professionnelle (chef des magiciens, des devins, des astrologues, Daniel 5, 11). Ce dernier sens apparaît sur de nombreuses stèles puniques, nous retiendrons en particulier, puisqu'elles sont proches du territoire d'Arabion, celles de Cirta (A. Berthier et R. Charlier, *Le sanctuaire punique d'El Hofra à Constantine*, 1955, stèles n° 65 à 67, 74 à 77, 82 à 84).

Mais existe également en hébreu la racine 'arabh qui est apparemment plus proche du nom d'Arabion; cette racine a le sens de «peuples mêlés», elle s'applique en particulier aux nomades du désert et, à partir d'Isaïe, aux Arabes qui lui doivent leur nom.

On ne peut cependant rattacher le nom d'Arabion à cet ethnique, il est plus simple d'expliquer la présence de la marque A (masculin singulier) au début du nom par une berbérisation du terme punique (S. Chaker, Onomastique berbère*, cahier n° 7). A-rabi(o) devrait donc signifier simplement : le maître, le chef.

Rab est l'équivalent du libyque Mess sur lequel est construit le nom de Messinissen («leur maître») dont les latins ont fait Massinissa. Ainsi Arabion portait effectivement le même nom que son père; c'est la proposition qu'avait faite J. Mazard pour étayer une hypothèse numismatique qui s'est avérée fausse.

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G. CAMPS

A252. ARABISATION

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Les berbérophones, identifiés par une pratique linguistique spécifique, ne sont à l'heure actuelle démographiquement minoritaires que parce que le Maghreb a connu depuis le Moyen Age un lent processus d'arabisation linguistique. Le fond du peuplement maghrébin est donc d'origine berbère : l'immense majorité des arabophones actuels ne sont que des Berbères arabisés depuis des dates plus ou moins reculées. Et, d'une certaine façon (historique et anthropologique), on peut dire sans polémiquer que tous les Maghrébins sont des Berbères. Mais au niveau des réalités socio-culturelles présentes, il est évident que la berbérité, la conscience d'être Berbère, est liée à la berbérophonie et ne concerne plus qu'une minorité — importante — de la population. Les «Autres» se définissent (et doivent être définis) comme «Arabes» parce qu'ils sont linguistiquement et culturellement arabes. En matière de culture, la réalité est d'abord fait de conscience.

Les grandes lignes historiques et géographiques du processus d'arabisation linguistique du Maghreb ont été posées d'une manière qui reste globalement satisfaisante par l'arabisant W. Marçais (1938-1961). On trouvera également une synthèse réactualisée de la question chez G. Camps (1983) et dans son introduction au volume I de l'*Encyclopédie berbère*. On ne traitera dans la présente notice que des aspects anthropologiques généraux (passés et actuels) et linguistiques du phénomène.

Les facteurs explicatifs

Comment se fait-il qu'une partie, maintenant majoritaire, des populations autochtones ait abandonné sa langue alors qu'une autre l'a conservé malgré la conquête arabe, l'islamisation, l'intégration très ancienne dans l'orbite arabo-musulmane et la pénétration à partir du XI^e siècle de populations arabes bédouines venues d'Orient?

L'interrogation porte bien entendu sur le tissu rural (sédentaire et nomade) du Maghreb. Car, dans les villes, on comprend aisément que le processus d'arabisation se soit accompli assez tôt. Les causes et cheminements sont clairs pour les cités fondées par les Arabes et les vieux centres de culture arabo-islamique (Kairouan, Fès...). On voit bien aussi pourquoi les habitants latinisés et christianisés des villes anciennes ont adopté la nouvelle langue dominante : l'arabe ne pouvait que s'imposer rapidement dans la ville, lieu de présence (politique, culturelle, humaine...) et de contrôle maximum des nouveaux maîtres du Maghreb.

Une première cause générale, fondamentale et permanente, à l'œuvre depuis treize siècles, relève de la domination symbolique : le rapport arabe/berbère a été, très tôt, une relation déséquilibrée en raison du lien consubstantiel de l'Islam à la langue arabe. En Berbérie comme dans tout le monde musulman non arabe, il y a toujours eu de ce fait valorisation marquée de l'arabe, langue du Sacré, langue de Dieu, mais aussi langue de l'Écrit et du Savoir légitime, langue du Pouvoir et de la Ville. Au Maghreb, cette prééminence a vite engendré un véritable complexe d'infériorité des Berbères vis-à-vis des Arabes et de leur langue. Car le berbère était sans tradition écrite et n'avait jamais été le vecteur d'une culture à rayonnement large. Dans l'aire méditerranéenne où l'écrit est valorisé à l'extrême, sacralisé même dans la tradition islamique, le berbère ne pouvait être perçu, face à la langue arabe, que comme un idiome barbare et imparfait : d'où une forte et ancienne tendance à recourir à l'arabe pour toute expression élaborée, visant à la reconnaissance.

Pour ce qui est du Maghreb profond, rural et tribal, l'approche comparée des deux cas d'évolution (arabisation/résistance du berbère) permet d'avancer un ensemble d'hypothèses explicatives. Mais les causes sont multiples et entrecroisées : chaque région mériterait une approche spécifique. Sans que l'ordre implique une hiérarchie absolue, on évoquera :

• *La géographie :* notamment l'isolement dans les zones de montagne, par opposition aux régions de plaines et de hautes plaines pré-sahariennes, très tôt arabisées parce qu'elles permettaient la circulation et l'installation aisées des populations arabophones venues d'Orient et des agents des pouvoirs urbains arabophones.

• *La démographie :* la berbérophonie s'est également bien maintenue dans des régions de fort peuplement, où l'occupation humaine était déjà suffisamment dense et ne permettait que difficilement l'intrusion d'éléments extérieurs. Alors que l'arabisation se développe surtout dans les zones à occupation humaine plus clairsemée (régions d'élevage pastoral, nomade ou semi-nomade, ou même sédentaire).

• *Le système de production et d'appropriation des sols :* la berbérophonie paraît, tendanciellement — il existe des exceptions notables comme le Moyen Atlas —, s'être mieux maintenue dans les régions de tradition «paysanne», à fort ancrage terrien, à appropriation individuelle ancienne des terres (même s'il y existe des formes de gestion et d'exploitation collectives). La collectivité de base — le village plutôt que la tribu — y est plus économique et topographique que généalogique. Tandis que les zones d'arabisation ancienne et large sont plutôt des régions de nomadisme ou de semi-nomadisme, des sociétés «agro-pastorales» où les liens du sang comptaient plus que le lien à la terre.

Il ne s'agit là, répétons-le, que de tendances, mais elles permettent de mieux comprendre les processus et les évolutions divergentes. Dans un cas, on a affaire à des

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MADDE YAYIMLANDIKTAN SONRA GELEN DOKÜMAN

13 MAYIS 2009

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISM IN THE OTTOMAN STATE

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TURKISH RELIGIOUS FOUNDATION, ISLAMIC RESEARCH CENTER / İSTANBUL - TURKEY

Arab nationalism, as defined by the fact that the Arabs form a separate nation on the grounds that they share a common language, history, geography and ethnic origins, and that this nation governs itself by having won political freedom, is a movement that appeared after the fall of the Ottoman state in a struggle for independence from western domination, especially that of the British and the French. However, it must be stated that Arab nationalism started to develop in the second half of the nineteenth century, and that at the time of the fall of the Ottoman state it had already reached an important level. Historians of Arab nationalism refer to this term as "pre-nationalism" and use the expression "Arabism".[1] The principle factors influential in the appearance of Arabism can be listed as follows: the changes in the traditional social, cultural and economic balances as a result of the increasing European population living amongst the Arabs as from the 1800s; a revival of the Arabic language and literature along with the forming of an Arab consciousness as a result of the development of educational and press organisations; and negative influences due to weaknesses in the Ottoman governing over the Arabs.

One of the important factors affecting the rise of Arabism is the destruction of local balance as a result of multi-directional European entry into the Middle East, and the failure of the Ottoman state to impose its authority in the region. Before the nineteenth century, European relations with the Middle East were limited to the trade purposes of smaller states such as Venice and Portugal in the middle ages, and later of larger states such as Britain and France. However, at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, the expanding of the area of intervention in Europe's political competition to the Middle East was to change the course of the history of the region in a significant way. The Middle East occupied an important position on Europe's agenda after the expulsion of Napoleon from Egypt in 1978. In however short a time that France had to withdraw from southern Syria and Egypt, Britain had secured an entry to the region *de facto*. For this reason, Britain was to feel obliged to take a close interest in the developments in Egypt primarily, and then those in Syria and Lebanon, when considering the security of the road to India.

After the expulsion of Napoleon from Egypt, during the period in which Mehmet Ali Pasha and his sons were in control, competition between France and Britain continued with the utmost speed. Both countries were investing in Egypt and developing their trade relations. Mehmet Ali Pasha was also trying to speed up development by gaining European knowledge and skills for the Egyptians, and whilst sending students to Europe on the one hand, he was also bringing European technicians to Egypt in order to train skilled native workers. These developments gave rise to two important results concerning the subject in hand. Firstly, the income and the formation of an organised, modern army, obtained as a result of developing trade and military relations with Europe, gave a chance for Mehmet Ali Pasha to carry out expansionist policies. Starting and winning wars against the Ottoman state, to which he was bound, and awakening the thought that he was going to form a strong, autocratic state in the Middle East, Mehmet Ali Pasha was stopped from carrying out his expansionist policies by direct British intervention (1840).[2] In other words, these policies played a part in the strengthening of the European population in the Middle East. Secondly, the developing relations with Europe, and especially the Egyptian students sent to Europe were a vehicle to the entrance to the Middle East of new ideas such as *vatan* (fatherland) and *vataniyye* (patriotism), some of the most important factors of the nationalist ideology that was to arise decades later. Some Egyptian progressives of that time started to spread the idea that the reason for Europe's advancement was patriotism. That is, patriotism was seen as a source of strength and progression. One of the first individuals in Egypt to try and spread this opinion was Rifa'ah Rafi' Tahtawi.[3]

By the 1870s, the idea of *vatan* and *vataniyye* had become widespread, and xenophobia as a reaction against the rising European population developed alongside Egyptian nationalism. In this period, the acceptance by important names, such as Afgani and his student Abduh, that Muslims remained backward, and the idea that a modern, rationalistic understanding of Islam, along with the study of natural sciences widespread in the West, and patriotism could save them from this backwardness was warmly welcomed by the *ulema*, soldiers and the newly-forming group of literates and thereby played an important role in the development of Egyptian nationalism. The increase in xenophobia at the beginning of the 1880s and the threats to European interests in Egypt resulted in the occupation of that country by Britain in 1882, which meant that a base was obtained whereby the developments in the Middle East could be easily followed and , if necessary, directed. Furthermore, from the 1890s to the fall of the Ottoman state, Egypt became a place where the Young Turks and Arabists, oppositions of the Ottoman state, could act freely and where ideas could be secreted through Ottoman borders by means of the press.[4]

The developing relations with Europe in Syria and Lebanon resulted in the formation of two groups: those supporting the West; and those against. While the Christian Arabs, with the influence of the missionaries working in this region from the first quarter of the nineteenth century , tended to rely on Britain and France, the Muslim Arabs were generally in favour of the strengthening of the Ottoman state and the securing of Islamic solidarity. As it is known, the French had close relations with the Syrian Christians and the Lebanese Maronites especially, and the British with the Druzes. The trade interests of these two countries in this region were gradually strengthening, and as a result Britain and France lost no time in opening their Consulates in the region. Apart from dealing with the work of their own states, from time to time the European consuls acted as guardians of the local Christians and secured them large shares arising from the developing trade relations. As for the Muslims, they were not pleased with such secular principles as Muslim-Christian equality, which they believed were forcibly imposed on them by the Europeans. These developments caused a rise in tension in the community, and in 1860 violent clashes occured between the Druzes and Maronites of Lebanon, and between Muslim and Christian in Damascus resulting in the death of thousands of people, mainly Christian.[5] This incident lead to direct European intervention. According to new arrangements, instead of being provinces, Syria and Lebanon were made into autonomous *mutasarriflik* (govenorships of sancaks) directly bound to İstanbul. A *mutasarrif* was to be selected from amongst the non-Lebanese, Ottoman Christians by the Ottoman state, but this placement would be validated after approval by the European states. With these new orders, the Ottoman presence in Lebanon and European interests were officially recognised.

Of all the European states, Britain and France in particular tried to benefit from every opportunity to increase their population in the Syrian region. It seemed as if the Druze community were delegated to protect and advance the interests of the British, and the Maronites those of the French. These states, while trying to secure the materialistic developments of these communities on the one hand, on the other they were simply provoking them to confront Ottoman authority, because when the Druzes or Maronites commited crimes against the state, they were protected by the British and French respecti-

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MADDE YAYIMLANDIKTAN
SONRA GELEN DOKÜMAN

Pan-Arabism

ARAP MİLLİYETÇİLİĞİNİN OSMANLI DEVLETİ'NDE GELİŞİM SÜRECİ

DOÇ. DR. Ş. TUFAN BUZPINAR
TÜRKİYE DİYANET VAKFI İSLAM ARAŞTIRMALARI MERKEZİ (İSAM)

Arapların ortak bir dil, tarih, coğrafya ve etnik temellere dayalı olarak ayrı bir millet oluşturdukları ve bu milletin siyasal bağımsızlığını kazanarak kendi kendini yönetmesi anlamındaki Arap milliyetçiliği Osmanlı Devleti'nin yıkılışından sonra Batılılara (özellikle İngiliz ve Fransızlara) karşı verilen bağımsızlık mücadelesiyle ortaya çıkmış bir harekettir. Ancak belirtilmelidir ki, Arap milliyetçiliğinin kökenleri 19. yüzyılın ikinci yarısından itibaren gelişmeye başlamış ve Osmanlı Devleti yıkıldığında önemli bir aşamaya gelmiş durumdaydı. Arap milliyetçiliği tarihçileri bu döneme "milliyetçilik öncesi" dönem adı vermekte ve bu manada "Arabizm" tabirini kullanmaktadırlar.[1] Arabizmin ortaya çıkışında etkili olan başlıca faktörler şunlardır: 1800'lerden itibaren Araplar arasında Avrupa nüfuzunun giderek artmasıyla geleneksel sosyal, kültürel ve ekonomik dengelerin değişmesi; 19. yüzyılın ikinci yarısından itibaren Arap dili ve edebiyatındaki canlanmanın yanı sıra eğitim ve basın-yayın kuruluşlarının gelişmesiyle Araplık şuurunun oluşması; ve Osmanlı yönetimindeki aksaklıkların Araplar üzerindeki olumsuz tesirleri.

Arabizmin ortaya çıkışını etkileyen önemli faktörlerden biri 19. yüzyılda Avrupa'nın çok yönlü olarak Ortadoğu'ya girmesiyle mahalli dengelerin bozulması ve buna karşılık Osmanlı Devleti'nin bölgede otoritesini tam olarak tesis edememesidir. 19. yüzyıl öncesi Avrupa-Ortadoğu ilişkileri Ortaçağda Venedik ve Portekiz gibi küçük devletlerin, daha sonra da İngiltere ve Fransa gibi büyük devletlerin ticari amaçla gerçekleştirdikleri girişimlerle sınırlıydı. Ancak 18. yüzyılın sonu ve 19. yüzyılın başında Avrupa'daki siyasi rekabetin mücadele alanının Ortadoğu'ya kadar uzanması bölge tarihinin seyrini önemli ölçüde etkiledi. Ortadoğu Napolyon'un 1798 Mısır çıkartmasından sonra Avrupa gündeminde önemli bir yer işgal etti. Her ne kadar Fransa kısa bir süre sonra Suriye'nin güneyinden ve Mısır'dan çekilmek zorunda kaldı ise de, İngiltere'nin bölgeye fiilen girişini sağlamış oldu. Bundan böyle İngiltere, Hindistan yolunun güvenliğini düşünerek birinci derecede Mısır'daki, ikinci derecede de Suriye ve Lübnan'daki gelişmelerle yakından ilgilenmek zorunda hissedecekti.

Napolyon'un Mısır'dan çıkarılışından sonra yönetimini ele geçiren Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa ve oğulları döneminde Mısır'da Fransız-İngiliz rekabeti olanca hızıyla devam etti. Her iki ülke de Mısır'a yatırım yapmakta ve ticari ilişkilerini geliştirmekteydiler. Mehmet Ali Paşa da Avrupa'nın bilgi ve becerilerini Mısırlılara kazandırarak gelişmeyi hızlandırmak için bir taraftan Avrupa'ya öğrenci göndermekte, diğer taraftan da Avrupalı teknisyenleri Mısır'a getirerek yerli kalifiye eleman yetiştirmeye çalışmaktaydı. Bu gelişmeler konumuz açısından iki önemli sonuç doğurdu: Birincisi, Avrupa ile geliştirilen ticari ve askeri ilişkiler sonucu elde edilen gelir ve kurulan düzenli modern ordu Mehmet Ali Paşa'yı yayılmacı politika izlemeye sevk etti. Bağlı bulunduğu Osmanlı Devleti'ne karşı açtığı savaşları kazanan ve Ortadoğu'da güçlü ve otokratik bir devlet kuracağı zannını uyandıran Mehmet Ali Paşa'nın yayılmacı politikaları İngiltere'nin doğrudan müdahalesiyle frenlenebilmiştir (1840).[2] Diğer bir ifadeyle, bu politikalar Avrupa'nın Ortadoğu'daki nüfuzunun kuvvetlenmesine katkıda bulunmuştur. İkincisi, Avrupa ile gelişen ilişkiler ve özellikle Avrupa'ya giden Mısırlı öğrenciler onyıllar sonra doğacak olan milliyetçilik ideolojisinin önemli unsurlarından olan "vatan" ve "vatanperverlik" gibi yeni fikirlerin Ortado-

OSMANLI, CİLT, 2, Ankara 1999

bilig

Yaz 2004 / Sayı: 30

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Mehmetkuluzâde, Hamide, Azerbaycan'da Yenilikçi Bir Öncü: Celil Mehmetkuluzâde: Hatıralar/Hamide Melmetkuluzâde, (Haz.:F. Özkan), Ankara 2002

Mutlu DEVECİ
Yeni Türk Edebiyatı El Kitabı (1839-2000), Ankara 2004

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Arap Milliyetçiliği: Ortaya Çıkışından 1918'e kadar

Dr. H. Bayram SOY*

Özet: Osmanlı Devleti'nde Tanzimatla birlikte modern okulların açılmasıyla ve Suriye, Cebel-i Lübnan ve Filistin'deki misyoner okullarının etkisiyle, özellikle Hristiyan Araplar arasında Batılı anlamda milliyetçilik fikirleri yaygınlaşmaya başlamıştır. Müslüman Araplar ise, İslâm dünyasının Batı karşısında önlenemez gerileyişine bir tepki olarak Arap kimlik ve kültür mirasına vurgu yapmak suretiyle, İslâm ve Batı medeniyetlerine Arapların yaptıkları katkılardan bahisle, Arapçılık şuurunu canlandırarak sözkonusu gerilemeye çözüm bulmaya çalışmışlardır.

Hristiyan Araplar, Arap kültür ve dilini canlandıracak faaliyetler yapmanın yanında, Osmanlı Devleti'nden ayrılma fikrini de gündeme getirerek bağımsızlığı savunmuşlardır. Müslüman Araplar ise ayrılıkçı fikirlerden ziyade, imparatorluğun bütünlüğünün muhafaza edilmesine taraftar olmakla birlikte, yaşadıkları bölgelerde Arap dil ve kültürüne daha fazla önem verilmesini talep etmişlerdir. Ancak Suriye'ye kıyasla, İngiliz idaresinin de etkisiyle, daha farklı bir milliyetçilik anlayışı geliştiren Mısırlı Araplar, "vatan" kavramına vurgu yaparak Araplık'tan ziyade "Mısırlı" kimliklerini ön plana çıkarmaya çalışmışlardır.

