This is a revised version of the George Antonius Lecture, given and St Antony's (Oxford) in June, 1978. It was translated into English by Mrs O. Rudigoz.

1. Sauvaget, Esquisse d'une histoire de la ville de Damas, REI, 1934, p. 467.

2 Sulūk, III, 100, quoted by A. A. Duri, s.v., 'Baghdad,' Encyclopédie de l'Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 1, p. 931.

3 Sauvaget, Esquisse, p. 468.

On the coffee trade, see my book, Artisans et commerçants au Caire au XVIIIème siècle, vol. I (Damascus, 1974), pp. 107-157.

Act I, sc. 3: quoted in J. Sauvaget, Alep (Paris, 1941), pp. 200-201.

Paris, Histoire du commerce de Marseille, vol. V, pp. 383, 416.

Quoted by J. Jomier, Le Mahmal (Cairo, 1953), pp. 218-19.

A. Raymond, 'La population du Caire, de Maqrîzî à la Description de l'Egypte,' in BEO 28 (1975): 212. See also A. Raymond and G. Wiet, Les marchés du Caire (Cairo,

Trécourt, Mémoires sur l'Egypte, ed. G. Wiet, (Cairo, 1942), pp. 24-25. I estimate that the population of Egypt in 1798 rose to about 4,000,000 people.

10 L. D'Arvieux, Mémoires (Paris, 1735), vol. VI, pp. 411, 417-18.

11 Paris, Histoire du commerce, vol. V, p. 416.

12 See my articles 'La localisation des bains publics au Caire, au XVème siècle,' BEO 30 (1979) (Mélanges H. Laoust II), and 'Cairo's Area and Population in the Early Fisteenth Century' Muqarnas 2 (1984). I call Qahira the Fatimid soundation, intra muros; the southern district spreads beyond bab Zuwaila and is limited, on the west, by the Halij (Cairo's canal); these western district spreads beyond the Halij.

13 See my articles, 'La localisation des bains publics,' and 'Les fontaines publiques du

Caire à l'époque ottomane,' Annales Islamologiques, XV (1979).

'Alī Pasha, Hitat (Būlāq, 1306/1888) 20 vols., vol. III, 63-64. For this question, see my article 'Le déplacement des tanneries à Alep, au Caire et à Tunis,' in Revue d'Histoire Maghrébine, nos 7-8 (1977): 195-197 (hereaster 'Le déplacement des tanneries').

13 See my article Essai de géographie des quartiers de résidence artistocratique,

JESHO 6 (1963).

16 See 'Les fontaines publiques du Caire.'

17 Sauvaget, Esquisse. My map of the extension of Damascus during the Ottoman

period is drawn from Sauvaget's maps VIII and X.

14 Sauvaget, Alep, maps LXII and LXX, from which our own map is drawn. See D'Arvieux, Mémoires, IV, 434-36: A. Russell, The Natural History of Aleppo, London 1794 (map); J. G. Barbie du Bocage, 'Notice sur la carte de M. Rousseau,' in Recueil des voyages (1825), vol. II, 194-244; K. al-Ghazzi, Kitāb Nahr (Aleppo, 1342H) 3 vols., vol. II, разsim; National Archives of Damascus, daftar Aleppo, 961-963н, 995-999н.

19 For the history of those waqf, see Sauvaget, Alep, 214, 216-7, 263-265; Ghazzī, Nahr, vol. 11, 47-52, 112-115, 117-123, 515-522; Muhammad Tabbakh, Iclam al-Nubala,

vol. III, 180, 181, 191, 202-206, 213-214.

²⁰ 'Le déplacement des tanneries,', pp. 193-95.

21 See my article 'The population of Aleppo in the 16th and 17th Centuries

according to Ottoman Census Documents,' IJMES 16, (1984).

22 J. A. Williams, The Monuments of Ottoman Cairo, Colloque international sur l'histoire du Caire, pp. 453-63; M. Rogers, s.v., 'Kāhira,' Encyclopédie de l'Islam and ed., vol. IV, pp. 454-61.

Great Britain, 1990, s. 61-75. 12CICA: 22799

Kanalah Mederad Mirona

Muhammad Ali and Palmerston Afaf Marsot

EVERYONE knows the political and diplomatic motives that caused Palmerston to thwart Muhammad Ali-the British attachment to Greek independence, the fear of Egyptian control of both routes to India, the threat he constituted to the Ottoman Empire, Britain's buffer against Russia. Less attention has been paid to the economic motives that underlay Muhammad Ali's expansionist policies and that led ultimately to the Palmerstonian reaction that cut Muhammad Ali down to size.

During the last decades of the 18th century the alliance between Egypt's rulers and merchants had strengthened noticeably.1 The trend towards rationalization of agriculture directed towards an export economy was apparent. A number of the so-called innovations Muhammad Ali and his supporters carried out in Egypt were in fact a continuation of 18th century trends and were developed in response to definite pressures by vested interest groups in the country. Undoubtedly Muhammad Ali's genius forced the pace, but he could not have controlled the Egyptian economy without the support of vested interests, especially among the military and bureaucratic

elite and a few select mercantile groupings.

Muhammad Ali sought to parallel in Egypt the lines of development of British industry-whether consciously or unconsciously. In order to capture a share of the world markets he planned to spread his hegemony over potential markets, and utilize their raw materials at one and the same time. These markets were Egypt's immediate neighbors, Sudan, Syria, Arabia and the Red Sea. Once all these territories had been major outlets for Egyptian trade, but fairly recently that domination had been lost through the influx of cheap western goods.2 Since Egyptian goods could not compete economically with western goods, Muhammad Ali planned a series of wars of colonial expansion in order to recapture these markets and their abundant raw materials necessary for his industries, and to impose a system of tariffs that would give him free rein to keep out competitive commodities. In the process, and as an adjunct to his wars, he also built up a powerful navy. These steps normally should have turned Egypt into an industrial power at the core of a local market that comprised the Ottoman empire, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea regions. But they did not, and a major reason was British opposition.

The Pasha had early realized that the path to maximum profit through commerce lay in displacing as many middlemen as he could in favour of himself and his retainers. The first victims were the Egyptian tax-farmers, the multazims, who controlled the country's agricultural wealth, and many of