ANKARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
İLÂHIYAT FAKÜLTESİ
DERGİSİ

ANKARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ İLÂHIYAT FAKÜLTESİ
TARAFINDAN YILDA BİR ÇIKARILIR

Cilt: XXV
The view of ethics as self-realization, or self-actualization, is one of the oldest and perhaps the most persistent themes of the history of moral philosophy. Its best formulation goes back to Aristotle. The view is also found in the writings of many Jewish, Muslim and Christian philosophers. It is, as a matter of fact, quite widespread among many modern and contemporary philosophers and social scientists who defend some forms of ethical absolutism by appealing to universal human capacities or potentialities. For example, we find the idea of self-perfection, albeit in a different forms, in Kant (the actualization of noumenal self), in Fichte (the self-realization of an absolute will of which each person is a temporary embodiment), in Hegel (the self-realization of the absolute spirit), in T.H. Green (self-realization through common laws, customs and institutions) and in many others. Again, the view is defended by, for instance, Erich Fromm who interprets existence as “the unfolding of the specific powers of organism” and says that “all organisms have an inherent tendency to actualize their specific potentialities. The aim of man’s life, therefore, is to be understood as the unfolding of his powers according to the laws of his nature.”

What is self-realization? It seems that the notion of self-realization is quite indefinite. “To realize” usually means the same as “to make real”. If we prefer, as Aristotle and al-Farabi did, the term self-actualization, “to actualize” in this context would mean the same as “to make actual.” And since each of us is already real or actual—in the sense that we exist—what will be the meaning of “to realize or actualize oneself?” It might mean to be true to one’s nature or, to use a Stoic expression,

"life according to Nature." If the same term occurs in a religious context, it might mean to act according to the will of God, which results—as many Muslim philosophers and Sufis believed—in "adopting the traits of the character of God." So, to put it in a nutshell, the view of ethics as self-realization is concerned with realizing our capacities or potentialities. But without taking the direction of self-realization into account, "realizing one self" does not mean much. Are we, for instance, to actualize *all* our potentialities? As we all know, there are many traits of character that we can develop but not usually desire to develop. No sane person desires to develop criminal tendencies that might exist in him. Thus, self-realization necessitates some forms of "self-limitation", "self-restrain" or "self-control". So as to make clear the relation between self-realization and self-limitation, a distinction is usually drawn between the 'higher' part and the 'lower' part in man's nature. The latter ought to be limited for the sake of the full realization of the former. In other words, by giving the lower part of the self under the command of the higher, we limit the self. Practically all idealistic and religious philosophies consider this a necessary step for the realization of the higher self in which man's true happiness consists. We all know that some people with certain mystical leanings went to extreme in their views concerning the subjugation of the 'lower part', and defended an ethic of renunciation. The majority of moral philosophers, however, regarded such subjugation as a means rather than an end, and thus remained faithful to an ethic of affirmation. They were fully aware of the fact that some grave feelings of pain ought perhaps to be experienced for the attainment of the most profound joys of life. So, the subjugation of the lower part is required in order to become receptive for the sublimest intellectual pleasures.

As it has already been pointed out, the clearest formulation of the ethics of self-realization goes back to Aristotle. According to him, the best way of finding out how man can gain happiness (*eudomania*) is to discover wherein his peculiar nature and thus virtue (*arete*, better translated as 'excellence') really lies. The peculiar excellence of a knife, for example, is that it cuts well; and that of a horse that it runs well. Man's excellence lies in something that he alone possesses: his rational faculty. Since he is a rational animal, his self-realization is to be sought in his exercise of reason. A man who does not exercise this peculiar human capacity or faculty, is not exercising his capacity as a man, and is not realizing within himself the kind of happiness of which only human beings are capable.
Al-Farabi, who tried to harmonize the teachings of great masters i.e. Plato and Aristotle, with those of Islamic revelation, welcomed the philosophical idea of self-realization. Almost all his major works were directed towards expanding and explanation of this basic notion. Now let us try to go into details of his argument concerning the nature of self-actualization.

