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الإدارة المضريّة لأزمات تأمين شركة قناة السويس

محمد السيد سليم^(٥)

يتناول هذا البحث موضوع إدارة مصر مجموعة الأزمات التي نشأت ابتداءً من ١٩ من يوليو سنة ١٩٥٦م حين قامت الولايات المتحدة بسحب عرض تمويل مشروع السد العالي، وأتتحتها بريطانيا والبنك الدولي للإنشاء والتعمير بقرار مماثل؛ مما أسفر عن اتخاذ جمال عبد الناصر قرار تأمين شركة قناة السويس في ٢٦ من يوليو، وقد امتدت تلك الأزمات حتى بدء العدوان الثلاثي على مصر في ٢٩ من أكتوبر في العام ذاته. ومن ثمّ، فإن مجال هذا البحث هو الإدارة المصرية تلك الأزمات دون التعرّض لإدارة الأطراف الأخرى تلك الأزمات إلا بمقدار ما يفيد في فهم الإدارة المصرية. كما أنه سيركّز على تلك الأزمات من منظور استراتيجيات إدارة الأزمة، ومن ثمّ سيكون السؤال المحوري في البحث: ما الاستراتيجيات التي طوّقها الرئيس عبد الناصر لإدارة تلك الأزمات؟ وإلى أي حدّ نجحت تلك الاستراتيجيات في تحقيق أهدافها؟

وللإجابة عن هذين السؤالين سنبدأ بإيضاح المفهومين اللذين سنوظفهما في البحث: الأزمة وإدارة الأزمة، مع التمييز بينهما وبين المفاهيم الأخرى التي تتعلق بهما، ثم تتحول إلى تحديد الأزمات التي شملتها عملية تأمين شركة القناة، لإيضاح مدى اقترابها أو بُعديها عن الأزمة طبقاً للتعريف الذي

(٥) كلية الاقتصاد والعلوم السياسية - جامعة القاهرة.

03 Ağustos 2017

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ابن الفوز محمد أمين السويدي (٧٠)
K22,1, 203. ادله: الحمد لله الذي امر باتباع سيده ...

Süveydi Muh. Emin

محمد أمين السويدي، ابوالفوز

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١٥١٥ - سبائك الذهب في معرفة قبائل العرب (٢)
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Süveydi Ebu'l-Meali (سلسلة)

Muh. Emin

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(٧٠)

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
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Husayn, 'Abd al-Ghaffar Muhammad.
(Barīṭaniyā wa-Muḥammad 'Alī
wa-mashrū' Qanāt al-Suways)

بريطانيا ومحمد علي ومشروع قناة السويس /
عبد الغفار محمد
حسين. — [Tanta, Egypt] :
دار سماح ، 1982 .

86, 26 p., [2] folded leaves of
plates : folded maps ; 24 cm.
Bibliography: p. 79-83.
(Presentation with comments of
British documents, related to the
Suez Canal Project during the
time of Muhammad 'Alī, Khedive
of Egypt (1769-1849)
Acquired only for LC.

28 KASIM 1982

Surveys KANAKA

REVIEWS

The Suez Canal in World Affairs. By Hugh J. Schonfield. Constellation Books. Pp. 174, illustrated. 15s.

Mr. Schonfield is an expert about the Suez Canal, and has already written two lively books connected with that subject. In this new and up-to-date book, which is no less lively, he has set out to give a history of the Canal in its relation to world affairs. The book is, then, a short history of Mediterranean politics for the better part of a century. He starts with the grant of the concession for digging the Canal, given in 1855 by the Khedive Mohammed Pasha al-Said to "my attached friend, Ferdinand de Lesseps, of high birth and elevated rank." And he ends with a chapter on the position of the Canal during the war between Israel and the Arab States in 1948. Other chapters deal with the Egyptian question during the latter part of the nineteenth century, the German *Drang nach Osten*, the defence of the Canal in the first World War; the question of excluding Italian ships from the passage of the Canal in the war between Italy and Ethiopia 1935-6, and the defence of the Canal in the second World War. His writing is concise as well as lively, and he has an independent judgment about world affairs.

His book is full of interesting information. He tells, for example; how Port Said was built on land reclaimed by filling in marshes of Lake Menzaleh with the material excavated from the harbour at the Mediterranean end of the Canal. He tells how in the first World War the Turks were as confident and cocksure that they would conquer Egypt by advancing across the Sinai Desert as Mussolini was confident in the second World War that he would conquer Egypt by advancing from the Libyan Desert to the Nile Delta. It is striking to learn that the traffic in the Suez Canal has steadily risen, and was never so high as in the last two years. In 1950 and 1951 the total number of vessels passing through the Canal was nearly double the total of the years 1938-9. That was due to the great increase in tanker traffic, which may be affected by the closing of the refinery at Abadan and the completion of the oil pipeline from Saudi Arabia to Sidon.


The position of Egypt in the control and technical services of the Canal has been greatly increased by the agreement made between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Government in 1949. The number of Egyptian directors was raised from two to seven, and the allowance to the Egyptian Government from gross profits was also increased; while four-fifths of the vacancies in the technical staff and nine-tenths of vacancies in the administrative staff were reserved henceforth for Egyptians. The Chairman of the Company said in 1951: "We use our utmost endeavours to be for Egypt, first, the most useful screen between that country and the great world interests which the Suez Canal has to satisfy, and secondly, an active instrument of the economic and social development of the province which the Canal has restored to life." In his chapter, headed "Aftermath," which deals with the problems of the Canal in the Israel war, he ventures a judgment—"The war should never have been fought, and with some goodwill and understanding on both sides an honourable settlement could have been arrived at." The remark does credit to his idealist outlook. But it was not as simple as all that.

The proof-reading appears to have been somewhat hurried. There are mistakes of spelling and punctuation, and occasionally the grammar is at fault.

The reference on p. 122 to the "Arabic Official Journal" appears to be the same as the previous reference to the Official Journal of the Egyptian Government. And on p. 91 the author mentions a speech of Mussolini in 1939, when he made a claim for Italy against France to control of the Canal, and adds that the speech "struck a note which is curiously up to date, from the viewpoint of 1952, in its references to Bolshevism and the need for a foreign loan"; but the remarks of Mussolini on those points are not quoted.

The book has useful appendices giving the text of the original concession and

الوجيز في إقليمية القناة الإفريقية



164-168

تأليف

أنور عبد الغنى العتاد
الأستاذ بجامعة الإمام محمد بن سعود


تأليف

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi	
Kayıt No:	5736
Yayıncı:	816
	AKA.V



الرياض - ص.ب. ١٠٧٢٠

وأخيرا أمكن حفر القناة على يد المهندس الفرنسي (فرديناند دي ليسبس).



الشكل رقم (٤١) «قناة السويس»

وبلغ طول القناة الجديد «١٦٠» كم واحتاج حفرها وتسوية أقسامها إلى عشر سنين وإلى حياة الآلاف من العمال المصريين الذين ماتوا أثناء حفر القناة. وقد تم افتتاح القناة عام (١٢٨٦ هـ - ١٨٦٩ م)، وتم إنشاء مدينة بورسعيد على منحرجها الشمالى إلى المتوسط. ولكن أجزاء منها احتاجت إلى زيادة عرضها

إن تطور السودان الاقتصادى مرهون بغير شك في توفير طرق المواصلات الملائمة، ولعل تمديد سكة الحديد وإيصالها إلى (واو) و(جوبا) في الجنوب سيؤدى إلى تطوير هذا الجزء النائى من السودان وإلى إشراكه بشكل فعلى في الحياة الاقتصادية والسياسية. إن بقاء عزلة الجنوب وبعده عن طرق المواصلات سيؤدى دوما إلى محاولات انفصال هذا الجنوب عن جسم السودان، وهذا أمر له خطره الكبير على استقلال السودان وأمنه.

قناة السويس:

لا يمكن لنا أن نهى هذا الفصل دون الإشارة إلى الأهمية العالمية الكبيرة لهذا الإقليم، والتي تنجم عن موقعه الملاصق لكتلة الأرض الأوراسية.

لقد ظل برزخ السويس الضيق ذى الأرض المنخفضة، حاجزا آثار المشاكل لمدة طويلة، وذلك بسبب احتمال استخدامه ممرا بحريا يصل المتوسط بالبحر الأحمر والشرق الأقصى. وقد تم بناء أول قناة تصل بين النيل والبحيرات المرة، (انظر شكل ٤١) منذ ما قبل (١٤٠٠ عام) ق.م.

وكانت السفن الصغيرة في ذلك الزمان تدخل النيل من البحر الأبيض المتوسط ثم تتوجه إلى البحيرات المرة عبر تلك القناة. وكان التجار بعد ذلك يحملون بضائعهم على الجمال مسافة قصيرة إلى شاطئ البحر الأحمر.

واستمرت التجارة بين أوربه الغربية والشرق الأقصى على امتداد العصر الوسيط، ولكنها ازدادت بشكل كبير نتيجة للثورة الصناعية، ومع هذه الثورة ازدادت شهية أوربه للمواد الأولية والأطعمة والمشروبات زيادة مضطردة، حتى فاقت قيمة المواد الأولية كالجوت والمطاط والمشروبات الجديدة، كالشاي، مثلا، قيمة البهارات التي كانت أممن صادرات الشرق إلى أوربه فيما مضى من أيام. وقد احتاجت أوربه في الوقت نفسه إلى تصدير سلعتها المصنعة لتدفع قيمة هذه المستوردات.

MODERN INDIA AND THE INDIANS

BEING A SERIES
OF IMPRESSIONS, NOTES AND ESSAYS

Surveys - 12-19

BY

SIR MONIER MONIER-WILLIAMS, D.C.L.

Turkey	8598
India	954
Taste	MON.M

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way, while the captain and first officer walked round with an air of calm professional assurance, casting critical glances of appreciation or depreciation at each member of the ship's company, and receiving respectful salutes in return. Then at a given signal the Sarang sounded his whistle, the whole circle of unbelievers melted away in an instant, leaving the crowd of believing Christians in the centre to settle down for Divine Service.

We reached Port Said at 6 A.M. on the 12th day after leaving England. The first sight of Egypt excites no emotions of any kind. The town of Port Said—called after the late Viceroy—is a collection of mushroom buildings which have sprung into existence since the commencement of the Suez Canal. It is now lighted with gas.

Nor is the entrance to the Canal at all imposing. The adjacent coast for miles is apparently below the sea-level, making the approach to the harbour almost impossible except by daylight; but a lofty lighthouse, which was cleverly constructed by erecting wooden moulds one above the other and filling them with concrete, stands on a pier on the right, and gives out a flashing electric light visible at an immense distance. There are also two long breakwaters, one lower than the other, constructed of huge blocks of concrete, running far into the sea on either side of the harbour, which effectually prevent the sand from drifting inside and choking the mouth of the Canal.

We entered very cautiously at dawn of day, and moored our ship to two buoys. Two British ironclads—the 'Invincible' and 'Pallas'—were already in the harbour, and another fine steamer, the 'City of Venice,' was waiting to make the passage after us, while the 'Serapis' had recently passed on ahead. In half an hour we had paid the dues, which I believe amounted in our case to about £1500, and had entered the Canal, the entrance being merely a continuation of the harbour, without lock-gates of any kind. Here, on the right, there is a narrow strip of land covered with sheds, owned by the British nation.

I was informed that when the works commenced, this land was offered to our Government for £800, and was declined. It is said to have been recently purchased by us for £26,000. This story will not appear incredible to any one old enough to remember the view Lord Palmerston took of the French engineer's great project.

Although the course of the Canal for the first thirty miles is as straight as an arrow, every mile of it abounds with interesting objects. The first thing noticed is an immense lagoon stretching for miles beyond the right bank, while on the left lies a trackless desert of sand, with here and there patches of what appears to be water, but is really nothing but the mirage produced by heated vapour. Then there are the natives on the bank in their picturesque costumes, the sturdy, half-naked Arabs at work in the water, the strings of camels with their burdens, the feluccas in the lagoon with their lateen sails, the myriads of water-fowl, and in the horizon long lines of flamingoes extending literally for miles, and standing motionless, like regiments of soldiers in white uniforms. But the one absorbing sight of all is the Canal itself. Such expressions as 'One of the wonders of the age,' 'a triumph of engineering skill,' give an inadequate idea of the magnitude of the work. It must be seen to be estimated at its right value.

Captain Methven, the commodore of the Peninsular and Oriental fleet, who watched the progress of the Canal from its commencement, and was one of the first of our fellow-countrymen to predict its success, favoured me with many interesting particulars which may be relied upon for accuracy. The lower platform at the base of the central channel is almost everywhere fully 70 ft. wide, and as the sides shelve off at an angle, there is generally a width of about 100 ft. at the surface of the water, the extreme depth of which is 27 ft., with a margin of 10 ft. or 12 ft. of shallow water on each side. The rule first made was that no ship drawing more than 26 ft. should be allowed to pass through. The

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Tarihî Araştırmalar
1950-1960

THE HISTORY OF EGYPT

THIRD EDITION

Süveyş Kanalı

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From the old order to the new, 1930-84

Comdr. Gamal Salem was appointed President of the Court, Anwar al-Sadat and Husayn al-Shafi'i members. The Court was further organized into three circuits each presided over by an army or air force officer to deal with the cases of over 700 persons accused of high treason. In all, the People's Court tried over 875 persons, and the military courts over 250 officers. Six members of the Muslim Brethren were executed, among them three lawyers, one merchant, a preacher and a plumber. Another ten were given various prison sentences. These were mainly lawyers, engineers, professors and high state officials. By 1955 there were over 3,000 political prisoners in the country.

It was alleged during the investigations and trials of the Muslim Brethren and other so-called subversive elements that President Naguib had been in close touch with them. Thus on 14 November the RCC decided to dismiss him from office and place him under house arrest.⁷

A month later, in December 1954, the High Military Court brought a number of Jewish doctors and others (fifteen persons) to trial on the charge of spying for Israel. Two of those convicted were executed in January 1955; others were given life sentences at hard labour. In the same month, the Bar Association was purged by dismissing its old Executive Council and appointing a new one.

On 16 January 1956 a new Constitution was promulgated. It consisted of 196 Articles providing for a presidential Republican system of government in which the President appoints and dismisses ministers. It also contained two new notions: first, that Egypt is an Arab nation, and second, that the State is committed to economic planning and social welfare in the interests of social co-operation among members of the nation. The real innovation introduced by this constitutional charter (it was superseded in March 1958 when Syria and Egypt entered upon a union) was that it replaced a parliamentary form of government by a presidential system. The Constitution was approved and the President elected by a plebiscite held on 23 June 1956. The Electoral Law of 3 March 1956 had provided for universal male suffrage at eighteen years of age and gave the franchise to military personnel on active duty. A law for a new unicameral National Assembly was decreed on 11 July which provided for the election of 350 members from 350 districts. The eligible age for the Assembly was thirty years and a fifty-pound (Egyptian) deposit. More important, the new legislation decreed the creation of a National Union (Article 192) to replace the Liberation Rally,

Revolution and republic, 1952-84

which was to screen and select nominees for election to the National Assembly.

Nasser was elected President in June and proceeded to form a new government on 29 June which included more technocrats and fewer soldiers. Thus Sayyid Mar'i took over a new Ministry of Agrarian Reform, Aziz Sidki a new Ministry of Industry, and Mustafa Khalil the Ministry of Communications. Free Officers Gamal Salem, Anwar al-Sadat and Hasan Ibrahim were dropped. Wing Comdr. Abd al-Latif al-Boghdadi was entrusted with the new Ministry of State for Planning.


