

THE EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY STRATEGY DOCUMENT AND TURKEY (Avrupa Birliđi Güvenlik Stratejisi Belgesi ve Türkiye)

Hakkı Büyükbaş
Yrd. Doç. Dr. , Erciyes Ü. İİBF
hakkibuyukbas@erciyes.edu.tr

“We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early,
rapid and when necessary, robust intervention”
EUSS

Özet

Avrupa Birliđi Devlet ve Hükümet Başkanları Konseyi, Aralık 2003'te, “Avrupa Güvenlik Stratejisi” belgesini kabul etmiştir. Belge, Avrupa Birliđi'nin güvenlik ve strateji kültürü oluşturma sürecinde önemli bir yere sahiptir. Belge, uluslararası ve Avrupa güvenlik durumuna ve Avrupa güvenliđi için muhtemel tehditleri; Avrupa Birliđi'nin stratejik amaçlarının neler olduğunu ve nihayet bu küresel ve Avrupa güvenlik durumu değerlendirildikten sonra, Avrupa Birliđi için dersler ve çıkarımları içermek üzere üç bölüme ayrılmıştır. Belge'de Avrupa Birliđi kendisini hem uluslararası hem de Avrupa güvenliđinde temel aktör veya temel aktörlerden biri olarak tanımlamaktadır. Ne var ki belge, tüm küresel ve bölgesel gelişmeler; ABD, Rusya ve hatta Çin gibi önemli aktörlere yer vermesine rağmen, hiçbir yerde Türkiye'ye göndermede bulunulmamıştır. Hâlbuki Türkiye Avrupa güvenliđinde olduğu gibi diğer kritik bölgelerde de önemli roller oynayan/oynayabilecek bir potansiyele sahiptir. Bu çalışmada söz konusu belge irdelenmiş ve Türkiye açısından tartışılmıştır.

Çalışma üç bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölümde Avrupa Birliđi'nin dünya siyasetinde siyasi bir aktör olma çabası ve niteliđi; ikinci bölüm-

de söz konusu belge ele alınmıştır. Üçüncü bölümde ise genel bir değerlendirme ile birlikte Avrupa güvenliği bağlamında Türkiye'nin muhtemel rolü belirtmeye çalışılmıştır.

Summary

This article aims to introduce and analyze the EU security-strategy document. This document, which consists of three chapters, was accepted by the European Council in December 2003. The paper will discuss the risks, threat perceptions and the security of the EU in the light of the document. The EU security-strategy document aims to build a common European strategy culture. With this document, the EU has declared its willingness to act as a global actor that would act as an equal partner with the USA instead of being an alternative to it. Therefore, the paper also compares the EU Security strategy-document with the strategic documents and security understanding of the USA. The study also underlines the geopolitical importance of Turkey for the European security and criticizes the fact that the document does not mention Turkey. In this context, this study tries to give an insight into the document in order to enlighten those who are interested in world politics and more specifically in security issues.

Introduction

This study attempts to analyze the European Union security strategy document (EUSS henceforth)¹ that is consisted of three chapters and has been approved by the European Council in December 2003. First of all, the document lays out the international and European security environment. In the second chapter, the strategic objectives of the EU within this environment are clarified and, in the third chapter, the policy implications of these objectives for the EU are explained. The study will discuss the risks, threat perceptions and security of the EU in the light of this document. In addition to the EUSS, the study also analyzes the geopolitical importance of Turkey for the European security. Despite its implications for Turkish security interests, the document has not yet been discussed either in the public or among scholars and this study hopes to initiate such a discussion.

¹ EUSS (2003). EU Security strategy document", Brussels,, 12. 12. 2003.

(<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>) (Downloaded: 28. 06. 2005). For a draft which proposed by Javier Solana, see http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/76255.pdf. See on the contents of the document as a discussion paper: Jan Joel Andersson, "The EU Security Strategy: Coherence and Capabilities", Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 20 October 2003, Stockholm, (<http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/docsto.pdf>) (Downloaded: 28. 06. 2005).