Müslüman ve Hristiyan Araplar arasındaki milliyetçi akımlara rağmen, Birinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında Hicaz'da Şerif Hüseyin'in başlattığı bağımsızlığı hedefleyen ayaklanma Araplar arasında ancak sınırlı destek bulabilmiştir. Gizli Sykes-Picot Anlaşması ve Balfour Deklerasyonu nedeniyle Birinci Dünya savaşından sonra bağımsızlıklarını elde edemeyerek Birleşmiş Milletler denetiminde İngiliz ve Fransız mandasında yaşamak durumunda kalan Araplar, ancak sömürgelerin tasfiye sürecine gidildiği 1940'ların sonlarından itibaren bağımsızlıklarını elde edebilmişlerdir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Arap Milliyetçiliği, Araplar, Milliyetçilik, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Ortadoğu

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birbirini besleyen

milliyetçilikler

- **Mustafa Atiker,** balkan milliyetçiliği
- **Bayram Soy,** milliyetçilik milliyetçiliğin kurdudur: arap ve türk milliyetçilikleri örneği
- **Ahmet Özcan'la** milliyetçilik üzerine söyleşi
- **Tuncer Namlı,** millet, milliyetçilik ve ulusalcılık



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milliyetçilik milliyetçiliğin kurdudur:

arap ve türk milliyetçilikleri örneği

BAYRAM SOY

Dr., Kırıkkale Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi

Giriş

İnsan, bilinen tarihinin her döneminde bir şey için, bir sebepten ötürü, bir ad altında çatışmıştır. Bu çatışmanın genellikle hayatı sürdürebilmek için gerekli unsurlardan kaynaklandığı, dikkatli bir tarih okuyucusunun gözünden kaçmaz. Çok eski dönemlerde, insan nüfusu bugünle kıyaslanamayacak kadar azken bir tarla, bir otlak, bir ova, bir bölge için, yani gittikçe büyüyen boyutlardaki araziler için mücadele verilirken de bu çatışma bir ad altında sürdürüldü. Herkes kendisine, nihaî tahlilde bir temeli olan, hayalî bir cemaat[1] aidiyeti tayin ediyor ve bu topluluğun menfaatleri uğruna hesaplaşılıyordu. Süreç neredeyse Fransız İhtilâli'ne kadar bu tarzda devam etti. Bu döneme kadar bir hükümdarlığın, krallığın veya imparatorluğun tebaası olanların, söz konusu üst otoriteye bağlılığını ağırlıklı olarak belirleyen şey, yaşadığı topraklarda huzur bu-

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بإشراف الرئيس علي ناصر محمد

الأحزاب والحركات القومية العربية

الجزء الأول

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Dimaşk Tarihsiz

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نشوء الحركة القومية العربية المعاصرة

مقدمة

فرض نشوء السوق الرأسمالية العالمية وآليات توسعها، منذ مطلع القرن التاسع عشر بخاصة، تبدلات جذرية على واقع النظام الدولي وتطوره، فقد قام منطق هذا السوق على تقسيم العمل الدولي وجرّ مجمل اقتصاديات العالم إلى الاندماج في شبكته المتمحورة حول المركز الرأسمالي الأوروبي. وفي هذا السياق، كان لا بد للامبراطورية العثمانية القروسطية من أن تواجه ضغوطاً مركبة ومتعددة الأشكال والوجوه من قبل الدول الأوروبية، ظهرت جلية في تآكل "الرجل المريض" واشتداد حركة استقلال ولاياته الأوروبية من جهة، وفي إجباره على إعادة بناء نفسه، وتبني سلسلة من الإصلاحات، حملت في التاريخ العثماني اسم "التنظيمات الخيرية".

بدأت مرحلة "التنظيمات" عندما أصدر السلطان عبد المجيد مرسوم (خط كلخانة شريف ١٨٣٩)، ثم أتبعه بـ(خط همايون ١٨٥٦). وتحددت الوظيفة الأساسية لهذه العملية في إصلاح جهاز الدولة و"تحديثه" على الغرار المؤسساتي

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Panarabizm

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Reconstructing
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the organizers of a subsequent conference at Cornell University in New York where I delivered the paper upon which this essay is based.

[2]"Internationality" first appeared in the *Oxford English Dictionary* in 1864—conveniently enough the year when Marx founded his First International and modern left-wing internationalism along with it.

[3]As quoted in Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Muller, *Global Reach: the Power of the Multinational Corporations* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), 14–15.

[4]The *Economist* (22 May 1993) carries a probing piece about the proposed breakup of IBM to make it more efficient, and recoup its record losses of 1991–1992.

[5]The *opus classicus* is of course Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); a less well-known but still very important *locus ultra-classicus* is Ernest Gellner, "Nationalism" in Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

[6]Thomas J. Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 2.

[7]The ones I happen to know have all been Russian, or partly Russian. I know one who is happy only living in hotels, and justifies this with a complex philosophy of exile as the natural, if often unrecognized, human condition. Buying a house and "settling down" merely makes him feel in exile from everywhere else.

[8]Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

[9]Eric J. Hobsbawm, "Some Reflections on The Break-up of Britain," *New Left Review* 105 (September-October 1977).

[10]See my article in the *London Review of Books,* February 1993.

[11]Roman Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx Versus Friedrich List* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

[12]Ernest Gellner, "L'avvento del nazionalismo e la sua interpretazione. I miti della nazione e della classe," in Perry Anderson, ed., *Storia d'Europa* (forthcoming). Quotations from a transcript kindly provided by the author.

[13]Ibid.

[14]A few weeks ago, a friend on his way from Zagreb to Belgrade was halted and, after the usual hassles and warnings, "invited" to pin on a lapel badge. It read, "I Love Serbs." He declined the honor, pointing out that he had not had the time to discover whether he loved them or not. This reply was met with gales of laughter: "Just what a Serb would say!" roared one of the banditti.

[15]Jane Jacobs, *Cities and the Wealth of Nations: Principles of Economic Life* (New York: Random House, 1984), 212–14.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid., 214–20 passim.

[18]Ibid., 212–14.

Martin Kramer

Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity

THREE LINES OF POETRY PLOT THE TRAJECTORY of Arab national consciousness. "Awake, O Arabs, and arise!" begins the famous ode of Ibrahim al-Yaziji, penned in 1868 in Lebanon.[1] George Antonius deployed the line as the epigraph of his influential book, *The Arab Awakening,*[2] as the first utterance of a nascent Arab desire for independence from Ottoman rule. "Write down, I am an Arab!" begins the poem of resistance by the Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, written in 1963 to assert an Arab identity denied by Israel and the West.[3] The poem immediately entered the Arab nationalist canon, to be recited from memory by a generation of schoolchildren. In the century that separated these two lines, millions of people gradually awakened and arose, insisting before the world and one another that they should be written down as Arabs.

"Are we Arabs one big lie?" This line ends a poem of anguish written in the midst of the latest Gulf crisis by Nizar Qabbani, the most widely read contemporary Arab poet and critic.[4] Too much had gone wrong to sustain exclamation points of awakening and defiance; they were replaced by a question mark of doubt. Once half of Europe and a Superpower had admitted to living a lie for most of this century, the Arabs could not suppress their own doubt any longer. Their god had also failed, spectacularly so. It had been called Arabism, or Arab nationalism, or pan-Arabism, and by the time Qabbani posed his question, it had been in full retreat for a generation.

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BALKANIQUES ET SUD-EST EUROPEENNES

ACTES DU PREMIER CONGRES INTERNATIONAL DES ETUDES BALKANIQUES ET SUD-EST EUROPEENNES

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IV

Histoire

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Pierre Lièvre

25 MART 2003

ZEINE N. ZEINE (Liban)

UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS CONCERNING INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS IN THE ARAB PROVINCES OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

In 1516-1517, the Ottoman armies of Sultan Selim defeated the Mamluks on the plain of Majr Dabiq, north of Aleppo, Syria. As a result of this decisive victory, the Arab Provinces of the Near East — all of which are, today, independent sovereign states—became part of the Ottoman Empire for four hundred years.

The Ottoman Empire was, first and foremost a Muslim Empire. The vast majority of the Arabs, as Sunni Muslims, felt that the Empire was also theirs and were, on the whole, loyal subjects of the Sultan — Caliph.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, the once great Empire of the Ottomans which stretched from the gates of Vienna to the shores of the Caspian Sea and from the Persian Gulf to Aden and through the Red Sea and North Africa to almost the Alantic ocean, entered its last stages of decline and disintegration. Enlightened Arabs became increasingly aware of the necessity of rejuvenating and reforming the old institutions and the administrative machinery of their Empire. Several reform projects were promised by the authorities but very few basic reforms were carried out.

ARAB DESIRE FOR AUTONOMY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT

Although in the nineteenth century there was as yet no «Arab Question» in international politics, anti-Turkish sentiment did grow in Arab lands during the second half of that century. It was due to diverse causes, the two principal ones being the steady deterioration in Ottoman administration, and Western influences of various kinds. Under the impact of Western education, the infiltration of Western political ideas, the intercourse of commerce, the introduction of the material goods of life, as well as through travel abroad and personal contacts with the West, the inhabitants of the Near East were slowly waking up to a new world of progress and independence, which was taking shape in the West.

This anti-Turkish sentiment, although very limited at the beginning, gathered momentum during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid and the regime of the Young Turks. The Sultan, at first, made several attempts to win the Arabs but the Arab leaders continued to plead and ask for reforms in their provinces of the Empire. Pressed at the beginning of his reign into accepting Midhat Pasha's constitution,

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— Panarabizm

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يهاجم شعب بني يعرب
ليشفى أحقاده والضغونا
وسرب المناطيد ملء الفضاء
يصب القنابل غيثا هتونا
وقذف المدافع بين الجموع
يهد معالمها والحصونا
ورعد قذائف (مكسيمها)
يشيب بهول صداه الجنينا
ورمي البنادق رشاشة
يحطم مجتمع الدارعينا
ولما ادلهمّت علينا الخطوب
وحققت الحادثات الظنونا
لقينا زعازع ريب المنون
وهان على النفس ما قد لقينا
نعم خاننا الدهر في جريه
وهل يترك الدهر حراً ركينا
غداة أسرنا بأيدي العدو
ورحنا نكابد داء دفينا
وضيم (الغريان) غاب العراق
وفارق ليث العرين العرينا
وجزنا كما شاء تلك الحزون
ننتظر الفتك حينا فحينا
وأرجلنا طوع قيد الحديد
تسيل دماً يستفز الرصينا
ولم نلو للدهر جيد الذليل
وإن يكن الدهر حرباً زبونا
وما ضامنا الأسر في موقف
أطعنا عليه الرسول الامينا
وما ضامنا ثقل ذاك الحديد
ونحن بحسن الثنا ظافرونا
ولم يزر بالحر غل اليدين
إذا ما قضى للعلاء الديونا
ولا غرو أن خان صرف الزمان
مثلي فمن طبعه أن يخونا

وقال عباس الخليلي وهو لاجيء إلى إيران من قصيدة:

رويداً رجال الإنكليز ورأفة
إن اليوم أسفرتم فإن لنا غدا
وإن قصرت أقدامنا عن خطاكم
مددنا إلى ما فوق هامكم يدا

ومنها يخاطب أهل العراق:

يحييكم أهل العراق على النوى
فتى في سبيل المجد أمسى مشردا
تحية عان كلما هبت الصبا
ينوح كما ناح الحمام مغردا
إن اليوم أطلقت اللسان بحبكم
فبالأس عنكم قد سللت المهندا
عواطف لا تنفك تغلي بمهجتي
إلى أن أرى فوق الصعيد موسدا

جمعية العربية الفتاة

كان العرب في الدولة العثمانية يعيشون في ظل الرابطة الإسلامية، شركاء متساوين في دولة واحدة، يجمعهم الولاء للخلافة. فلما تولى حزب «الاتحاد والترقي» مقاليد الحكم، أخذ الاتحاديون يتحولون تدريجياً من تلك الرابطة التي انتظمت القوميات العديدة التي تتألف منها الدولة العثمانية، وخاصة القوميتين الرئيسيتين التركية والعربية، إلى فكرة التمييز بين العنصر التركي وغيره، وبذلك تغيرت الدولة من كيان إسلامي ذي قوميات متعددة، متساوية في الحقوق والواجبات، إلى دولة تركية تضم رعايا من قوميات أخرى.

وعندئذ تساءل العربي عن مكانه في هذه الدولة أين يكون، وعن حالته ما هي؟ أهو أشبه بالألماني أو الفرنسي أو الإيطالي في الدولة السويسرية، أم هي أقرب إلى حالة الهندي في الامبراطورية البريطانية؟

ولم يقتصر هذا الشعور والتساؤل على العرب بين رعايا الدولة العثمانية وحدهم، بل ساد أبناء القوميات

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Pan-Arabism

پان‌عربیسم

خرداد ۴۲ تا پایان سال ۵۷، ج ۱، تهران: بنیاد شهید انقلاب اسلامی، ۱۳۷۳ ش.

/ رحیم روحبخش /

پان‌عربیسم، اندیشه و نهضتی فراگیر در جهان عرب، منادی وحدت اعراب. این مفهوم غالباً مترادف با ملی‌گرایی عرب آمده است، ولی برخی به‌اختلافات جزئی میان این دو مفهوم اشاره کرده‌اند. از جمله، پان عربیسم را «خط اصلی فکری ملی‌گرایی عرب» (نفا، ص۱۳۴، به‌نقل از تاچ[1]) یا «هدف اصلی ملی‌گرایی عرب» (شلّاله[2]، ص۱۹) خوانده‌اند. برخی در تبیین هدف ملی‌گرایی عرب به‌دو محور «استقلال جهان عرب و اتحاد تمام بخشهای آن در یک کشور» اشاره کرده‌اند (ابراهیم، ص۵۹) که نزدیکی و جدایی‌ناپذیری این دو مفهوم را نشان می‌دهد.

دربارهٔ سرآغاز و منشأ ملی‌گرایی عرب نیز دیدگاههای مختلفی وجود دارد. بعضی از نویسندگان عرب ریشهٔ آگاهی به‌کلیت عربی را به‌دورهٔ جاهلیت قبل از اسلام و یا عصر نهضت شعوبیه* می‌رسانند (شلاله، ص۲۲؛ رجایی، ص۲۹۰). در مقابل، آلبرت حورانی* از اندیشمندان برجستهٔ عرب، بر این عقیده است که آگاهی اعراب از همزبانی و مباهاتی که به‌این زبان کرده‌اند سابقه‌ای دیرینه و پیش از اسلامی دارد و حتی قبل از اسلام نیز به‌نوعی احساس همنژادی شبیه بوده است، اما این احساس همنژادی و همخانوادگی بعد از ظهور و بسط اسلام، با پیوستن انبوه عربی زبانهای غیراصیل به‌این خانواده، از بین رفته است (ص۲۶۰). برخی نیز میان موجودیت ملت عرب و دعوت به ملی‌گرایی عرب تفاوت قائل شده و ملی‌گرایی را آگاهی ملت عرب از وجود تفاوت فرهنگی با دیگران و وابستگی ایشان به‌موجودیتی خاص و تمایل به انتقال این آگاهی به بیانی سیاسی ــ که آمال مردم برای استقلال، خودمختاری و زندگی بهتر را تجسم کند ــ دانسته‌اند، و ازینرو ملی‌گرایی عرب را مفهومی جدید و متعلق به‌قرن سیزدهم/ نوزدهم می‌دانند (ابراهیم، همانجا).

آنتونیوس[3]، از برجسته‌ترین پژوهشگران عرب، جنبشهای وهابیت در جزیرةالعرب و محمدعلی‌پاشا در مصر را پیشگام عرب‌گرایی خوانده است (ص۲۱-۲۲). اما به نظر او جنبش ملی عرب به طور جدی و سازماندهی شده در ۱۲۹۲ با شکل‌گیری انجمنی مخفی در بیروت فعال شد، که آغاز آن به تأسیس «انجمن هنری و علمی»[4] در ۱۲۶۳ در بیروت بازمی‌گشت (ص ۵۱-۵۲، ۷۹). این انجمن مخفی شعبه‌هایی در دمشق، طرابلس، و سویدا داشت و برنامهٔ آن استقلال سوریه و لبنان، پذیرش زبان عربی به‌عنوان زبان رسمی آن ممالک، الغای سانسور و رفع محدودیتهای آزادی بیان و عدم استفاده از سربازان محلی در خارج از مرزهای سوریه و لبنان بود. فعالیت این انجمن بتدریج فرونشست و تقریباً در ۱۳۰۲ بکلی از میان رفت (لوتسکی[5]، ص ۳۲۶). برخی نظر آنتونیوس را رد می‌کنند و عقیده دارند که گرچه سالهای حدود ۱۲۹۲ شاهد اوج چشمگیر احساسات ملی عربها بوده، اما تا آغاز قرن بیستم، هیچ حرکت سیاسی قابل‌ملاحظه و مهمی، بر پایهٔ ملی‌گرایی، وجود نداشته است (رجایی، همانجا؛ وات، ص ۱۱۷). با این حال، بیشتر نویسندگانی که در این باره قلم زده‌اند معتقدند که روشنترین بیان اولیهٔ احساسات ملی‌گرایی عرب در *طبایع‌الاستبداد* عبدالرحمان کواکبی* که در ۱۳۱۶/ ۱۸۹۸ در مصر منتشر شد، قابل مشاهده است (اسعدی، همانجا). این نویسندهٔ سوری که نخستین متفکر اصیل اشاعه‌دهندهٔ اندیشهٔ لائیک اتحاد عرب شناخته شده است، عربها را به‌جدا شدن از ترکها و تلاش در راه یگانگی، به‌رغم جداییهای مذهبی، دعوت کرد. او در کتاب *ام‌القری* خواستار بازگشت خلافت به مبادی اصلی‌اش، که از نظر او اعراب بودند، شد (آنتونیوس، ص ۹۷-۹۸).

جدا از اینکه اندیشهٔ اتحاد اعراب و عربگرایی از چه زمانی شروع شد، ریشه‌های سیاسی و اجتماعی ظهور و رشد این اندیشه را باید در افول قدرت حکومت عثمانی جستجو کرد (← ادامه مقاله). در آغاز قرن دهم/شانزدهم تقریباً تمامی کشورهای عرب به‌انقیاد ترکان عثمانی درآمدند و در دولت عثمانی ادغام شدند (لوتسکی، ص۹). توده‌های عرب در سراسر مدت حکومت عثمانی تا اوایل قرن بیستم با ترکان احساس بیگانگی نمی‌کردند و از وحدت مناطق مسلمان‌نشین ترک و عرب راضی بودند و سلطان عثمانی را حاکم برحق مسلمانان می‌شناختند. عثمانیها نیز در مقابل، تبعیضی در حق اعراب روانمی‌داشتند و فرماندار هر منطقهٔ عرب را، که نقیب نامیده می‌شد، از اهالی همان منطقه منصوب می‌کردند (نقوی، ص۳۹). تا اواخر قرن دوازدهم/هجدهم نیز احساس تعلق به‌دارالاسلام براحساس تعلق ملی به‌فرهنگ و سرزمین خاص غلبه داشت (لوئیس، ص ۱۷۳-۱۷۴).

اوایل قرن دوازدهم/ اواخر قرن هفدهم دورهٔ افول عثمانی و بحرانهای شدید بود، بحرانهایی که تمام شئون زندگی اجتماعی را فراگرفت. این بحرانها، فشار روزافزون هیئت حاکمه بر اتباع عثمانی، بویژه اتباع غیرترک از جمله اعراب، را در پی

1. Tuetch 2. E. Chalala 3. G. Antonius 4. Society of Arts and Sciences 5. Lutskü

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Panarabism

"Introduction to the History of the Petty Kings"

by
Adunis

THE LITERARY WORK

A poem set in the Arab world around September 1970; published in Arabic (as "Muqaddimah li-tarikh al-muluk al-tawa'if") in 1970, in English in 1992.