The analysis of the term “self-actualization” is not the subject-matter of Ethics only, it is also the cardinal theme of his psychology, politics and metaphysics. In fact Al-Farabi does not take “Ethics” in a restricted sense as we usually take nowadays. Ethics for him is a rational inquiry of how to be virtuous and happy. In order to have a solid idea of man’s ultimate destiny, Al-Farabi worked out a rationalistic psychological theory which he used as a firm base for his ethico-political philosophy.

In his account of the nature of the soul, Al-Farabi relies much on Aristotle as well as on the Neo-platonic commentators of Aristotle’s *De Anima*, which was translated into Arabic by Hunayn b. Ishaq. To sum up Al-Farabi’s psychology, he divides the main faculties of the soul into five: The Nutritive, the Imaginative, the Appetitive and the Rational. There is a master-servant relationship between these different faculties of the soul. In fact, Al-Farabi sees the same hierarchical order in a perfect socio-political organization and in the whole universe.

The Rational is divided into theoretical and practical. Al-Farabi cannot be credited with any kind of originality in any of these ideas. Perhaps the most original part of his philosophy is his theory of the Active intellect which goes together with his doctrine of self-actualization.

The first initial capacity which everybody shares is the Potential Intellect. In his *Risāla fi’l-Aql* Al-Farabi says that “the intellect which is in potentiality is some soul or part of a soul, or one of the faculties of the soul, or something whose essence is ready and prepared to abstract the quiddities of all existing things and their forms from their matters, so that it makes all of them a form for itself or forms for itself.” Now self-actualization takes place when this Potential Intellect becomes the Intellect-in-Act and whereby becomes the Acquired Intellect. This transformation from potentiality to actuality is also a transformation of sensibles to intelligibles. Man is the only creature who has been endowed
with such capacity. As soon as man acquires knowledge, actuality begins to take place, and at this initial stage he needs body and the bodily organs. The passage about the ascent of the intellect to its highest stage is so important that it is worth quoting it in full:

The lowest stage of existence for man is that in which, in order to subsist, he needs the body as the form needs matter. His next higher state of existence is that in which he does not depend for subsistence on the body as matter; nevertheless he needs for all his actions or for most of them some powers of his body and is positively benefited by them... The highest state of existence is attained by man when his actions are not in any thing other than himself; that is when he masters his whole energy to realize his innermost self as a result of which his being and action and whatever he does become one and the same... 

This new rank of existence makes the Potential Intellect the actual intellect. When this process of actualization takes place, the intellect and the intelligibles abstracted from matter obtain a different ontological status. It is here that the Intellect-in-Act, which is itself an intelligible, knows itself. In other words, at this stage the intellect is self-intelligible and self-intellective at the same time. It is a form of forms, and its existence is separate from matter. Here it becomes the Acquired Intellect, which is the highest rank that the intellect can reach.

Having explained the nature of the Potential Intellect, al-Fârâbî tries to answer the question how man, or rather the intellect, reaches the stage of self-actuality. According to him, it is not possible to think that a thing can become actual without any help from another being outside itself and not potential. There should be an externally active power which can give the Potential Intellect the aid it needs. This existent is the Active Intellect, without which the whole universe, according to al-Fârâbî, is unthinkable, let alone man and his self-actualization.

The Active Intellect, al-Fârâbî believes, is a separated form which never existed in matter nor ever will exist in it. It is this intellect that makes the intellect in potentiality the intellect in actuality, and makes

5 Al-Madina al-Fâdila (= Madina), ed. A.N. Nader, p. 103.
6 Aql, p. 120.
the potential intelligibles, intelligibles in reality. For al-Fārābī the Active Intellect is the end because its examples are followed; the agent because it gives the principles which render man so far as he is man; it in also the perfection because man attempts to approach it. He identifies the Active Intellect with the Holy Spirit (rūḥ al-quds), and he says that its grade should be called by a title such as al-malakūt, the Kingdom of Heavens. This intellect has two main functions: Firstly it is the "giver of forms" (wāḥīb assuwar), since it is always at work - a quality which gives the basis of the assurance of existence. Secondly it illuminates man's intellect and makes possible for him to cognize the spiritual realities. It is through communication with the Active Intellect that man receives revelation and cognition which are explained, by al-Fārābī, by the term "conjunction" (ittisāl).