1. European Security Strategy Document: Its Scope and Content

The EUSS outlines the security environment in which the EU regards itself as a European and global security actor. In this environment, the EU tries to establish a multi-polar international order based on multilateralism. In the document, Russia has been given a vital role for the European security as a strategic partner of the EU. Despite the fact that the security of Europe and that of Turkey are closely interrelated², Turkey is not mentioned in the document, nor is given any role in the new European security design. However, the areas that establish the European security environment are also strategically critical for Turkey. Turkey stands at the crossroads of the regions, which are regarded in the document as important regions for the European security such as the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Near East, and the Caucasus.

The idea of establishing a security strategy document for the EU is the result of the failure of the EU member states to form a unanimous response to the Iraq policy of the US.³ Some EU members felt that the solidarity of the transatlantic states was ended by the US. They also perceived that the US ignored the EU as a global political actor. It was inferred by some European politicians that Washington was eager to see the EU merely as a complementary part of the US global policy⁴. The US started the war in Iraq and expected the support of her allies without taking their views into consideration. In other words, the Iraq policy of the US served as a catalyst for the EU in forming a security strategy document. The EUSS document was based on the experience of Iraqi crisis and it was designed to reveal a single EU stance toward various developments in the world. The document also presented a foreign policy perspective to the EU member states. In the document, the EU emphasized that it was an independent global political actor.

For a long time, it has been frequently expressed on the other side of the Atlantic that Western Europe would gradually lose the strategic importance in international relations that it had enjoyed during the Cold War.⁵ The EU, which was founded

² Çayhan, Esra (2002), "Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası ve Türkiye", *Akdeniz Üniversitesi. İ.İ.B.F. Dergisi* (3), pp. 42-55.

³ Karaosmanoğlu, Ali L. (2003), "Transatlantik Çatlağı: Değişen Kimlikler", *Doğu-Batı Düşünce Dergisi* 23, (Mayıs-Haziran-Temmuz), pp. 175-183; Karaosmanoğlu, Ali (2001), *Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği Açısından Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri*, *Doğu Batı*, (No 14), pp. 156-166.

⁴ Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1997), *Die einzige Weltmacht*, (Weilheim/Berlin).

⁵ Schweigler, Gerhard (2004), "Aussenpolitik der USA", Lösche, P. / von Loeffelholz, H. D. (Hg.), *Länderbericht der USA* (Bonn: BPB), pp. 410-506; Deighton, Anne. 2002. "The European Security

upon an unstable political background, could not be an important strategic partner under the new circumstances. The EU, which had already lacked a common strategic culture, did not have the capability of acting with a single identity. According to this view, the USA should have arranged its security and defense relations with each EU member separately instead of dealing with the EU as a single actor. For instance, it was thought that the political influence of France in international relations had diminished after the collapse of the Soviet Union and that it had lost part of its political power to reshape the international order. Thus, Germany, which was considered to be a rising European power, should have been given priority over France. While Germany was considered a regulative actor (*Ordnungsmacht*) in Central and Eastern Europe, Japan would take over certain roles in the Far East as a close ally of the US in world affairs. In the absence of a power such as Germany or Japan in the Near East, the US would take a direct role in reshaping the region. In the new world order, the US had no longer compelling reasons to further support the European integration process. Therefore, the US support for the deepening of EU integration was abandoned and the priorities of the US foreign policy shifted to reshaping the Near East and, in a broader sense, Asia.

The EU was thought to be lacking strategic thought and political significance as demonstrated by Kissinger's famous words that "the EU did not even have a phone number." Consequently, for the US, the EU was not an important player in world affairs.⁶ As a response to this perception, the EU accepted the security strategy document that shows a common attitude, determination and will for developing a common strategic culture. With her strong will to play a strategic role in international relations, France revealed a great deal of effort during the preparatory phase of the document and proved that it could not be cast aside in the shaping of world affairs. Germany, under the leadership of Kanzler Gerhard Schröder, supported France in these efforts transform the EU into a global political actor.

Thanks to the joint leadership of France and Germany, the EU tried to gain a world-power status⁷. The EU commissioner Javier Solana was appointed as the "Foreign Minister of the EU" and the EU finally had a phone number and fortified

and Defence Policy', *Journal of Common Market Studies*. Vol. 40 No. 4, pp. 719-41

⁶ Mathiopoulos, Margarita (1998), "Die USA und Europa als globale Akteure im 21. Jahrhundert", *Aussenpolitik*, 2/1998, pp. 41-57.