Whereas in 1954 Nasser used his closest associates to strengthen his position against Naguib and civilian opposition groups, now with the consolidation of his position in 1956 after the elimination of his opponents he brought more civilians into the government to head new departments concerned with economic, agrarian and social problems. Such alternation of personnel for his retention of power, or at least a pre-eminent position in the power structure of the military oligarchy, was a trade mark of Nasser's rule and political style throughout his Presidency.⁸

Further arrests and purges, especially of leftist and Communist elements, continued throughout 1955 and 1956. Internal consolidation of power by Nasser was by no means complete with his triumph over Naguib and the Muslim Brethren. Yet the two-year period 1955-7 was characterized by developments in the foreign relations of Egypt which had a direct bearing upon internal policies. It is therefore useful at this point to turn to these before outlining the economic and social policy programmes adopted by the régime in the 1950s and early 1960s.

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

One of the goals set by the régime when it first came to power was the eradication of imperialism. To most Egyptians this meant the end of British military occupation of the Canal. Partly related to this issue was the status of the Sudan. It will be recalled that the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement of 1899 worked relatively well until 1924. The strained relations between Britain and Egypt after the assassination of Sir Lee Stack Pasha, Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, in November that year resulted virtually in the elimination of the Egyptian side in the Condominium. The Sudan question flared up again in the late summer of 1947 when Egypt

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Imperialism and Nationalism in the Middle East

*The Anglo-Egyptian Experience
1882-1982*

EDITED BY

KEITH M. WILSON

Önemli

The significance of Suez Canal
for Western Strategy since 1956

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Geoffrey Warner

62. Eden letter, cited in Bar-Zohar, op. cit., p. 1254. The reference to 'the declaration attached to my announcement of October 21' is obscure, for no text of this declaration or announcement can be found in the available sources. It is unlikely that it refers to the declaration transmitted to the Israelis after the Paris conversations on 16 and 17 October (see above) for the date is too late. It may have been a statement drawn up at the Chequers meeting of senior ministers and officials on 21 October (see above) and sent, or brought by Lloyd, to Sèvres. Its existence, however, serves to undermine still further Lloyd's attempt to deny any British agreement with Israel. According to Thomas (op. cit., p. 196), Eden's letter was brought to Paris on the afternoon of 25 October by Logan and Dean.
63. Pineau, op. cit., p. 137; Lloyd, op. cit., p. 186.
64. Lloyd, op. cit., p. 248.

The Significance of the Suez Canal for Western Strategy since 1956

EDWARD M. SPIERS

The Suez Canal, on account of its location and its traditional prominence in British imperial thought, has evoked extravagant and grandiloquent writing. On the eve of the Suez crisis, *The Economist* described the Canal as 'the Achilles Heel of Britain and of Europe'. In subsequent years, it was still regarded as possessing 'great strategic importance' and as 'the main artery connecting Western Europe to Asia and East Africa'.¹ For a more precise examination of the Canal's geo-strategic significance, this chapter will examine the commercial and military uses to which the Canal has been put over the past twenty-five years, the ease with which these activities have been prevented, and the cost and availability of alternative routes. These criteria are essentially subjective; each major user will evaluate the Canal differently in view of its own geographical location and its political, military and economic interests.² Any changes in the Canal's significance, therefore, will be assessed by reference to its commercial usage, particularly in respect of oil, and its strategic utility over the past generation.

The economic impact of the first closure of the Suez Canal was comparatively slight. Western Europe's shipments of oil were met by re-routing the world tanker fleet and the despatch of additional supplies from the USA and Venezuela. The crisis proved to be short-lived; within six months the Canal was re-opened and soon working efficiently under Egyptian control.³ Yet the crisis had demonstrated the vulnerability of the Suez route, through which some two-thirds of Western Europe's oil supply passed.⁴ To reduce this vulnerability, European governments had to accumulate larger reserves of oil, to diversify their sources of supply and, above all, to develop more flexible means of transport, so avoiding dependence upon the Canal.⁵

In 1956, some 95 per cent of tankers could use the Canal either fully or partially laden. Even the seven 45,000 tonners found it more profitable to transit the Canal at 80 per cent capacity and then to 'top up' in the ports of the Levant, rather than to travel fully laden round

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'Collusion' and the Suez Crisis of 1956

GEOFFREY WARNER

Two of the most frequent objections levelled at contemporary historians when they attempt to illuminate the recent past are that they do not possess sufficient perspective and that, in many cases, the archives are not yet open for research. The first implies that some necessary interval has to elapse between an event and the historian's attempt to discuss it, but proponents of this view rarely enlighten us as to the length of the interval in question. Are we now able, for example, to see the First World War in proper perspective? Or the French Revolution? To ask these questions is to expose the falsity of the problem, for our perspective is of course continually changing. The second objection presupposes that we do not have enough information to reconstruct what happened with a reasonable degree of accuracy, but that if we wait until that day—thirty, fifty or one hundred years after the event—when the historian is allowed into the archives, all will be revealed. Neither of these presuppositions is in my view correct.

As far as the first is concerned, the reader is simply invited to contrast what is already available in the form of first-hand testimony on the subject of this article—the Suez crisis of 1956—with the sources available for the study of, say, the British Isles in the fifth century AD. Historians of that period would give a great deal to have the equivalent of even the most partial of the Suez memoirs, but its absence quite rightly does not prevent them from producing a great deal of valuable history.

The second presupposition—that the truth is only to be found in the archives—displays an excessive faith in the integrity and procedures of the politicians and officials responsible for producing the documents which eventually find their way there. Confining ourselves to British policy, we would do well to bear in mind Lord Tedder's strictures upon the integrity of official records. These 'are not perhaps the ideal, and certainly not the whole, source on which I have to rely', he wrote in the preface to his war memoirs. 'I expect that most of us have seen, sometimes with amusement and sometimes with anger, reports and orders obviously worded with an eye to the future his-

'Collusion' and the Suez Crisis of 1956

torian, or, as we used to call them, "for the record". The wording of signals and orders "for the record" is a very fine art and well calculated to fox the historian.¹ There are doubtless many documents on the Suez crisis which were written 'for the record'; indeed, we shall have occasion to refer to one in due course.

When we turn to procedures, we find that these sometimes conceal as much as they reveal. One might suppose, for example, that since the Cabinet is reputedly the principal locus of decision within the British system of government, its records are particularly informative. In reality, however, Cabinet minutes are among the blandest official records in existence. As Patrick Gordon Walker, himself a former Cabinet minister, has written, they 'give no indication of the order in which the points were made: they are always marshalled pro and con. There is no way of telling who spoke or even how many Ministers spoke. Not all the points made in argument are recorded. No indication is given of the tone or temper of the debate.'² Two of Lord Gordon Walker's Cabinet colleagues, moreover, are on record to the effect that the minutes can sometimes be quite misleading even in what they do say.³

In the case of the Suez crisis, there are some even more intractable problems. Evidence exists, as we shall see, that normal bureaucratic routines were not always observed: officials were purposely excluded from important meetings and not told what had taken place; records were deliberately not kept of certain vital discussions, and so on. There are even suggestions that documents have been wilfully destroyed. The Israeli Prime Minister in 1956, David Ben-Gurion, told the American journalist, Cyrus Sulzberger, almost twelve years later that 'Eden sent over to Paris after the affair in order to have all the original documents destroyed. But he found that I had copies. And I may note that it was only then that he became friendly to Israel.'⁴ There would, of course, have been nothing to prevent the destruction of documents in British hands and, indeed, the Whitehall correspondent of *The Times*, Peter Hennessy, has written that 'For years there have been persistent rumours among those in the know that what little genuinely sensitive material was committed to paper during the build-up to the invasion of Egypt was destroyed at the time or shortly after. The little that has survived is said to be kept in the closely guarded registry of the Secret Intelligence Service, or MI6...'⁵ As Hennessy remarked, the archives of that particular organization are unlikely ever to be opened.

While the opening of the normal run of British government records for 1956, which will take place on 1 January 1987, will therefore yield some new information, it is doubtful whether it will compel us drastically to revise what we already know about Suez from existing first-hand accounts. Some of these accounts are a lot more precise than

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85. Stansgate's untitled note, 2 May 1946, HLRO, ST/188/8.
86. 422 H.C.Deb., 7 May 1946, col. 894 (in the 24 May debate it was, paradoxically, a Labour MP who pointed out that it was the Egyptian government who wanted the British out, 'Fellaheen or no Fellaheen').
87. Campbell's letter to Howe, 15 June 1946 (P.R.O., F.O. 371/53303/J2742).

Egypt, the Arab States and the Suez Expedition, 1956

ELIE KEDOURIE

From a very early date Egypt became a well-defined and distinctive political entity. In antiquity, it remained for many centuries one of the great powers of the Mediterranean and of the Near East—which is to say one of the great powers of the world. After the Muslim conquest, the distinctive character of Egypt by no means disappeared. And, under the Fatimids, the Ayyubids and the Mamelukes, it once more became a centre of empire. The Ottoman conquest of 1517, again, did not prevent Egypt from retaining, to all intents and purposes, a large degree of autonomy which, in the first half of the nineteenth century, was considerably enlarged and consolidated. This was the achievement of an Ottoman officer Muhammad Ali, who became viceroy of Egypt.

There are two aspects of Muhammad Ali's rule which are relevant to our subject. In the first place, he had the ambition of making Egypt into a regional great power. Control over the resources and population of a large country, ruthlessness and the ability and willingness to make use of European advice and techniques, enabled him to become a formidable military power. He conquered the Sudan, he sent military expeditions to Arabia and the Morea, and finally levied war on the Sultan, his suzerain, coming very near to destroying the Ottoman dynasty, and occupied the Levant for a decade. But his vaulting ambition crashed to the ground by the intervention of European great powers, chiefly of Great Britain, and, at the time of his death in 1849, of all his conquests only the Sudan remained in his possession.

Muhammad Ali established a dynasty which, in some fashion or another, ruled over Egypt until 1952. His example and his record bequeathed to his successors the ambition to use the resources of Egypt in order to gain regional primacy. And this ambition was transmitted to the regime which supplanted Muhammad Ali's dynasty in 1952. Muhammad Ali's history, then, shows that, in modern times, Egypt had the potential to become a regional power. Its rulers have been

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The Suez Canal and the British Economy 1918-1960

RICHARD C. WHITING

From its opening in 1869 until 1956 the Suez Canal was regarded as a key feature of the British economy: in the year of the Canal's inauguration the *Economist* commented quite accurately that it 'had been cut by French energy and Egyptian money for British advantage'.¹ In 1956, in more gloomy conditions, Eden warned publicly of the 'serious industrial dislocation and unemployment' which would come from any prolonged interference with the traffic of the Canal—because of the importance of oil to the British economy 'machinery and much of our transport would grind to a halt'.²

In examining the Canal and the British economy in the twentieth century, due account has to be taken of these judgments, but inevitably they reflect different uses of the Canal over time and also suggest an importance which was more apparent than real. In the first contribution to this volume, Dr Steele dealt with the religious and political antagonisms arising from the British in Egypt before 1914. This contribution is concerned with the more prosaic world of trade and shipping, and there is a further change of perspective for, as far as the use of the Canal went, the British crossed swords as much with the French *rentier* capitalists who ran the Canal Company as they did with the Egyptians themselves.

The relationship between the Suez Canal and the British economy can be approached in three ways: by relating the Canal to Britain's trade and to the international economy of which it was a part; by examining the use made of it by shipping companies; and by outlining the triangular relationship between the shipping companies, the Canal company and the British government, the last of course both holding shares in the Company and having an interest in the health of British shipping. Like most three-cornered relationships, this was not always a very happy one.

During the first half of the century the Canal was bound up with many key changes in the British economy and Britain's position in the world. To put it simply, our period begins when the British economy


The Suez Canal and the British Economy 1918-1960

was still a powerful force internationally, reflected in her trade in certain products, most especially coal; the period ends when British economic power and competitiveness had declined and when her shipping industry had failed to respond to a switch from coal to oil as a source of energy and as a cargo. Our period begins when the Suez Canal played a central role in the movement of commodities and in the multilateral payments system to which these movements gave rise; it ends with the closure of the Canal in 1956 which affected the economy not so much in real terms because of the hindrance to the movement of goods and materials, but as a political crisis which diminished confidence in sterling. In my broad conclusion, there is no need to depart from the judgment made by Dr Steele that the Canal was extremely useful to Britain and her trade but was never indispensable. But it does seem worthwhile to investigate how far Britain's use of the Canal was at one with her fortunes elsewhere, or how far it reflected particular strengths which were not evident in the wider, more hostile world. I will begin by examining the Suez Canal, British trade and shipping, before moving on to the rather more historically specific section on the shipowners, the British government and the Canal Company.

The savings in shipping time effected by the Canal remained fairly constant from 1918 to 1956: that is a saving of roughly half on the journey from Bombay to Liverpool via the Cape, between one-quarter and a third to China, with much smaller differences in the trade with Australia, perhaps a day or two.³ The main value of the Suez Canal in world trade lay in yoking together suppliers of primary commodities from the East with their customers in the more developed West, and acting as a channel for a reciprocal flow of manufactured consumer and capital goods west to east. Among the commodities going southwards through the Canal to the East we therefore find railway equipment, metals, and machinery to meet the demands of hitherto non-industrial countries which in the inter-war period were beginning to develop some industrial capacity.⁴ These countries in turn sent raw materials of various sorts to the industrial core of the world economy—ores and metals, textiles, vegetable oils and food. Of growing significance throughout our period in the traffic going northwards through the Canal to the West was oil from the Middle East. Inevitably the countries east of Suez did not have a monopoly in the production of primary commodities—the American continent was a major producer of meat, oil, cotton and copper. The main producers east of Suez using the Canal, India, Burma and Ceylon, sent rice, rubber, tea and various metals and minerals, especially manganese; in the period after the Second World War the export of oil from the Middle East dwarfed all these products. The impact of oil is shown in the changing propor-



قناة السويس:

تحديات مستمرة وحياة متجددة



استطلاع : علي عثمان

تصوير : طالب الحسيني



● خريطة قناة السويس . .

النقل البرية التي عرفتها البشرية . شريط « السكة الحديد » يخترق المدينة ، ويقطع الثلاثين أكبر شوارعها ، ومنه تنفرع الأسواق المختلفة .

أحياء جديدة تضاف إلى المدينة في الشمال والغرب كحي الشيخ زايد ، وأخيراً كانت قائمة عشوائياً يعاد تخطيطها ، كحي السلام ، صناعات جديدة تنشأ على بعد اثني عشر كيلومتراً من المدينة .

خرجنا من نطاق المدينة إلى الجنوب ، فاستوقفتنا لافتة يقوم بتعليقها شابان ، مكتوب عليها « استراحة الدبابات » ، سألنا عن التسمية فأشاروا فرأفقتنا إلى عدد من الدبابات المحطمة ، إنها دبابات « إسرائيلية » حاولت دخول المدينة أثناء حرب أكتوبر ١٩٧٣ م ، فأوقفتها قذائف المدافع عن المدينة . والتقط لها زميلي المصور بعض الصور ، وواصلنا سيرنا بين المزارع في طريق ضيق : المزارعون يعكفون على أعمالهم الحقلية المختلفة ، أسر كاملة تعمل في الأرض ،

الإرشاد ، ويطل على بحيرة التمساح . أمينا الأجراءت ، وصعدنا إلى الغرف ، أزاح عامل الفندق ستائر النوافذ ، فبدا المشهد رائعاً : سفن مبحرة في المر المائي داخل البحيرة ، (قوارب آلية « لنشات » سريعة ، تتحرك باتجاهات مختلفة ، مجموعات من الصيادين في قواربهم الصغيرة ينتشرون على سطحها ، أندية وشواطيء خاصة متجاورة على ضفافها ، سكوت مياها إلا من حركة أمواج خفيفة ، ولونها الصافي ، يغريان بالفقر إليها .