SYNOPSIS

An elegy, the poem mourns the sudden passing of Gamal Abdel Nasser, whose death amplified a growing sense of frustration and despair among Arabs following their defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

Considered by many to be the most influential Arabic poet of the late twentieth century, Adunis was born Ali Ahmad Said in 1930 in Qassabayn, a small village near the Syrian coastal town of Latakia. His early education was frequently interrupted because his poverty-stricken family needed him to work in the fields and it was difficult to reach the schools. But his father urged Ali to study, encouraging him to learn Quran recitation in a local religious school and to memorize classical Arabic poetry. In early adolescence, young Ali had an opportunity to recite one of his own poems before the first president of republican Syria, Shukri al-Quwatli, who was so impressed that he awarded the boy an advanced secondary education at government expense in one of the best schools in the country, where he received rigorous intellectual training in both French and Arabic. It was also a center of political activism. The young Ali affiliated himself there with one of the smaller, but extremely well-organized nationalist factions, the Syrian Social National Party (SSNP). It was during this time (probably 1947 or 1948), that he took the pen name "Adunis," which is Arabic for the ancient Greek fertility spirit Adonis. An ancient center for worship of Adonis was in Lebanon, not too far from where the Arabic poet grew up. In taking the name, he was following the lead of SSNP members who aimed to show that many highly respected ideas and beliefs of the Greeks (long acclaimed, in the West, as the founders of their civilization) had actually originated farther east, in the "Syrian" lands. In 1949, the founder of the SSNP, Antun Saadah, was executed for a coup attempt against the Syrian government, which inspired Adunis to compose a series of poems embracing extensive meditations on the nature of heroism and leadership (including "Qalat al-Ard" [1949-1950; The Earth Said] and "Al-Ba`th wa-al-Ramad" [1957; Resurrection and Ashes]). Within a decade, Adunis had begun to shift the object of his deliberations to another magnetic Arab leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who assumed power in Egypt in 1954. Over the next 15 years, Nasser became the foremost advocate for a revitalized vision of an all-embracing Arab nationalism transcending country boundaries. Adunis appears to have embraced a similar view at this time, as shown by his writing of two poems honoring Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil, the founder of the Umayyad caliphate in Spain and a tenth-century hero of the Arab nationalist movement ("Ayyam al-Saqr" [Days of the

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MECELLETU'L-EZHER, C. 31 ,
(sayı 8) s. 970-74 , 1960 KAHİRE.

الكواكبي والقومية العربية

للأستاذ محمد سعيد العريان

في منتصف القرن الماضي نشأ الكواكبي ، وفي مستهل هذا القرن مات ...

نشأ في سورية ، ومات في مصر ،

تنفس أول أنسام الحياة في حلب ، ولفظ آخر أنفاسه في القاهرة ...

وفيما بين حلب والقاهرة ، وفيما وراءهما من بلاد الأمة العربية ، ومن بلاد المسلمين ، كان له خطوات ، ونظرات ، وانفعالات ، ثم كان له من ذلك كله دعوة إلى الإصلاح جريئة وصريحة ...

نصف قرن عاش في هذا العالم ، هو نصف القرن الذي يصنع للبشرية في كل العالم اليوم تاريخها المعاصر ، لأنه نصف القرن الذي تماوجت فيه الأحداث والآراء ، فكان من تماوجها وقتذاك هذه المذاهب السياسية والاجتماعية التي تحكم عالمنا المعاصر : الفوضوية ، والاشتراكية ، والديمقراطية التي نراها اليوم في شتى صورها ، هي صور الحكم التي تمخض عنها اصطراع الآراء ، وانفعالات النفوس ، وأزمات القلب والعقل في النصف الثاني من القرن الماضي . . . نصف القرن الذي عاشه الكواكبي على أرض الشرق .

من تلك الصور التي كانت تتراءى للناس في مرآة الحوادث ، خلال ذلك النصف الثاني من القرن الماضي ، كانت تتراءى لأعين الناس صورتان متشابهتان أعظم التشابه ، إحداهما : في بلاط السلطان عبد الحميد ، والأخرى في بلاط القيصر ...

أما في بلاط السلطان عبد الحميد فكان الخليفة الذي يزعم أنه باسم الله يحكم ويستبد ويسيطر ، وباسمه يخنق ويغرق ويحرق ، وباسمه يسفك ويفتك ويهتك ، ومن حوله أبو لهدى الصيادي وأمثاله ، يزعمون للخليفة ، ولأنفسهم ، وللناس ، أن هذا اللون الفاسد من الحكم هو شرع الله ، وهو الدين ، وباسم الله ، وباسم الدين ، يجب أن يذل الناس ، وأن تطأطأ الرءوس ، وأن يعيش البشر كالرقيق ، أو كقطعان الماشية ، ليس لها حرية ولا رأي ولا إرادة ؛ لأن الحرية والرأي والإرادة هي حق الخليفة الجالس على عرش الله وحده . وليس لها عزة ولا كرامة ولا نعمة ؛ لأن العزة والكرامة والنعمة حق أبي الهدى الصيادي دون سائر المحكومين من رعية الخليفة .

هذه الصورة في بلاط السلطان عبد الحميد

لعهد الكواكبي كانت تقع
مشابهة في بلاط قيصر روسيا
كان ثمة القيصر ، وكان في بطانته ر
وكان الخنق والإغراق والإحراق ، وكان السفك والفتك والهتك ، وكانت الشهوات والمباذل ، وكان الملايين من المحكومين كالرقيق أو كقطعان الماشية . بلا حرية ولا رأي ولا إرادة ، وبلا عزة ولا كرامة ولا نعمة ، وكان ذلك كله بفتوى راسبوتين هو الدين ، وهو شرع الله . وكان القيصر هناك ، مثل السلطان هنا ، هو ظل الله على الأرض ...

من هاتين الصورتين المتقابلتين في استنبول وبطرسبورج ، كان تماوج آراء ، وكان اصطراع مذاهب ، وكانت أزمة العقيدة التي زلزلت إيمان الملايين بالله ، وبالديانات ، وأنشأت الخصومة بين الدين والحرية ...

في إبان هذه الأزمة التي أوشكت أن تعصف بطمأنينة البشر وسلام العالم ، كان الفيلسوف العربي عبد الرحمن الكواكبي في بلادنا ، وكان متفلسفة آخرون في روسيا وفيما يجاورها من البلاد ...

أما عبد الرحمن الكواكبي فقال : لماذا الخصومة بين الدين والحرية ؟ إن الدين لا يخاصم الحرية ، إنه سلام العالم ، وطمأنينة البشر ، وضمير الكون ، وسلوك الإنسانية الراشدة ، وما تلك الصور التي يزيفها أمثال وباطل ... اعرفوا الدين الحق تعرفوا الحرية ، وتعرفوا الإرادة ، وتعرفوا العزة والكرامة ... فأصلحوا دينكم تصلح لكم الحياة ، وتعز وتكرم ..

وأما متفلسفة روسيا فلم يستطيعوا أن ينظروا إلى ما وراء الصورة الظاهرة ، فقالوا إنه أفيون الشعوب ، يخدر العقول ، ويسلب الإرادة ، ويناهض الحرية ...

فلسفتان متقابلتان هنا وهنالك ، أما إحداهما ففلسفة أصيلة عميقة تبحث عن الأسباب والعلل وتطب لأصل الداء ، وأما الأخرى فدعوة تدمير وهدم ورجعية ، تريد أن تنتكس البشرية وتعود أدراجها إلى حيث بدأت ، لا يوجه سلوكها ضمير ، ولا يربط بين آحادها إيمان ولا تهتدي بغير الغريزة ...

في أزمة العقيدة التي استحكمت خلال تلك السنين التي اصطدمت فيها العقيدة بالرغبة في الحرية ، كانت دعوة الكواكبي إلى إصلاح الدين وتجريده ، وإلى وحدة الأمة العربية لتنهض برسالتها لدعم الحضارة وتقدم الإنسانية ، وكانت دعوة لينين ، مقترف الشيوعية الأول ، إلى تدمير الدين ونحوه ،

The American Historical Review
c. 96/s. 5 [December-1991] Washington.
s. 1363-1373.

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

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20 TEMMUZ 1993

Arab Nationalism: Historical Problems in the Literature

RASHID KHALIDI

As with many aspects of Middle Eastern history, the study of Arab nationalism has tended to remain isolated from broader trends in history and the social sciences and specifically from the comparative study of nationalism. Similarly, most writing on nationalism has drawn sparingly on Middle Eastern examples. Thus, while a few of the early studies of nationalism in comparative perspective, such as that of Hans Kohn, devoted some attention to the nascent nationalisms of the Middle East including Arab nationalism, more recent writers, such as Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson, have touched on the Middle East only in passing, if at all.[1]

Within the field of modern Middle Eastern history, beyond a general isolation from current trends in history, including the comparative study of nationalism, there has been a propensity toward compartmentalization along linguistic and national lines.[2] This has led to an unfortunate situation in which those studying Arab and Turkish nationalism, for example, have often been unaware of the relevance of one another's work, unfortunate because Middle Eastern nationalisms—such as Turkish and Arab nationalism before World War I or Zionism and Palestinian nationalism more recently—have strongly influenced one another in many ways and have served as the channels through which political concepts and forms of organization originating in Europe entered the Middle East. Failure to examine these reciprocal influences has at times led to an overemphasis on direct European influences and to numerous other kinds of distortions, notably a

[1] As can be seen from the title of his first book, *A History of Nationalism in the East* (New York, 1929), Hans Kohn came to the comparative study of nationalism after examining its specific properties in the Middle East and Asia, an examination that informs his book *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background* (New York, 1944). See also E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge, 1990); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. edn. (New York, 1991). Hobsbawm offers a list of recent works on nationalism (p. 4), including Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (London, 1983), Anderson's book, and the collection edited by Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, 1983). None of these books deals in any depth with Middle Eastern nationalisms. One of the few authors on nationalism with expertise in the Middle East field is Elie Kedourie, whose work is discussed below. See especially his *Nationalism*, 4th rev. edn. (London, 1985) and the edited work *Nationalism in Asia and Africa* (New York, 1970).

[2] This compartmentalization may be due in part to the specialized language study necessary for work on the historiography of Arab, Turkish, and Iranian nationalism, as well as Zionism. It is also in part a function of the insidious influence of nationalist rhetoric on these different historiographies. As a result of the heady impact of the subject studied on some of those studying it, much research and writing on these topics has come to reflect in microcosm the antagonisms between Middle Eastern nationalisms.

Pan-Arabism

was overthrown by the army chief of staff, General Zia ul Haq. General Zia promised fresh elections within ninety days, as stipulated by the 1973 constitution, and put the country back on the road to democracy. It took him eight years to do so. In the meantime, he used a controversial murder conviction to order the execution of former prime minister Bhutto. His rule for eleven years (1977–1988) was further marred by the bitter legacy of the Soviet war in Afghanistan: rising religious extremism, Islamic militancy, and political confrontation. Pakistan became an ally of the Western powers as a front-line state against Moscow's Afghan misadventure. It did better economically under Zia and developed nuclear capability during the Afghan war years.

Zia was the first ruler of Pakistan who tried zealously to Islamize the state and society, although the nation had taken the designation of "Islamic Republic" under its first constitution, in 1956. It is debatable whether this was the result of his personal religious beliefs, or if he was using religion as a source of political legitimation. Whatever the reason, Zia interpreted the movement for the creation of Pakistan in purely Islamic terms and asserted that Islamization was the best way to secure and stabilize Pakistani society. He took drastic measures for building Pakistan as an Islamic society. He introduced Islamic taxes like *zakat* and *ʿushr*, and replaced centuries-old British laws relating with Islamic penalties for offenses such as theft, robbery, adultery, and false accusation of adultery. He made the drinking of alcohol by Muslims an offence punishable by six months' imprisonment and fine of 5,000 rupees. He established a separate federal Shariʿat (Islamic law) Court to hear appeals against convictions under the Islamic laws. Most of these laws and the Islamization process of the Zia regime have been controversial, but Zia's legacy in this regard lingers on.

The death of Zia in a plane crash returned the country to democracy in 1988. The elections in October of that year resulted in a divided mandate between the Pakistan Peoples Party of Benazir Bhutto and the Muslim League. Benazir became the first women prime minister of Pakistan and the first to head up a democratic government in eleven years. The Punjab, the largest province in the Pakistani federation, had a Muslim League government headed by Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, a former political ally of Zia. The political confrontation between the rival political parties, and the president's willingness to use her powers to dismiss elected members of parliament, provincial assemblies, and governments at the center and in the provinces kept the country unstable. Four elected governments, two of the Pakistan Peoples Party and two of the Muslim League, were dismissed between 1988 and 1996, followed, each time, by new elections. The military continued to play a role in these dismissals from behind the scenes. Ultimately, the various political parties in the parliament closed their ranks and, in 1997, passed the thirteenth amendment to the constitution, which stripped the president of the power to dismiss future elected governments.

This collaboration between the government of Nawaz Sharif and the opposition parties didn't last very long. Sharif had a two-thirds majority in the parliament and was equipped with tremendous executive powers, and he began to act in an arbitrary manner. The opposition dubbed him as a civilian dictator. He forced a sitting president, a chief justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, and an army chief of staff to resign. When he removed General Pervez Musharraf from office in October 1999, the military took over power for a fourth time, through a bloodless coup. General Musharraf designated himself as the chief executive of the country, suspended the constitution, dismissed the central and provincial governments, and promised social and national reforms to return the country to a workable democracy. His coup, like previous ones, was endorsed by Pakistan's Supreme Court, but with the injunction that he would hold elections and hand over power to the elected assemblies within three years. National elections were set to be held on 10 October 2002, but Musharraf held a national referendum in April 2002 and got himself elected as president for a five-year term.

An image of the Badshadi mosque in Lahore, Pakistan, appears in the volume two color insert.

See also **Awami League; Jinnah, Muhammad ʿAli; South Asia, Islam in.**

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Rasul Bakhsh Rais

PAN-ARABISM

Also known as Arab nationalism, pan-Arabism is the ideology that calls for the political unity of Arab peoples and states. By consensus, Arabness is defined not by religion or geographic origin, but, as Satiʿ al-Husri proposed, by language. Arabs are those whose mother tongue is Arabic and who identify with the history and culture associated with it.

Although some scholars trace its origins to nineteenth-century state builders such as Muhammad ʿAli of Egypt, or religious reform movements such as the Wahhabiyya, or intellectuals such as ʿAbdallah al-Nadim and ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, pan-Arabism developed as a coherent ideology and political movement at the time of the First World War. It arose as a response to both European imperialism and to the mismanagement and pan-Turkic ideology associated with the Young Turk movement in the Ottoman Empire.

Edit. Richard C. Martin, Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World, vol. II, New York 2004. pp. 518–519 .İSAM 130386.

EDITOR IN CHIEF JOHN L. ESPOSITO,
THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MODERN ISLAMIC WORLD, Volume, I.
NEW YORK - 1995, s. 113-116 İSAM KTP:
04 KASIM 1995

Egyptian-Israeli conflict, the road to peace, and his role in the league.

TAWFIQ Y. HASOU

ARAB NATIONALISM. Like other strands of third-world nationalism, *qawmīyah ʿarabīyah* or Arab nationalism cannot be understood apart from its anticolonial ethos and its glorification of the collectivity's origins and history in the face of Western dominance. These general components of nationalist doctrine raise, however, important issues in the case of Arab nationalism. For instance, can anticolonial movements based on Islamic reformism (like those of al-Afghānī or Abduh) or regional empire-builders (Egypt's nineteenth-century ruler Muḥammad ʿAlī and his son Ibrāhīm) be considered precursors of the doctrine? Some have looked even further back to emphasize the role of eighteenth-century Salafīyah Islamic movements, such as Wahhābism that preached a pure, "uncontaminated" Islam.

The view adopted here is that Arab nationalism as a political movement is essentially a twentieth-century product. Its bases and components may, however, originate with the presence of the Arabic language itself or with the Arabs' social, intellectual, and political culture. Arab nationalism has been centered on "Arabness" and hence on the important question "Who is an Arab." At present there is consensus around the view of Sāṭiʿ al-Ḥuṣrī (1882–1962) that Arabs are identified by their language, having Arabic as their mother tongue and consciously identifying with it. Indeed, al-Ḥuṣrī defined nationalism as love of the nation and organic identification with it, and the bases of such a national collectivity are language and common history. To these bases some have added common traditions and interests as well as common culture shaped by the same environment. In its most modern form (with Nasser, the Baʿth, or Muʿammar al-Qadhdhāfī), Arab nationalism aims at the political reunification of all Arabic-speaking states from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean, and their transformation from a *Kulturnation* into a *Staatnation.* [*See the biography of Ḥuṣrī.*]

This interplay between the doctrine's cultural and political phases attracts attention to the sequences in its evolution, for the movement acquired its present form only gradually. Its vicissitudes are a function of various factors: intervention of external powers in the region; defining events or political upheavals that shook the area; the type of leadership at the head of the movement; and its competition with two other loci of people's loyalty—the territorial state and Pan-Islamism. The movement's evolution may be divided into four phases.

Nineteenth Century to World War I. Ottomanism and Islamic solidarity were challenged by modernizing forces at the empire's center and by the provinces' demand for Arab distinctiveness. Though interest in Western science and technology united the Young Turks and many Arabs, the drive of the Committee of Union and Progress for turkification alienated the Arabs and accelerated their demand for autonomy. Cultural clubs—organized by Lebanese Christians in collaboration with American missionaries—proliferated (al-Yāzijī, 1819–1871; al-Shidyaq, 1805–1887). When the Syrian Buṭrus al-Bustānī (1819–1883) pleaded for girls' education or the Egyptian Rifāʿah Rafīʿ al-Ṭaḥtāwī (1801–1873) emphasized *waṭan* (fatherland), they constituted secularist challenges to the Islamic establishment of the Turkish caliph. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī (1848–1902) tried to find a compromise and suggested in his *Umm al-Qurā* the return of the caliphate to its originators, the Arabs. The first Arab nationalist conference, limited to Asian Arabs, was held in Paris in 1913. World War I marked the beginning of an explicitly political phase. Sharīf Ḥusayn and his sons, in collaboration with Britain and France and with the active help of T. E. Lawrence, revolted against the empire to establish a single Arab kingdom in its Arab provinces. [*See* Young Turks; Waṭan; Congresses; *and the biographies of Kawākibī and Ḥusayn.*]

Interwar Period to the Establishment of Israel. Rather than forming a unified Arab kingdom, however, the Arab provinces were divided between France and Britain according to the secret 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement. In November 1917 as well, Lord Balfour promised Palestine as a national home for the Jews. Directed against European domination (rather than as before against Muslim authority), the basic We/They dichotomy of nationalism facilitated the movement's politicization. African Arabs were still excluded (as Najib Azouri shows in *Le réveil de la nation arabe dans l'Asie turque*, Paris, 1905). Given the predominantly hereditary leadership at the time and the increasing imposition of European-type administrative divisions, Arab nationalism was locally rather than regionally oriented. Pan-Arab writings such as al-Ḥuṣrī's, with their secularist orientation and objective of a unified Arab state, compensated for this localism.

Revisionist and Mass-Oriented Movements, 1945–1967. Increasingly dominated by a new middle class

THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM (New Edition), Vol. VIII, 1993 LEIDEN, pp.

Gudjarātī, when the distribution of population according to religion was as follows: Hindus, 222,714; Muslims, 28,690 and Jains, 12,542. Since Partition, many of the Muslims have emigrated to Pākistān.

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PALEMBANG, the capital city of the province of *Sumatera Selatan* (South Sumatra) in Indonesia, situated on the shores of the Musi river. It lies in long. 104° 45′ E. and lat. 2°59′ S., and has a population of *ca.* 790,000 (1990), of whom some 85% are Muslims.