⁷ Hilz, Wolfram (2005), "Die Sicherheitspolitik des Europäischen Führungstrios", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, pp. 38-39.

its role as a political actor in world politics. Moreover, as a response to the “Grand Strategy” of the US president George W. Bush, the EU adopted a strategy paper entitled “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy,” prepared by Solana.⁸ This was an attempt to prove the will, power, and determination of the EU to play a role in the shaping of international security and defense relations as an equal actor with the US. In addition to this, the strategy paper also revealed EU’s aspirations to be more than a civilian power.⁹

The Iraq crisis triggered the process that led into the EUSS. The Iraqi question revealed that the US and the EU perceived the notions of “I” and “the other” differently and assessed world politics and threats in different ways. Moreover, a guiding document was needed to minimize the differences among the EU member states on foreign policy issues. In the light of these requirements, the document was approved unanimously by the Heads of states and governments of the EU member states.

The document is the first example of the efforts in the EU to develop a culture of common strategy by exceeding the conventions of nation-state strategy culture. With the document, the EU’s both perception and assessment of world politics and its role as a new political actor became clearer. In the document, the concept of security was defined in a quite broad manner, which included military, political, diplomatic, economic and environmental dimensions. A natural result of this new definition of security was the necessity to develop suitable instruments and precautions in order to overcome possible crises.¹⁰

The EUSS covered three major areas:

Security Environment: Global Challenges and Key Threats,

Strategic Objectives, and

Policy Implications for Europe.

In the introduction part of this article, the meaning and importance of the EU as well as influences and changes which affected the EU member states and citizens

⁸ USNSS: (www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf) (17. 5. 2004); Schrader, Lutz (2004), “Europas Antwort auf Bushs Grand Strategy”, *Welttrends* 42 (İlkbahar), pp. 37-50.

⁹ Ehrhart, Hans-Georg (2004), “Abschied vom Leitbild „Zivilmacht“? Konzepte zur EU-Sicherheitspolitik nach dem Irak-Krieg”, Varwick, Johannes / Knelangen, Wolfgang (Hg.), *Neues Europa - alte EU?* (Opladen: Verlag Leske und Budrich), pp. 149-163.

¹⁰ Reiter, Eric (2004), “Die Sicherheitsstrategie der EU”, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B* 3-4, p. 27.

are pointed out. It is stated that Europe has never been so secure, prosperous, and free as it is today. The US and NATO's positive contributions to the EU integration process are also stated in the introductory part. It is emphasized that, despite the expansion of some values such as the rule of law and democracy, Europe faces threats and challenges. The first part of the document addresses the European security environment in a context of global challenges and main threats.

2. Security Environment: Global Challenges and Key Threats

The EUSS describes the new security environment of Europe through the definition of the new threats such as international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons and technology of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states, and organized crime. In the document, these new threats are assessed in relation to the negative and positive consequences of globalization.

With respect to the negative consequences of globalization, the problems of poverty and hunger are particularly emphasized. Since poverty and hunger may lead to instability and armed conflicts, the policies to fight these problems are considered within the framework of security measures. The connection between poverty / hunger and security that the document makes, is certainly worth praising. The connection between security and human development, which cannot be seen in the security strategy of the US, shows the importance given by the EU to social democratic values. In addition to humanitarian issues, Europe's dependency with regard to energy is also stressed in the document as a possible source of threat.

The EUSS regards terrorism as the most serious problem for the existing European security and focuses on the global dimension of the problem. The fact that the document focuses on this problem must be an indicator of the US search for co-operation in security issues.¹¹ The document states that Europe is both a target and a base for terrorists. The reality that terrorism forms a threat to European security is supported by the fact that the El-Qaeda organization had cells in some European countries such as Britain and Spain.