واسطة العقسد :

غادرنا الفندق ، واتجهنا إلى المدينة . الاسماعيلية مدينة خدمات ، يسكنها موظفو الحكومة ، والعاملون في هيئة قناة السويس وشركاتها ، والعاملون في الصناعات الخفيفة ، وتتخذها جامعة قناة السويس مقراً لها ، وهي جامعة حديثة ، موزعة على مدن القناة الثلاث ، نقل فيها التخصصات النظرية لصالح التخصصات العلمية المرتبطة بطبيعة أنشطة المنطقة .

مدينة هادئة ، حدائقها التي تتركز في المناطق المحاذية للقناة نضرة الخضرة ، وأشجارها منسقة ، نظافة ملموسة في قسمها الأول - كان يطلق عليه الحي الافرنجي ، حيث نشأت مدينتنا بور سعيد والاسماعيلية ، على حين ، أولها الحي الافرنجي ، وكان يسكنه الأجانب ، في مقابل حي العرب الذي استمد اسمه من ساكنيه - ولذلك كان تخطيط الحي الأول وتنظيمه يحظى بالاهتمام دون الآخر ، فشوارعه متسعة ومجملة بالأشجار المستورد بعضها من أوروبا . في قسم من هذا الحي الذي يسكنه حالياً كبار الموظفين والتجار ، وتتركز فيه معظم المصالح الحكومية .

دخلنا قلب الحي التجاري : ازدحام شديد ، وأصوات بشرية متداخلة مع ضجيج كل وسائل

منذ مائة وعشرين عاماً ، وبالتحديد في ١٨ (أغسطس) آب ١٨٦٨ م ، التقت مياه البحر الأبيض المتوسط والبحر الأحمر ، بعد أن انقضت المعاول على السد المؤقت في البحيرات المرة . وبعد ثلاثة شهور - في ١٧ (نوفمبر) تشرين الثاني ١٨٦٩ - أعلن رسمياً في حفل باذخ ، ما زالت وقائعه تثير الدهشة ، عن افتتاح قناة السويس للملاحة العالمية . ومنذ ذلك الوقت دارت حول القناة أحداث كثيرة ، وصراعات عنيفة ، دفع الشعب المصري ثمنها تبعية ، وانكساراً وفقداناً للاستقرار ، ولكنه كان دائماً متحدياً ، حتى عاش أيام زهوه وانتصاره ، عندما ملك القناة . فراح ينمي المجتمع الحضري الذي نشأ حولها وبسببها . واليوم تدفعه تحديات الحاضر إلى اقتحام المستقبل الصعب .

إنتاج الفاكهة ، خاصة الصيفية كالمانجو ، والبطيخ والشمام ، بالإضافة إلى الموالح والفرول السوداني ، فطبيعة التربة حولها ، سواء كانت رملية ناعمة أو خشنة ، تصلح لهذه الأنواع من المحاصيل الزراعية .

دخلنا المدينة ، وتوجهنا إلى مقر هيئة قناة السويس ، مع المرافق الذي كان بانتظارنا . مقر إدارة الهيئة أو مبنى الإرشاد مقام على ضفاف بحيرة التمساح ، ومكون من ثلاثة عشر طابقاً ، يعلوها برج لإرشاد السفن ، مزود بأحدث الأجهزة اللاسلكية ، لتيسير عملية الاتصال بالسفن العابرة ، وبمكاتب حركة الملاحة ، وكذلك بأجهزة قوية للرصد ، يمكن بواسطتها مراقبة حركة الملاحة في القناة في الأيام الجيدة الرؤوية إلى القنطرة شمالاً ، والبحيرات المرة جنوباً .

قابلنا بعض المسؤولين بالهيئة ، ثم اتجهنا إلى الفندق ، وهو على بعد خطوات من مبنى

في الصباح الباكر من يوم ربيعي دافئ ، من شهر (مارس) آذار ، خلفنا مدينة القاهرة بصخبها وضجيجها الذي لا يتوقف ، وامتداداتها العمرانية المتواصلة على رمال الصحراء في شمالها الشرقي ، باتجاهنا إلى مدينة الاسماعيلية التي تبعد عن القاهرة حوالي ١٢٠ كيلومتراً : وهي واسطة محافظات القناة الثلاث ، والمقر الرئيسي لهيئة قناة السويس البحرية .

مع اقترابنا من مشارف الاسماعيلية ، حملت لنا التسمات الصباحية الرطبة رائحة منعشة لفواكه مخلطة بغير أزهار متوهجة تفتحها ألوانا على رؤوس الحقول والأشجار . الخضرة تتزايد وتتكثف مع توارى اللون الأصفر ، حدائق تلي حدائق ، وأشجار متعانقة بكثافة تصنع خيلة جميلة فوق الطريق القديم الجديد ، باعة الفاكهة الطازجة يتوزعون على الطريق : برتقال ، يوسف ، فراولة ، فوز ، فالاسماعيلية تشتهر

Islam Ansiklopedisi
Kütüphane No: 6

الدكتور علي سلطان

11A İsmail
Tasavvufi

سنة (287-288) في سنة

تاريخ سورية

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نهاية الحكم التركي

جميع الحقوق محفوظة

لدار طلائع للدراسات والترجمة والنشر

08 MAYIS 1998

الطبعة الأولى

١٩٨٧

وقد هدد القناصل البريطانيون في دمشق، بأنه إذا ضربت الاسكندرونه أو حدث اضطراب لأهلها، فسوف يكون مضطراً برغم إرادته للانتقام منهم في الحال (في دمشق)، ولهذا طلب هؤلاء القناصل (وكانوا قد تجمعوا في دمشق بأمر الحكومة التركية) من وزارة الخارجية البريطانية ألا تفعل شيئاً ضد المدن غير المدافع عنها، حتى لا تتعرض أرواحهم للخطر، وكان اتصالهم عن طريق القنصلية الأمريكية. كما قرر جمال أن يعدم الانكليز بمقابل العثمانيين الذي يقتلون في الاسكندرونه، وهو الذي يحدد العدد. ولذا طلب القناصل أيضاً من السفن الانكليزية ألا تضرب الاسكندرونه. وكان عدد الانكليز ٥٠٠، واعتبرهم جمال باشا سجناء في دمشق^(٥١). وقد يكون جمال باشا تصور أيضاً، أنه حمى بذلك ساحل سورية من ضرب سفن الحلفاء، بينما كان يعد لحملة قناة السويس.

الحملة على قناة السويس

جمع جمال قواته من سورية من الجيش والمتطوعين، وطلب من وهيب باشا والي الحجاز أن يقود قواته من هناك إلى عمان. وكان من المفروض أن يقود الحسين بن علي أو أحد أبنائه المتطوعين من الحجاز إلى عمان أيضاً. لكن الحسين احتج بوجود بقائه في مكة ليدافع عن الحجاز، كما اعتذر ابنه علي الذي قاد المتطوعين وبقي في المدينة. لكن جمال باشا لم يعدم وجود أعوان له من السوريين أمثال شكيب أرسلان الذي قاد المتطوعين الدرروز، وعبد الرحمن اليوسف الذي أرسل متطوعة الأكراد، وبلغ مجموع الحملة العثمانية اثني عشر ألفاً^(٥٢).

لم تكن هذه الحملة العسكرية سرية، وكان جمال باشا قد أعلن أنه أتى من أجل تنفيذها، كما أن الإنكليز والفرنسيين كانوا على علم بتحركات القوات العثمانية بأدق التفاصيل. وتوجد تقارير كثيرة في وثائقهم تدل على هذا التحرك. ولذا كان الإنكليز

سلفه زكي باش الذي كان يعاملهما بأدب. أراد جمال باشا أن يحضر البطريك الحويك وأوهانس باشا إلى دمشق لإيقائهما فيها، لكنه قبل بعد توسط كبير أن يكتب أن يرسل الحويك مطارينه من الدرجة الأولى للسلام عليه في دمشق بدلاً منه بسبب مرضه حتى يشفى، وحتى لا ينكسر خاطر الموازنة، وعندها يأتي الحويك للسلام عليه^(٤٧). وإن مقارنة بين طلب زكي باشا وجمال باشا لأوهانس كي يحضر ثم للبطريك أيضاً، تعطينا صورة عن طريقة تعامل جمال باشا مع شخصيات لبنان. جاء في برقية زكي باشا لأوهانس «حضرة صاحب الدولة أوهانس باشا متصرف جبل لبنان، أرجو أن تفضلوا بزيارتي في المقر العام للمذاكرة في أمور هامة، وإعلامي سلفاً بموعد قدومكم». أما برقية جمال باشا فهي «متصرف جبل لبنان، تعالوا غداً لمقابلتي في دمشق. قائد الفيلق الرابع جمال^(٤٨). ولنلاحظ الاستصغار الذي أتى بطلب الديوان العرفي لاحتضار البطريك الياس الحويك «إلى قائمقام جونييه - أرسلوا حالاً حنه زوجة طنوس من قرية الكفور، والياس حويك البطريك الماروني»^(٤٩).

ونفى جمال باشا أعداداً كبيرة من وجهاء ورجال لبنان وبينهم من المسلمين، لكنه لم يرسلهم إلى الأناضول كما حدث مع ترجمة القنصليات الأجنبية. بل نفاهم إلى القدس، بسبب علاقتهم المحققة عنده مع قنصليات الدول المحاربة للدولة، وذلك من قبيل الاحتياط الذي لا بد منه في حالة الحرب حسب رأيه^(٥٠). وظن جمال أن الأمور استقرت له بتودده إلى العرب المسلمين في سورية وبقسوته تجاه اللبنانيين، حتى يخافوا ولا يفعلوا شيئاً مضرراً بالدولة، كانت هذه سياسته المعتدلة قبل غزوه لقناة السويس، وكان اعتداله ناجماً عن رغبته بنجاح حملته ولم يكن راغباً أن يفعل شيئاً يؤثر على نتائجها.

(٤٧) شكيب أرسلان، سيرة ذاتية، ص ١٣٦-١٣٧.

(٤٨) مذكرات الحكيم، بيروت ولبنان، ص ١٦٠.

(٤٩) مذكرات الحكيم، لبنان وبيروت، ص ١٧٣.

(٥٠) شكيب أرسلان، سيرة ذاتية، ص ١٤٧.

(٥١) F. O. 371/2481/ No 15633, 14-17, Dec. 1914.

(٥٢) علي فؤاد، كيف غزونا، ص ٨٠، وشكيب أرسلان، سيرة ذاتية، ص ١٤٠-١٤٦.

تاريخ الحركة القومية

وتطور نظام الحكم

فمصر

بقلم

(D) isih Tarande

عبد الرحمن الراجحي

Muharrir


١٩٢١-١٩٢٥

الجزء الثاني

(من إعادة الديوان في عهد نابليون إلى إنتهاء الحملة الفرنسية)
(ومن جلاء الفرنسيين إلى إرتقاء محمد علي أريكة مصر بإرادة الشعب)

الطبعة الرابعة

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Araştırmaları Enstitüsü	
Kayıt No :	6839-2
Tasnif No. :	962.3218 RA.F.T



دار المعارف

٢١

آثار ترعة الفراعنة القديمة وخليج أمير المؤمنين . وعهد إلى المهندس لويس Le Père كبير مهندسي الطرق والجنسور أن يدرس مشروع حفر ترعة تصل البحر الأبيض بالبحر الأحمر وأن يضع تقريراً عنه (٨)

وعاد إلى القاهرة في اليوم السادس من شهر يناير سنة ١٧٩٩ .

رواية الجبرتي :

قال الجبرتي عن رحلة نابليون إلى السويس : « وفي يوم الاثنين سادس عشر رجب سنة ١٢١٣ سافر ساري عسكري بونابارته إلى السويس وأخذ صحبته السيد أحمد المحروقي (كبير تجار القاهرة) وإبراهيم أفندي كاتب (جمرك) البهار، وأخذ معه أيضاً بعض المديرين والمهندسين والمصورين وجرجس الجوهري (كبير المباشرين) ، وأنطون أبو طاقية ، وغيرهم ، وعدة كثيرة من عساكر الخيالة والمشاة ، وبعض مدافع ، وعربات وتختروان ، وعدة جمال لحمل الذخيرة والماء والقومانية (المؤونة) ، وقال في موضع آخر : « وفي مدة إقامته بالسويس صار يركب ويتأمل في النواحي وجهات ساحل البحر والبر ليلاً ونهاراً » .

منشور نابليون بإعادة الديوان

قبل أن يغادر نابليون القاهرة إلى السويس ، أصدر منشوره بإعادة الديوان في ٢١ ديسمبر سنة ١٧٩٨ وبين فيه أنه عطل الديوان منذ شهرين عقاباً لأهل القاهرة على الثورة التي نهضوا فيها . وأنه رأى بعد أن سكنت الأحوال وهدأت الخواطر إعادة الديوان سيرته الأولى ، وقد ملأ منشوره بعبارات جوفاء تعود أن يكرزها في بياناته ومنشوراته إظهاراً لسلطوته . وأغرق في هذه العبارات حتى ادعى أنه اطلع الغيب وأنه يعلم أسرار النفوس وما تخفي الصدور ، وزعم أن احتلاله مصر مذكور في بعض آيات القرآن الكريم ...

أراد نابليون بهذا الأسلوب أن يشعر الناس شدة بأسه وقوته ، ويأتيهم من ناحية الخوارق التي اعتادوا أن يسمعوها في ذلك العصر . لكنه في الحقيقة لم يؤثر في حالة الشعب النفسية ولم

١٩

قيادتها ستعهد لي . لكن نابليون عزم على أن يتولى قيادتها بنفسه . وقد عرض على الجنرال (كافريالي) يوم ٢٢ نوفمبر (٢٢ ديسمبر سنة ١٧٩٨) قيادة تلك الحملة فأجبت بالقبول . ثم ذكر كليبر أن نابليون دعاه قبل رحيله إلى السويس أن يصحبه إليها ، فأجاب كليبر بأن الجنرال كافريالي أخبره بقرب سفره إلى دمياط وقطية للزحف على سوريه . فكان جواب نابليون أن في الوقت سعة بعد عودتهم من السويس . ثم رجاه كليبر في أن يبقى هو بالقاهرة إلى أن يرجع من رحلته ، فأقره نابليون وأتابه عنه في القيادة العامة (٣) . ويقول الكولونيل جاكوتان Jacotin إن الحملة على سوريا كانت تهيأ معدتها قبل تحركها بنحو شهرين (٤) . كل هذا يدل على أن نابليون قد أعاد الديوان بعد أن اعترم تجريد الحملة على سوريا . وأنه أمر بإعادته قبل رحلته إلى السويس . فنقل إذن كلمة عن هذه الرحلة وعن أهمية السويس وعلاقتها بمشروعات نابليون .

احتلال السويس ورحلة نابليون إليها

كانت للسويس أهمية حربية كبيرة لم تفت نابليون . وبخاصة لأن لها صلة وطيدة بمشروعاته في الشرق . فقد كان بالرغم من تحطيم أسطولها في واقعة (أبو قير) لا ينفك يبتكر الوسائل ويرسم الخطط لينال من إنجلترا عدوته اللدود . ولم يفقد الأمل في تجريد حملة برية تخترق آسيا وتصل الهند . وكان يرى من جهة أخرى أن السويس تصلح لأن تكون قاعدة بحرية على شاطئ البحر الأحمر . يصل منها إلى الهند . وفكر كذلك في وصل البحر الأبيض المتوسط بالبحر الأحمر بقناة تجرى بينها . وجد في انفاذ هذا المشروع ، وكان غرضه منه محاربة إنجلترا وزعزعة قوائمها في الهند ، لكنه لم يفلح في تحقيق فكرته وصرفه عنها سير الحوادث وتقلب الأحوال . فالسويس كانت إذن قاعدة لمشروعات جملة طاقت برأس نابليون . لا غرو أن وجه عنايته إلى احتلالها عسكرياً واكتشاف موقعها وارتياح الجهات المجاورة لها ، فعهد إلى الجنرال (بون) Bon أن يحتلها (٥) فسار هذا إليها من القاهرة سالكاً طريق الحجاج وعسكر بها في أوائل شهر ديسمبر سنة ١٧٩٨ .