Al-Fārābī is of the opinion that self-actualization is only possible when man receives the first intelligibles (al-ma' qūlūt al-uwal) which are the primary principles of knowledge (al-ma'rif al-uwal). There are three first intelligibles: Primary principles of knowledge of geometry; principles of the knowledge of good and evil (ethical knowledge); and, principles of metaphysical knowledge. Without this initial capacity there cannot be the knowledge of, or even desire for, self-actualization, since to desire it requires some degree of knowledge. Man knows his true self when he makes use of the first principles and the primary knowledge given to him by the Active Intellect. But in order to receive the aid of the Active Intellect, there should be an effort and struggle to reach the above-mentioned higher stage. Not to struggle is a crime in the eyes of al-Fārābī, since the stage of self-actualization is an indispensable degree of existence for the immortality of the self or the soul.

When al-Fārābī talks of the importance of knowledge in the process of self-actualization; it seems that he has theoretical knowledge in mind. In fact, the program which al-Fārābī lays for the study of philosophy in Tahsil as-sa'āda is in fact the program of self-actualization. Only the advancing of knowledge will purify the soul, or to be more precise, will make man's intellect perfect, and elevate it. In this struggle the maximum of his perfection can only be supplied by philosophy, i.e. theoretical knowledge. Although different sciences cont-

---

8 Siyāsa, p. 35-6.
10 Siyāsa, p. 35.
11 Ibid, p. 79.
12 Madina, p. 84; Siyāsa, p. 74.
tribute different things to man in his journey towards self-perfection, theoretical knowledge has more significant role to play, since it aims at the existents whose existence and continuance do not depend on the contrivance of man at all. As a matter of fact, the use of the term knowledge, says al-Fārābī, is metaphorical, if the case is practical rather than theoretical.

In his glorification of the theory al-Fārābī has, no doubt, the support of Aristotle as well as that of Neo-platonic sources. In De Causis, or what is otherwise known among the Muslim philosophers as Kitāb alkhayr al-mahd, for instance, “knowledge” is defined as the property of intellect whose possession renders perfection to man. Al-Fārābī’s Plato investigates the true nature of theoretical knowledge. In his Euthyphro he says that religion does not give us such knowledge, nor does the science of language (in Cratylus), nor poetry (in Ion), nor rhetoric (in Gorgias), nor sophistry (in Sophist). Plato knew however that such knowledge exists, although Protagoras and many others tried to deny it. Plato proved this in his Meno where he stated that “this knowledge is the knowledge of substance of each of the beings; and such knowledge is the final perfection of man.”

By emphasizing the importance of theoretical knowledge in the process of self-actualization al-Fārābī does not wish to give the impression that practical knowledge can be ignored. The former is higher than the latter, because it decides upon it and aims at the knowledge of pure intelligibles and above all at the knowledge of God whom man tries to imitate as far as his capacities allow. Without the perfection of practical part of the soul, however, true self-actualization is not possible. So, the perfection of the faculty of deliberation is also necessary.

The perfection of this faculty consists in the discovery and determination of what is most useful for man. In other words, the object of this faculty is the discovery and discernment of “voluntary intelligibles” which are variable. It is quite clear that the deliberative faculty is a part of practical virtue which also called “intelligence” by common people. It is to this part that volition and choice adhere. In fact, deliberation, according to al-Fārābī, is a process of thinking which starts

14 A. Badawi (ed.), Neoplatonici apud Arab, Cairo, 1955, p. 23.
15 Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, p. 53 f.
16 Tahsil as-Salāda, Hyderabad, 1345/1926, p. 18ff.
17 Fusūl, sects., 6, 30,66.
from a desired end, and aims at the discovery of means. No doubt, the power of deliberation deserves to be called 'virtue', when it is employed for a good end. To employ it for a good end does not only include the good end for the individual but political legislation and household economy as well. The employment of the deliberative virtue of the first Ruler, for instance, is not only good for himself, but for the whole community as well.