In the document, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction coupled with the presence of terrorist organizations and organized crime is mentioned as another threat to the European security. In order to cope with these threats, the EU

¹¹ Dedeoğlu, Beril (2004), "Yeniden Güvenlik Topluluğu: Benzerliklerin Karşılıklı Bağımlılığından Farklılıkların Birlikteliğine." *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, Sayı 4.

has started a bargaining process with France, Germany and Britain as the leading actors. However, this initiative of the EU is yet to obtain concrete results.¹²

Another significant point stressed in the first part of the document is the changing function and significance of states and the emphasis on their changing role in the process of globalization. The unstable relationship between Near Eastern states and the state system has been pointed out in the paper. The warning was made that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advances in rocket technology in this region particularly might turn the Near East into a source of threat for the European security.¹³

The regional conflicts such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Liberia are also mentioned in the document as possible sources of threat. These unstable environments have an indirect effect on the European security as they trigger organized crime (human trafficking, illegal immigration, the opium trade etc.). In the document, Europe is defined as one of the main targets of these activities of organized crime and this situation increases the security worries of Europe.

In order to cope with these threats, the EU has also defined certain strategic objectives in the EUSS. Promoting democracy in the neighboring regions, strengthening EU's capability of rapid reaction to threats and crises, the use of the crisis prevention capabilities of the EU, and emphasizing the significance of transatlantic relations are some of these strategic objectives.

3. Strategic Objectives

The strategic objectives, which are identified in the EUSS, are based on the assumption that humanity has more opportunities and abilities than ever, but that it also faces dangers and uncertainties in similar proportions.

The thesis that democracy should become global for the sake of European security is also a part of these strategic objectives. One may conclude that the US and the EU share similar opinions and political culture; nevertheless Europeans widely share the idea that the American way of life has some negative aspects. Although it is accepted that US political culture attaches somewhat importance to citizens' rights and human rights, it, however disregards some social problems such

¹² Frankfurter Rundschau, 16.11.2004.

¹³ Perthes, Volker (2004), "Europa und Amerikas Greater Middle East" (Berlin: *SWP Aktuell* 5, Feb.).

as homelessness. Moreover, the EUSS relies too much on market conditions, but it does not give due care to the regulatory power of politics. As is well known, in US political culture, “liberty as one of the values of the Enlightenment is preferred to “equality.” In contrast to this, European political culture attaches more importance to “equality.” Therefore, it may be assumed that the EU has a different approach toward values such as equality, liberation, democracy, and the free market from that of the US.

Whereas the US prefers military instruments as a way of intervening in issues of world politics, the EU utilizes economic and other civilian instruments such as development aid. In other words, the EU strategy differs from the national security strategy of the US in terms of using civilian instruments in addition to military ones in its proposed intervention policy.

The EUSS proposes three strategic goals toward establishing a secure environment in Europe. In order to cope with the threats, which result from international terrorism,¹⁴ preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, reinforcing the role of “International Atomic Agency” and establishing a tight export regime are listed as basic measures. Although the US has also the same concerns and supports these measures, it prefers to implement the measures unitarily, while the EU prefers a multilateral approach.¹⁵

As a result of globalization, the security threats are no longer limited to a closed geographical area. Threats to European security may begin outside the European territory and the whole globe needs to be regarded as the European security area.¹⁶ As a part of the globalization process, the security threats and risks are not only of military origin and cannot be coped with by military instruments alone. Such threats can only be overcome through the simultaneous use of political, diplomatic, and military instruments.

The document states how the EU has responded to the above-mentioned threats, and shows its contribution to the security of the Balkans, Afghanistan

¹⁴ For Turkish perspective on international terrorism see Denker, Mehmet Sami (1997), *Uluslararası Terör, Türkiye ve PKK*, Boğaziçi Yayınları: İst.; Arıboğan, Deniz Ülkü (2003), *Tarihin Sonundan Barışın Sonuna Terörizmi Anlamak ve Anlamlandırmak*, İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları.

¹⁵ Krause, Joachim (2004), “Multilateralism: Behind European Views”, *Washington Quarterly*, (Spring), pp. 43-59.