(٣) يوميات الجنرال كليبر .

(٤) كتاب وتخطيط مصر، الجزء السابع عشر .

(٥) أمر نابليون المؤرخ أول ديسمبر سنة ١٧٩٨ . مراسلات نابليون الجزء الخامس وثيقة رقم ٣٦٩٦ ورقم ٣٦٩٧ .

(٨) راجع ما كتبه عن هذا المشروع بالجزء الأول ص ١٢٥ من الطبعة الأولى .

Author: AL-SOLAMI, DAWI AWAAD
Title: BRITISH PREPARATIONS FOR THE SUEZ WAR--1956
School: UNIVERSITY OF EXETER (UNITED KINGDOM) (5016) Degree: PHD
Date: 1988 pp: 397
Source: DAI 50/03A, p.777
Subject: HISTORY, MIDDLE EASTERN (0333); HISTORY, MODERN (0582); POLITICAL SCIENCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS (0616)
Publication No.: AACDX85403
Abstract: Available from UMI in association with The British Library.

Relying on official documents, this thesis explores the British political and military preparations for the Suez War of 1956.

The British Government's plans were aimed primarily at overthrowing President Nasser and his Government and establishing a successor Government, at least co-operative, if not subordinate, to Britain and the Western Powers. Most decision makers in the British Government, including Sir Anthony Eden, were determined from the outset to use force to achieve their objective.

From the evidence presented in this study, it is clear that most decision makers in the British Government were searching for pretexts to justify the use of force against Nasser. From 28th July 1956 the British were tempted to concert with Israel in military action against Egypt. The idea had been discussed and considered by the Egypt Committee and the Chiefs of Staff. By the middle of October the British Government realised that their actions would not facilitate a justifiable pretext for the use of force and on 22nd October their actual collusion with Israel started at a meeting which led to the signing of the Sevres Accord.

As far as the military planning was concerned, the Government intended to achieve its objective with Operation Musketeer, then Musketeer Revised and the use of psychological warfare. Preparations for these operations served to reveal that deficiencies existed in almost every section of the Armed Forces. Psychological warfare lacked sophistication.

Following the execution of Musketeer, the Government planned to occupy at least the Canal Zone, if not the whole of Egypt, until a co-operative successor Government had been found from among Nasser's opponents, such as the Wafd politicians, and had established itself in the country. Occupied areas in Egypt were to be administered by military government or military control depending on the situation. The British plan to overthrow Nasser disintegrated at the time of its execution. Political miscalculation, military difficulties preventing an early landing and a sharp division within the Government, were the most important causes for its failure. More significantly, contrary to the commonly held view, the fear of Soviet Union intervention was inter alia a major factor in the Cabinet's decision to accept the United Nations' call for a ceasefire.

* آراء فى منهج البحث التاريخى

٢٤٣ د. محمد حبنى عبد اللطيف

- ثانىا: الندوات

١ - من بحوث ندوة قناة السويس (أربعون عاماً على التأميم) التى عقدت

بمقر الجمعية فى الفترة من ٢ إلى ٣ ديسمبر ١٩٩٦م.

* موقف شركة قناة السويس من تأميم القناة

٢٥١ د. محمد عبد الرحمن برج

* موقف الغرب من تأميم قناة السويس

٢٥٩ د. لطيفة محمد سالم

* علاقة تأميم قناة السويس بحرب ١٩٥٦

٢٧٧ د. عبد المنعم إبراهيم الجمعى

* موقف الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية من الأزمة العراقية - الكويتية ١٩٦١م

٢٨٧ د. عبد الحميد عبد الجليل شلبى

* دور علماء الحملة الفرنسية فى دراسة خطط القاهرة

٣٢٣ د. أيمن فؤاد سيد

* سياسة بونابرت الإسلامية

٣٣٧ د. محمد عبد الرحمن برج

* مظهر التقديس بزوال دولة الفرنسيين، كمصدر لدراسة تاريخ الحملة

الفرنسية على مصر


٣٤٧ د. عبد المنعم إبراهيم الجمعى

Meebletüt - Tarixiyeti'l - Misriyye

cilt: 40 (1997-1999) Kahire

s. 354.

D-083



15 NISAN 2000

Author: TYSON, CAROLYN ANN
Title: MAKING FOREIGN POLICY: THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE (SUEZ CRISIS)
School: THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY (0075) Degree: PHD Date: 1984
pp: 345

Publication No.: AAC8416751

Source: DAI 45/04A, p.1188

Subject: HISTORY, UNITED STATES (0337)

Abstract: This dissertation examines the process of making foreign policy for the Middle East in the post-World War II years. I have described and analyzed recommendations by the National Security Council, formulation of a plan in executive offices, and its final approval by Congress. The end product was the Eisenhower Doctrine, which declared U.S. commitment to defense of Western interests in the Middle East, by arms if necessary. The announcement responded to external events: namely, the decline of British influence in the region, made apparent in the Suez Crisis of 1956, and intimations of Soviet moves into the Middle East.

Reasons for U.S. commitment to the area became evident in the years after World War II. Rich oilfields and a strategic location indicated to policymakers the importance of the Middle East to Western security; establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 contributed humanitarian concern to defense demands. Until the mid-1950s, the Tripartite Declaration of Britain, France, and the U.S. guaranteed Middle East stability by controlling the flow of arms to states of the area and ensuring their boundaries. But in 1955, an Egyptian agreement with Czechoslovakia to purchase Soviet arms ended Western monopoly and alerted Washington to renewed Russian interest in the Middle East. The next year, nationalization of the Suez Canal led to a joint Anglo-French-Israeli attack of Egypt to force settlement of the crisis favorable to their interests. Its failure in November 1956 initiated a sequence of events leading to a new role for the U.S. in the Middle East.

Decisions in Washington rested upon security council studies, made largely during the Truman administration. Formulation of a policy awaited the invasion of Egypt spurred by Soviet threats of military intervention. The basic outline of the Middle East plan was the handiwork of Secretary Dulles, under the direction of President Eisenhower. The administration presented its final version, the Eisenhower Doctrine, to Congress on January 5, 1957. With the approval of both the House and Senate, it hoped to make clear the American resolve to deter communist penetration of the Middle East.

13 OCAK 1997

SUEZ 1956


The Crisis and its Consequences

EDITED BY
WM. ROGER LOUIS
AND
ROGER OWEN

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi Kütüphanesi	
Dem. No:	59642
Tas. No:	962 SUE.C

CLARENDON PRESS · OXFORD
1989

تأميم قناة السويس... الرئيس الراحل عبد الناصر
يعلن على الشعب استرداد القناة.



٢٦ يوليو ١٩٥٦ : تأميم قناة السويس (*)

بقلم: د. جمال العطيبي.

كانت استعادة قناة السويس نزوة مواجهتنا لمعركة الحرية السياسية، وكانت موقعتنا الفاصلة في هذه المعركة، وكان النصر فيها معناه اندحار القوى الأجنبية التي اتخذت المنطقة العربية كلها ملكاً خاصاً لها..

جمال عبد الناصر

محجفة بسيادة مصر رفضها عبد الناصر، على نحو ما سنعرضه فيما بعد عند كلامنا عن يوم آخر خالد في حياة عبد الناصر، حينما أطلق إشارة البدء في بناء السد العالي في ٩ يناير ١٩٦٠. وبين يوم إعلان عبد الناصر تأميم قناة السويس، وبين يوم إطلاق إشارة البدء في بدء السد العالي سنوات من النضال الشاق.

كان رد عبد الناصر على سحب تمويل السد العالي هو تأميم قناة السويس.

كان دخل شركة قناة السويس في عام ١٩٥٥ مبلغ ٢٥ مليون جنيه أي حوالي مائة مليون دولار.. هي التي قرر عبد الناصر أن تصبح من حق مصر، في حين كانت المساعدة المشروطة التي عرضتها أمريكا وإنجلترا لبناء السد العالي لا تتجاوز ٧٠ مليون دولار على مدى خمس سنوات.

وتنفيذاً لهذه السياسة المستقلة رفض عبد الناصر الاحلاف العسكرية. كان يرى أن الخطر الحقيقي ضد مصر والأمة العربية هو خطر الصهيونية، وبدأ بحثه عن السلاح لجيش مصر الفتى.. ولكن الدول الاستعمارية منعت عنا السلاح في الوقت الذي أخذت فيه تسلح ربيبتها إسرائيل. وكسر عبد الناصر احتكار السلاح. وعقد صفقة الأسلحة التشيكوسلوفاكية في سبتمبر ١٩٥٥، وقامت تأثرة الدول الاستعمارية، ومضى عبد الناصر يؤكد سياسة مصر المستقلة حينما أدان حلف بغداد وشارك في مؤتمر باندونج ثم اعترف بالصين الشعبية في أبريل ١٩٥٦.

ثم بدأت بعدها قصة السد العالي، الحلم الذي كان يراود عبد الناصر، وسحب البنك الدولي عرضه للاشتراك في تمويل المشروع بناء على ضغط أمريكا وإنجلترا بعد أن عرض شروطاً

من العام نفسه، وأبدى موافقته على دستور ١٩٥٦، وأعلن عبد الناصر سياسة مصر الوطنية المستقلة فقال:

«إننا لا نقبل مطلقاً أن نأخذ أوامر من الخارج. كل سياستنا تنبعث من مصلحتنا، من ضميرنا، من نفوسنا، من أرضنا، من مصر وليس من أية دولة أجنبية. ونحن في سبيل المحافظة على استقلالنا، وفي سبيل تأمين حدودنا، وفي سبيل بناء وطننا.. في سبيل هذه الأسس الثلاثة والمبادئ الثلاثة نبني علاقتنا الخارجية بكل وضوح وصراحة... نحن نسالم من يسالمننا ونعادي من يعاديننا. هذا مبدؤنا. فنحن نريد السلام ونريد أن نعيش في سلام بعيداً عن المؤامرات الدولية»^(١).

في مدينة الإسكندرية وفي نهاية احتفالات مصر بالعيد الخامس للثورة، وقف جمال عبد الناصر أمام جموع الشعب وأعلن أنه:

«في نفس هذا اليوم تقرر تأميم قناة السويس ونشر هذا القرار فعلاً في الجريدة الرسمية وأصبح هذا القرار امراً واقعاً..»

ومعركة تأميم قناة السويس هي واحدة من المعارك التي خاضها عبد الناصر ضد الاستعمار والنفوذ الأجنبي، والتي كان لها أثر بعيد المدى في العلاقات الدولية وفي بعث القومية العربية وفي تبين خطانا على طريق الثورة الاجتماعية.

كان قد تم جلاء الجنود البريطانية عن القناة في ١٢ يونيو ١٩٥٦ وكان الشعب قد انتخب جمال عبد الناصر رئيساً للجمهورية في ٢٣ يونيو

(*) من كتاب أيام خالدة في حياة عبد الناصر للدكتور جمال العطيبي، دار المعارف بمصر، نوفمبر ١٩٧٠.

Erskine B. Childers


The Road to Suez

A Study of Western-Arab Relations

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi Kütüphanesi	
Dem. No:	59976
Tas. No:	953 CHI. R

LONDON
MACGIBBON & KEE
1962

0.6 NISAN 1999



محمد حسنين هيكل

قصة السويس

آخِر المعارك في عصر العماققة

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Kütüphanesi İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi	
Demirbaş No:	130838
Tasnif No:	962 HEY.K

- القصة التي عاد العالم الى اسرارها بعد عشرين سنة : ١٩٥٦ - ١٩٧٦ .
- صراع بين عبدالناصر وايدن وموليه وبن جوريون على مستقبل الشرق الاوسط
- تشرشل وايزنهاور وديجول ونهرو وتيتو وهمرشولد بين ابطال القصة .
- الانتصار العربي « الكامل » في عصر الحرب المحدودة ونظرياتها الجديدة .

08 NISAN 1995

Beirut - 1986

Author: HARRISON, ROBERT T.
Title: ROAD TO SUEZ: GLADSTONE AND THE EGYPTIAN CRISIS OF 1882
School: UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (0208) Degree: PHD Date: 1987
Source: DAI 48/04A, p.999 Publication No.: AAC0560503 NOT AVAILABLE
Subject: HISTORY, MODERN (0582)
Abstract: This dissertation, Road to Suez: Gladstone and the Egyptian Crisis of 1882 understands that the leadership of the Liberal Government laid the foundation for the invasion of Egypt a year prior to the event, and, therefore, challenges the accepted historical opinion which views British intervention as reluctantly made at the last minute by lesser Cabinet officials. This interpretation sees Gladstone as framing a policy which united several strains of imperialist thought under the banner of "saving Egypt's liberties" as a pretext to crush the Egyptian Nationalist movement and destroy its leader, Colonel Ahmed Arabi before Egypt could gain independence. The liberal destruction of a National movement was undertaken to maintain Egypt's relationship within the Ottoman Empire by which the security of the Suez Canal was guaranteed in order to protect Britain's own Imperial interests to the complete dismay of the European Powers. The nature of this aggression further isolated Britain from the European community and sparked the rush for colonies and thus, the birth of neo-imperialism. (Copies available exclusively from Micrographics Department, Doheny Library, USC, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0182.)


03 OCAK 1997

ARAB POLITICS
IN
THE UNITED NATIONS

Süveyş Kanalı

MISIR

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi İzmir - Türkiye	
Kayıt No :	
Tasnif No. :	



ABDUL WAHED AZIZ ZINDANI
Ph. D.
SANA'A, Y.A.R.

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi İzmir - Türkiye	
Kayıt No :	7476
Tasnif No. :	956.3 ZIN.A

THE CAXTON PRESS PRIVATE LIMITED
NEW DELHI
SEPTEMBER, 1977

Makale "Mısır" pasetindedir

construction of the state by becoming teachers or bureaucrats. Muhammad Reza Shah turned women from potential participants to passive beneficiaries; 'the state [determined] the pace and details of reforms for women' for the purpose of projecting the shah's benevolence and modernity rather than in response to women's expressed needs and interests. He derived his vision of modernity and of modern woman from the West just as he received arms from the West. Opposition of all stripes was anti-imperialist, and because 'moral corruption is seen as the linch-pin of imperialist designs ... women as mothers and wives ... bear a heavy responsibility for the moral health and ... political fate of the country'.

In the particular vision of authenticity that came to characterize the revolution and the subsequent government, symbols like the veil re-entered the political lexicon, charged with new meaning and importance. Behind the symbolism is a real narrowing of the possibility for women to define the 'woman question'. During the Pahlavi period, there was a small space for women to set their own agendas in the 'contest between the modern State and the traditional God'. Najmabadi concludes that at present, 'to have a room of her own, the Iranian woman is now faced with subverting God and State'.

The Modern Middle East: A Reader

Edited by
Albert Hourani,
Philip S. Khoury and Mary C. Wilson,
London-1993, s. 535-549.
DN: 26575



29 AGUSTOS 1994

Consequences of the Suez Crisis in the Arab World

RASHID KHALIDI

Beyond its effect on Egypt and the other direct participants, the Suez crisis had a profound impact on the rest of the Arab world. This was illustrated throughout the crisis over Suez from mid-1955 onwards in the powerful wave of Arab support for Egypt. It was particularly striking in view of the initial lukewarm response of many Arabs to the Egyptian military regime which had emerged from the 1952 revolution. Suez changed this, firmly establishing Gamal Abdel Nasser as the pre-eminent Arab leader until the end of his life, and Arab nationalism as the leading Arab ideology for at least that long.