The area of Palembang, united with neighbouring Malayu (Jambi), was the centre of the (Mahayana-) Buddhist empire of Sri Vidjaya (4th-14th centuries A.D.), renowned especially in the 8th-10th centuries for its famous study centres for Buddhism and Sanskrit. After the 11th century, tantric Kāla-Čakra-Buddhism with a strong magical component became dominant. In 1377 Palembang was conquered and partly destroyed by the ruler of Madjapahit, the great Hindu-Javanese empire (14th-15th centuries). A royal prince, after his escape, founded Malacca [*q.v.*] in 1403 and became its first sultan after adopting Islam in 1413. The Javanese-Chinese *adipati* of Palembang, Arya Damar (after his conversion to Islam: Arya Dilah = ʿAbd Allāh, 859-91/1455-86), became the ancestor of the later sultans of "Palembang Darussalam". Sultan Susuhunan Arya Kusuma ʿAbd ar-Raḥīm (1069-1118/1659-1706) was the first ruler to adopt this title. After a power struggle between Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin and Sultan Ahmad Najamuddin in 1811-21, a struggle used by the British and Dutch for their conflicting interests, the Dutch finally exiled the last sultan, Najamuddin's son, in 1825, following a last abortive attempt to regain his independence. Thus the history of the sultanate came to an end.

In the second half of the 18th century especially, some Muslim scholars from Palembang achieved international fame, such as ʿAbd al-Ṣamad al-Palimbānī [*q.v.*]. At present, Palembang is the site of an influential *Institut Agama Islam Negeri* (State Islamic Institute, *IAIN*), to promote Islamic education.

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PAMIRS, the name (of unknown etymology) of a mountain massif of Inner Asia. Its core is in the modern Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous oblast of the former USSR, but it spills over into Kirghizia and Tadjikistan to the north and west, and into the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region of China to the east, and Afghānistān (including the Wakhān corridor) and Pākistānī Kashmīr (Āzād Kashmīr) to the south. Comprised mainly of east-west-running ranges, its many river valleys being right-bank affluents of the upper Oxus (here called the Pandj "Five [rivers]", its mountains reach a height of 7,495 m/24,584 ft. on Communism Peak. It is extremely thinly populated: the population of the western Pamirs is in the main ethnically Tadjik and Ismāʿīlī Shīʿī in faith, whilst that of the eastern Pamirs is mainly Turkish Kirghiz and Sunnī Muslim (some of these last, from the Wakhān corridor, fled via Gilgit and eventually settled in Turkey after the 1978 Communist takeover in Afghānistān; see Muhādjir. 2. In Turkey and the Ottoman lands, at vol. VII, 353b). As a typical refuge area, it is in the Pamirs region that there survive certain archaic eastern Iranian languages, such as Shughnī, Ishkāshmī, Wakhī, Yāzghulāmī, Sanglīčī, Mundjī, etc. [see Īrān, iii. Languages, in Suppl.].

Being so topographically and climatically unattractive to all but a few agriculturists in the valleys and nomads on the plateaux, the only part of the region of historical significance has been the upper Oxus valley, along which an important commercial route led to passes across the Hindū Kush [*q.v.*] mountains to the Pandjhīr [*q.v.*] valley of Afghānistān and southwards into Čitrāl [*q.v.*] and Gilgit [*q.v.* in Suppl.]. It was doubtless for this reason that the region was known to the Chinese, with Shughnān [*q.v.*] appearing in Chinese sources, such as the travel account of the early 7th century Buddhist pilgrim Hsüen-Tsang, as *She-kʾi-nior* "the kingdom of the five *She-ni* (gorges)", apparently referring to the Oxus's name here of Pandj. In Islamic times, al-Yaʿḳūbī, *Buldān*, 292, tr. Wiet, 109, mentions the principality in "upper Tukhāristān" [*q.v.*] of (?) Khumār-Beg or Khumār-Tigīn, ruler of Shikinān (Shughnān) and Badakhshān [*q.v.*]; the people there were still pagan, though apparently tributary to adjoining Muslim princes (see Ibn Ḥawḳal, ed. Kramers, 467, tr. Kramers and Wiet, 449-50; Barthold, *Turkestan*³, 65). The *Ḥudūd al-ʿālam* (4th/10th century) situates in the Pamirs region the "Gate to Tibet", *dar-i Tubbat*, and the seat of the *malik* of Wakhān at Ishkāmish, its chef-lieu (tr. Minorsky, 120-1, § 26.12-18, comm. 363-9; cf. Marquart, *Ērānšahr*, 224-6).

Towards the end of the 13th century, Marco Polo passed through the Pamirs region, from Badakhshān to the Wakhān valley and thence northwards to Kāshghar [*q.v.*]; he describes the sparse inhabitants there as warlike Muslims, with a chief called (?) *None* (Yule-Cordier, *The book of Ser Marco Polo*³, London 1903, i, 170-9 and Itinerary map no. III).

Subsequently, the upper Oxus region of the Pamirs was mainly under the political authority of Nizārī Ismāʿīlī hereditary *mīrs* based on Shughnān, who managed to survive pressure and attacks from the local Tīmūrid governors; this isolated Ismāʿīlī community has been significant for its rôle in preserving many theological and legal texts of the sect (see F. Daftary, *The Ismāʿīlīs: their history and doctrines*, Cambridge 1990, 436, 441, 486-7, 544). Toward the end of the 19th century, the upper Oxus/Pandj river was established, after disputes between the Amīr of Afghānistān ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Khān [*q.v.*], the Amīr of Bukhārā and the Russians, as the political boundary between Russian Central Asia and Afghānistān (the Russo-Afghan Agreement of 1895) (see L. Dupree, *Afghanistan*, Princeton 1973, 424).

Bibliography: Given in the article, but see also *BSE*³, xix, 127-9, and the bibls. to Badakhshān, Shughnān and Wakhān. (C.E. Bosworth)

PAN-ARABISM, an ideology advocating an overall union of Arabs (*waḥdat al-ʿArab, al-waḥda al-ʿArabiyya*). Ideologues of Pan-Arabism have consistently recommended such union on the basis of several elements of commonality: (a) Language and culture, considered the ultimate expression of the entire Arab nation and one of its major links with the

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■ عبد الناصر (جمال -)

(١٩١٨- ١٩٧٠م)

جمال بن عبد الناصر بن حسين بن خليل عبد الناصر، قائد عربي تجاوزت أفكاره ومبادئه حدود مصر ليصبح رائداً للقومية العربية في الحقبة المعاصرة. ولد في الاسكندرية لعائلة مصرية متواضعة، أصلها من قرية بني مر (٤ كم عن أسيوط)، تلقى علومه حتى الثانوية في الاسكندرية والقاهرة، حينما كان والده موظفاً متواضعاً في مصلحة بريد قرية الخطاطبة . تذوق معنى الوطنية منذ أن شارك في طفولته بمظاهرات ١٩٣٠ المناهضة للوجود البريطاني في مصر. تخرج في الكلية الحربية عام ١٩٣٨م برتبة ملازم، وعين بسلاح المشاة في ثكنة منقباد، وعند نشوب الحرب العالمية الثانية، نقل إلى الخرطوم، وفي نهاية عام ١٩٤١م عاد إلى مصر ليشهد مع بداية العام التالي امتهان كرامة بلده حينما اقتحم السفير البريطاني قصر عابدين بالدبابات طالباً من الملك فاروق تكليف مصطفى النحاس المؤيد للسياسة البريطانية، تشكيل الحكومة المصرية، فكان ذلك الحدث مدعاة للتفكير بإنشاء ما عرف تاريخياً بتنظيم الضباط الأحرار.

في عام ١٩٤٤م اختير جمال بسبب كفاءته ضابطاً، ليكون مدرباً في الكلية الحربية، ومن خلال عمله اتسعت شهرته على مستوى كثير من ضباط الجيش المصري، وحينما وقعت حرب فلسطين عام ١٩٤٨م شارك فيها وهو برتبة صاغ (رائد) إلى جانب قائده الأميرلاي (قائد اللواء) أحمد عبد العزيز الذي استشهد في آب ١٩٤٨م، وهو يردد على مسامعه «تذكروا جيداً أن هذه الحرب كان أولى أن نخوضها في مصر ذاتها»، وأصيب جمال وتردد

اسمه في معارك إسدود والنقب وعراق المنشية، وحينما حوصر في بلدة الفالوجا رفض أوامر قيادته بوقف إطلاق النار، وظلّ يدافع عنها حتى بداية عام ١٩٤٩م، وكبد العدو (١١٨ قتيلاً)، ومع أنه منح وسام النجمة العسكرية، أكدت الحرب له صدق ماكان يسمعه من قائده قبل استشهاده، وكشفت له عن كثير من خفايا الأمور، كفساد الأسلحة وعدم الإعداد لأخطر معركة واجهها العرب في العصر الحديث، فكانت سنة ١٩٤٩ البداية الفعلية لتنظيم الضباط الأحرار الذي بدأ بلجنة تأسيسية من خمسة ضباط كان جمال على رأسهم، وصدر لهم أول منشور بهذا الاسم سنة ١٩٥٠.

في أيار ١٩٥١م حصل على دبلوم أركان حرب، ومنح رتبة بكباشي (مقدم) وعين مدرساً في كلية الأركان، وقد مكنه عمله الجديد من تعرف النخبة الممتازة من ضباط الجيش، فكثف جهوده في الاتصال بهم، وضمهم إلى تنظيمه الذي أخذ طريقه إلى تكوين خلاياه السرية داخل وحدات الجيش، وقد أفاد عبد الناصر من فترة وجوده، بصفته مدرباً سابقاً في الكلية الحربية ثم مدرساً في كلية الأركان، في تعميق ثقافته العسكرية والقومية من خلال عشرات الكتب التي قرأها (قدرها الكاتب السويسري ج . فوشيه G.Vaucher بنحو ٧٥ كتاباً) معظمها في التاريخ السياسي و الاستراتيجية العسكرية، كما أفاد من سير بعض الشخصيات التاريخية الكبيرة التي كان لها نشاط كبير في بناء وحدة الأمم، التي ينتسبون إليها مثل بسمارك وغاريبالدي.

في بداية عام ١٩٥٢م كانت مدن مصر الرئيسة تشهد أحداث عنف واغتيالات واشتباكات مع القوات البريطانية، انتهت بحريق القاهرة المشهور ومقتل مايزيد على ٦٠ شرطياً بيد القوات البريطانية، الأمر الذي أفاد منه الضباط الأحرار فقاموا بثورتهم البيضاء في ليلة ٢٣ تموز ١٩٥٢م، واستولوا على مؤسسات الدولة جميعها، وأسدل الستار على حكم أسرة محمد علي باشا بإعلان النظام الجمهوري في مصر.

برز في الفترة مابين ١٩٥٢- ١٩٥٤م صراع بين منهجين سياسيين، مثّل الأول جمال عبد الناصر كونه نائباً لرئيس الحكومة و وزيراً للداخلية، وكان يميل إلى ضرورة التغيير والقضاء على الفقر، والمفاسد التي كانت تعاني منها مصر، بأسلوب ثوري سريع. في حين مثّل الثاني اللواء محمد نجيب الذي تولى منصب رئاسة الجمهورية، وكان يرى معالجة هذه الإصلاحات بالأسلوب السياسي البطيء، وانتهى الصراع بإقالة محمد نجيب سنة ١٩٥٤ليصبح عبد الناصر الرجل الأول في مصر، معلناً تنفيذ برنامجه الذي استهله بالتخلص من قيود معاهدة ١٩٣٦م مع بريطانيا، حينما قال في أول لقاء شعبي: «على الاستعمار أن يحمل

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kilde ifade edildi. Yeni Türk sosyo-kültürel varlığının heterojen unsurları bu toprağa bağlandı. Fakat yeni Türk milleti, Sırplar, Bulgarlar, Yunanlılar ve daha sonra Araplar gibi, tarihî zilletlerinin (hezimetlerinin) intikamını almak hevesiyle yanıp tutuşan bir zümrenin hâkimiyeti altında değildi. Tam tersine, tarihî ezilmişlikten ve maziye nostaljiden nispeten âri etno-sosyal grupların eski bir karışımından meydana gelmiş olan yeni varlığın Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nu ihya etmek gibi irredentist bir isteği yoktu. Aslında saltanata karşı isyanını haklı göstermek için tarihe göz yummak elit tabakanın işine geliyordu. Nitekim, eski parlak günlerin rüyasına dalmaktansa, umutla geleceğe bakmak bugün de Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin temel felsefesi ve siyasi yönelimidir.

OSMANLICILIK, İSLÂMCILIK VE ARAPÇILIK (ARABİZM)

Müteveffa Albert Hourani Arap düşüncesine dair klasik incelemesinde, Arap milliyetçiliği bölümüne "Araplık" duygusunu ifade eden kültürel faktörleri vurgulamakla başlamıştır. Bunlar arasında Vehhabî İsyanı ve Mehmed Ali Paşa'nın oğlu İbrahim Paşa'nın Araplara milliyetlerinin ve siyasi özgürlüklerinin geri verilmesine dair sık sık tekrarlanmış bildirisi vardır (gerçi siyasi özgürlük sözkonusu olduğunda bu belki de İbrahim Paşa'nın gerçek düşüncesinden çok Fransızların beklentisi ve umuduydu).[31] Her halükârda Hourani Arapları iki gruba ayırır: Kuvvetli bir monarşinin ve birleşmiş bir imparatorluğun İslâm'ın bağımsızlığını sağlayacağını düşünen Türk taraftarı bir grup; ve imparatorluğun bütünlüğünün ancak meşrutî saltanat, Müslümanlar ve gayri-Müslimler için eşit haklar, din ile siyasetin ayrılması, eşit adalet ve zorunlu eğitim ile korunabileceğine inanan Türk aleyhtarı ve gayrimüslim bir grup. Arap-Türk anlaşmazlığının başlıca sebebi, Hourani'ye göre, bir Arap "millî" kurumu olan hilafetin Türkler tarafından zaptedilmiş olmasıydı. Hourani bu görüşlerini Wilfrid Scawen

31 Bkz. Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, s. 260-323; Osmanlılar hakkında daha sonraları yazdıklarına bakarak, Hourani'nin Arap Hıristiyanlarının milliyetçi yazılarına duyduğu sempatiyi yansıtan eski görüşlerinde radikal bir değişiklik meydana geldiği söylenebilir.

Blunt'un *İslâm'ın Geleceği* (1882) ve James Finn'in *Sancılı Zamanlar (Stirring Times) (1880)* adlı kitaplarından alıntılarla desteklemiştir.

Bu iki yazar da İngilizlerin bir Arap hilafeti kurmak ve Arapları Türklere karşı kışkırtmak amacını güden üstü örtülü politikalarına angaje olmuşlardı. Hourani Arap milliyetçiliğinin doğuşu konusunda daha çok Hıristiyan Arapların yazılarına dayanmış fakat Müslümanların Hıristiyanların çağrılarına cevap vermediklerini itiraf etmiş ve böylece o kadar övülen 19. yüzyıl Arap milliyetçiliği edebiyatının sadece küçük bir azınlığın ürünü olduğunu ve ona hitap ettiğini, geniş kitlelerin takdirine mazhar olmadığını söylemek istemiştir. Gerçek şudur ki Arap elitleri, Türklerden farklı olarak benliklerine kök salmış kuvvetli bir tarihî süreklilik ve etnik kimlik duygusuna sahiptiler. Kur'an'ın dilinin Arapça olduğunun, Peygamber'in bir Arap olduğunun ve Arapların İslâm'ın doğmasında ve yayılmasında büyük bir rol oynamış olduklarının farkındaydılar. Diğer Müslümanlar da Arapların İslâm'daki özel yerini kabul etmekten geri kalmamışlardır. Hattâ Türkler Araplara *kavm-i necib* (soylu millet) unvanını vermişlerdir. Modernlik, Osmanlıcılık ve İslâmcılık Arapların tarihî kimliğini canlandırmamıştır, çünkü bu duygu Araplarda zaten çok kuvvetliydi; sadece eski kimliklerini yeni şartların ışığında yeniden tanımlamaya zorlamıştır. Bu şartlar Arapların öz bilincini derinleştirmiş ve onları değişikliğe uğramış dinî ve etno-kültürel kimliklerine karşı hassaslaştırmış ve tarihlerini değişik bir şekilde algılamaya sevketmiştir. Araplardan farklı olarak Türkler, kendilerini İslâm'la dil veya Peygamber'in kabile ilişkileri bazında değil, sadece inanç bazında özdeşleştirmişlerdir. Bununla birlikte Mevlidleri, Sufilikleri, çoğulcu kültürleri ve özel tarikatleri dinlerinin dış görünüşünü "Türkleştirmiştir". Ama Araplar yine de bir Arap halifesi getirip onun izinden gitmeye pek yanaşmamışlardır. Nitekim, Şerif Hüseyin'in kısa ömürlü sözde hilafeti ve 1924'te Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tarafından kaldırılan hilafetin yeniden tesisi girişimleri bunu göstermiştir. O halde Türklerin halifeliği ele geçirmiş olmaları Arap-Türk ihtilâfının sebebi olamaz (bkz. Onbirinci Bölüm).

Ernest Dawn ve Arap milliyetçiliğini inceleyen başka bilim

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OSMANLI YÖNETİMİNDEKİ TOPRAKLARDA ARAP MİLLİYETÇİLİĞİNİN DOĞUŞU VE SURİYE

M. Derviş KILINÇKAYA

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KAVM-İ NECİP Mİ, KAVM-İ HAİN Mİ?

ARAP MİLLİYETÇİLİĞİNİN DOĞUŞU

AYŞE HÜR

Başlangıçta eski Arap kültürüne dönmeyi ve Arapçaya hak ettiği yeri vermeyi hedefleyen kültürel Arap milliyetçiliği, Batılılarla bölgenin Müslüman ve Hıristiyan Arap aydınlarının ortaklaşa kurduğu Sanat ve Bilim Topluluğu, Doğu Topluluğu, Suriye İlim Cemiyeti gibi örgütler aracılığıyla giderek siyasallaştı. Suriyeli şair İbrahim Yazıcı'nın 1868'de yazdığı ünlü şiirindeki şu dize Arap milliyetçiliğinin o yıllardaki yönelimini gayet iyi özetler: "Uyan ey Arap ve ayağa kalk!"

Araplar ve Osmanlıların elindeki Arap toprakları konusunda uzman olan İngiliz istihbarat görevlisi Thomas Edward Lawrence Araplarla birlikte Akabe'de.

London and the Invention of the Middle East: Money, Power and War 1902-1922, Roger Adelson.

Arapların 400 yıl boyunca barış içinde yaşadıkları Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan ayrılmaları ile biten süreci anlamlandırmak, bugün bile pek çok kişi için zor bir iştir. Şerif Hüseyin'in 1916 Haziran'ında kendi adına çıkardığı bir fetva ile başlayan Arap İsyanı, Türk tarih yazımında "Arapların Türkleri arkadan hançerlemesi" olarak anılır. Arap milliyetçiliğini Jön Türklerin Türkçülük politikaları mı doğurdu, yoksa Arap milliyetçiliği mi Türkçülük akımını doğurdu sorusuna 1938 yılında yazdığı "Arap Uyanışı" *(Nahda)* adlı kitabıyla cevap veren tarihçi ve Arap milliyetçisi George Antonius'a göre, Arap milliyetçiliğinin tarihi 19. yüzyıldaki Hıristiyan ve liberal Müslüman aydınların yoğun olduğu Beyrut'taki misyoner faaliyetlerine kadar gider. Bu görüşü eleştiren ilk isim olan Zeine N. Zeine'ye göre ise Suriye Osmanlı idaresinde ekonomik olarak kalkınmıştı ve Arap milliyetçiliğindeki kritik eşik, Jön Türklerin yerleşik teamüllerden kopup Türk milliyetçiliği politikalarını uygulamaya koymasıyla ortaya çıkmıştı. Tarihçiler Albert Hourani ve A.L. Tibawi ise İslamcı modernizmin emperyalist tecavüzlere karşı bir tepki olarak İslamın taşıyıcısı Araplar fikrini yüceltmeye gittiğini, ancak bunun Osmanlı'dan kopuşu gerektirecek kadar şiddetli bir tepkiye dönüşmediğini söyler. Abdülaziz ed Düri ise Arap ulusu fikrini Peygamber'e kadar götürür ve Arap milliyetçiliğinin "Türkler Batı'ya karşı çıkacak güce artık sahip olmadıklarını gösterdiklerinde ve İttihatçılar Türkleştirme politikalarını benimseyip Arap diline karşı çıkarak ciddi bir provokasyona saptıklarında" güç kazandığını söyler. Ernst Dawn bu görüşlere tamamen karşı çıkar ve Arap milliyetçiliğinin köklerinin 1908 öncesine gittiğini, imparatorluğun sonuna kadar da geniş kitlelerin ilgisini çekmeyen, Şam elitlerinin hükümette yer alma mücadelesi olduğunu iddia eder. Rashid Khalidi Arap tarihini Şam merkezli irdelemenin sakıncalarından söz eder ve Arap dünyasının diğer önemli merkezlerine, örneğin Beyrut ve Kahire'ye bakmadan Arap milliyetçiliğini anlamanın zorluğuna işaret eder. Arap milliyetçiliğinin daha kapsayıcı evrensel bir kül-

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Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı
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İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi

AZİZ ALİ EL-MISRİ VE OSMANLI DEVLETİNE KARŞI FAALİYETLERİ

Aziz Ali El-Mısri And His Activities Against Ottoman Empire

Ömer Osman UMAR

Fırat Üniversitesi Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Bölümü Öğretim Üyesi.