¹⁶ (Guerot, 2004).

and the Democratic Republic of Congo¹⁷. As is known, the EU deployed military troops in the mentioned regions and wanted to promote the peace and to create wealth in these regions. Another important point in this part of the document is that defense doctrines of the Cold War era have lost their function and the problem of occupation was no longer a serious problem. However, the document set the ground for intervention by emphasizing the necessity to start the defense line at or outside the European border. However, how the EU will establish a balance between international law and its intervention policy is a significant point that needs clarification.¹⁸

The improvement of the EU's relations with its neighbors is another important part of the new European security strategy. Spreading security, wealth and democracy throughout its neighboring regions has become crucial for the EU in the process of creating a belt of peace near its borders. Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean and the Balkans are targets of this policy. The Israel-Palestine conflict forms the basis of Near Eastern problems. In this conflict, while the EU has supported the Arabs, the US has backed Israel.¹⁹ Whereas the US has been tolerant toward the security concerns of Israel and overlooked its wrongdoings, the EU has been more sensitive to the situation of the Palestinians.²⁰

The increasing role of the US in the Near East, especially after the Iraqi war, has been another source of concern for the EU. As the US initiated the "Greater Middle East" Project and allocated 18-19 billion US\$ solely for the reconstruction of Iraq²¹, the EU has become worried about being left out of the developments in the region and issued a draft document entitled "The EU-Mediterranean and Middle East Strategic Partnership" on March 22, 2004. As such, the EU demonstrated its concern over the question of security. The document was a part of the Barcelona

¹⁷ Heise, Volker (2005), "Militärische Integration in Europa" (Berlin: SWP-Studie, Sept.).

¹⁸ Ortega, Martin (2005), "Über Petersberg hinaus: Welche militärische Missionen für die EU?", in: Gnesotto, Nicole (2005) (Hg.), *Die Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der EU*, Institute für Sicherheitsstudien der EU, Paris, pp. 87-104.

¹⁹ Ataöv, Türkkaya (2003), *11 Eylül: Terörle Savaş mı, Bahane mi* (İstanbul: Alkım Yayınevi).

²⁰ Krell, Gert (2004), "Die USA, Israel und der Nahost-Konflikt", Studie über Demokratische Außenpolitik im 20. Jahrhundert, (Frankfurt/M.: HSFK-Report Nr. 14); Asseburg, Muriel (2003), "Die EU und der Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten" and "Materialsammlung zum Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten Anlageband zur SWP-Studie 2003/S 28", "Die EU und der Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten" (Berlin: SWP-Studie, July).

²¹ Gaerber, Andrae (2004), "Transatlantische Initiative für Mittleren Osten und Nordafrika -eine unvollständige Agenda", *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, (Heft 4, Berlin), pp. 87-110).

process and emphasized the intention of the EU to contribute to the peace, stability and wealth of the region.

The third strategic target of the document is the establishment of an international order based on law and multilateral relations. As dependency increases in a globalized world, it is thought that a stronger and healthier international community will be formed. It is assumed that as participants become familiar with judicial norms they will try to conform to these norms; unlawful behaviors will be taken under control by using multilateral mechanisms. However, international law should be rearranged in line with the new conditions. Despite this call, the document did not focus on the need that international organizations' strength should be increased. The document has referred to the United Nations as a universal actor and its role in international security. Because the decisions of the UN form the basis and framework of international law, the UN Security Council is a primary multilateral organization that is responsible for international peace and security. The UN constitutes the heart of multilateralism and world order, and it should continue to be so. Therefore, one of the priorities of the European security policy is to reinforce the UN and so help the UN to play its role successfully.

It is emphasized in the document that the international and regional organizations are a fundamental part of a prosperous and peaceful world order. The document stresses the significance of commercial and economic relations in establishing a better international order and that of global and regional organizations in facilitating these relations. In this respect, the EU security strategy is clearly different from the American national security strategy. The EU constitutes an example of multilateral relations among equal states that are established for the purpose of economic and political development. The EU can contribute to the formation of the new world order by being an example to the rest of the world and help other states to attain the same standards.

The document did not name the "rouge states. It pointed out that the frequent use of military sanctions will diminish the legitimacy of the present international system and may throw the international order into a chaos. Therefore, particular attention should be paid to judicial values in determining the behaviors of other actors. The document did not mention any coercive measures.

4. Policy Implications for Europe

The third part of the document lays out policy implications for Europe. Main policy suggestions are:

- “-the need for the EU to develop a strategic culture,
- strengthening EU’s capacity for preventing crisis and swift action,
- improving civil crisis management, making military and civil elements more effective by combining these two after the intervention to crisis,²²
- enabling diplomacy as an instrument to solve problems,
- the call to develop strategic partnerships with the leading states of world politics.”