Suez also gave a final push to the tottering hegemony over the Arab world which Britain and France had sometimes shared and sometimes disputed for over a century. It exposed their weaknesses, encouraging Iraqis, Algerians, Adenis, and others to liquidate their last footholds in the region. Arab leaders ceased paying attention to London and Paris, turning instead towards Cairo, Washington, and Moscow. Finally, because it involved Israel in overt collaboration with the old imperial powers, and in an invasion of the territory of an existing Arab state, the Suez crisis established an image of Israel in the Arab world, and a pattern of conflict with it, which had an impact perhaps as important as that of the 1948 war.

In spite of the significant effects of the Suez crisis on the Arab world, relatively little primary material has emerged to illuminate the motivations of different Arab leaders and governments (with the exception of course of Egypt), and to enable researchers to chronicle this aspect of the crisis.¹ Whereas we can now follow the Egyptian, British, French, Israeli, and American sides of the Suez controversy relatively easily through archival or memoir material, to study the various Arab actors involved we are forced to

world and acknowledges that a failure in the Arab struggle had been the absence of a Palestinian element.

1968-70 Nasser leads War of Attrition against Israel.

1970 January: Nasser secures promise of latest Russian missiles, SAM-3s, technicians to man them, MiG-25 reconnaissance aircraft and eighty other Russian planes.

28 September: Nasser dies. National mourning in Egypt. Nasser is succeeded by Anwar el-Sadat, a close associate and Vice President at the time of Nasser's death. Initially thought of as a caretaker, Sadat is later elected President in a national referendum and by the middle of 1971 exercises a firm personal control of the government of Egypt. Sadat stages new elections for trade unions and professional bodies, as well as for his political party, and institutes a new Egyptian constitution which makes provision for personal freedoms as well as changing the name of the country from the United Arab Republic to the Arab Republic of Egypt.

29 AGUSTOS 1994

Ritchie Orendak, The Middle East Since 1914, New York 1992.

s. 73-80

7. The Suez Crisis of 1956

1955 November-December: Nasser, following Czechoslovak arms deal, lets Washington know that he would prefer to finance Aswan dam, his scheme to move Egypt into the modern age, with American money and so maintain his neutral posture. American response slow, as President Eisenhower's advisers - George Humphrey, United States Secretary of the Treasury, and Herbert Hoover Jr, Assistant Secretary of State - regard the scheme as a greedy ploy mounted by British manufacturers and construction companies. At discussions in Washington (21 November-16 December) it is agreed that the United States would provide \$56 million and Britain \$14 million for the first stage of the construction, and consider later grants up to \$200 million. Contingent on the Anglo-American grants, the World Bank would lend \$200 million.

1956 1 March: King Hussein of Jordan dismisses Sir John Glubb (Glubb Pasha), the British-born Commander-in-Chief of the Jordanian armed forces. Nasser congratulates Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary, on Britain's removing Glubb to improve relations with Egypt. Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister, initially thinks that Nasser is behind Glubb's dismissal, but the former head of the Arab Legion probably persuades the Prime Minister otherwise. The young King Hussein dismisses Glubb as he fears that many see Glubb as the ruler of Jordan, at a time when there is internal resistance to moves in the direction of Jordan's joining the Western-orientated Baghdad Pact.

12 March: Eden speaks to Guy Mollet, the French Premier, about the possibility of an Anglo-French alignment against Nasser.

21 March: British Cabinet meeting suggests that Nasser could be isolated by Anglo-American action. Britain could use Iraq to overthrow a regime sympathetic to Nasser in Syria, while the United States could use Saudi Arabia. Action to be taken against Nasser could include cancelling Aswan dam loan.

27 April: Khrushchev makes a speech about Russia preferring an arms embargo in the Middle East. Nasser thinks this threatens his arms supply from the Soviet Union, and hastily recognizes Communist China. John Foster Dulles, the United States Secretary of

M.E. Yapp "The Near East since the First World War"

London - 1991, s. 402-410. DN: 18453

Ursel / Klaus
Kühnle / Ingrid

which had led Britain to support the League of Nations and collective security between the wars persuaded her to uphold the United Nations after the war; her adherence to the principles of the Atlantic Charter was not merely a pious obeisance.

These last remarks bring us to the question of the loss of will. The Second World War had cost Britain dear: £1.2 billion of overseas investments liquidated; £3 billion pounds of overseas debt acquired (£500 million in the Near East); the National Debt doubled; Britain's trade severely damaged with exports less than a third of what they had been in 1939; considerable damage to housing and industry; and so many men under arms that there was a shortage of manpower for industrial reconstruction. At the same time the new Labour government was elected on a programme which included a great extension of welfare services. At a critical period of post-war decision Britain experienced one of its worst winters of the century. In the early months of 1947 the country was blanketed in snow and ice and industrial production almost came to a stop. Something had to go and in February 1947 Britain decided to stop economic assistance to Greece and Turkey, refer Palestine to the UN and announce a date for India's independence. It is reasonable to argue that as nationalism increased the cost of maintaining the British position in the Near East so loss of will reduced the price Britain was willing to pay for it.

THE SUEZ WAR

The Suez War of 1956 marks a period in the influence of Europe in the Near East. It was the last occasion on which Britain and France attempted to impose their will on a major regional power by force and although both of them continued to play a significant role in parts of the region thereafter, theirs was a declining role. After Suez it was the United States and the USSR which became the principal international powers in the region. More important still Suez represented the new assertion of the regional powers.

The Suez War had two points of origin: regional and international. The regional aspect derives from the Arab-Israeli dispute. The conclusion of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war had not led to a settlement of the points at issue. The war was ended by armistice agreements signed at Rhodes in 1949 and it was intended that the armistice should be followed by a peace agreement negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations. But the UN Conciliation Commission failed to

produce a solution and conferences at Lausanne (1949), Geneva (1950) and Paris (1951) achieved no success. The two main points in dispute were the frontiers of Israel; whether they should be those indicated by the UN in 1947, those established by the armistices in 1949 or some compromise between those lines; and the future of the Palestinian refugees; whether they should be allowed to return to their homes, compensated or resettled. To these points of difference were added others arising from continued friction along the armistice lines and the Egyptian refusal to allow Israel to use the Suez Canal. For the Arab states the problem of a settlement was complicated by the question of Arab Palestine, whether an Arab state should be established or whether the annexation of the West Bank to Jordan should be accepted.

Various approaches to a settlement by international action and regional contacts were tried and failed. Agreement between Jordan and Israel was near in 1950 but failed partly because of the reluctance of Israel to recognize Jordanian possession of the West Bank and partly because opposition within Jordan caused 'Abdallāh to abandon the project. From 1952 until 1956 there were discussions of a settlement which linked Egypt and Israel and which received British and US support. In 1954-5 an elaborate plan was concocted involving a compromise on frontiers, an Egyptian-Jordanian corridor in the Negev, a free port for Jordan at Haifa, a non-aggression pact, the return of some refugees and the resettlement of others. That plan also failed partly because Israel suspected that she would be called upon to surrender much of the Negev and partly because Egypt seemingly lost interest. Another approach towards agreement was the Johnston plan for the sharing of the Jordan waters. The plan began as a way of settling some 200,000 refugees on irrigated land in the Jordan valley but developed into a detailed scheme for a Jordan Valley Authority involving co-operation between Israel, Syria and Jordan. But in October 1955 the Arab League shelved the plan.

During the same years there was increasing tension along the borders of Israel. On the Syrian frontier there was friction arising from the Israeli efforts to develop Arab and waste land in the demilitarized zones north of lake Tiberias and Syrian hostility to these efforts. There was shelling and counter shelling and raids. On the Jordanian frontier there was trouble arising from the resentment felt by refugees at Israeli appropriation of their lands. Guerrillas crossed the frontier and attacked Israeli posts and settlements. Israel retaliated, notably with the raid on the village of Qibya in October 1953 which left 50 dead and the village destroyed. But from 1954 the worst troubles arose on the



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
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Hayat Tarih Mecması, yıl: 6 / sayı: 7, 1.1. Ağustos 1970

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11 AGUSTOS 2001 s. 73-75



III. Ahmed çeşmesi ve Ayasofya.

hatça Fransızca, İngilizce, Almanca, Türkçe, Rumca, Ermenice, Rusça konuşabilirler. Onlardan ne isterseniz derhal temin ederler.

Istanbul Yahudileri iki büyük kola ayrılmışlardır: Bunlardan ilki, Selânik'tekilerle aynı koldan olan İspanyol Yahudileridir. Diğer grup ise Doğu Avrupa'dan gelmiş olup, son derece kötü bir Almanca konuşanlardır.

İlk topluluk Hasköy'de, ikincisi ise Balat'ta oturur.

Bunların arasında da din, iki büyük mezhep ile bölücü rolünü oynamaktadır. Birbirlerine karşı dinsiz, münkir gibi ithamlarda bulunurlar. İspanyol Yahudileri ile Alman Yahudileri birbirlerine pek benzemezler. Sonuncular, birincilerden daha pis, daha çirkin ve daha gösterişsizdir. Fuhuşla ilgili ticaretle uğraşan ahlâksızlar da genel olarak Alman Yahudileri arasından çıkar.

Ahlâki bakımdan bütün eksiklerine rağmen Yahudi erkeği evinde, iyi bir koca, iyi bir baba olmasını becermiştir. Ne kadar mutaassıp olsa, bu taassubu İslâm'ın ki ve hele Rum'un ki kadar koyu değildir. Okuması olanları, hekimleri, avukatları hemen hepsi İstanbul Mason teşkilâtına dahildir.

Dini baskıya rağmen, gün geçmez ki bir Yahudi, Müslüman veya Hıristiyan di-

nine geçmesin. Bu din değiştirmeler ne dereceye kadar samimîdir, bunu Tanrı'dan başka kimse bilemez.

LEVANTENLER'E DAİR

Levantenler'e gelince, bunlar her tarafta rastlanan levantenlerden farklı değildirler. Bu kelimeden aslında ne anlaşılır? Bu insanlar hangi milliyetlendirler? Nereden gelirler?

Levanten deyince, Doğu ülkelerinde yaşayan Avrupalı ailelerin çocukları kastedilir. Fakat tam Levanten olmak için üçüncü nesile kadar gelmek gerekir. İşte o zaman, ne Türk, ne Fransız, ne İtalyan, ne İngiliz, ne de Avrupalı olan bu büyük aileye ait olma şerefini kazanır. Bu dereceye gelince Levanten sahip olduğu kusurlarla tam yerine oturmuş demektir.

Fırsat çıktığında gerekli bütün nezaketi göstermekte kusur etmez. Bu kabiliyetinde o kadar ileri gider ki, sizi kendine inandırarak esir edebilir.

Levantenler, Pera'yı kendileri gibi melez olan ve yine kendi tâbirleri ile «Küçük Paris» olan garip bir şehir yapmışlardır. Hayatları Luxembourg, Petits - Champs gibi kahvelerde ve birahanelerde geçer gider. Hepsî elçiliklerden kabul gördüğü ve kulakları da delik olduğu için pek çok sırta vâkıf olurlar ve gerektiğinde bunları satmasını becerirler.

I. Dünya Harbi'nde

Kanala

Hücum

Yazan: Em. Gnl. Şemsi Rıza Zobu

BU memlekette iktidara gelenlerin hiç birisi vatansız değildi, hepsi memleketini seven insanlardı. Harıl harıl da çalıştılar. Buna rağmen, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun bir adım ileri gitmesinden vazgeçtik, koca devleti batırdılar. Bunun sebebi ne idi? Kısaca cevap vermek gerekirse ukalalık, kendini beğenmişlik, her şeyi ben bilirim iddiası, diyebiliriz. Bundan sonraki iktidarlarda da bunu görmek kabildir.

Sultan Hamid idaresini beğenmeyenler, gizli bir cemiyet kurdular. Temeli 1890 yılında İstanbul'da tıbbiye okulunda atılmış olan bu cemiyetin merkezi, çeşitli hadiselerden ötürü zamanla Paris'e ve nihayet Selânik'e intikal etmişti. Meşrutiyet'in iadesi terânesiyle gizli çalışmaya başlayan bu cemiyetin asıl hedefinin, Sultan Hamid'i devirerek, iktidarı ele almak olduğu sonraki davranışlarından anlaşılacaktır. Bu maksada ulaşmak için Rumeli'de Bulgar, Rum v.s. azınlıklara da baş vurulmuş olduğuna dair vesikalar mevcuttur.

Böylece sahneye çıkmış olan İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti I. Meşrutiyet'in ilân olan 23 temmuz 1908 yılından, imparatorluğun I. Cihan Harbi sonunda mağlûp ve memleketin düşman tarafından işgaline başlandığı, Osmanlı parlamentosunun fes-

hedildiği gün olan 21 ocak 1918 cumartesi gününe kadar 9 yıl, 7 ay, 24 gün iktidarda kalmıştır.

İttihad ve Terakki Partisi'nin kutbunu üç kişi teşkil ediyordu. Tal'at, Enver ve Cemal Paşalar. Bu zevatın dediği dedikti. Birinci Cihan Harbi süresince Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nu bu üç kişi idare etmişti. Bunlar kimdi, kısaca arz edelim:

1) **Tal'at Paşa:** Partinin birinci adamı, lideri olup, Selânik P.T.T. Başmüdürlüğü'nde başkâtip idi. İhtilâl sırasında 34 yaşında bulunuyordu. Elinde yalnız Edirne As. Orta Okulu'ndan alınmış bir diploması vardı. Bir müddet de Fransız mektebine devam etmişti. Bu zat önemli devlet hizmetlerinde de bulunmamış olduğundan, kendi kendisini yetiştirmeye inkan ve vakti yoktu. Tal'at Bey, posta başkâtipliğinden, koca imparatorluğun dahiliye nazırlık makamına oturdu.

2) **Enver Paşa:** 1908 ihtilâlinde Kur. Bnb. idi. 1914 yılı başında, vakitsiz ve uydurma kâdemlerle birden yükselmişti. Paşalığı işe şahsen kendisinin ve İttihad ve Terakki Partisi'nin, Sadrazam Prens Said Halim Paşa üzerine yaptıkları tazyik neticesinde sağlanmıştı. Bu suretle Kor. Kur. Bşk'lığından Harbiye Nazırlığına ve

06 MARI 2002

begründet
von
Klaus Schwarz

herausgegeben
von
Gerd Winkelhane

Diğerz Kanak

Philip Anderson

Rückzug in Ehren?

**Die Nahostpolitik der Briten nach der
Suezkrise, 1957–60**

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi Kütüphanesi	
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Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein
General der Artillerie a. D.

Mit den Türken zum Suezkanal

Mit 24 Bildern und 7 Karten


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Dem. No:	65 722
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BEDOUINS AND MAMLUKS IN THE SINAI TRADE, 1750–1800: THE STRUGGLE FOR SUEZ

Pascale Ghazaleh

Before and throughout the Mamluk and Ottoman periods, the Bedouins of Egypt are mentioned, both in primary and in secondary sources, as potential troublemakers, encroaching upon the settled areas and wreaking havoc on the trade routes during political crises or famines. The frequent accounts of their looting and pillaging, found in literature from the chronicles of Ibn Iyas and al-Jabarti to Ibn Khaldun's theory of civilizational decay and renewal, testify to the perception that the Bedouins posed a threat to both trade and the stability of the central government. Most scholars discussing the Red Sea trade, in particular, have noted the importance of the Bedouins' role in transporting merchandise and protecting caravans. This role has usually been seen as a passive one: the less the Bedouins' presence was felt, the more they were appreciated. Understandably, however, the crises caused by the Bedouins have been more often emphasized; less has been written on the importance of their role in a trade crucial to the entire Ottoman Empire, involving thousands of people and hundreds of thousands of paras.