ÖZET

Aziz Ali Mısri, Enver Paşa'nın önemli makamlara gelmesini çekemeyerek, kendisine menfaat sağlamak amacıyla Arap milliyetçiliğine yönelmiştir.

II. Meşrutiyet'in getirdiği serbest ortamdan faydalanarak, önce Kahtaniye daha sonra da, el-Ahd Cemiyeti'ni kurmuştur. El-Ahd Cemiyeti'ne sadece Osmanlı ordusundaki Arap subaylar, üye olabilmekteydi. Cemiyetin amacı, Avusturya-Macaristan İmparatorluğunda olduğu gibi, Türk-Arap federasyonu kurmaktı.

Trablusgarb Savaşı çıkınca, Aziz Ali Mısri de, Trablusgarb'a gitmiştir. Buradan İtalyanlara karşı direnmeden çok, Arapları Osmanlıya karşı kışkırtma faaliyetinde bulunmuş, emirlere uymamış ve yolsuzluk yapmıştır.

Bu kötü davranışları üzerine, Osmanlı yetkili makamlarınca idama mahkum edilip, daha sonra affedilmiştir. Mısır'a giderek, I. Dünya Savaşında İngilizlerle birlikte Osmanlı Devleti aleyhine faaliyet göstermiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Aziz Ali el-Mısri, İngiltere, Mısır, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Arap Milliyetçiliği.

SUMMARY

Aziz Ali Mısri had activities as an Arap nationalist because he was jealous of Enver Paşa who was a successful statesman and promoted to the important positions.

Firstly, he established the society of Kahtaniye and then the society of El-Ahd to take advantage of the freedom of Meşrutiyet II. The members of society of El-Ahd was the some officers of Ottoman Army. The aim of the society was the establish of federation of Türkish-Arab.

Wheh the war of Trablusgarb had started, Aziz Ali Mısri went to Trablusgarb,too. İn this places instead of waring against İtaly, he proveked Araps aganist to Ottaman Empire. Because of his harmful activities he was decided to execute but soon he was forgived. And then he went to Mısır and in these places he allied with England against Ottaman Empire during The World War I.

Key Words: Aziz Ali El-Mısri, England, Egypt, Ottaman Empire, the nationalism of Arap.

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Süveyş'in Batısında
Arap Milliyetçiliği
Mısır ve Nasırcılık

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Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı
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Arap Milliyetçiliği: Ortaya Çıkışından 1918'e kadar

Dr. H. Bayram SOY*

Özet: Osmanlı Devleti'nde Tanzimatla birlikte modern okulların açılmasıyla ve Suriye, Cebel-i Lübnan ve Filistin'deki misyoner okullarının etkisiyle, özellikle Hristiyan Araplar arasında Batılı anlamda milliyetçilik fikirleri yaygınlaşmaya başlamıştır. Müslüman Araplar ise, İslâm dünyasının Batı karşısında önlenemez gerileyişine bir tepki olarak Arap kimlik ve kültür mirasına vurgu yapmak suretiyle, İslâm ve Batı medeniyetlerine Arapların yaptıkları katkılardan bahisle, Arapçılık şuurunu canlandırarak sözkonusu gerilemeye çözüm bulmaya çalışmışlardır.

Hristiyan Araplar, Arap kültür ve dilini canlandıracak faaliyetler yapmanın yanında, Osmanlı Devleti'nden ayrılma fikrini de gündeme getirerek bağımsızlığı savunmuşlardır. Müslüman Araplar ise ayrılıkçı fikirlerden ziyade, imparatorluğun bütünlüğünün muhafaza edilmesine taraftar olmakla birlikte, yaşadıkları bölgelerde Arap dil ve kültürüne daha fazla önem verilmesini talep etmişlerdir. Ancak Suriye'ye kıyasla, İngiliz idaresinin de etkisiyle, daha farklı bir milliyetçilik anlayışı geliştiren Mısırlı Araplar, "vatan" kavramına vurgu yaparak Araplık'tan ziyade "Mısırlı" kimliklerini ön plana çıkarmaya çalışmışlardır.

Müslüman ve Hristiyan Araplar arasındaki milliyetçi akımlara rağmen, Birinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında Hicaz'da Şerif Hüseyin'in başlattığı bağımsızlığı hedefleyen ayaklanma Araplar arasında ancak sınırlı destek bulabilmiştir. Gizli Sykes-Picot Anlaşması ve Balfour Deklerasyonu nedeniyle Birinci Dünya savaşından sonra bağımsızlıklarını elde edemeyerek Birleşmiş Milletler denetiminde İngiliz ve Fransız mandasında yaşamak durumunda kalan Araplar, ancak sömürgelerin tasfiye sürecine gidildiği 1940'ların sonlarından itibaren bağımsızlıklarını elde edebilmişlerdir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Arap Milliyetçiliği, Araplar, Milliyetçilik, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Ortadoğu

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

İNGİLİZLERİN HİCAZ İSYANINA MADDİ YARDIMLARI

*Yrd. Doç. Dr. M. Metin HÜLAGÜ**

A. ARABİSTAN'IN SİYASİ DURUMU

Osmanlı Devleti'nin Asya kıtasında yeralıp bünyesinde kesif bir Arap nüfusu barındıran, ayrıca coğrafî konumu itibarıyla da savaş açısından oldukça önemli bir durum arzetmekte olan[1] Arabistan Birinci Dünya Savaşı arefesinde duygu ve lisan açısından birlik içerisinde olmakla birlikte siyasî yönden sadece gruplara ayrılmakla kalmamış, fakat aynı zamanda birbirine muârız kabileler arasında mücâdele alanı hâline de gelmiştir. Askerî açıdan küçümsenecek bir yapıda olmamakla birlikte müşterek bir Arap hareketini gerçekleştirecek lider ve önderden yoksun bulunmaktaydı[2].

Aralarındaki anlaşmazlıklar nedeniyle savaş kamplarına ayrılmış olan Araplar kendilerine, ister Müslüman ve isterse Müslüman olmayan her kim tarafından olursa olsun yapılacak müdâheleden hoşnut bulunmamaktaydılar. Ayrıca icra edilişinde hiç bir şart kabul etmeyen ve adeta kutsal bir vazife halini alan kan davaları ile geleneksel özgürlüklerine bağlı kalmaya çalışmışlardır[3]. Bu ve sâir nedenlerden dolayı Araplar Merkezî Arabistan'da Birinci Dünya Savaşı öncesi "İbn Suud" ve "Râşidîler" olmak üzere iki idarî kısma ayrılmışlardı[4].

---

* Yrd. Doç. Dr. M. Metin HÜLAGÜ, Erciyes Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Bölümü, KAYSERİ.

1. Zeine N. Zeine, *Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism,* Beirut 1958, s. 98.
2. Kürkçüoğlu, Ömer: *Osmanlı Devletine Karşı Arap Bağımsızlık Hareketi 1908-1918,* Ankara 1982, s. 92.
3. Steiner, M.J.: *Inside Pan-Arabia,* Chicago 1947, s. 53.
4. Glubb, Sir John Bagot: *Britain and the Arabs. A Study of Fifty Years 1908 to 1958,* London 1959, s. 60.

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Kapak

ARAP MİLLİYETÇİLİĞİ

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ulug bilge çad atlıgı... odurgan buyruku çabış sengün bodunı tokuz bayırku kayra basmıl tokuz tatar bunça bodun çad bodunı[42].

Bir kaplumbağa kaide üzerindeki taşa Böke Tutam tarafından işlenen Terhin yazıtındaki bilgiler Şine-Usu ile tamamlandığında göreceğiz ki, Uygur devletinin kuruluşu ve Moyun-Çor Kagan devrini hiçbir yabancı kaynağa başvurmadan öğrenebileceğimiz çok değerli bir tarihi belgedir. Hem Türk tarihi açısında son derece kıymetli olan bu kitabe, hem de kültür tarihimizin vazgeçilmez kaynaklarından birisidir.

Ank. Üniv. D.T.C.F. Tarih Bölümü
TARİH ARAŞTIRMALARI DERGİSİ 1995
cilt: XVII/sayı:28, Ankara-1996, s.85-108
O.119

(42) Bakınız, *Terhin Yazıtı*, Kuzey 4: Kutlu hanımın oğlu Bilge Tölös Ulug Bilge Çad'dır (Şad). Atlıları...Odurgan'dandır. Bakanı, Çabış Şengün halkıdır. Tokuz-Bayırku, Kayra, Basmıl (Kayra-Basmıl?), Tokuz-Tatar bunca halk şadın halkıdır.

II. ABDÜLHAMİD DÖNEMİNDE SURİYE VE LÜBNAN'DA ARAP AYRILIKÇI HAREKETLERİNİN BAŞLAMASI VE DEVLETİN TEDBİRLERİ

*Prof. Dr. Selçuk GÜNAY**

Bilindiği üzere Araplar Osmanlı İmparatorluğu dahilinde yaşayan Müslüman toplulukların gerek nüfus ve gerekse yaygınlık bakımından en büyüklerinden birisidir. Osmanlı Padışahı Yavuz Sultan Selim'in 1517'de Hilafeti Osmanlılara geçirmesiyle Arap Dünyasının büyük bir kısmı üzerinde Osmanlı hakimiyeti. Bu durum Türk-Arap ilişkileri açısından yeni bir dönemin başlaması manasına geliyordu[1].

Osmanlı Devlet yapısında Araplar "Kavim-i Nevip" olarak eddedilip mümtaz bir yere sahip olurken, Osmanlı millet sistemi içindeki yerlerini alıyorlardı[2].

Ancak şurası muhakkaktır ki, Osmanlı yönetiminin Arap dünyası üzerindeki hakimiyeti heryerde aynı özelliği taşımaması, şartların ve coğrafyanın tesiriyle şekillenmiştir. Nitekim Osmanlı yönetimi bilindiği üzere "Mağrip" ve "Maşrık" olarak vasıflandırılan Arap ülkelerinde kendine has yönetim biçimlerini uyguluyordu[3].

Irak ve Suriye gibi ülkelerde eyalet sistemi uygulanırken, Mağrib (Fas, Tunus, Cezayir) ülkelerinde merkez idarenin daha az etkili olduğu bir sistem mevcuttu[4].

Osmanlı Devletinin gerilmesine paralel olarak Arap vilayetlerinde yönetimin aksaklıklar ve bozukluklara uğraması kaçınılmaz gözüküyordu. Ancak tabiatiyle 19. yüzyıl ortalarında itibaren başlıyarak Arap fikri

* Atatürk Üniv. Fen-Ed. Fak. Tarih Bölümü Öğretim Üyesi.
(1) Muzaffer Kürkçüoğlu, Osmanlı Devletine Karşı Arap Bağımsızlık Hareketi (1908-1918), Ankara 1982, s.7
(2) Zekeriya Kurşun, *Yol Ayrımında Türk-Arap İlişkileri*, İstanbul, 1992, s. 18.
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(4) Bernard Lewıs, The Arabs in History, London, 1966, s.161.

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Arab Nationalism: A History

Nation and State in the Arab World

Youssef M. Choueiri

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ARAB NATIONALISM
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

From Triumph to Despair

ADEED DAWISHA

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı
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Panarabism

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Palestinian and Pan-Arab Nationalism, 1918-1939

by Yehoshua Porath

The existence of a human group, Arabic in its language and tracing its origin back to a common ancestral heritage in Arabia, has a long and uninterrupted history. Even Islam with its universalistic tenets could not eliminate Arab feelings of separate identity. Moreover the special place that they and their language hold in Islam did much to consolidate Arab awareness of their own identity. It is true that this awareness was not originally expressed in political terms, and that Islam remained the only legitimate body-politic accepted by most Muslims, including Arabs, up to the second decade of the twentieth century. But already on the eve of World War I this old established *Weltanschauung* was being called in question by Turkish and Arab nationalists and it received a mortal blow with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The ideological transformation underlying nascent Arab nationalism involved a mutation of traditional Arab awareness of their distinct identity into the belief that this should assume political form, either in autonomous and federated provinces inside the Ottoman Empire or, gradually, through a separate state.

Rashīd Ridā and 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Kawākibi, both Syrian exiles in Egypt, active in the early years of the twentieth century, provided one source for this ideology by preaching that Islam could be rescued from the Western and Christian peril only by restoring its original mores; an essential part of its glorious past was the dominant position which the Arabs had once enjoyed within the 'community of the believers'. Demands were made at that time, encouraged by the Egyptian ruling dynasty, to wrest the Caliphate from Turkish hands and restore it to the Arabs, as its only true and loyal upholders.[1] This was regarded as an urgent necessity in order to save Islam from the hands of the decadent Ottoman government, especially after 1909, when it was gradually realised that the overthrow of Abdül Hamid by the Young Turks meant the resumption of the earlier secularising policies which the Sultan had reversed. Abdül Hamid's orthodox policies had been above all intended to cement the loyalty of the Arabs to the last surviving Islamic power. Thus he had made the notables and '*ulamā*' of the Fertile Crescent the main instrument and beneficiaries of his policies. The mosques and religious schools in their towns were lavishly aided and his closest advisers were drawn from their ranks.[2] No wonder that after he had been deposed, his policies reversed and his advisers dismissed, the Arab élite of the various towns adopted a hostile attitude towards the Young Turk government.[3]

After several years in office, it became clear that for the majority of the Young Turk ruling élite the alternative to Abdül Hamid's orthodox-Islamic concept of state and government was a secular national Turkish state. Adopting Turkish nationalism as the alternative foundation of the Ottoman Empire necessarily led to policies of Turkification. The Turkish language was introduced as the sole medium of instruction in state schools and the sole recognized language in Parliament and the law courts, national symbols were derived from the Turkish past, etc. Such policies engendered strong reactions in the Arabic-speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire. And some of the young, Western-educated Arabs reacted to this upsurge of Turkification by espousing a counter-nationalism of their own. Among the early manifestations of this were calls to safeguard the position of the Arabic language and the rights of the Arab

Pan-Arabizm (160202)

edited by. Angelika NEUWIRTH, Birgit EMBALÓ, Sebastian GÜNTHER, Maher JARAR. Myths, Historical Archetypes and Symbolic Figures in Arabic Literature, Beirut-1999, s.423-436.

D.N:139269

23 OCAK 2008

A MYTH OF ARAB NATIONALISM

Fayṣal b. al-Ḥusayn in Amīn al-Rayḥānī's Naḥnu wa-Hārūn al-Rashīd - *A Historical Approach*

JENS-MARTIN MEHLER

On Friday morning, September 8, 1933, the people of Baghdad learned sad news: their King was dead! He had died in the early morning hours of the same day, far away from Iraq.

> The people (...) were stunned.[1] None could take his place as balancer of forces, nor preserve his equal relations with his own extremists and with the British, with town intelligentsia and with wild tribesmen, none could control, by personal prestige, the ruling class and its factions ministers.[2] No one, was the unanimous opinion, could replace Fayṣal.[3]

One may guess that this description of a person, given by two historians, should be enough to create a myth.[4] But the life of Fayṣal b. al-Ḥusayn al-

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1 Majid Khadduri: *Independent Iraq 1932-1958. A Study in Iraqi Politics*. 2nd ed. London 1960, 4.

2 Stephen Hemsley Longrigg: *Iraq 1900 to 1950. A Political, Social and Economic History*. 2nd ed. London 1965, 237.

3 Khadduri: *Independent Iraq*, 4.

4 The term "myth" comes originally from the Greek *mithos* (μῦδος) which means "word" or "speech" in contrast to *logos* (λόγος) which means "word" too, but one that elicits discussion, an 'argument'. Cf. Kees W. Bolle: "Myth", in: *The Encyclopedia of Religion*. Vol. X. New York 1987, 261: "A myth is an expression of the sacred in words: it reports realities and events from the origin of the world that remain valid for the basis and purposes all there is. Consequently, a myth functions as a model for human activity, society, wisdom and knowledge". Beside this religious definition Gero v. Wilpert gives another one which is nevertheless in some way connected to religion but shows the meaning of myths in modern times. He sees myths as "Urdichtung und unerschöpfliche(n) Quell der Poesie. In dieser Form begegnet auf späteren Kulturstufen (...) gegenüber der rationalen, differenzierten Zivilisation immer wieder der Versuch der Mythisierung gewisser Bilder und Vorstellungen, die nach Durchgang durch das rationale Denken und der wissenschaftli-

Development of the Jewish National Home, 1920-1929' (unpublished D.Phil dissertation, Oxford University 1978), pp.316–320; Seikaly, 'Arab Community', pp.218–25, 336–54; Y. Ratner, *Chayai ve-Ani [My Life and Myself]* (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: Schoken, 1978), pp.218–29.

30. For Hushi's words see 'Din ve-Heshbon me-Peulut ha-Va'ad ha-Poel shel Moetset Poalei Haifa' [Report of Activities of the HLC Executive], 1930, LA/Library; see also EHLC, 18 and 29 May 1929, 30 June 1929, 14 July, 13 Aug., 16 and 30 Oct. 1929, LA/250-27-1-620; SCLE, 12 and 28 March 1929, 10 July 1929, LA/210-18; Moshe Shapira, (HLC secretary 1928–1930), to EH, 3 March 1929, LA/208-1-127-b; HLC Labour Exchange, 25 June 1929, LA/250-27-1-647; Hushi to Vilbush, 2 and 10 Oct. 1929, LA/120-1236-1; PHLC, 4 Aug., 10 Oct. 1929, LA/250-27-1-663.
31. For the intertwining of political and economic relations in pre-state Palestine and later see M. Shalev, *Labour and the Political Economy in Israel* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), Ch.2.

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı
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The Antonius Papers and *The Arab Awakening*, Over Fifty Years On

LIORA LUKITZ

What can be the purpose of writing about George Antonius more than 50 years after the publication of *The Arab Awakening*, when apparently everything that was worth analysing and reviewing has already been done by other writers?[1] Why dwell on the issue again if not for the fact that the book itself and its theme – the rise and establishment of nationalism as the leading doctrine in the Arab countries after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire – still remains a source of polemics among those who study the modern history of the Middle East, its traps, dead ends and pitfalls?

The answer is that the consequences of intricate diplomatic exchanges before and after World War I, or the disorientation and confusion they created for future generations, still evoke fervent discussion. The thesis there developed still stimulates scholars to rethink its central themes and their political implications.[2] By following this debate, we are reminded of the complexity of the underlying notions (in their current meaning as well as in their original one), and compelled to reconsider some of the assumptions at their basis which have, over the decades, been accepted as indisputable and uncontested evidence.