The EU’s successful crisis management in the Balkans is often used as the indicator of what the EU can achieve²³. It is stressed that the EU can achieve similar success in other regions only if the member states adopt a common attitude. It is reiterated that the EU, with a common culture and the will, can use its potential in managing and overcoming crisis. Other achievements of the EU in international politics and security are touched upon. In order to eradicate the threats and dangers mentioned above, the EU should improve its mobility. The EU defines itself as an actor responsible for both regional and global security. To carry out its global responsibility, the essential equipment and the Common Foreign and Security Policy instruments should be reinforced through various mechanisms. In this way, it is thought that the EU will be able to make a significant contribution to the European security.

With its military personnel of two million and military expenses of 160 billion Euros, the EU has the power to establish its own defense system and to set up active intervention means.²⁴ However, the use of this potential depends on the

²² Rummel, Reinhard (2004), (2005)a, “Der zivile Gehalt der Europäischen Sicherheits und Verteidigungspolitik”, Schröter, Lothar (ed.), *Europa und Militär - Europäische Friedenspolitik oder Militarisierung der EU?*, (Schkeuditz), pp. 83-105; Rummel, Reinhard (2004), “Soft-Power EU Interventionspolitik mit zivilen Mitteln”, in: Ehrhart, Hans-Georg / Schmitt, Burkard (Hg.), *Die Sicherheitspolitik der EU im Werden* (Baden-Baden: Nomos V. G.), pp. 259-279.

²³ Ortega, Martin (2005), “Über Petersberg hinaus: Welche militärische Missionen für die EU?”, in: Gnesotto, Nicole (2005) (Hg.), *Die Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der EU*, Institute für Sicherheitsstudien der EU, Paris, pp. 87-104.

²⁴ Reiter, Eric (2004), “Die Sicherheitsstrategie der EU”, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 3-4*, pp.

permission of the national states. The EU is of the opinion that this potential can be used more efficiently, if also a common strategic culture is adopted. However, the EU is far away from this point. The EU has undertaken some responsibilities in collaboration with either the US or the UN, but the EU has not managed nor has it intervened in a serious crisis so far.

The EU accepts that it can achieve some of its political goals through the use of diplomatic instruments wisely. Diplomacy is seen an easy and less expensive means compared to military intervention. In this context, the need to coordinate foreign trade, development aid, and foreign and security policies is emphasized. According to the document, trade and development policies should be used as powerful tools to promote reforms and prevent crises.

According to the document, in addition to its transatlantic relations, the EU needs to establish good relations with the other powers in world politics as well. By this strategy, the EU aims to form a more peaceful and stable multi-polar world order, in which the EU can participate as an “equal actor.” For this reason, the importance of multi-lateral relations is often stressed together with the need for the EU to develop new partnerships not only with the US²⁵ but also with such actors as Canada, Russia, Japan, China and India. That the names of those states are mentioned in the document should be seen not only as an outcome of the EU’s efforts toward finding support to its own project but also that these states play a significant roles and/or that they will play a more important role in the future in world politics.

5. European Security and the Role of Turkey

The EUSS document, which attempts to redesign the role of the EU within the global security, does not refer to Turkey in any way, although Turkey has been in an active relationship with the EU in the past fifty years. However, Russia’s importance in respect of European security is pointed out clearly. On the other hand, by not giving Russia an EU-membership perspective, the members have accepted a different strategy on Russia,²⁶ whereas they have agreed a possible full-membership of

26-31.

²⁵ Hacke, Christian (2004), “Die europäische Verfassung: Katalysator für mehr außen und sicherheitspolitische Gemeinsamkeiten?”, *Politische Studien*, (Sept-Okt.), pp. 63-71.

²⁶ EU-RUSSIA Summit (2005), *Fifteenth EU-Russia Summit*. Road Maps, Moscow, 10 May 2005; (http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/84815.pdf) (downloaded: 28. 08. 2005); (http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/com_strat/russia_99.pdf) (28. 08.