The objective of this essay is to evaluate the Bedouins' role not as a threat to central government, nor as a potential spanner in the smooth works of commerce, but as actors in their own right, who could have considerable impact on trade and politics, changing the course of events and countering the decisions of rulers and merchants. Through the analysis of one incident among many, involving a Bedouin raid along the route from Cairo to Suez, I will attempt to place the Sinai Bedouins in the context of late eighteenth-century Egypt and explain their behavior, both in this par-

Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi, c. II/9, 1968

deniz ve denizcilik tarihi

pozitifinde.

SÜVEYŞ'DE TÜRKLER

ve

SELMAN REİS'İN ARIZASI

Prof. Dr. Şehabeddin TEKİNDAĞ

Mısır ve Suriye yoluyla Batıya nakledilen Hind emtiasından alınan transit resimlerini daha da ağırlaştırıp, yeni liman vergileri ihdas eden Memlûk Sultanlığının, tâkip ettiği bu iktisadî siyaset yüzünden büyük bir buhranla karşı karşıya kaldığı bir gerçektir. Nitekim, bu iktisadî siyaset Arap denizcisi İbn Mâcid'in rehberliği ile hareket eden Vasco de Gama'yı Hindistan'a giden deniz yolunu bulmağa sevk etmiş (1), Portekizliler, Hindistan sahillerine sağlamca yerleşmişlerdir. Bu suertle, en mühim gelir kaynağını kaybeden Memlûk Sultanlığı, Portekizlileri Hindistan filosu umumî Kumandanı Alfansod Albuquerque'in, Maskat ve Horefkân'a taarruzu, Hürmüz'ü alıp Acem-Körfezi'ni kapatması, nihayet Portekiz Kralı Manuel'in Hindistan Müslümanlarını tazyik ile ticaret gemilerine karşı düşmanca hareketleri üzerine (2), bir takım tedbirler almak zorunda kaldı. Nitekim, Memlûk'lu Sultanı Kansuh el-Gûrî, Mekke'nin limanı kabul edilen Bender-i Cidde'yi sur ve burçlarla takviye ettirdiği gibi, deniz kumandanı Emîr Hüseyin El-Kürdî emrinde bulunan bir Memlûk'lu filosunu Portekizliler üzerine sevketti. Diu Müslüman vâlisinin filosu tarafından desteklenen Memlûk'lu donanması, Albuquerque'in oğlu Lorenzo emrinde bulunan Portekiz donanmasını 1508 de Hindistan'ın Şaul limanında mağlûp etti ise de, derhal, faaliyete geçen Albuquerque, Memlûk'lu donanmasını baskına uğratmış, kuvvetli bir Portekiz filosu da Aden'i tehdide başlamış idi. Bu son

durum üzerine Süveyş'de kuvvetli bir filo teşkil etmek lüzumuna kani olan Kansuh el-Gûrî, Osmanlı Padişahı II. Bayezid'e müracaat ederek ondan şöretleri bütün Akdenize yayılan Anadolu Levendlerini Memlûk Sultanlığının yardımına göndermesini rica ile kereste, demir, halat gibi gemi inşasına lüzumlu malzeme ve top, barut gibi ateşli silâhlar talep etmiştir.

Bayezid'in bu müracaatı müsaid karşıladığı anlaşılmaktadır. Zirâ, bu maksatla bir yardım kafilesi derhal yola çıkmış idi. Yardım kafilesi Alâiye (= Alanya) civarında Sain-Jean L'Hospitalier'lerin baskınına uğramış olmasına rağmen, Anadolu'lu Levendler Süveyş'e gitmeğe muvaffak olmuşlardır. Çağdaş Memlûk'lu müellifi İbn İyâs, Selman er-Rumî (= Anadolu'lu) maiyetinde Süveyş'e giden 1.000 denizci Türk hakkında pek kıymetli bilgiler vererek, Süveyş'de Portekizlilere karşı sefer için girişilen faaliyetleri belirtmektedir (3). İşte Bender-i Cidde Beyi Emir Hüseyin ve Türk denizcilerinin gayretiyle 20 gemiden ibaret birer filo teşkil eden Selman Reis, 1515 de Hind denizine hâkim Portekizlilere karşı sefere çıkmıştır. Bununla beraber, bu seferde mağlûp olan Selman Reis ile Emîr Hüseyin (4), ertesi sene 22 Gurab (5), ve 2 Kalyondan müteşekkil bir filo ile Bender-i Aden'i muhasara etmişlerse de, yine muvaffak olamamışlar, yaralı olarak Bender-i Cidde'ye dönen Selman Reis (6) gemilerinden bir kısmını Süveyş'e göndermek zorunda kalmıştır. İşte tam bu sırada Mısır'ın Yavuz Sultan Selim tarafından feth edildiği haberi gelmiştir.

SELMAN REİS'İN ARIZASI

1517 senesi Eylülünün 10 unna kadar Mısır'da kalarak yeni nizâmlar vazeden Selim, Mekke Emiri Seyyid Şerif II. Ebu'l-Berekât (1497 - 1525) in, oğlu Şerif Muhammed Ebû Numeyy vasıtasıyla gönderdiği Mekke'nin anahatlarını almış, Emîr'e bir fermân (= merâsim-i şerif) ile birlikte pek çok hediye ve zahire gönderdiği gibi (7), haksız mal topladığı iddia

تكریم مسیبرة

شركة قناة السويس

مراجعة: د. الأستاذ الدكتور / عمر عبد العزيز حمر

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الأهمية السياسية والاستراتيجية للبحر الأحمر

بعد افتتاح قناة السويس

(1869 - 1900)

D.N: 166809

السيد حسن جلال

أستاذ التاريخ الحديث غير المتفرغ

كلية الآداب - جامعة الإسكندرية

(فرع دمنهور)



Author: POLSTER, DEBORAH
Title: THE NEED FOR OIL SHAPES THE AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC RESPONSE TO THE
INVASION OF SUEZ (MIDDLE EAST, DIPLOMACY)

School: CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY (0042) Degree: PHD Date: 1985

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Subject: HISTORY, UNITED STATES (0337)

Abstract: The Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 highlighted the vital need for the uninterrupted flow of oil from the Middle East. The question of free world access to oil reserves had not, in the fifties, risen to the level of public concern. The accepted perception was of a plentiful supply. Only behind closed doors did policy-makers and strategists concede the future shortfall.

In its efforts to resolve the Suez Crisis, the United States pursued two approaches to its diplomatic intercourse. The first was the traditional pursuit of diplomacy through official communications channels between nations. The second were secret diplomatic negotiations. This sub rosa diplomacy included not only the mobilization of persons outside the official hierarchy of government to communicate and discuss sensitive proposals with their foreign counterparts, but also private off-the-record communications between official representatives of the negotiating parties. The substantive diplomacy of the Suez Crisis was handled primarily through this letter channel because the real foreign policy objectives of the United States were hidden from the American people and would have been unacceptable if known.

The United States concluded this crisis with a new and delicate role in the area. It declared its independence from European tutelage and control. To achieve its own policy goals, the United States was willing to act unilaterally, when necessary, even if that caused rifts between it and its European allies. Furthermore, the United States was willing to act as arbiter of events in the Middle East. It forced Israel to make concessions demanded by the Arabs under threat of compromising the supply of oil. In return, the United States felt compelled to give Israel "something": economic aid, credits, planes, tanks or anything else.

The development of this study has been largely dependent on the wealth of materials available at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. They include Presidential correspondence, memoranda of conversations with heads of State, government officials, friends and associates, memoranda, agenda, press releases and reports. Furthermore, the Library houses hundreds of manuscript collections and a vast array of oral history transcripts of significant members of the Eisenhower Administration.

28 OCAK 1997

Author: MUFTAH, SALEH MUSTAFA
 Title: THE INFLUENCES OF AMERICAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS UPON AMERICAN-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS--1948 THROUGH THE SUEZ WAR OF 1956 (MIDDLE EAST)
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Abstract: The relations between the United States and Egypt during the period 1948-1956 opened with major political changes in both the Middle East and the United States. In May 1948, the state of Israel was established, in July 1952, the Free Officers seized power in Egypt and over-threw the old regime and in January 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower took office in the United States. The main purpose of this study is to explain the influence of American-Israeli relations between 1948 and the Suez War of 1956 upon American-Egyptian relations and the U.S. policy of containment of communism in the Middle East.

The first two chapters trace American-Egyptian relations before the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, and the American attitude toward the Zionist movement until the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. The third chapter deals with the American role in the Egyptian Revolution and in the Egyptian controversy with Britain regarding the Sudan and British troops in Egypt. The final chapter traces American relations with both Egypt and Israel from 1948 through the Suez War of 1956, and the American attempt to include Egypt in a defense system against communism in the area.

This study is based on unpublished materials in the National Archives, Washington, D.C., the Presidential Libraries of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower, published documents, memoirs, newspapers and secondary sources. It does appear from this study that despite the growing tension between Egypt and the U.S. regarding Israel, American-Egyptian relations were good before the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. The year 1952 was considered a turning point in the deterioration of relations between the two countries. The main reasons for this deterioration were due mainly to the growth of Arab nationalism in Egypt, the American attitude towards the Zionist movement until 1948, the support given by the United States to the newly-created state of Israel and American policies towards the multitudinous problems resulting from the foundation of that state.

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Elizabeth MONROE

BRITAIN'S MOMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1914-1971, London 1981. DN: 59657

“ Ils reviendront ces dieux que tu pleures toujours! Le temps va ramener l'ordre des anciens jours. La terre a tressailli d'un souffle prophétique ”²³, écrit Gérard de Nerval dans *Les Chimères*. Dans la littérature romantique de la première moitié du XIX^e siècle, l'Orient se voit fréquemment associé aux thèmes du temps cyclique et de l'éternel retour. Cette association perdurera par la suite dans de nombreux poèmes et romans.

La persistance de ces thèmes renvoie probablement à la complexité des perceptions du temps au sein de la société industrielle naissante, une société qui se souvient, surtout en France, de ses origines agricoles et de l'importance de la succession des saisons, une société qui hésite sur le sens à donner au mot révolution. Si le mot renvoie pour les uns, qu'ils soient républicains ou bonapartistes, à l'idée d'un changement irréversible, il se comprend pour les autres, pour les ultras souvent marqués par la lecture de Joseph de Maistre, en particulier, dans son acception ancienne de cycle astronomique ou historique. Dans cette acception ancienne, les choses reviennent à leur point de départ, les astres repassent au mêmes endroits du ciel, les rois sont restaurés et l'ordre rétabli²⁴.

Le temps linéaire du progrès scientifique et technique semble à première vue incompatible avec la pluralité des perceptions du temps social et historique qui caractérise le XIX^e siècle. La tension qui s'établit du même coup pourrait devenir insupportable sans l'existence de mécanismes de compensation idéologiques et symboliques. La perspective d'une régénération de l'Occident au moyen de l'Orient fait probablement partie de ces mécanismes de compensation permettant de réintroduire la perspective de retours en arrière et de cycles au sein de la marche en avant des sciences et des techniques. Au travers de la fusion annoncée de l'Occident et de l'Orient, la modernité rencontre l'immémorial, le progrès s'allie avec son contraire.

Au cours de la première moitié du XIX^e siècle, une telle alliance trouve son illustration la plus frappante avec la récréation d'un État grec. Plus encore que la politique de modernisation menée par Méhémet Ali en Égypte, cette récréation permet de conjuguer progrès et récit des origines, temps linéaire et temps cyclique, Orient mythique et Occident parti à la recherche de son passé. “ Ils reviendront ces dieux que tu pleures toujours ! Le temps va ramener l'ordre des anciens jours. La terre a tressailli d'un souffle prophétique ”.

23. G. de Nerval, “ Myrtho ”, 1854, in *Œuvres*, t. 1, Paris, Gallimard, 1974-1978, 12.

24. Sur ce conflit entre conceptions de l'événement révolutionnaire, on pourra consulter M. Ozouf, *Les Auteurs du roman. Le Dix-neuvième siècle entre Ancien Régime et révolution*, Paris, Fayard, 2001.

Edit: Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, Kostan Chatzis, Efthymios Nicolaidis, Multicultural Science in the Ottoman Empire, Turnhout 2003.İSAM 148691

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FAIRE L'HISTOIRE DES USAGES DES OBJETS TECHNIQUES :
FORMULES, PROJETS ET PRATIQUES. L'EXEMPLE DES BROUETTES
SUR LE CHANTIER DU CANAL DE SUEZ (1859-1869)

Nathalie MONTEL

En 1980, paraissait dans la revue *La Recherche*, revue française de vulgarisation scientifique, un article signé Bertrand Gille, intitulé “ Petites questions et grands problèmes : la brouette ”¹. Dans cet article, l'historien des techniques s'interrogeait sur l'étymologie du mot “ brouette ”, mais aussi sur les origines et l'époque d'apparition en France de cet instrument, devenu depuis un objet familier et d'usage commun, que l'on rencontre aujourd'hui fréquemment dans nos campagnes et jardins citadins. C'est ce même instrument, d'apparence anodine, qui est également au centre de l'enquête menée ici. La perspective est néanmoins différente. Il ne s'agira pas de savoir si la brouette est vraiment née en Chine ou si elle est effectivement apparue en France dans la première moitié du XIII^e siècle mais d'illustrer, à travers l'histoire de ses usages au XIX^e siècle, la dimension culturelle que portent en eux les objets techniques.

Il n'est pas question de faire un point complet sur les usages de la brouette à travers le monde, mais plus simplement d'évoquer quelques-uns des moments de cette histoire en prenant notamment appui sur une recherche consacrée à l'histoire du chantier du canal de Suez², qui fut l'occasion de croiser cet outil. Avant de faire état des péripéties de la brouette au cours de ces travaux en Égypte, il est toutefois nécessaire de procéder à un rapide état des savoirs relatifs à l'emploi de cet outil dans les travaux publics. C'est sur le terrain de la presse spécialisée que se terminera l'enquête. De la confrontation des résultats issus de ces différents terrains d'investigation, quelques enseignements de nature méthodologique pourront être tirés.

1. Cet article a été repris dans Coll., *La Recherche en histoire des sciences*, Paris, Seuil, 1983, 79-88 (Point Sciences).

2. Voir Nathalie Montel, *Le chantier du canal de Suez (1859-1869). Une histoire des pratiques techniques*, Paris, Presses de l'École nationale des Ponts et Chaussées/Éditions In Forma, 1998.

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MARCH 1,
 1958

First-Hand Impressions of Nine Momentous Days

Süvey & Kanal

EGYPT DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS

BY GEORGE F. HOURANI

THE political and military history of the nine days of warfare in Egypt, October 29 to November 7, 1956, will eventually be reconstructed from the materials provided by world journalism and diplomacy. The following pages are an attempt to supplement that history by a personal account of life in Egypt as seen by my wife and myself during those days. I had gone there on sabbatical leave from the University of Michigan, for study of Near Eastern history, assisted by a fellowship from the Ford Foundation; my wife and I had entered the country on October 5. Throughout the period I am going to

During the Suez crisis of 1956 the majority of our faculty members were here in Ann Arbor, but GEORGE F. HOURANI, Associate Professor of Arabic Studies, was right at the center of those events, as our readers will discover. Of Lebanese origin, born in England, Dr. Hourani was traveling as an American citizen. His academic degrees are B.A. (honours), Oxford, '36, and Ph.D., Princeton, '39; from 1939 to 1948 he was lecturer in classics and philosophy at the Government Arab College in Jerusalem; in 1950 he joined our faculty. His publications include *Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times* (Princeton, '51) and *Ethical Value* (University of Michigan Press and Allen & Unwin, '56).

describe we were residing in Heliopolis, a suburb of Cairo, except for one night spent in Alexandria for reasons which will be mentioned.

The following timetable sets down some of the main events, public and personal, of the period, and will be sufficient to provide a framework for the present narration.

Sun., Oct. 28. President Eisenhower expressed alarm at Israeli mobilization.