After the determination of means comes the actual performance of virtuous actions. According to al-Fārābī, "the man of practical wisdom must possess moral virtues" Moral virtues are the virtues of the appetitive part of the soul, such as temperance, bravery, generosity, justice and the like. These virtues are the established disposition in the soul without which selfactualization can not take place. Basing himself on the Aristotelian definition, al-Fārābī says that virtuous actions are the "mean" actions which open the way to a noble character. Al-Fārābī mentions some moral virtues so as to explain his idea of the Golden Mean. He uses the word wasat or tawassut to convey the idea of the Aristotelian Golden Mean, and he uses it in respect of physical aspects of life, e.g. eating, drinking, sleeping, as well as in respect of moral aspects of life. Moral virtue is defined in terms of tawassut, and the latter is defined as the mean between excess (ziyāde) and defects (nuskān) which are also called ifrāt and tafrit respectively. Al-Fārābī is fully aware that to seize the Golden Mean is very difficult. It requires the correction of bad dispositions, natural or formed by will. In order to be successful here, one ought to perform good actions continuously for a very long period. As soon as he starts to obtain some pleasure in the execution of good actions, and performs them with ease (bi-suhūlatin) he may be sure that he is heading towards the stage of self-actualization.

In all these al-Fārābī makes his position fairly clear: In order to reach the stage of self-perfection man ought to go three main stages: First of all, He ought to have a correct apprehension of the end, and the ultimate destiny of his existence. This requires the perfection of the rational part of the soul. Any failure in respect of this theoretical per-

---

18 Tahsīl as-Sa'āda, p. 22 f.
19 Fusūl, sects., 37 and 80.
20 Ai-Tanbih 'ala Sābil as-Sa'āda (= Tanbih), Hyderabad, 1346/1927, p.11, Cf. Also Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea (= E.N.), London, 1925, p. i, 13, 1103a.
22 Ibid, 14f.
fection leads man to destruction and misery. Then comes the correct apprehension and determination of right means which can only be done if and when the power of deliberation becomes perfect. Thirdly comes the performance of good actions which can only be done when man acquires moral perfection. In short, for self-actualization both perfections, theoretical and moral, are required. Those who lack in the former but possess some degree of moral perfection can not reach the stage of full selfactualization. Nevertheless, they will be able to have the imitations of realities by the help of which they will attain their due happiness. On the other hand, those who lack in moral perfection, although having a cognition of realities, will be utterly miserable, since they deliberately abandon the right means of achieving self-perfection. As to those who lack in both perfections, they will be doomed to nothingness like beasts, since their souls, according to al-Farabi, are sick and remain chained to matter whose destiny is utter destruction.

Their intellects remain at the level of potentiality, and Potential Intellect by itself is not immortal.

This last point indicates very clearly that there is a close relationship between the question of self-actualization and that of immortality. It seems that according to al-Farabi, immortality is not in the essence of the soul. This means that man is not born as an immortal being. Immortality is something to be gained by intellectual and moral effort. In other words man ought to gain some degree of self-actualization in order to deserve immortality. Those souls that remain in potentia forever will never reach the stage of actual existence, so they will, as we have just pointed out, perish together with the destruction of their bodies. But the souls that attain both theoretical and practical perfections, or at least one of these perfections, will be immortal.