Turkey in the organization. One of the reasons for excluding Turkey from the new security strategy may be an attempt on the EU side to prevent Ankara's position from becoming more powerful during the negotiations. Moreover, the existence of Russia as the new strategic partner might have made Turkey less important in the eyes of the EU members. In the document, the Balkans, the Mediterranean region, the Near East and the Caucasus have been listed among the sensitive regions for European security. These regions are important for also the security of Turkey, which is at the junction of all these regions. In addition to being affected by the developments in Europe, Turkey also has the potential to affect the security environment in these regions.²⁷

Although there is no direct reference to Turkey in the document, the EU is undoubtedly very concerned with Turkey for strategic reasons.²⁸ Preferring Russia over Turkey as a strategic partner could cause new security complications for world order. The EU, by choosing Russia as the main partner in its security policies, will push Turkey to stay closer to the US in its search for security guarantees. Yet, the US, despite relatively improved relations, still considers Russia a rival state. Especially with regard to the Caucasus and Central Asia, the US has given priority to Turkey over Russia in a certain way.²⁹

Russia's continuing influence in the region, for the most part, has worked against the interests of Turkey and the Turkic people. Russia and Turkey have been competing for a long time over becoming the most important actor in the region. Turkey's alliance with the West has been an essential counterbalance to Russia's power. That is why Turkey has always tried to enter into the western state system. It has also given importance to setting up relationships with the main actors and the strongest state in this system.³⁰

2005);

Mommsen, Margerata (2004), "Die EU und Russland", *Weidenfeld*, Werner (ed), Europa Handbuch (Bonn: BPB), pp. 483-502.

²⁷ Oran, B. (1996), "Türk Dış Politikası: Temel İlkeleri ve Soğuk Savaş Ertesindeki Durumu Üzerine Notlar", *AÜSBF Dergisi*, (cilt.: 51, No: 1-4), pp. 353-370.

²⁸ Bağcı, Hüseyin (2000), "Die Probleme der Türkischen 'Grand Strategy' in einer sich veränderten Sicherheitsumwelt: Gestern und Heute", *Studien und Berichte zur Sicherheitspolitik*, (1), pp. 5-25.

²⁹ Sagorski, Andrej (2000), "Entwicklung der russisch-amerikanischen Beziehungen", Gorzka, Gabriele. / Schulze, Peter, (Hg.), *Wohin steuert Russland unter Putin?* (Frankfurt: Campus V.), pp. 329-34.

³⁰ Çomak, Hasret (2005), "Rusya Faktörü ve Üç Boyutlu Dış Politika", *Stratejik Öngörü*, (June); Haydar Çakmak, *Avrupa Güvenliği*, Ankara: Platin, 2007, pp. 201-208.

In addition to her possible contribution to the establishment of a multilateral security understanding, with her strong army Turkey is also capable of intervening actively in possible crisis situations. Turkey prefers to participate in European and transatlantic institutions as well as in EU structures. In case of the failure to join the EU, there is a strong possibility that Turkey will become more isolated and more depended on the USA. On the other hand, it is also possible that Turkey would establish stronger relations with Russia and with the other power centers, which would conflict with the security priorities of the EU.

Turkey, in spite of all these worries, doesn't claim to function effectively as a regulative power (*Ordnungsmacht*) in the Near East, Central Asia or the Caucasus. Turkey, in order to reinforce the international system that is under the leadership of Transatlantic allies, should be active in the aforementioned regions and achieve its political and economic development in the framework of transatlantic and European institutions.

Some circles in the EU claim that with the possible EU membership of Turkey, the EU will border some unstable frontiers and that if Turkey becomes a member of the EU, it may increase its power and impact in the surrounding region. If Turkey becomes a more powerful regional actor, this would provoke the reaction of Russia and thus the relations between the EU and Russia could become tense and the security in Europe would deteriorate. Since Turkey's membership will eventually be so costly, keeping it out of the EU-integration process may be recommended.³¹ Furthermore, if Turkey becomes a more prosperous country, this could result in Turkey's gaining more power within the European institutions that may also be considered to work against the interests of the EU.

It is possible to argue that the EU takes Turkey's geopolitical position into account to a certain extent, but it seems it lacks the ability to assess this position well.³² The EUSS document states that the dependence of the EU on the out-of-area energy sources is a threat to Europe's security. Turkey is a country at the crossroads

³¹ Wehler, Heinz-Ulrich (2004), "Verblendetes Harakiri: der Türkei-Beitritt zerstört die EU", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, (B 33-34): 6-8; Reiter, Eric (2004), "Die Situation der EU in ihrer geplanten strategischen Überdehnung – Sicherheitspolitische und strategische Aspekte eines Beitritts der Türkei zur EU" (Arbeitspapier des Österreichischen Instituts für Europäische Sicherheitspolitik Wien, Dez.).