Mon., Oct. 29, eve. Telephone calls from U.S. Consulate to citizens, urging preparation for hasty evacuation.

Tues., Oct. 30. Israeli attack in Sinai. Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt and Israel.

Wed., Oct. 31. Anglo-French air attack on Egypt began.

Thur., Nov. 1. We left Cairo for Alexandria with the last evacuation group.

Fri., Nov. 2. We returned from Alexandria to Cairo. News of the first U. N. Assembly resolution calling for cease-fire and withdrawal of attacking forces.

Mon., Nov. 5, morn. Anglo-French landings in Port Said. Last raids on Heli-



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
BUILDING THE SUEZ CANAL

By the Editors of
HORIZON MAGAZINE

Author
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Professor of Economics, Columbia University

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
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وفلاسفة بارزين أمثال بليك وامرسون وثوروسترنديبرغ وسانتيانا. إلا أن أفكاره لم تلق ذلك الترحيب الحار في بلاده إذ حكمت عليه الكنيسة السويدية بالحرمان عام ١٧٦٩ بذريعة الهرطقة.

بل حالتان نفسيتان.

لم يقتصر تأثير سويدنبورغ في المقربين إليه فقط، فقد نشأت بعد وفاته مباشرة منظمات كنسية عديدة اعتمداً على فكره، كما أثر في أدياء

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
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الأرثوذكسية - الإصلاح الديني

■ السويس (قناة -)

كان سنوسرت الثالث، أحد فراعنة السلالة الثانية عشر (٢٠٠٠ - ١٨٠٠ ق.م)، هو أول من تحقق على يديه شق قناة تربط البحر المتوسط بالبحر الأحمر؛ فكانت المراكب القادمة من البحر المتوسط تسلك بادئ ذي بدء أول فرع من فروع النيل شرقاً، أي الفرع البيلوزي (نسبة إلى مدينة بيلوز الأثرية التي كان موقعها بالقرب من موقع مدينة بورسعيد الحالية) حتى تصل إلى مدينة بويست (الزقازيق)، ثم تتجه شرقاً مارة بمدينة تيخاو (أبو صوير) فتبلغ البحيرات المرة التي كانت في ذلك الحين خليجاً متصلاً بالبحر الأحمر.

وقد ازدادت أهمية برزخ السويس في عهد الفرس، فلما حكم داريوس ملك الفرس مصر في عام ٥١٠ ق.م، أعار القناة جلّ اهتمامه فأمر باستمرار الحفر فيها، وأدخل عليها تحسينات كبيرة، ولكنه لم يفلح على الأرجح في وصل البحيرة المرة بالبحر الأحمر إلا بواسطة قنوات صغيرة لم تكن صالحة للملاحة إلا في أثناء فيضان النيل.

وفي عام ٢٨٥ ق.م، تمّ إعداد القناة بأكملها، إذ أمر بطليموس الثاني بحفر الجزء الواقع بين البحيرة المرة والبحر الأحمر، ليحل محل القنوات الصغيرة التي حفرها داريوس، فأصبحت القناة



تصب في البحر الأحمر بجوار مدينة

كليسا (وهو اسم السويس الإغريقي

وفي عام ٩٨م، ولأسباب تتعلق

OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL

Fikret SARIOGLU

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Laleli, Istanbul, Turkey

The Suez Canal, connecting the eastern Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea, is one of the most accomplished works of humanity both scientifically and technically. The canal, 163 km long and a width is minimum of 60 meters, reaches to the city of Esmaeleyya, and then to the Gulf of Suez over the river basins such as the lakes of Timsah, Bitters.¹

It is not a new idea that to make a connection between the Red and the Mediterranean Seas and to provide a passing way to the Indian Ocean; and it had been used sometimes since the antic era. Chronologically under Pharaoh Necho II, the first canal was built in 609 B.C. between Nile-Bitter Lakes and the Red Sea, and Ptolemaios II (285-246 B.C.), the King of Egypt, had the canal extended, and then it was restored by Trajan (98-117 A.D.), the Emperor of Rome. However since this waterway was not so convenient for the maritime purpose, it was left as such. Amr ebnu'l -As, the conqueror of Egypt, in 642 and 645 had that canal reopened which was used through the times of Pharaohs. The canal that was closed later was reopened to the use in the era of the Khalepha Mehdi, but again later it was closed entirely².

The Ottoman Administration, after taking the control on Egypt and the coasts of the Red Sea, thought to profit from the Suez Shipyard to protect the region from Portuguese that were active through the Indian Ocean and the Oman Sea, and assigned here the branches of Suez and Egypt Captainship as part. Pîrî Reîs who gave us information about the region in his book, *Kitâb-ı Bahriyye*, like Seydî Ali Reîs, was the head of this fleet. Seydî Ali Reîs talked about the experiences he had while he was the head of the Suez Captainship in his book, *Mir'âtü'l-Memâlik*.³ The other duties of the fleet that was formed as a new one are to look after Turkish merchant ships working in the Red Sea, and to help for transportation of the hadji candidates from Suez to Jeddah. The demonstrative actions of the Portuguese ships through the Indian waters and the Red Sea as well, both politically and commercially, were the events that monitored carefully by the Ottoman State. Considering the situation as an important matter both spiritually and esteemed by the Ottomans that have the control on the Hejaz areas, and even when it is needed, the attempt of opening of the Suez Canal was to be able to depart to go to the Indian with the fleet were within the era of Sultan Selim II (1566-1574).

Grand Vizier Sokullu Mehmed Pasha decided to open the Suez Canal to get the Ottoman Naval Force be able to get into the Red Sea, to open the ways for the Muslims who come from the India to the Hejaz, and to be able to speak authoritatively about the trades of the Indian and Yemen; and notified the General-Governor of Egypt with the order issued in January 12 1568. Information asked to report to Istanbul in this order were these preventing of the attacks of the Portuguese the Indians, and

¹ www.lexicorient.com/e.o; J. Walker, "Süveyş" *İA*, XI, 256-257.

² <http://www.suezcanal.com>; <http://www.suez-canal.com>

³ *Mir'âtü'l-Memâlik*, reviewed and prepared by Mehmet Kiremit, Ankara 1999.

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- 1. Suez, crisis - 1956
- 2. Canal de Suez - Historia I. Titulo.
94(620 Suez)"1956" 962.0
ICMA 4-32890 R. 69748

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5 JUN 1974

MADRID YAHWLANDER PAN
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Süveyşkanalı

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181520

19 JUN 1967

MADDE TAYINLANDIRAN

objectifs impériaux d'un contrôle plus facile sur les peuples du désert, ont été largement débattues dans des études récentes et ne sont pas faciles à déterminer⁶³. Il était, après tout, un officier colonial, et on ne peut guère douter que sa loyauté première fut dirigée vers le gouvernement britannique, et non pas vers les tribus en tant que telles. Mais pour Glubb, les intérêts impériaux et les besoins des nomades n'étaient pas forcément antagoniques. Ainsi, il s'éleva contre ses supérieurs, critiqua la politique britannique et essaya d'aider leurs tribus pendant les années difficiles, même si, ce faisant, son objectif ultime était d'avoir mainmise sur eux. D'autre part, l'impression laissée à la lecture des travaux de Glubb, à la fois officiels et publiés, et en étudiant son comportement effectif, est qu'il était un véritable « bedouinophile ».

Ces affirmations deviennent plus plausibles si Glubb est analysé dans le cadre de la tradition britannique d'une affinité présumée entre nomades arabes et l'Empire britannique comme l'a souligné Tidrick. Quelles que soient ses motivations réelles, il est impossible de comprendre l'énorme succès de Glubb dans la pacification des tribus, en particulier, et à traiter des affaires tribales, en général, sans insister sur son approche emphatique envers les nomades pendant une période de grave crise. Face à des conditions terribles dans la première moitié des années 1930, même les modestes moyens en sa possession étaient suffisants pour aider un grand nombre de personnes à survivre à cette période difficile. La dépendance et le confort croissants des tribus nomades ont permis l'expansion du contrôle de l'État et ont facilité leur intégration dans sa structure. Cette intégration a donné à l'État jordanien une base sociale de soutien qui a fait défaut dans la plupart des pays post-coloniaux – ce qui peut expliquer dans une large mesure la résilience de l'État et du régime depuis. Sans aucun doute, le projet de Glubb a laissé un héritage durable.

Traduit de l'anglais par Simone di Tonno

63. M. Heaney Norton, "The Last Pasha: Sir John Glubb and the British Empire in the Middle East, 1920-1949", thèse de doctorat, John Hopkins University, 1997, pp. 198, 208-209; R. Bocco, T. M. M. Tell, *op. cit.*, 1994, pp. 120-122; J. Massad, *op. cit.*, 2001, chap. 3.

Süveyz 181520

L'OPÉRATION DE SUEZ DE 1956. « LE DERNIER [ANGLAIS] DEBOUT »

*Peter HINCHCLIFFE **



Des scènes de colère au Parlement, des manifestations monstres contre la guerre, des attaques au vitriol dans les médias, un Premier ministre de plus en plus harcelé alors qu'une force d'invasion occidentale se prépare à attaquer un pays arabe... Non, nous ne sommes pas en février 2003. Ni en Irak. Mais en novembre 1956, au moment de l'opération Mousquetaire Révisé et de l'attaque anglo-française contre l'Égypte pour s'emparer du Canal de Suez et provoquer le renversement du président du pays, Gamal Abdul Nasser. La crise de Suez de 1956 et le retrait – ou plutôt le repli précipité – d'Aden, deux épisodes de l'aventure coloniale britannique d'après-guerre qui marquèrent la fin de jeu pour cet Empire « sur lequel le soleil ne se couchait jamais », et plus particulièrement pour ce qu'il en restait au Moyen-Orient.

Je dois reconnaître un intérêt personnel particulier pour les deux. Adolescent, et sous-lieutenant fraîchement émoulu au West Yorkshire Regiment, j'ai participé à l'opération Mousquetaire Révisé – nom de code de l'opération anglo-française de Suez, en novembre 1956. J'ai apporté ma modeste apostille à l'histoire en ma qualité de dernier soldat britannique en service actif à avoir quitté le sol égyptien. D'où le titre ci-dessus ! Pour ce qui est d'Aden, j'y ai résidé en tant que fonctionnaire colonial durant

* Peter Hinchcliffe est professeur honoraire au Centre d'études supérieures du monde arabe (CASAW) à l'université d'Edimbourg, et a écrit un certain nombre d'ouvrages sur le Moyen-Orient. En tant que diplomate britannique, il a beaucoup œuvré dans la région où il fut consul général à Doubaï, ambassadeur au Koweït et ambassadeur en Jordanie. Avant de rejoindre le ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commonwealth, il a passé six ans comme administrateur politique dans la Fédération d'Arabie du Sud.

181520

3500 SCHNEUWLY PURDIE, Mallory. De la diversité à la
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[Summaries in German & Italian.]

Schneuwly Purdie

droit civil de la répression reconquérante conduite les années suivantes par le sanguinaire général Rodolfo Graziani. Revers et succès s'enchaînèrent pour Mohammed Fekini durant les années 1920, au gré des péripéties de combats où son second fils, Husayn, fut tué. Pour arriver à bout de l'occupation intégrale de la Quarta Sponda, entreprise avec le facisme, il fallut une conquête impitoyable, l'anéantissement au combat et dans les camps de concentration d'un huitième de la population libyenne de 1914 à 1932, date à laquelle s'éteignit la résistance libyenne. En 1934, succédant aux deux établissements de Tripolitaine et de Cyrénaïque, fut instituée la colonie italienne de Libye : pour la première fois, elle correspondit territorialement à ce qui deviendrait la Libye indépendante.

Sous la pression militaire italienne croissante, traqué, Mohammed Fekini dut quitter le jabal Nafusa où il guerroyait, et gagner le Sud, pour finalement aboutir au Fezzan. En 1930, l'offensive italienne, à coup de bombardements meurtriers, l'obligea de nouveau à s'enfuir vers l'ouest et à s'expatrier : il gagna le Sud Algérien. Il se rendit, avec ce qui restait de sa famille et de sa troupe, au bord de Tarat, au nord du Tassili, où il fut désarmé par les Français. Au terme de près de deux ans d'errance dans le désert, il parvint à gagner le Sud tunisien. Il vécut dans le désarroi et la pauvreté jusqu'à sa mort à Gabès en mars 1950, un an et demi avant la reconnaissance de l'indépendance de la Libye – son fils, Ali Nouredine, sera ambassadeur de Libye en Tunisie.

Ce fut donc dans la résistance et par la résistance que s'édifia la formation étatique et nationale libyenne, comme ce fut le cas pour d'autres pays colonisés, à commencer par la Tunisie et l'Algérie voisines²⁰. Naissance de la nation libyenne est un livre relativement original par rapport aux productions antérieures d'Angelo Del Boca : il ne s'appuie pas surtout sur des documents italiens ; mais au premier chef sur le récit de l'autre, sur les documents de l'autre, sur l'histoire de l'autre. L'entrecroisement des témoignages aboutit à une synthèse des versions, vues par les protagonistes affrontés, d'une même histoire.

Pour autant, on a dit que, s'il put enseigner à la Faculté de Sciences politiques à partir de fin 1981, A. Del Boca ne devint jamais professeur ès-qualités d'histoire contemporaine à l'université de Turin. Il dit, non sans quelque amère satisfaction, que cette université qui l'a si longtemps recalé (bocciato) finit sur le tard (2002) par le nommer docteur honoris causa, peu avant que l'université suisse de Lucerne lui décerne les mêmes lauriers. A. Del Boca n'est pas pour autant retraité, lui qui affirme tranquillement que « travailler ne fatigue pas ». Aujourd'hui, à 84 ans, il reste actif, toujours plein d'allant et de verve, sans que son statut lui ait tourné la tête. Son engagement dans l'histoire plurielle ne devrait laisser indifférent aucun historien, en particulier sur les deux rives de la Méditerranée qui partagent tant de parts communes de leurs histoires respectives.

Gilbert MEYNIER

Professeur émérite, Université de Nancy

²⁰ Précisons : en Tunisie, où régnait la dynastie husaynite, qu'on peut qualifier de tunisienne, l'antécédence étatique est mieux avérée que dans l'Algérie où le *baylik* n'avait pas le même enracinement. Mais dans les deux cas, l'invention de la nation, au xx^e siècle, se fit bien dans la réaction indépendantiste à la domination coloniale – selon des modalités différentes, s'entend.

PIQUET Caroline, *Histoire du canal de Suez*, Paris, Perrin, 2009, 372 p.

Les études sur l'histoire du canal de Suez connaissent un regain d'intérêt chez les historiens français. Nathalie Montel avait ouvert la voie en 1998 en publiant un ouvrage passionnant sur le percement du canal, *Le chantier du canal de Suez, 1859-1869. Une histoire des pratiques techniques*. L'étude s'arrêtait à l'ouverture du canal en 1869, laissant le champ libre à de futurs travaux. La publication en 2008 de l'ouvrage de Caroline Piquet, *La Compagnie du canal de Suez, une concession française en Égypte (1888-1956)*, qui comme celui de N. Montel est le fruit d'un travail de doctorat, s'inscrit dans la continuité de ces recherches universitaires qui s'appuient sur un solide corpus de sources manuscrites ; en l'occurrence, l'imposant fonds d'archives de la Compagnie universelle du canal maritime de Suez, la société par actions fondée en 1858 par Ferdinand de Lesseps, croisé avec d'autres sources européennes, principalement britanniques et italiennes. L'*Histoire du canal de Suez* que propose C. Piquet est un ouvrage de synthèse destiné à un public plus large. Solidement appuyé sur les recherches antérieures de l'auteure, il en possède toute la rigueur scientifique.