One of the principal builders of this construction was, as is widely known, George Antonius. However, amazingly enough, no thoroughly conducted analysis of his personal archive has yet been published which would end the discussion on whether he knew a great deal more than he exposed in his book. The leading studies on the subject analyse *The Arab Awakening* by comparing its text to some of the sources revealed officially after its publication, but a number of questions regarding the discrepancies between Antonius' arguments and the documents in his possession still remain unanswered.[3]

Some answers to these questions are to be found in the papers assembled at the Israel State Archives after Antonius' death. A glance at these papers can bridge the gap between assumptions and evidence and shed some light on controversial points in Antonius' argumentation.

British official documents, private Western and Arab archives, secondary sources and oral accounts were at the basis of Antonius' analysis.[4] These sources, however, had not been used according to a methodical system of reference, opening the way to doubts about the veracity of some of his

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PHILIP S. KHOURY

SYRIA AND THE FRENCH MANDATE

The Politics of Arab Nationalism

1920-1945

WITH A FOREWORD BY

ALBERT HOURANI

- Panorabism

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المقاومة العاملية لسياسة القمع العثماني 1825 - 1750

Pro-Arabica

12 MAI 1989

د. حسين سلمان سليمان(*)

أود أن اشيرَ في مستهلِ هذا البحث إلى المصاعب التي تعترض الباحثَ في تاريخ بلاد الشام عموماً وجبل عامل خصوصاً، خلال معظم الفترة التي خضعت فيها للحكم العثماني (1516 - 1918)، بسبب غيابِ المصادرِ الأصلية لتلك الفترة التاريخية، فرغمَ الحركة الفكرية والعلمية التي عرفها جبلُ عامل في ذلك الزمن، نلاحظ ندرةَ المشتغلينَ من أبنائِه في علمِ التاريخ، وإعراضِهم عنه وانصرافِهم الى علوم الدين من فقهٍ وتوحيد. ونميلُ إلى الاعتقادِ بأن هذا النقصَ انما هو نتيجةٌ لما أصاب البلادَ العامليةِ بعد احتلالِها من قِبَلِ أحمد باشا الجزار، وما أعقبَ ذلك من مصادرته للمكتباتِ العاملية، التي كانت تغص بالكتبِ والمخطوطاتِ الثمينة. ونأمل أن يتمَّ سدُّ هذا النقصِ، مع نشر مزيدٍ من الوثائقِ المحَلية والأوروبية لتلك الحقبةِ التاريخية.

وإلى أن يتمَ ذلك فخيرٌ لنا أن نعرجَ من التوقف عن المشي كلياً، وإذا كان التعمق التاريخيُّ ضرورة، والمادة العلميةُ أقلَ وفرةً مما نرغب ونتمنى، فما هذا بعذرٍ مقبولٍ لتجنبِ الموضوع.

وسوف يكون اطار بحثنا للفترة التاريخية الممتدة من منتصف القرن الثامن عشر ولغاية نهاية الربع الأول من القرن التاسع عشر، مع التركيز على الموقف العاملي من العثمانيين بعد نهاية الشيخ ناصيف النصّار سنة 1781.

لم تشكل حدودُ لبنانَ الحاليةُ مجتمعاً سياسياً واحداً خلال الإمارتين المعنية والشهابية، ولكن عاش سكانُها منذ قرونٍ في أقاليمَ منفصلة، لم تكن تحملُ اسماً واحداً، ولم تستعمل كلمةُ لبنانَ بالمعنى الرسمي المحدد المضمون، إلا بعد إنشاءِ المتصرفيةِ اللبنانية سنة 1861، فقد عُرِفَ المعنيون باسم امراءِ الدروزِ لا امراءِ لبنان، وكذلك عرفَ خلفاؤهم الشهابيون،

(*) قسم التاريخ ـ كلية الآداب ـ الجامعة اللبنانية

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Weldon C. Matthews

PAN-ISLAM OR ARAB NATIONALISM? THE MEANING OF THE 1931 JERUSALEM ISLAMIC CONGRESS RECONSIDERED

One of the most complex questions in the study of the history of Arab nationalism is that of the relationship between Islam and nationalism in collective political identity. This complexity shows itself clearly in the specific case of the Palestinian national movement during the early Mandatory period, when the Islamic political sensibilities that historically had been central to the Ottoman Empire were thoroughly intertwined with Palestinian territorial nationalism and Pan-Arabism.[1] It is not difficult to identify individual Palestinian activists who expressed their political identities at various times through any or all of these categories.[2] Clearly, religious and nationalist bases of social and political identity are neither mutually exclusive nor unchanging over time. Concepts of identity, whether expressed through kinship relations, citizenship, or religious and national identity, are generated, chosen, and manipulated in specific historical circumstances. As Dale Eickelman explains, "These forms do not exist as objects that can be torn from social and cultural contexts by anthropologists for recording and classification into typologies."[3] One can therefore ask, Under what circumstances did Palestinian activists choose to express their political identity in terms of nationalism?

One way to approach this question is to consider nationalism as part of the larger issue of culture, as described by David Laitin. This strategy suggests that nationalism, like other cultural identities, is "Janus-faced," having two dimensions. From one aspect, nationalism seems palpably real to those who participate in it, and it contains its own values, which order political priorities.[4] Such values are suggested in Anthony Smith's formulation of the core doctrine of nationalism, which asserts that specific nationalisms share common beliefs. These are that humanity is by nature divided into nations, that identification with a nation is necessary to the attainment of freedom and self-realization, that nations attain fruition only in their own nation-states, and that other loyalties are subordinate to that of the nation-state.[5] The second face of culture shows itself to be a resource to be exploited by political entrepreneurs seeking to maximize their power and influence. Aspiring and competing leaders recognize that "*shared cultural identities facilitate collective action*" and thus deploy these identities

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6

HAZEM ZAKI NUSEIBEH

The Religious Factor in Arab Nationalism

Since Islam plays a vital role in Arab nationalism, a difficult problem facing this movement, and the movement for Arab unity is the large number of non-Muslim Arabs. In this selection Nuseibeh describes how Arab nationalists themselves have unsuccessfully attempted to solve this problem.

WHAT were the ideas and the basic postulates of this specifically Arab nationalism? They were, to begin with, a combination of many factors in a developing process. Each stage of development differs in certain

From Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh, *The Ideas of Arab Nationalism,* pp. 47–68. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), copyright, © 1956 by Cornell University. By permission of the publisher.

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important aspects from its predecessor and betrays all too clearly the internal as well as the external influences at work. In the course of less than half a century, five distinct stages are clearly recognizable. The first registers the impact of European expansion, exemplified in the occupation of Egypt and Algeria. The European expansion evoked an Islamic-Arab reaction. But the idea of a united Islamic state was still the axis around which the movement rotated, and the religious impulse still predominated over the national. The outstanding exponent of this phase was Abdul Rahman al-Kawakebi of Aleppo, Syria. Although a contemporary and a disciple of Afghani, Kawakebi branched out on his own by differentiating between the Arab movement and the general Pan-Islamic movement. He had derived the distinction between the Arab and the non-Arab Muslim peoples

> from the lessons of history, that is to say from the part played by Arabs in the rise . . . of Islam, from the intimate connexion between the Arab genius and the spirit of Islam, and from the special place to which the Arabs were entitled in the fortunes of Islam by their language and their descent. So that, while fully upholding the doctrine of the unity of Islam

and subscribing to Afghani's campaign for the regeneration of Islam, he advocated the transfer of the caliphate to an Arab of the Quraysh tribe, with Mecca as the capital.[1]

The second phase reflects the reformist tendencies, which had been mounting to a crescendo under the impact of the repeated reverses suffered by the Ottomans in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean. The Arab populations of the Empire were dismayed at the failure of the central authorities to ward off European encroachments on Arab territories. The Italian seizure of Tripolitania in 1912 was the spark which ignited the powder keg of Arab disaffection.

. . .

The third phase was the Arab answer to the Turkish nationalist movement, which was beginning to assert itself under the banner of Pan-Turanianism. Clearly, the Young Turks who preached this racial creed were guilty of inconsistent thinking. For

> Turanianism, with its ideal of exalting the Turkish nationality and stressing the affinity of the Turks in the Ottoman Empire with their racial brothers in central Asia, was the negation of the doctrine of Ottomanism, which aimed at uniting the different races of the empire into one nation on a basis of equality for all.[2]

The policy of Turkification naturally alarmed the Arabs and drove them to active opposition, both open and subterranean.

The principal demand was still decentralization so that the Arabs could pursue their own cultural and political development unhindered. The Arabic language occupied the chief place in the Turco-Arab con-

3

Arab Nationalism and Islamism

Like other religions, Islam is not a generic essence, but a nominal entity that conjoins, by means of a name, a variety of societies, cultures, histories and polities. Some hagiolatrous (or worse) varieties of Islam in India, for instance, are no closer to Islam "in essence" than certain contemporary African messianic prophetisms are to Christianity, though the "Hinduism" of the former does not, except in specific fundamentalist moments, alter its title to Islamism. If religion is a determinate concept denoting the elaboration of belief, practice, society, polity and the world in general by means of the opposition between the sacred and the profane, a particular religion, as a generic phenomenon, adds virtually nothing to this save a name and a number of associated classificatory tokens (basic dogmas and fundamental devotions and, above all, specific textual and other genealogies). The determinate existence of a religion is always historical, the specific production and circulation of what has been termed *les biens religieux*[1] in a specific social location by and for specific groups involved in the social and political dialectic. A religion is always produced and reproduced according to the exigencies of society and polity, though this is almost invariably undertaken in terms of a fundamentalist motif, a myth of origin claiming a particular textual genealogy.

This marriage of fundamental heterogeneity and fundamentalist homogenization, and the claims of the latter to primacy, is the first cautionary point I wish to make before the connections of Islamism and Arab nationalism are explored. Given the assumption that there is little that is generically Islamic about Islam, the relation between contemporary Islamic movements and ideologies and Arab nationalism is not one which finds its bearings in a comparative juxta-

position of Islam and Arab nationalism, which charts their concordance and discordance or which registers the correspondence or conflict of identities, as in the standard positions on the matter.[2] But this should not imply that there is not something generically religious about Islam and whatever classifies itself as Islamic, for these call forth immediately and valorize the vast repertoire of tokens and images that have been associated with that constellation of specific cadences of the relation between the sacred and the profane that history and collective memory have registered as Islamic. The positive connection between Islam and Arab nationalism takes place, in terms of the first, on the domain of sacralization, and in terms of the second, on that of Arabization. They relate, not as pre-existent *sui generis* entities, but as they are separately or jointly generated in terms of antecedent (and ever-changing) ideological, sociological, political and cultural locations.

Like things sacred, nations and their ideological components are constantly fashioned and refashioned. They do not belong to the realm of nature, and are no more the results of a seminal continuity and fixity than religious communities, but are rather delimited as political units by nationalist movements, and thus can not be said to antedate them except in the fantastic genealogies of nationalism.[3] That nationalism, including Arab nationalism, is not generically coterminous with the existence of the Arabs is the second cautionary point I wish to make; whereas Lebanese Nasserism and that of the Syrians, for instance, share the same political language, their socio-political and cultural import is utterly distinct, as distinct perhaps as the Baathism of Tripoli and of South Lebanon, or as Beirut Nasserism of 1975 and 1984, especially with a view to relation with Islamism.

This seemingly enigmatic situation is indicated in order to underline two matters of relevance to the relation between Islamism and Arab nationalism. Chief among these is that nationalism, like Islam, is sociologically indeterminate,[4] in the sense that the politico-cultural unity it espouses, and the politico-cultural unification whose agency it is, are not ones which can be exclusively apportioned to a particular class or coalition of classes, not even the "middle class". Put in another way, this indicates that the different parties to the social and political dialectic (classes or political groups of a more various bearing, as would be more appropriate, in the case of Arab and other Third World nationalisms) can be said to constitute

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مستقبل العلاقة بين القومية العربية والإسلام

د. أحمد صدقي الدجاني

رئيس المجلس الاعلى للتربية والثقافة والعلوم في منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية، واستاذ التاريخ بمعهد البحوث والدراسات العربية

(١)

في مستهل دراستنا لمستقبل العلاقة بين القومية العربية والاسلام نستشعر الحاجة ، بداية ، إلى تحديد مفهومنا لبعض المصطلحات التي نتداولها ، وصولا إلى تحديد واضح لموضوع الدراسة والمسائل التي سنتداولها فيه .. تنبع الحاجة إلى تحديد مفاهيم المصطلحات من حقيقة أن عدم تحديدها في الحديث عن القومية العربية والاسلام أدى إلى بروز خلافات حادة بين المتحدثين كان يمكن الاّ تبرز لو بدأنا بالتحديد ، ومن الممكن أن تضيق أو تنتهي لو استدركنا وحددنا . والأمر متصل بما يطرأ على معاني الكلمات ومدلولاتها من تطور عبر الزمان ، وبالمعاني الجديدة التي تعطى لكلمات قديمة في مرحلة معينة . وتنبع الحاجة إلى التحديد الواضح لموضوع الدراسة من حقيقة اتساع الموضوع ، ولكوننا نبحث في العلاقة بين أمرين تترابط فيهما العناصر وتتداخل .

إن مفهومنا لمصطلح **القومية العربية** يشمل الفكرة والحركة . وهذه **الفكرة** تقوم على **الفكر العربي القومي** ، الذي نعرفه بأنه « فكر ينطلق من الايمان بحقيقة الانتماء القومي لأمة عربية واحدة ، وينشغل بدراسة واقع هذه الأمة ، ويبحث من ثم في التدليل على وجودها كوحدة ، وفي توحيد الوطن العربي ، وفي تحرير الأجزاء المحتلة من هذا الوطن ، وفي التقدم به ، وفي تحديد مكانه في العالم » . كما أن **الحركة** هي العمل على تجسيد هذه الفكرة من خلال تفاعل الانسان مع بعدي الزمان والمكان ، وصولا إلى الهدف .

ويرتبط بهذا المصطلح، مصطلح **الأمة العربية** التي هي الجماعة البشرية المعنية والتي توافرت لها مقومات الأمة . ونلاحظ هنا أن كلمة « أمة » تحمل معنى جديدا طرحه الفكر القومي وتجاوز به المعنى القديم للكلمة. كما يرتبط بهذا المصطلح، مصطلح **الوطن العربي** الذي هو وطن هذه الأمة . أما مفهومنا للاسلام فهو انه دين سماوي ، نزل على الرسول العربي ، يرى فيه المؤمنون عقيدة ونظاما للحياة في شتى مجالات الحياة . ويرتبط بهذا المصطلح مصطلح

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المسلمين ، وهم الذين يعتنقون هذا الدين ، وفيهم عرب وغير عرب من شعوب أخرى . ويستخدم البعض في التعبير عن المسلمين مصطلح « **الأمة الاسلامية** » ضمن المعنى القديم لكلمة الأمة . كما يرتبط بهذا المصطلح مصطلح **العالم الاسلامي** الذي يضم كل أرض يعيش عليها مسلمون ، والوطن العربي جزء منه . ويرتبط بهذه المصطلحات جميعها مصطلح **الحضارة العربية الاسلامية** ، التي هي إحدى الحضارات البارزة في التاريخ الانساني ، والتي قامت وازدهرت في الوطن العربي والعالم الاسلامي ، ومثلت جماع نشاطات الحياة فيهما . وهناك من يقتصر على وصفها بأنها **عربية** أو بأنها **إسلامية** ونحن نميل إلى أن نقرن الصفتين معا إنطلاقا من حقيقة دور العرب ولغتهم فيها ودور الاسلام والمسلمين فيها .

هناك مصطلحات أخرى جرى تداولها خلال القرن الماضي عند البحث في هذا الموضوع ، ويتصل معظمها بمصطلحات تستخدمها الحضارة الغربية الحديثة . ويمكننا أن نحدد مفاهيمنا لها على ضوء مفاهيمنا لتلك المصطلحات الأساسية[١] .

نصل إلى تحديد الموضوع الذي نحن بصدد دراسته ، وهو مستقبل العلاقة بين القومية العربية والاسلام ، فنطرح فيه ثلاث مسائل :

المسالة الاولى : ما هو المكان الذي سيحتله الاسلام كدين في فكرة القومية العربية وفي حركتها ؟

وما هو المكان الذي ستحتله الفكرة القومية عموما وفكرة القومية العربية على الخصوص في الفكر الاسلامي والعمل للاسلام ؟

المسالة الثانية : كيف ستكون العلاقة بين الوحدة العربية والتضامن الاسلامي ؟ وقبل ذلك ، ما هو مكان الوحدة العربية في التضامن الاسلامي ؟ وما هو دورها في تحقيقه ؟

المسالة الثالثة : ما هو دور العرب موحدين ودور المسلمين متضامنين في عالمنا المعاصر ، على الصعيد الحضاري الانساني ؟

لا بد لنا أن نمهد لحديثنا عن هذه المسائل الثلاث بالتذكير بمنهجنا في الدراسة المستقبلية . فهذا المنهج ـ بإيجاز شديد ـ يعتمد على معرفة صورة الواقع موضوع البحث وتحليلها ، والربط بين هذه الصورة وبين مجرى الحركة التي أوصلت إلى هذا الواقع ، ويكون الانطلاق من ذلك إلى تشوف المستقبل وطرح ملامحه والتوقعات التي يحتمل حدوثها فيه ، كاستمرار للحركة التي تحكم الواقع . ولا يغيب عن البال عند طرح الملامح والتوقعات دور إرادة الفعل في صنع المستقبل ، ودور الحلم في صنع إرادة الفعل[٢] .

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(١) تتبع هذه المصطلحات برنارد لويس في بحثه ، «On Modern Arabic Political Terms» المنشور في كتابه: Bernard Lewis, **Islam in History** (New-York: Alcove Prezz, 1973) كما قدم جاك بيرك بحثاً عنها الى الندوة العالمية حول الإسلام التي انعقدت في باريس يوم ٤ كانون الأول (ديسمبر) ١٩٨٠ .

(٢) بشأن الدراسة المستقبلية يراجع :

قسطنطين زريق ، **نحن والمستقبل** (بيروت : دار العلم للملايين ، ١٩٧٨) ؛ وقد شرحنا وجهة نظرنا في المنهج في كتاب ، **العرب وتحديات المستقبل** (القاهرة : مكتبة الانجلو ـ المصرية ، ١٩٧٦) .

Author: MAKSOUD, HALA SALAAM
Title: THE ISLAMIC CONTENT OF ARAB NATIONALIST THOUGHT, 1908-1944
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Source: DAI 50/09A, p.2926 Publication No.: AAC9004739
Subject: PHILOSOPHY (0422); POLITICAL SCIENCE, GENERAL (0615); RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY OF (0322)

Abstract: Islam and Arabism are closely interwoven. The challenge facing theoreticians of Arab nationalism was to distinguish their perimeters. This dissertation examines how Arab nationalists responded to this challenge and on what basis they justified Arab separatness from the Ottoman Empire--the only existing Muslim power at the beginning of the century. If Islam is the major determinant of Arab consciousness, how did Arab nationalists cope with the political dimension which is inherent in Islam? Did they develop a concept of the state and a theory of government independent of Islam?

In an attempt to answer these questions, this dissertation reviews the genesis of Arab nationalist thought until 1944. It shows that the Arab nationalist movement is a product of the reformist movement in Islam. It asserts that nationalism, inasmuch as it incorporates a secular theory which considers the citizen centre-place irrespective of religious or communal affiliations, would not have hit a responsive chord with the deeply-religious Arab masses were it not for the novel reformist interpretations of Islam introduced by highly-respected Muslim theologians. It was reformist Muslim thinkers who bestowed legitimacy on Arab consciousness and at the same time gave Western concepts of government Islamic acceptability.

Empowered with this legacy, Arab nationalists did not fully realize the serious challenge that Islam constituted. Western-educated and estranged from the Muslim discourse, they assumed that Islam could be spiritualized and divested of its political content without a confrontation. They did not address the political problems pertaining to the role of Islamic law in the formation of a secular state where all citizens are treated equally and obey the same laws independent of their religious beliefs.

This dissertation deduces that the rise of Islamic fundamentalism can be partly attributed to this theoretical vulnerability which was revealed during the nineteen seventies as a consequence of the political setbacks encountered by nationalist elites.