³² Oran, B. (1996), "Türk Dış Politikası: Temel İlkeleri ve Soğuk Savaş Ertesindeki Durumu Üzerine Notlar", *AÜSBF Dergisi*, (cilt.: 51, No: 1-4,) pp. 353-370.

of energy corridors and the contribution of Turkey to the EU's energy needs might overcome the energy problem in Europe. However, the EU has so far preferred to supply its energy needs not through Turkey but through Russia.³³ This shows that the EU has accepted Russia's re-expansion in the Caucasus and Central Asia and its control over these regions.³⁴ However, oil and natural gas of the Caucasus and Caspian Sea could be better transported to Europe through Turkey. The EU has not taken the importance of Turkey into consideration as much as the US has. In other words, this means that the EU has not dispelled its suspicions concerning the positive contributions that Turkey could make toward improving the European security.

The main reason for excluding Turkey from the EU security strategy seems to be the concern that Turkey will eventually become more powerful after joining the EU and will change the balance of power in Europe³⁵ to an extent that it might even stop the EU integration process. After becoming a member of the EU, Turkey may significantly increase its influence in the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Near East, and the Balkans. This enormous potential of Turkey causes some concerns within the EU and results in a suspicion about Turkey's actual membership. However, Turkey's possible exclusion from the European integration process will not only show the limits of the EU's expansion but it will also demonstrate the limits of the EU's power for becoming a global actor.

Concluding Remarks

The EUSS document, which aims to build a common European strategy culture, is an important step in defining the common interests and the common threat perceptions for the EU. However, it is still unclear what sort of impact the document will have on the EU and on its members. The EU members are aware of the fact that they cannot overcome new security threats only with their own

³³ Ruelhl, Lothar (2005), "Sicherheitspartner Türkei. Geopolitik, Strategie und europäische Interessen", *Sicherheitspolitik des Bundesministeriums für Landesverteidigung*, Wien, (April); Schneider, Eberhard (2005), "Die Europäische Union und Rußland im 21. Jahrhundert", (Berlin: *SWP-Diss. papier*, Mai); Goetz, Roland (2004), "Rußlands Energiestrategie und die Energieversorgung Europas", (Berlin: *SWP-Studie*, March).

³⁴ Müller, Friedeman / Ulbach, Uwe (2001), "Persischer Golf, Kaspisches Meer und Kaukasus", (Berlin: *SWP-Studie*, January).

³⁵ Nussbaumer, Heinz (2004), "Wo endet Europa? Vom Umgang der Europäischen Union mit der Türkei", *Vortrag vor der Orientgesellschaft Hammer -Purgstall* am 18. 12. 2004 in der Diplomatischen Akademie Wien. <http://www.da-vienna.ac.at/userfiles/nussbaumer.pdf> (12. 08. 2005).

national resources. However, they seem too far from putting the common interests of the EU above their national interests.

Considering the war in Iraq, The EUSS document is also an attempt to overcome the fragmentation among the EU states. The EU has declared its willingness to act as a global actor and as an equal partner of the US.³⁶ It has been strongly pointed out that through establishing a multi-polar system, to which the EU can contribute, a stable and peaceful world order could be created. Thus, the EU document agrees with the US security understanding in respect to security threats and the need for intervention in regional crises. However, they differ with respect to the policy suggestions put forward to cope with these threats. By designing its intervention policy as a combination of economic, civilian, and military elements, the EU has differentiated itself from the US.

Despite the aim of promoting the security in Europe, Turkey has not been given any consideration in the document. However, the EU can be closer to realize its strategic vision with the contribution of Turkey. As it has been mentioned in the document, Turkey as a state that has been participating in the Barcelona process and playing a critical role in some regional organizations such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the Economic Cooperation Organization and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, can substantially contribute to the EU's security policy.

³⁶ Rummel, Reinhard, (2004), "Europäische Mitverantwortung für globale Sicherheit", Reinhard C. Meier-Walser (ed.) *Gemeinsam sicher? Vision und Realität Europäischer Sicherheitspolitik* (München), pp. 119-143.