation between Islamists and post-Islamists.

Common Ground and Common Goals for Inter-Muslim Dialogue?

Amin’s observation is that, “a post-Islamist project...seeksto transform society using a society-centred approach—to transform the political and social macrostructures by inculcating new vision and consciousness into individuals and society.”

However, in this respect, it should also be understood that there is a typical divide between Islamism and post-Islamism, as can be seen in Pakistani Islamism and post-Islamism, and the Pakistanis Khurshid Ahmad and Javed Ahmad Ghamidi may be considered. Kurshid Ahmad is a representative Islamist and Javed Ahmad Ghamidi is a representative post-Islamist. According to Husnul Amin the central problem, the disagreement between Islamists and post-Islamists is the question of democracy and also a reformulation of shura per Ghamidi.

Khurshid Ahmad maintains, “political authority and power-making have to be devised on the basis of the supremacy of the Shariah and the consent and confidence of the people...accountability is not only before God, it is also before the law and the people.”

“Those in authority must enjoy the confidence and support of the Muslims, the Umma, the real repositories of Khilafa. It is very clear from the verse quoted above that the authority or assignment to rule over the earth has been promised to the whole community of believers and not to any particular person, class, family or group...the istikhlaaf granted to the faithful is in the nature of a popular vicegerency - each and all have been given this assignment...that is why the mode of decision-making for the Umma has been described as shura, i.e. their affairs are conducted through consultation among themselves.

Ghamidi departs from this Mawdudi perspective as described by Khurshid Ahmad radically on the question of sovereignty, the place of shariah and shurah.


63 Amin, Husnul, “Post-Islamist Intellectual Trends in Pakistan: Javed Ahmad Ghamidi and His Discourse on Islam and Democracy”, pp. 181-184


These points are critical. According to my own observations during fieldwork in Pakistan during 2003 and 2008, the communication which Husnul Amin described above between Islamists and post-Islamists is not perfectly open with all persons, however. What I observed was that there are Islamists who refuse to acknowledge post-Islamists as legitimate or even consider their ideas or to speak with them. Others are more open for intercommunication as Husnul Amin and Bayat describe above, so it can be concluded that there is some possibility of direct or indirect communication. If this communication happens, it should serve the purpose of fostering better representation and addressing the needs and concerns of Muslims.

Inter-Muslim Dialogue and Cooperation Elsewhere

If more successful representation is achieved with Islamist and post-Islamist dialogue, the experience and lessons learned by Islamists and post-Islamists could be relevant also for Muslims living in minority situations. Muslims in the West may also face certain dangers and/or needs for representation. However, quite optimistically, regarding Muslims in minority situations in the West, Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking opine that,

“...there are paths to openness, equality, and freedom in the constitution of an adequate political society...the core path for us combines a commitment to a cosmopolitical order with a conviction that a generous, respectful, and caring orientation to all agents in the polity grounds the possibility of a commitment to common citizenship (with a resistance toward denishment) and a contribution to the collective good through sustained dialogue.”

Kinnvall and Larking also opine that,

“By self-consciously adopting our new concept of postdiasporic Muslims, those who now live as minorities in the West are powerfully situated in their hybridity and their self-reflexivity to act as a vanguard in the emergence of a new political psychology of globalization...this new political psychology is postnationalist, self-dialogical, and engaged in dialogue with a range of others.”

While Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking are describing is a kind of representation by “post-diasporic” Muslims, this representation would be pluralistic amongst different Muslims. A representation by post-diasporic Muslims could draw not only on the framework described above by Abu-Nimer and by Shafiq and Abu-Nimer but also on new experience and lessons learned by Islamists and post-Islamists working to achieve more unified representation. The end results would be Muslims in minority situations maintaining their faith and religiosity, even as minorities, and also being better prepared to address concerns for representation.

Conclusion

This paper set out to suggest that there are real prospects for an inter-Muslim dialogue amongst Pakistani Islamists and post-Islamists to achieve better representation. Contrary to the observation that Islamism is a failure, bounden to a past time and place or is disintegrating, (or that similarly post-Islamism could be a failure), there are still prospects for Islamists and post-Islamists to work to achieve better representation and to address some challenges posed by globalization and lead to their original intended purpose for both groups of an Islamized society. Representation is necessary for Muslims in Muslim majority countries and also for Muslims in minority situations, for example, in the West. While there are Islamists who are loathe to even speak to post-Islamists, a long-term strategy involving inter-Muslim dialogue, carried out properly with planning, proper protocols, and with proper follow up afterwards can lead to a major recycling and re-examination of the foundational ideas and concepts of Islamism and post-Islamism. This recycling of foundational Islamist ideas could reexamine these ideas, consider their relevance with respect to the current milieu and relevant social issues of concern to Muslims. With respect to injustices, Islamists and post-Islamists in Muslim majority countries can engage in a discourse to plan and pursue other important strategies espousing Islamic unity in representation on these issues of common concern. While Islamization of society is not a realistic objective for Muslims in minority situations, minority Muslims can find ways to represent themselves and effectuate improved relations with others, including with non-Muslims. In all situations, minority and majority Muslims can seek to better legitimately represent themselves to address their political and economic concerns. The dialogue concerning these foundational ideas with other Muslims could ultimately seek to promote better and more relevant representation of Muslims and seek to address some of the problems caused by globalization.

For the Pakistani Islamists and post-Islamists, the question would appear to be “shurah amongst whom and who qualifies to be included in a discussion”? Muhammad Khalid Masud states, concerning the construction of sharia in Pakistan that, “...such power relations do not become normative unless other groups also find that construction suitable to their interests and are convinced, at least to some degree, through communication...a consensus, even if a silent one, develops after a negotiation among various interest groups.”71 It would appear that inter-Muslim dialogue, for example between Islamists and post-Islamists, would be very important for these two categories of politically engaged Muslims in Pakistan regarding all aspects of political engagement and representation. The fruits of this dialogue, if constructive, could also be interesting for review by Muslims elsewhere.

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