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ISLAM AND THE THEORY OF ARAB NATIONALISM

by SYLVIA G. HAIM

IT IS OFTEN argued that Islam and nationalism, being systems different in origin and inspiration, are contradictory almost by definition, and that no useful purpose can be served in discussing them in connection with each other. In this essay I will, however, try to examine Islam and Arab nationalism as systems of belief, and to discover the point of contact between them, and whether a reconciliation between the two creeds is possible or not.[1] It will be necessary to study the literature of the Arab nationalist movement, to trace any Islamic elements that it may contain, and to endeavour to relate these elements to the traditional system of Islamic belief. Such a study will involve the discussion of the changes that have come over certain terms, Islamic in origin and character, as a result of the infiltration of Western ideas into Arabic thought.

Nationalist doctrines in Europe have usually encouraged xenophobia, an exaggerated pride in race and language, and a desire to seek inspiration in a pre-Christian past; Eastern nationalisms naturally followed suit in these as in other, perhaps less aggressive, tendencies of nationalism, since it was from Europe that nationalist theories were learnt in modern times. The literature of Arab nationalism does not lack illustrations of these tendencies. To take an example, Sāmi Shawkat, a Director General of Education in Iraq in the 1930's, spoke as follows to the teachers of private and foreign schools in Baghdad in 1939:

'We have up to now neglected a most vital aspect of our glorious history; we have made it start at the prophetic message, and this is a period of less than fourteen centuries. In reality, however, the history of our illustrious Arab nation extends over thousands of years, and goes back to the time when the peoples of Europe lived in forests and over marshes, in caves and in the interstices of the rock; at that time our own ancestors used to set up banks, sculpt statues, and lay down canons and codes of law; they invented then the first principles of medicine, geometry, astronomy, the alphabet, and the numerals. On the stele of Hammurabi in the Louvre, we find inscribed the basic law given by one of our ancestors, Hammurabi; one of its clauses concerns the legal punishment of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth; this took place before the Torah, the Gospels, or the Qur'ān. In the same way we find that everything makes us lift our heads high when we consider the histories of the Semitic empires formed in the Fertile Crescent—the Chaldean, the Assyrian, the African, the Pharaonic, or the Carthaginian; all these things must persuade us that the civilization of the world at the present time is based on foundations laid by our ancestors. These empires and their dependencies are all our property; they are of us and for us; we have the right to glory in them and to honour their exploits, just as we have the right to cherish and exalt the glories of Nabuchadnezzar, Hammurabi, Sargon, Rameses, Tutankhamen, in the same way that we glory and take pride in 'Abd ar-Rahmān ad-Dākhil, 'Abd al-Malik b. Marwān, Hārūn ar-Rashīd, and al-Ma'mūn.'[2]

Sāmi Shawkat went on to say that this pride in the Arab past had to be systematically inculcated: 'No other history', he ended his address by saying, 'is to be taught in an attractive and sympathetic manner except the history of the Arab nation (*al-umma al-'arabiyya*), and when I say the Arab nation, I mean the history of all the Semitic waves.'[3] A more detailed exposition of his views on the role of the

[1] See also 'Islam and Arab Nationalism', in *Die Welt des Islams* (New Series), Vol. III, p. 201.

[2] Sāmi Shawkat, *Hādhihi ahdāfuna, man āmana biha fa huwa minna* (Baghdad, 1939), p. 11. See also Muhammad Jamīl Baiham, 'Al-'Arab qabl al-Islām wa ba'duhu fī Filastīn', in *Al-'Irfān* (Sidon, 1952), pp. 440–1. The author there maintains that the Arab nationality (*qaumiyya*) and language precede Islam in Syria.

[3] Shawkat, p. 14. Sāmi Shawkat is not the only one to make the Arabs the ancestors of all known civilizations in the Middle East; 'Alī Nāsir ad-Dīn, an ideologue of Arab nationalism, does the same, and affirms that what are commonly called peoples (*shu'ub*), such as the Assyrians or the Chaldeans, are Arab tribes and not nations or peoples. He considers that Islam, although important as an event because of the expansion it made possible, is but an accident in the larger and older being of Arabism. See his *Qadiyyat al-'Arab* (Beirut, 1946), pp. 30 n. 1, 55 n. 2, 57 n., 104 ff. Edmond Rabbath, a Syrian Christian, at one time Deputy in the Syrian Parliament, elaborates the same point of view with greater precision and a show of scientific method. See his *Unité Syrienne et Devenir Arabe* (Paris, 1937).

Panarabism

Martin Hartmann

Der Islamische Orient

Band - II. Die Arabische Frage

Amsterdam – 1976, s. 1-685.

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Gibt es eine arabische Frage?

Es gibt heute eine und es gab immer eine. Nur trat sie verschieden stark hervor. Eine Weltfrage wurde sie vor 1285 Jahren. Eine Weltfrage zu werden ist ihre Zeit nahe. Wie oft sie vor Muhammad es gewesen, wissen wir nicht[1]).

Diese Frage darf nicht zusammengeworfen werden mit der andern, die ihr verwandt ist und zugleich in scharfem Gegensatz zu ihr steht, der Islam-Frage. Bei der Arabischen Frage handelt es sich um Volksgesellung, nicht um Glaubensgesellung. So sehr hat freilich der Islam das Nationale auszuschalten verstanden, dass es für zahlreiche arabische Muslime nicht da ist, dass sie unter der Fahne der Religion jeden Augenblick bereit sind, gegen die andersgläubigen Volksgenossen zu wüten, und dass sie das härteste Joch der Stammfremden tragen, wenn sie glauben, der Islam fahre gut dabei.

Nach der politischen Stellung sind heute drei Gruppen von Arabern zu unterscheiden:

1. Araber unter arabisch-islamischer Herrschaft,
2. Araber unter nichtarabisch-islamischer Herrschaft,
3. Araber unter nichtarabisch-nichtislamischer d. h. fränkisch - christlicher Herrschaft.

Die Gruppe „Araber unter arabisch-nichtislamischer Herrschaft“ gibt es noch nicht.

Die Gruppen unter arabisch-islamischer und fränkisch-christlicher Herrschaft bleiben hier unerörtert. Die arabisch-islamischen Reiche sind gering an Zahl. Nur eines ist bedeutend: Marokko. Das ist endlich

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Kütüphanesi

A NEW TREND IN THE REALM OF ARAB THOUGHT

by

TSUTOMU SHIRAKAWA

Millî Kütüphane
24 ARALIK 1993

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34. Ibn Kathir, Tafsir al-Qur'ān.
35. George Sale, The Koran Preliminary Discourse, London, P.30
36. William, Historian's History of the world, London, 1908 A D., P. 11.
37. Ibid., P. 113.
38. D. G. Hogarth, Arabia, Oxford, 1922 AD., P. 20; Bertram Thomas, The Arabs, London, 1937 AD., P. 43 ; Arthur Gilman, The Saracenes, London, 1883 AD., P. 60
39. Al-Qur'ān, 111:3
40. Ibid., 11: 23- 24.
41. Ibid., XLI: 41-42,
42. Ibid., LXIX: 41-43.
43. J. H. Rodwell, The Koran, London, 1876 AD., P. 21.

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15 MAYIS 1996

REVIEW

Pan-Arabism

Uneasy Symbiosis: George Anthonius's Anglo-Arab Discourse in The Arab Awakening

Geoffrey P Nash

According to Edward Said, *The Arab Awakening, The Story of the Arab National Movement* belongs to the category of grand narratives of emancipatory nationalism. This judgement of George Antonius's book is not the usual one however. It has been discussed mainly in terms of its status as a nodal point within the field of Middle East Studies. Thus Albert Hourani's 1977 George Antonius Memorial Lecture to St Anthony's College Oxford poses the question "how far the book can be regarded as a permanent and valuable contribution to our knowledge of its subject", and then goes on to review the revisions of Antonius's historical argument made by the likes of Sylvia Haim, A L Tibawi, Z N Zeine, and C E Dawn. Though Hourani problematizes Antonius's mixing of "political advocacy" with "historical narrative", it is as an essay in historical analysis that he is primarily interested in the work [1]. So a recent reviewer, critical of the influence of Antonius on the study of Arab nationalism, is more concerned to refute what he calls the "Antonius paradigm" than to read The Arab Awakening for its function as a liberationist narrative [2].

A methodology which approaches any piece of historical writing and analyzes it according to its discourse, attitudes and alignments is itself open to criticism of the type that "what actually happens" (or happened) in societies like the Arab ones Antonius writes about, is not conclusively decided upon by analysis of "what people say and write about them"[3]. It is the contention of this article, however, that once the terms of its discourse

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THE ARAB NATIONALISM OF MAKRAM 'UBAYD

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The Arab nationalism of Makram 'Ubayd, the Coptic Secretary General of the Wafd from 1927 to 1942, and one of the most important political figures of modern Egypt, has been widely noted. Virtually every work on Arab nationalism in Egypt or on Coptic-Muslim relations mentions 'Ubayd's Arab nationalism, if only in passing. These works can be divided into two broad categories. First, there are works, often by Arab authors, that regard 'Ubayd as a sincere pioneer of Egyptian Arabism and as an important example of the fact that not all Copts have been suspicious of, or hostile to, Arab nationalism. Sa'ad al-Dīn Ibrahīm's praise of 'Ubayd for his ability to make of Arab unity a complement to his deep Egyptian patriotism,[1] or Muṣṭafā al-Faqī's tribute to 'Ubayd as one of the few Egyptian politicians who understood the importance of the Arab area at an early period,[2] are typical. On the other hand, there is a second body of works, often by Western writers, that is negative, seeing 'Ubayd's Arabism as the pandering of a hypocritical Copt who sought to ingratiate himself with a Muslim audience. In her classically hostile work towards Arab nationalism, Sylvia Haim speaks of 'Ubayd as a Coptic leader who liked to curry favour with Muslims and who therefore declared that the Egyptians are Arabs.[3] And B. L. Carter, writing twenty-five years later, calls 'Ubayd an 'unlikely supporter of Arabism who may have adopted it as a tactic to overcome the handicap of his Christian background'.[4]

This article is divided into two parts: (1) a review of the articulated

[1] Sa'ad al-Dīn Ibrahīm, 'Makram 'Ubayd: al-Miṣriyya wa-l-'Urūba', in Munā Makram 'Ubayd (ed.), *Makram 'Ubayd, 1889–1989: Kalimāt wa-Mawāqif* (Cairo, 1990), 27–9.

[2] Muṣṭafā al-Faqī, *al-'Aqbāṭ fī l-Siyāsa al-Miṣriyya: Makram 'Ubayd wa-Dawruhu fī l-Haraka al-Waṭaniyya* (Cairo, 1985), 83.

[3] Sylvia Haim (ed.), *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology* (Berkeley, Cal., 1964), 52.

[4] B. L. Carter, *The Copts in Egyptian Politics: 1918–1952* (Cairo, 1986), 108.

views, published writings, and activities that have contributed to 'Ubayd's reputation as an Arab nationalist; (2) a discussion of why 'Ubayd may have adopted Arabism. Before turning to these matters, a note about the importance of 'Ubayd, and hence the importance of determining the cause and nature of his Arabism, may be relevant. To say simply that 'Ubayd was Secretary General of the Wafd says very little. He was Muṣṭafā al-Naḥḥās's right-hand man, and some have argued that 'Ubayd, and not al-Naḥḥās, exercised control over the party. Whatever scholars' ultimate evaluation of 'Ubayd's career and talents may be, virtually no contemporary or later observers have failed to comment upon his extraordinary intelligence, wit, eloquence, energy, and organizational and administrative abilities. A brilliant political tactician who could move among the political élite with consummate skill, he was nevertheless a truly populist leader, with strong links to the press, the labour movement, and to the youth and other cadres of the Wafd party. The nicknames given to him—'Ibn Sa'ad' (the Son of Sa'ad) and 'al-Mujāhid al-Kabīr' (the Great Struggler)—did not emerge from a vacuum. At the same time, 'Ubayd was a Copt, but a Copt who was in no way a token and who was so influential and so well integrated as to be able to transcend virtually all identity as a leader of a particular religious community.[5] Having made these observations on 'Ubayd's importance, I now turn to the heart of my remarks.

14 HAZIRAN

I. THE FOUNDATION OF 'UBAYD'S REPUTATION AS AN ARAB NATIONALIST

'Ubayd's first espousal of Arab nationalism seems to have come in the summer of 1931, during a visit to Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon.[6] In speeches in all of these countries he spoke explicitly and clearly of Arab identity, of the bonds that linked the Arab peoples in the past and present, and of the hopes for an Arab future. He based Arab unity on linguistic, emotional, and spiritual ties, but also on a common struggle against imperialism. He called, specifically, for a future economic union

[5] This summary of 'Ubayd's importance draws, in particular, upon al-Faqī, op. cit.; Makram 'Ubayd, op. cit.; Carter, op. cit.; Janice Terry, *The Wafd 1919–1952* (Beirut, 1982); and Ṭāriq al-Bishrī, *Al-Muslimūn wa-l-Aqbāṭ fī Iṭār al-Jamā'at al-Waṭaniyya* (Cairo, 1984).

[6] This trip is treated in a number of sources to which I refer in the course of this article, and more particularly in Thomas Mayer, *Egypt and the Palestine Question, 1936–1945* (Berlin, 1983), 22–32; Muḥammad 'Alī Ṭāhir, *Nazarāt al-Shūrā* (Cairo, 1932), 131–4; Anīs Ṣāyigh, *Al-Fikra al-'Arabiyya fī Miṣr* (Beirut, 1959), 34–6; and Makram 'Ubayd, op. cit., *passim*.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Arab Nationalism and the Idealist Politician: The Career of Sulayman al-Baruni

J. E. PETERSON

The career of the Tripolitanian resistance leader and Ibadi author, Sulayman al-Baruni (1870–1940), took place during a critical period in the evolutionary process of modern political thought in the Arab world. Al-Baruni was raised in a traditional and heavily religious atmosphere, yet during his lifetime he displayed a strong commitment to secular politics and acquired military experience as a guerrilla commander in Tripolitania against the Italians. The combination of religious upbringing with involvement in political and military affairs may seem paradoxical at first glance, but this ambiguous role formation was a logical result of the intellectual and political climate prevailing in the Arab world during the early part of the twentieth century. At that time, Arab response to the direct challenge of European culture and politics had not yet been clearly articulated.

That the reaction of Middle Eastern society in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to modern European encroachment was frequently in terms of a pan-Islamic ideology is not surprising. The subsequent development of an indigenous secular Arab nationalism over the twentieth century follows rather directly

from the example of secular nationalism (based on linguistic, ethnic or similar foundations) in Europe. Nevertheless, between the pan-Islamist antecedents and the secular, ethnically oriented nationalism of the present era lay a transitional phase incorporating ideological elements from both.

> [In the nineteenth century] the distinction between religion and nationhood was somewhat blurred: in any case, for the broad masses nationalism and Islam were indistinguishable. The secret of Islam's hold on the political realm . . . lay precisely in its capacity to see the sacred and the profane interchangeably, in terms of the same scale of values.[1]

Early resistance to European penetration of Islamic territory was led by religious figures turned military commanders. Three such individuals who waged unsuccessful campaigns against the invaders in the first half of the nineteenth century were Ahmad Brilwi (fighting against the Sikhs and British influence in northern India); Imam Shamil (fighting against the Russians in Daghistan); and 'Abd al-Qadr (fighting against the French in Algeria).[2] Later, expressions of pan-Islamist response relied increasingly on secular notions of nationalism without, however, giving up the underlying idea that opposition to existing regimes could be legitimated by appeals to Islam. The mid-nineteenth century variety of pan-Islamism espoused by the Young Ottomans regarded the Ottoman Empire as the primary political unit, thus linking nationalist aims to a geographical territory rather than totally relying on the amorphous concept of *dar al-Islam*. Over the following century, the goals of pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism became increasingly incompatible without, however, becoming completely severed.

The development of a clearly observable schism between pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism occurred first in the Arab East. Before the First World War, most Muslim intellectuals and

1. Hisham Sharabi, *Arab Intellectuals and the West: The Formative Years, 1875–1914* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 106–107.

2. These examples are drawn from Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East and the West* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), pp. 99–100.

Edited by James Piscatori and George S. Harris
Law, personalities, and politics of the Middle East: essays
in honor of Majid Khadduri. Boulder (Colorado), 1987. s. 124-139

Edit. Fatma Müge Göçek, Social Constructions of Nationalism in the Middle East. New York 2002, s. 15-84
ISAM 96231
07 MAYIS 2004

CHAPTER 2

The Decline of the Ottoman Empire and the Emergence of Greek, Armenian, Turkish, and Arab Nationalisms

Fatma Müge Göçek

In the late nineteenth century, a Muslim army physician commented on how the attempts to salvage the empire led ironically to its demise by generating disparate identities, including his own Turkish one. He stated:[1]

> We saw that a Circassian club had opened in our neighborhood. Then an Albanian association was formed. Soon after, an Arab philanthropic society appeared! . . . Circassians wanted their freedom, as did the Albanians. The members of all these clubs were graduates of our own schools. . . . Hence the Bulgarian . . . Albanian . . . Arab independence movements were all manned by those reared and educated in our country, our schools . . . I am dying for the Turkish cause, but I am carrying this cause like a secret bowl in me. I do not tell about it to anyone. For I know that if we do that, our action will legitimate the explication of the inner thoughts of the others. And that would mean the fragmentation, the extinction of the empire.

In spite of the precautions of the physician, the ensuing polarization generated Greek, Armenian, Turkish, and Arab[2] nationalisms. This chapter focuses on the emergence of these nationalisms through time and in comparison to one another. It argues that structures, visions, and organizations interact to construct nationalisms. Specifically, political structures combine with visions of history within the context of specific organizations to produce Greek, Armenian, Turkish, and Arab nationalisms.

Basam Tibi; Arab Nationalism: A critical Enquiry; tera. Marian Farouk-Sluglett, Peter Sluglett; New York 1991.
ISAM134598

4 The Historical Background of Arab Nationalism

Social change[1] in the Middle East may be explained in terms of acculturation theory, to the extent that the archaic-chiliastic and secular-nationalist variants of the literary and political renaissance which took place in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire in the early nineteenth century were generated by forces from outside the area. However, this theory cannot be particularly fruitful if it implies a Euro-centric approach. Thus Behrendt devalues his otherwise useful explanation by claiming, as a European, that the 'underdeveloped nations' imitate all the achievements of Europe in a negative fashion[2] from a position of psychological weakness. von Grunebaum's more sophisticated attempts to interpret Westernisation in the Islamic world are equally questionable. He sees it as a process which can only be understood in psychological terms: in other words 'cultural change' is seen in terms of psychologically-based American cultural anthropology.[3]

In this attempt to trace the historical roots of Arab nationalism in the early nineteenth century, acculturation theory will be utilised where it seems to be relevant. It is clear that Arab nationalism and the movements which preceded it have largely developed under the influence of Europe. However, such an approach cannot by itself lead to a real understanding of the phenomenon. Here Walther Braune says aptly that 'to declare that its [sc. Arab Nationalism's] origins can be traced back to European influences is the equivalent of carrying dates to Basra. Naturally, in this and almost every other way in modern times, the Arab Orient has been influenced by Western history. But *foreign influences can only take effect when conditions for their reception and subsequent transformation exist.*'[4] It is therefore necessary to describe the social structure of the Ottoman Empire at this time, and also the social changes that took place in

THE DILEMMA OF ARAB NATIONALISM

As nationalism gathered force in the Arab World during the last several decades, its only discernible aims had been to achieve political freedom and unification for Arab peoples who objected to existing political divisions separating them. In more recent years certain Arab leaders such President Nasser of the United Arab Republic have begun to associate economic and social progress with the ends of Arab nationalism.