À partir d'une lecture géostratégique de l'histoire de la voie d'eau qui « représente une sorte d'espace-monde où se lisent les évolutions politiques, économiques et techniques des deux derniers siècles » (p. 311), C. Piquet retrace les cent cinquante ans d'existence du canal depuis le début des travaux de percement, en 1859, jusqu'à nos jours. Les intitulés des onze chapitres de l'ouvrage, qui s'organisent selon une progression chronologique, reflètent cette approche à la fois politique, économique et technique.

Dimension politique

Le chapitre introductif intitulé « Rivalités autour d'une voie maritime » s'attache à décrire les contextes politiques dans lesquels se sont inscrits tous les projets de mise en relation de la Méditerranée avec la mer Rouge et au-delà, l'océan Indien, depuis l'Antiquité jusqu'au xix^e siècle. Replacer le projet de Lesseps dans un espace temporel large permet à l'auteure d'examiner comment les grandes puissances ont établi le contrôle des routes maritimes. Elle met notamment l'accent sur le contexte politique et économique du début du xix^e siècle, c'est à dire la rivalité franco-britannique pour le contrôle de la route commerciale des Indes dont l'occupation du territoire égyptien est l'une des clés. L'auteure s'attache ainsi à décrire la place marginale faite à l'Égypte dans ce contexte colonial. Dès 1865, le saint-simonien Prosper Enfantin²¹ prédisait que « le canal ouvrira l'Égypte à la domination étrangère » et, constate C. Piquet, « suprême humiliation, l'Égypte fut occupée en 1882 par les Britanniques non pour elle-même, mais pour son canal » (p. 17).

La dimension politique du canal est de nouveau mise en avant dans les chapitres 6 et 7 qui traitent des grands conflits mondiaux de 1914 et 1940. Si la première guerre renforce la domination britannique sur le canal et coupe court au principe de sa neutralité, elle ne marque pas un tournant dans la politique conduite par les grandes puissances à l'égard de sa gestion. La fracture s'opère dans les années 30, lorsque le mouvement national égyptien se cristallise autour de l'occupation, par les troupes britanniques, de la zone du canal. La crise de Suez, en 1956, après la nationalisation de la Compagnie, ne constitue alors que le dénouement

²¹ Les saint-simoniens, qui dès 1833 se sont investis dans le projet de percement, seront écartés par Ferdinand de Lesseps qui s'appropriera néanmoins leur héritage spirituel.

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Sûveys

181520

03 Mars 2014

MADDE YAYIMLANDIKÇAN
SONRA GELEN DOKÜMAN

La France et l'Égypte: à l'époque des vice-rois
1805-1882, edit. Daniel Panzac, Andre Raymond, Caire 2002.

Jean-Paul Calon

**Le canal de Suez:
une révolution technique
sur la terre des pharaons**

COMME le souligne la note de présentation de notre colloque, le canal de Suez est, sans doute, la réalisation la plus spectaculaire des relations franco-égyptiennes à l'époque des vice-rois. Réalisation franco-égyptienne s'il en fut; certes, le génie de Lesseps, les capitaux français, les techniques françaises, la diplomatie française, ont-ils pesé de tout leur poids. Mais, on ne saurait trop y insister, sans l'audace et le sens de l'avenir de Muhammad Saïd, sans la confiance d'Ismail, sans les travailleurs égyptiens, sans les finances égyptiennes, le Canal n'aurait pas été inauguré le 17 novembre 1869. On connaît l'histoire du Canal et sa légende, depuis le plat de macaronis jusqu'aux fastes de l'inauguration le 17 novembre 1869. Ce que l'on connaît moins, c'est la révolution technique dont le Canal a été le catalyseur. Le creusement du Canal a débuté de manière pharaonique, avec des corvées de milliers de fellahs, maniant la pelle et la pioche, pour s'achever à l'aide de monstres mécaniques mus à la vapeur. C'est en Égypte, terre des pyramides et des temples, que, pour la première fois dans le monde, sur une grande échelle, la machine a remplacé la peine des hommes. Cet aspect de la collaboration franco-égyptienne au temps des vice-rois, coïncidant avec les grandes mutations techniques du siècle, méritait, sans doute, qu'on s'y arrête. Nous allons le faire, en examinant successivement les défis de la géographie et de l'histoire puis les réponses apportées à ces défis.

Les défis de la géographie et de l'histoire

Les canaux plus ou moins mythiques des pharaons, comme les projets de Le Père ou des saint-simoniens, empruntaient le Nil puis, à hauteur du Caire, rejoignaient la mer Rouge. Muhammad Saïd et Lesseps ont choisi le tracé direct mis au point par Linant bey et Mougel bey, après que l'on ait rectifié l'erreur de Le Père et constaté que les deux mers étaient au même niveau. Tracé idéal, certes, rectiligne entre Méditerranée et mer Rouge, séparant d'un trait l'Afrique et l'Asie. Mais tracé plus difficile car à travers

253-266.

Süveys (181520)

İADDE YAYINLANDIKTAN
SONRA GELEN DOKÜMAN

22 Mayıs 2015

July 2008 the International Criminal court brought ten criminal charges against President Bashir, accusing him of war crimes and crimes against humanity, claiming he wanted to destroy three tribal groups in the Darfur region because of their ethnicity. Even though there is a warrant for his arrest, Bashir was on the ballot for the 2010 election.

See also ANCIENT AFRICAN CIVILIZATIONS; ISLAM IN AFRICA.

MADE YAYIMLANDIKTAN
SONRA GELEN DOKÜMAN

ROBERT BAUM

(Suez 18520)

04 Ekim 2015

Suez Canal

Constructed waterway across the Isthmus of Suez in northeastern Egypt that connects the Mediterranean and Red seas.


The Suez Canal is 195 km long (121 mi), and at least 60 m (200 ft) wide for its entire length, and permits direct passage from Europe and the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean, instead of the long voyage around the Cape of Good Hope in SOUTH AFRICA. The canal links the Mediterranean Sea at Port Said to the Red Sea at Suez by connecting a series of lakes: Lake Manzilah, Lake Timsah, and the Bitter Lakes. It has no locks, because these lakes lie nearly at sea level. In most places the canal has only one

shipping lane; however, passing lanes exist at several points.

The canal was constructed by the French- and Egyptian-owned Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez (Universal Company of the Suez Ocean Canal), which had obtained a ninety-nine-year lease from the Egyptian viceroy, Said Pasha. After the expiration of the lease, control would revert to EGYPT. Construction was begun in 1859, performed mostly by Egyptian workers under poor conditions, and completed in 1867. The canal opened to sea traffic on November 17, 1869.

In 1875 the British government bought Egypt's shares in the company. In 1936 Great Britain negotiated an agreement with the Egyptian government that granted Great Britain the right to defend the Suez Canal Zone, including the canal's approaches. The canal became a symbol of Third World emergence from colonialism when Egypt contested British control in the years after World War II (1939–1945). Egyptian nationalism compelled the British in 1955 to agree to withdraw its troops by 1962.

In July 1956, however, after the United States withdrew monetary support for construction of the ASWAN HIGH DAM, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel NASSER seized the canal, despite the claims of British and French shareholders. He earmarked its revenues for dam construction



SUEZ CANAL, C. 1856. (Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress)

22 436-437

Encyclopedia of Africa, vol. II, edit. Kwame Anthony Appiah, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, ISAM DN. 234360.

SOME REMARKS ON THE IDEA OF A SUEZ CANAL
IN THE 16TH CENTURY

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20 Aralık 2015

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The conquest of Egypt in 1517 gave to the Ottomans a direct access to the Indian Ocean. The Red Sea and the lands approaching the Arabian Sea were brought under their control and Suez, the former Mamluk naval base, became the main center of Ottoman shipping operations in that area.

The Suez fleets were built there on a smaller scale than the Mediterranean fleets, because the near total lack of strategic resources (especially timber) left the Ottomans chronically starved of ships, men, and supplies. Theoretically, the problem could be solved with a solution taken from the past: a canal linking the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, which would have allowed the Ottomans to mobilize the full strength of their Mediterranean fleet. If successful, the scheme of project could have been an important step toward a true oceanic expansion of the Ottoman empire.¹

A connection between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea through the isthmus of Suez, as a response to the new route passing via the Cape of Good Hope, has drawn the attention of many historians; but historiography still lacks an adequate overall analysis of all references and plans about a Suez canal in the sixteenth century. The notes that I have assembled here offer no more than a brief outline of a subject that deserves to be studied in more detail to pen the way for new understanding. I shall revisit some sources that were known and sometimes singularly discussed in national historiographies, and shall add few more manuscripts and sources not discussed before. No one of the historians who wrote on the topic really tried to put it into comparative and global perspectives and in its historical context. Referring to commercial networks between Asia and Europe, even an authoritative historian like Halil İnalcık says that the vision of a wider Mediterranean, which was taken up mainly by the grand vizier Mehmed Sokollu, led the Ottomans to seek alternative routes including the idea of the Suez Canal, as already proposed by the Venetians to the Mamelukes in anti-Ottoman Empire in 1504, was shot several times during the century in

¹ Faroqhi, S. "Red Sea trade and communications as observed by Evliya Çelebi (1671-72)", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, V-VI (1991): pp. 87-106.

الخلوة في تاريخ الفكر : تساؤل في المفهوم
الطريقة الدرقاوية بسوس نموذجا

Derkavyye 040338
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27 Aralık 2015

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أولا : تساؤل في المفهوم ؟

ما أحوجنا إلى التَّمسُّك بقيمنا المثلى في عالم الصورة والصوت وصخب
الاعلام، عالم يتعالى فيه ضجيج الحياة المادية، وتغترب فيه - رُوَيْدًا - مثيلات هذه
القيِّم، ويغدو توظيف الكلمة والصورة والصوت جميعا لإبراز هذه القيِّم أمرا
يقتضيه تصعيد الصوت، تصعيدا يعلو فوق كل ضجيج، بما هو نابع من عمق أصالتنا
الحضارية.

ومن أجل ذلك فتحنا - فجأة - ملف الخلوة وكنا قد طويناه منذ أربعين سنة :
فمصطلح الخلوة في مفهومها اللغوي يعتبر ثلاثيا لأنه واوي، فيقال الخلوة ضمًّا
والخلوة فتحًا والخلوة كسرًا⁽¹⁾، صور ثلاث ينصرف مضمونها إلى : الفعل الذي
يقوم به المرء لابتعاد عن الناس، وهو : الاختلاء كما ينصرف في الوقت نفسه إلى مكان
الاختلاء. فهما صورتان : صورة الخلوة الفعل وصورة الخلوة : المكان، وتصبح ست
صور بما تختزنه في مفهومها ضمًّا وفتحًا وكسرًا.

والخلوة المقصودة في هذا الموضوع ليست مجرد ابتعاد عن الناس، فالمفهوم هنا
محدد بتحقيق غاية معينة يهدف الفرد من خلالها إما إلى التأثير في حياته الخاصة أو

(1) الخلوة ثلاثية الفاء وتأتي بالضم «خلوة» في خلوات الرسل والأنبياء، وبالفتح «خلوة» في خلوات
الأبرار من الأولياء والصالحين، وبالكسر «خلوة» لخلوات الأشخاص العاديين وعامة الناس.

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HASHMI, Sohail H. 'Zero plus zero plus zero':
Pakistan, the Baghdad Pact, and the Suez crisis.
International History Review, 33 iii (2011)
pp. 525-544.

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the usual classification of Iraqi ideological trends into territorial-nationalist (“patriotic”) and pan-Arabist categories, and adds Kurdish nationalism as a third primary category. Kirmanj, like the authors he cites, finds a pronounced unraveling of Iraqi “patriotism” in the decades following the 1958 revolution and the establishment of military domination of Iraqi politics, culminating in the crimes of the Anfal campaign. The penultimate chapter addresses developments in Iraq since 2003, relying mostly on media reports.

Aside from the chapter covering the period since 2003, the book is generally built on citations of recent texts in the scholarly literature on modern Iraq; Iraqi social science scholarship, such as that of ‘Ali al-Wardi; and a handful of Arabic and Kurdish primary sources, particularly newspaper articles. An exception to the reliance on secondary sources is found in a brief, but thorough, section in the final chapter in which Kirmanj closely analyzes how Iraqi Arabic and Kurdish school textbooks reinforce sectarian and ethnic exclusivity through their historical narratives and language (233-41).

While some aspects of Kirmanj’s analysis are useful contributions to the literature on Iraqi identity formation, there are significant flaws in the book’s framing. The idea that Iraq “simply lacks” certain elements that produce “nation-formation”—that these elements are either present or absent—is an oversimplification of the theories of identity formation that Kirmanj himself cites, which emphasize the ways in which such elements are constructed and “imagined.” The book alludes to the existence of countries undergoing national integration in “normal circumstances” (84) without clearly describing them; then, despite lacking the necessary comparative cases, it argues that Iraq is not among these countries. The main counterpoint to Kirmanj’s argument, however, is not an idealized Iraq imagined as a “normal” country exhibiting harmonious unity. Rather, it is an appreciation of the heterogeneity and fluidity of group identities, as well as the importance of vernacular politics and popular discourses in understanding these identities. Tellingly, while the book cites nearly every key text on Iraqi identity published since the 1990s, it completely overlooks Orit Bashkin’s highly influential *The Other Iraq* (Stanford, 2009). Bashkin’s findings of “hybridity” in Hashemite-era Iraqi discourses would, at the very least, add nuance to—and perhaps even challenge—Kirmanj’s argument if he were to incorporate them into his book.

The faults in Kirmanj’s framing inevitably lead to more specific errors. For example, from the outset the book anachronistically establishes Iraq’s politically salient communities at the time of the formation of the state as “Sunnis,” “Shiites,” “Arabs,” “Kurds,” “Chaldo-Assyrians,” and “Turkmen” (2). The author neither explains how these present-day categories came to exist, nor

differentiates between ethnic and religious-sectarian categorizations, treating them as analogous and therefore interchangeable (7). Compounding the problem is the fact that no working definition of the vexing term *ethnic* is offered.

Despite its flaws, *Identity and Nation in Iraq* is a thoughtful opinion from a perspective that is common among some observers of Iraq, yet under-represented in academic historical discourse. As such, it should be judiciously considered by scholars specializing in the topic of Iraqi identity formation. However, it lacks the perspicacity and subtlety that would be necessary in an introductory monograph for those who are not already experts on the subject. ✱

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Survey 181520

GUY LARON. *Origins of the Suez Crisis: Postwar Development Diplomacy and the Struggle over Third World Industrialization, 1945-1956.* Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2013. xv + 210 pages, notes, index. Paper US\$55.00 ISBN 978-1-4214-1011-1. *rev. Luke Peterson.*

In the Acknowledgements section of his weighty 2013 publication, *Origins of the Suez Crisis: Postwar Development Diplomacy and the Struggle over Third World Industrialization, 1945-1956*, Hebrew University Professor Guy Laron credits University of Texas Professor William Roger Louis with being a guiding historical light in the development of the paper that became this monograph. As a former student of Louis myself, I can also testify to his decisive scholarly influence. For Louis, history is the stuff of personality; “Governments don’t do anything,” he once quipped in our British studies seminar, “only people do.” Louis believed in the Great Man theory of history so fervently that he methodically scratched through references to bureaucratic monoliths such as HMG, Washington, or the Kremlin when marking student work. For Louis, it is the men who occupied the offices in question who made history, not governments or institutions. Louis believed strongly that the destiny of a country was in the hands of the men who ran it.

When Laron abides by this historiographical ethos, his narrative sings. Readers are treated to insightful descriptions of period politicians: “a short, chubby man, full of insecurities and towering ambitions” (Khrushchev), and even heretofore unreported political intrigue: “Joseph Stalin suffered a massive stroke. How fatal it actually was, we may never know...” (84, 86). These and passages like them are precisely the stuff of king slaying and empire

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