As far as al-Farabi’s idea of the immortality of the self-actualized souls is concerned, it is quite in keeping with the Islamic tenets. Those who are perfect theoretically and practically, or to use the Kura’nic terms, those who have faith (imān) and a record of good works (amēli sāliha) will be immortal and happy. Those who are perfect theoretically only will be immortal but not happy. Lastly those who lack in both perfections will be neither immortal nor happy. Although this last idea seems to be quite consistent with al-Farabi’s general philosophical outlook but it is at variance with the Islamic view of immortality. It is very surprising indeed that al-Ghazālī criticises the falsafa’s doctrine of destiny

of the soul, and charges them with infidelity because of their denial of the resurrection of the body, but says nothing about the apparently un-Islamic idea concerning the position of non-actualized souls. Perhaps this might be due to the fact that al-Ghazâlî's nearest source was the works of Ibn Sinâ who adhered to the view that the soul in its essence is immortal. A very careful and searching criticism of al-Fârâbî's account of immortality came not from al-Ghazâlî but from Ibn Tufayl who asserted that such an account "leads all men to despair of God's mercy... This is a slip that cannot be rectified, and a false step that cannot be remedied."  

So far we have tried to examine al-Fârâbî's idea of self-actualization from psychological and, to some extent, ethical points of view. But we can also talk of social self-realization in al-Fârâbî. Social self-realization works in much the same way as individual self-realization. In fact the latter is only possible when the former exists, since man is by his very nature a social being. Thus individual self-actualization is only an ingredient in the entire pattern of social fulfillment encompassing all the members of a given society. For realization of social self-actualization, al-Fârâbî envisages an ideal polity and a Virtuous City where the ultimate aim of the individual is coincided with that of the whole community.

The ideal polity is that in which the ruler attains a kind of virtue which he could not possibly attain except in it... The ruled attain in their temporal life and the life of the world to come virtues which could not possibly be attained except in it...

It is very clear in this passage that communal self-actualization is a social achievement, and it is due to this noble purpose that the people of the virtuous city come together.

Now the existence and the continuity of the virtuous city is unthinkable without the existence of a man, or a group of men, who are the highest in respect of natural dispositions and of the dispositions which are formed by the power of deliberation. Thanks to activities of these men, the people of the city become aware of the right cognition of realities or their true representations. In the virtuous city the normal process of social self-realization takes place in the following manner: First we

24 Hayy b. Yaqān, ed. by A. Amin, Cairo, 1959, p. 62.
25 Fusūl, sect. 84.
26 Tahsil as-Sa'āda, p. 29. Cf. Madina, 101ff. and Siyāsā, p. 79.
have the ruler who possesses both theoretical and practical perfections. After this ruler there comes a group of people who have been instructed and trained in what causes the perfection of nations. Their duty is to persuade and instruct other people who are not as fortunate as they themselves are. The first ruler instruct the elected group (khass) in demonstrative methods. Whereas they instruct the common people through persuasion, since the latter can only adhere to the unexamined opinions and confine themselves to the images of realities. So they are not equipped to be instructed by demonstrative methods. Therefore they can only be instructed by the methods of persuasion and imaginative representation. Whatever method is used, the aim of education is the disappearance of wicked actions, and the establishment of natural and voluntary goods in cities. When the normal methods of instruction fails, the use of mandatory methods becomes necessary. Whatever comes to people from their first ruler through the appointed men of distinction is good and directly relevant to the process of social self-realization. The ruler has the right to declare war against wicked people. Such a war may be considered as a “civilizing war.” That is why al-Fârâbî demands a warlike virtue from the first ruler. Holy war is a legitimate means to make other people aware of the meaning of a fully actualized life; so al-Fârâbî seems to favour not only the defensive war but the offensive war, if the situation demands it.

Now let us try to summarize what we have been saying so far: al-Fârâbî is of the opinion that the Potential Intellect has the capacity to be actual and thus perfect. Man is born with the “primary knowledge” but he can only actualize himself through investigation and study. Knowledge makes intellect detach itself from matter and become an actual being. It reaches the highest stage when it becomes Acquired Intellect. This, however, is only possible by the help of the Active Intellect. A full self-actualization takes place when there is a “conjunction” (ittisâl) between the Active Intellect and Acquired Intellect. It should be borne in mind, however, that without the existence of voluntary goods (al-khayrât al-irâdiyya) and moral goods theoretical perfection cannot lead man to a satisfactory level of self-realization. And since man is a social being by nature, a virtuous political organization must be available as well.

29 Tahsil as-Sâ‘îda, p. 23.