Political freedom has been largely achieved in varying degrees by the principal Arab states today; but political unification still looms very far on the horizon of attainment. Several attempts had been made in the last half century to hasten the process of unification: the Arab Revolt in 1916, the pan-Arab congresses in the 1930's, schemes proposed by the rulers of Iraq and Jordan in the 1940's, the formation of the League of Arab States in 1944, and the union between Egypt and Syria in 1958. Of these efforts only the organization of the League proved most enduring. This poses the question whether political union under present circumstances is feasible in a form other than the League's. At the same time one may speculate over the desirability of less controversial approaches, non-political in character but which may bring about political union as the crowning achievement.

That efforts to bring about political union have been largely frustrated during the first half of the twentieth century is indicative of the dilemma besieging the Arab nationalist movement. The dilemma has been compounded by policies aimed at forcing unification under the pressures of adverse experiences intensified by the exigencies of the Cold War with little regard for the state of political, social and economic preparation of existing Arab states to measure up to the obligations attending the achievement of unity; not the least important of these is the readiness of Arab leaders and intransigent pressure groups to yield sovereign power to a central Arab government.

To appreciate the nature and range of the dilemma, we must give consideration to certain fundamental problems which must be resolved if political union is to be achieved and preserved. These relate to the pattern of Arab nationalism's evolution, the impetus of the West, entrenched separatism, the rivalry of Islamism, the need for a flexible conceptual understanding and for a greater utilization of the League's potential.

Pattern of Evolution

In the earliest inception of a nationalist consciousness in the Arab World not all segments of Arab society for which the movement speaks today were involved; nor were its invokers motivated by similar considerations. Accordingly it reflected the views of its articulators, mostly the Christian intellectuals of Lebanon. Budding nationalists in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria had different ideas concerning the aims of nationalism. There were basic differences among nationalists from the very beginning.

CAESAR E. FARAH, ARABS AND OTTOMANS: A CHECKERED RELATIONSHIP, ISTANBUL 2002. ss. 103-124

DN.95941

a few hairs of his beard and the maintenance of the holy places, are not considered by the Moslem *ulema* to be a strong reason. Besides, it is not easy to believe the story about the mantle of the Prophet or the hairs of his beard.

The difficulty in the question of the khalifate is not limited to the question of his being a Koreishi or not, but the most difficult problem as far as we know is confined to the agreement of all the Mohammedans in the choice of the right man, who could be entrusted to take over the responsibility of this most dignified post, when the question of choosing a khalifa is brought under discussion.

It is not very easy to unite the various ambitions which disagree with each other. If one begins to consider these difficulties he is bound to fall into despair. In the presence of all these difficulties, if a man could be found who is well known and highly respected and honoured by Mohammedans, who could claim special qualifications and capacity, these difficulties may be surmounted.

A glance at the history of the khalifate since its existence up till the present time is sufficient to prove that this matter stands in importance far above any other question in the eyes of the Mohammedans. It is not a general question which is definitely explained by religion, nor is it a question of worship connected between man and his Creator. It is simply a worldly question which has been most intimately connected with the Mohammedan faith. Such questions have always given rise to great and serious disagreement and ambitions. I sincerely hope that the Moslems will be able, in the face of all these difficulties, to wake up and consider their interests first when the time comes for them to decide for themselves.

Please accept my heartiest respects.

(Sf.) *Mohd. Mustafa*

Elie Kedouri
"The Chatham House Version and other Middle-Eastern Studies"
1984, Hanover, s. 213-235
DN: 223321.
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8

Pan-Arabism and British Policy

In the years following the first world war, pan-Arabism was the only political doctrine to make headway and to exert a powerful appeal in the Arabic-speaking lands. The nature of the war settlement itself and the political power which some of the leading votaries of this doctrine acquired in consequence of the settlement contributed alike to such a result. The situation developed suddenly, with revolutionary abruptness. Men who before the destruction of the Ottoman empire were quite obscure, emerged all at once after 1919, not only to preach a doctrine which got the Arab east into its grip, but actually to exercise political power in one of the former provinces of the empire. In 1914 such a state of affairs was impossible to imagine. It is true that there were then murmurings in Beirut, and that Syrian *émigrés* in Cairo were demanding a decrease in meddling from Istanbul and the enlargement of local initiative. But these grievances were local and specific; they related to the quality of government services or to the proper scope of local administration; and those who sought redress for such grievances were mostly men well known in their communities, able perhaps to conduct a sober constitutional opposition but not to entertain grandiose, limitless ambitions. How they would have fared under imperial rule, where their opposition would have taken them, how the Arabic-speaking provinces would have developed under their leadership, it is now impossible to say. The war made Britain and the Ottoman empire enemies; Britain fomented a revolt in the Hijaz against the Ottomans, and to this revolt gravitated a number of disaffected Ottoman officers who, when the war ended with the triumph of their patron, claimed the leadership of the Arab movement and were eventually enabled, by devious and complicated means, to obtain political control of Mesopotamia, where they set up government as the kingdom of Iraq.

The new leaders thrown up by the war were pan-Arab by nature.

Hamdard Islamicus, vol: XX, no:1 (1997) Karachi, s. 49-60.
0.47

The Rise of Pan-Arab Nationalism in Egypt (1930-40)

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II

Eastern or Pan-Muslim Wide Community?

We traced in *Hamdard Islamicus** drives by leaders and writers in the *waṭanī* independence movement of Muṣṭafā Kāmil under British colonial rule to develop solidarity with various non-Muslim African or Asian populations in conflict with Westerners. India offered Egyptian nationalists a substantial independence movement, led by the Indian National Congress since 1885, that reiterated the principle that Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and Christian Indians were becoming one political nation.[1] The Japanese could defeat the Westerners, but for the Kāmilists at least, consolidation of relationship with the Japanese required that they accept Islam. The Kāmilists projected special triumphalist affinity with the Muslim minorities in India and China that alienated Coptic readers.

Interest in the past cultures and current ideologies and struggles of non-Muslim Chinese,[2] Japanese, Indians and Negroes[3] mounted among Egyptian intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s as they repudiated a West that had enslaved, slaughtered and exiled Muslims and colored peoples. But the pre-1914 Kāmilist pattern reasserts itself: a sizeable section of acculturated intellectuals in the event could only sustain transcontinental identification with Muslim populations in such "Eastern" countries.

Easternism in the 1930s and 1940s had two main types. The more widespread was *ideological pan-Easternism*: this repudiated or relativised modern secularoid-postitivist Western civilization by exalting the "spiritual" religions or religio-philosophical thought, high cultures and achievements of (often non-Muslim) Asian and African peoples. *Western pan-Easternism*, to contain such critiques of the West, championed totalist adoption of Western patterns and ideology as the means to achieve sovereignty from the Western powers (Turkey, Japan). The Coptic secularist Salamah Mūsa and some Muslim Egyptian contributors to his magazine *al-Majallāt al-Jadīdah* had to perform acrobatics in the 1930s and 1940s: they made Gandhi as much the Westernizing enemy of Hindu traditionalism as of the British, a brown Ataturk.[4]

A sectionally Islam-promoting ideological pan-Easternism – one, however, that validated openness to aspects of the West – was elaborated in Ahmad Ḥasan al-Zayyāt's literary-intellectual weekly *al-Risālah* (1933-1953). The Eastern identification of al-Zayyat and his colleagues did offer openings for radical critiques of the secularist-ameliorist foundations of the "materialist" West. However, their Easternism also functioned as a diluting, detotalizing appendage to Arab and Muslim community. An instance was al-Zayyāt's 1935 indictment of the Westernizing reforms imposed by Mustafa Kemal, titled "To Where are the Turks Being Driven?" In it, he voiced great fury at the Ataturkist regime's separation of Islam from the State, abolition of Islamic holidays and its drive to cut, the peasantry and – more dangerous – the youth it was educating, off from "the guidance of Islam". For this Egyptian Arabo-Islamist in 1935, the heavily Arabic common Islamic civilization and high cultures that the Ottomans maintained, and the joint Islamic political community that Arabs and Turks had shared for centuries, were the main stakes that Ataturkism threatened.

But a looser, wider community was under Ataturkist attack as well: "the East". Al-Zayyāt defined the entity that the Turks had been forced to repudiate in terms of a range of pagan or non-Muslim ancient civilizations as well as revealed Judaism-Christianity-

*For the first part of this serial see *Hamdard Islamicus*, vol. XIX, 1996, No. 4, pp. 67-90.

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HAMDARD ISLAMICUS, XX/2 (1997) s.19-41. Karachi

The Rise of Pan-Arab Nationalism in Egypt in the 1930s and 1940s – III*

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Haykal

Haykal's activity as a frequent Minister of Education in the 1930s and 1940s instances the compensative linguistic nationalism drive of multi-lingualized older intellectuals. They had faced deculturation under the British and now in the pan-Arab era pursued compensating Arabizing drives that had costs for their Westernist enterprises.

In his 1951 memoirs, Haykal presented himself as, while Minister, the Europeanizing-educated nativist who labored to reverse the pre-1922 deculturizing colonial education that had produced him and other bicultured intellectual leaders. The nationalist assumption motivating Haykal, when Minister, was that "language is among the preconditions for a nation to have life". Haykal's 1951 memoirs presented his drive to strengthen Arabic in the schools in 1941 as a continuation of a sort of revolt by his generation of secular-educated professionals to define the self by literary classical Arabic, in the face of the foreign languages in which British colonial rule immersed them. When editor of *al-Siyāsah* (founded in 1922), he had recruited graduates of higher colleges/faculties (*kulliyyāt*) of (Europe-derived, secular) law of commerce to help him "renew" Egyptian journalism: they proved unable to write up even short news items in acceptable Arabic prose. Promotion of Arabic in the government schools by post-1922 Egyptian governments contracted such linguistic alienation. However, the failure of the latest generation of Egyptian children and adolescents to master standard Arabic, for Haykal, denied meaning to Egypt's political independence. Egyptian pupils had to be conscious of their "responsibility": under Britain's colonial rule "we used to study all subjects, except the Arabic language, in English in secondary schools"; in contrast, the new generation of students in Egyptian government schools "studied all subjects except the foreign languages in Arabic", "the government is their government". If the students mastered standard Arabic they would "raise up their homeland".[1] Haykal believed that no ordinary child could learn two radically different languages before he was nine or ten years old. In line with pressure from zealot Arabist officials in his Ministry, he cut the residual teaching of English in the government primary schools. This drew attacks from the English-language *Egyptian Gazette* – Haykal believed the British Embassy inspired it – that "fanaticism" and "xenophobia" had motivated him. His response quickly generalized out from Britishers and Egyptians in Cairo in 1941 to Europeans in general as enslavers and economic exploiters of "the Muslims" and "the children of the East" since generations: when the Muslims/Easterners tried to throw off their yoke or compete for the wealth and resources of their own land the Europeans defeated them with "fanaticism" and "xenophobia".[2]

Emotions of cultural and national identity might motivate Haykal to impose classical Arabic at the expense of Egypt's modernization. Yet he objected to unretrained graduates of Islamic institutions as teachers of Arabic: he wanted to synthesize restored classical Arabic with implantation in Arabic of Europe-originated literary forms and concepts. Now, though, the drive to make classical Arabic pervade life circumsribed Western elements. He wanted new courses to teach classical Arabic through which Egyptian pupils would grasp the universal "concepts" (*ma'ānī*) also used by contemporary Westerners, but without "the words of actual expressions being

*For the earlier portions of this series see *Hamdard Islamicus*, vol. XIX, No. 3, 1996; vol. XX, No. 1, 1997.

Basam Tibi; Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry; ter. c. Marian Farouk-Sluglett, Peter Sluglett; New York 1991.
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

8 Pan-Arab Nationalism versus Pan-Islamism: The Role of Islam in al-Husri's Writings

(a) Preliminary Remarks

In the course of a long life (1882–1968) al-Husri was able to ensure that his ideas gained maximum publicity. He published frequently, and also managed to spread his theories in the course of his employment as an educationalist in various Arab countries. The application of his general theory to the specific conditions of the Arab world appeared in the form of painstaking historical works on the genesis of the Arab national movement, as well as in polemics and controversies with representatives of other political currents in the Arab Middle East.

The general framework of the Arab national movement has already been described. Accordingly, this section will concentrate on al-Husri's exposition of the phenomenon, and on his discussions and disagreements with other Arab nationalists, notably the Pan-Islamists, the Egyptian nationalists, and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.

al-Husri's systematic account of the history of the Arab countries under Ottoman rule[1] is a classic of its kind. He gives a detailed description of the way in which the Arab lands became a part of the Empire[2] and an account of the general stagnation into which the Arab world fell under Ottoman rule,[3] as a result of characteristics inherent in the social structure of the Empire. According to al-Husri, the wave of modernisation during the Tanzimat period[4] particularly affected the Arab countries, because the modernisation of social institutions was accompanied by a more rigorous political centralisation, which included a more systematic and hence more effective

Syrian populace. Both adopt a posture of militant anti-Zionism and implicitly challenge the legitimacy of existing governments. Both reduce the pressure of domestic issues by directing popular emotions outward.

Both ideologies have radical and moderate forms, and their radical versions foresee the complete elimination of boundaries and the incorporation of all parts of the Syrian or Arab homeland into a single state. In each case, the radical vision predominated in early years and was transformed by dint of long failure into something less ambitious and more practical. Their moderate versions foresee close relations between states but not total absorption.

Whereas pure Pan-Syrian nationalism is almost exclusively the possession of non-Sunni Arab minorities, pragmatic Pan-Syrianism appeals mostly to Sunnis, who see it as a more feasible alternative to Arab nationalism. If the minorities consider Pan-Syrianism an end in itself, Sunni Arabs tend to see it as a more practical version of Pan-Arabism. They choose not to fight Pan-Arabism but to cooperate with it. That Hashimi leaders advocated this approach is hardly surprising, given the family's attachments outside Syria—its origins in the Hijaz, Husayn's dream of becoming caliph, and the uprising which aspired to control Iraq as well as Syria.

Prince Faysal, leader of the Arab Revolt and briefly king of Syria, saw a close connection between Syrian and Arab nationalism; indeed, he used the two concepts almost interchangeably. He argued in May 1919 that Syria had a right to autonomy: "Although the Arabs are one nation [*umma*]—and all of us know that the Arab provinces are one land [*bilad wahida*] in terms of history, geography, and national ties—Iraq is an independent country [*bilad mustaqilla*], unrelated to Syria, just as Syria has no relation to all the other Arab countries [*al-bilad al-ʿArabiya*]."[103] Symptomatic of the confusion in Faysal's mind about these terms was a speech he gave in March 1920, in the course of which he referred to "the Syrian Arab nation," "the Arab countries," "the Arab nation," "the district of Syria," "the Syrian nation," and "the Syrian region."[104] Soon after, he talked of both a "Syrian Arab bloc" and "the Arab world."[105]

Faysal's brother ʿAbdallah became the major exponent of pragmatic Pan-Syrian nationalism. Although lacking Saʿada's intellectual ambitions, ʿAbdallah did construct a coherent argument which he elaborated over many years. In addition to the speeches, declarations, and other channels available to him as ruler, he wrote two memoirs, compiled a documentary record, and even contributed to Transjordanian newspapers under a pseudonym.

ʿAbdallah saw no contradiction between Greater Syria and the Arab nation; to the contrary, as he tirelessly explained during three decades of residence in Transjordan, he believed the unification of Syria to be the first, most critical step toward the achievement of Arab unity. Greater Syria was the cornerstone of Arab unity, the feasible first step and the polity that he could dominate. Greater Syria—rather than the Fertile Crescent or some larger Arab entity—attracted ʿAbdallah's attention because it was the smallest national unit and therefore the most realistic one he could aspire to rule. He regarded Syria as the heart of Arabism, the region whose unity had to be established before more ambitious schemes could be implemented. ʿAbdallah did not consider Greater Syria a replacement for the Arab nation but, like Egypt, one of the components that made it up. His prime minister, Tawfiq Abu'l-Huda, explained that, once unified, Greater Syria "would participate in whatever the Arabs would agree upon as far as their union is concerned."[106] ʿAbdallah accepted Pan-Arabism, envisioning a unified Syria that would take up "its ideal place alongside a general Pan-Arab union."[107]

ʿAbdallah held Greater Syria as the key to modern Arab history. He interpreted its establishment as "the goal of the Arab Revolt"[108] and saw the decision of the General Syrian Congress of 1920 in the same light: "It obligated the Arabs to work for their genuine good and glory to strive for the union of the Syrian lands [*ad-diyar ash-Shamiya*] and the union of Syria and Iraq in the Fertile Crescent."[109] Syria was the primary objective of ʿAbdallah's 1921 military campaign and remained his chief concern thirty years later. ʿAbdallah argued in 1943 that "there will be no presence for the Arabs so long as Greater Syria remains torn apart. When it is united, the Arabs will be united."[110] Toward the end of his life, an embittered ʿAbdallah declared: "We, the Hashimis, left the Hijaz for the sake of Syria and Palestine and lost it to a barbarous Arab people."[111] The creation of a Greater Syrian state looked back to the revolt and forward to Arab unity.

This vision persuaded some Jordanians. For example, the prominent Jordanian politician Zayd ar-Rifaʿi recalls how he saw Arab unity in the late 1940s: "When I was a student at the university [in Cairo], I imagined that Arab unity had to be achieved gradually by means of four entities, not a single entity. The first entity was a union of natural Syria, for nothing distinguishes the Jordanian from the Palestinian, nor from the Syrian or the Lebanese or even the Iraqi."[112] (He saw the other three entities as being Egypt, the Arabian peninsula, and the Maghrib.)

Pan-Syrianism versus Pan-Arabism

Differing Views of the Arab

Just as Pan-Syrianists differ on Pan-Arabism, Pan-Arabists are divided in their views of Pan-Syrianism. For some Pan-Arabists, the two cannot be reconciled; for others they complement each other. The more narrowly a Pan-Arabist defines the Arab, the more sympathetic he is to Pan-Syrianism; and the wider his interpretation, the more opposed he is. The definition of an Arab, in turn, largely depends on religious identity, locale, and era. Belonging to a minority group, living in the early twentieth century, and residing in Syria make it likely that a person sees Pan-Syrianism and Pan-Arabism as compatible. Being a Sunni, living late in the century, and residing outside Syria point the opposite way.

When Christians launched Pan-Arabism, their definition of Arabs was narrow, being restricted to the Arabic speakers of the Fertile Crescent and Arabia. As we have seen, the Sunni Muslims adopted the ideology and expanded the

المركز العربي للدراسات الاستراتيجية

بإشراف الرئيس علي ناصر محمد

حركة القوميين العرب

النشأة - التطور - المصائر

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı
İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi
Kütüphanesi

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محمد جمال باروت

Dimesk 1997
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Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı
Kütüphanesi
İslâm Araştırmaları

مجموعة من المؤلفين

قراءات في الفكر القومي. الكتاب الثالث: القومية العربية والإسلام والتاريخ والإنسانية

(بيروت: مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، ١٩٩٤). ٥٢٥ ص.
(سلسلة التراث القومي)

حسين معلوم

كاتب مصري.

الفكر القومي وإشكالية «العروبة والإسلام»: قراءة نقدية في نصوص «تيار الاعتدال»

ـ ١ ـ

ضمن أهم الإشكاليات التي شهدتها ساحة العمل الفكري والثقافي، بل والسياسي، في الوطن العربي، على امتداد هذا القرن العشرين، وما قبله (ربما منذ بدء عصر النهضة العربية الحديثة، على الأقل)، ولم تجد طريقها إلى الحل بعد، هي تلك الخاصة بمسألة علاقة القومية بالدين، وفحواها المحددة «العلاقة بين العروبة والإسلام».

قطعاً، هناك العديد من العوامل التي ساهمت في الوجود المستمر لهذه الإشكالية، وانتفاء المقدرة على التوصل إلى حل لها، في آنٍ، على امتداد هذه الفترة الزمانية الطويلة (نسبياً)، لعل من أهمها أن القضية ما زالت تُطرح، في ثنائية، ينصرف التفكير من خلالها إلى الكيفية التي يجب أن ترتب بها العلاقة بين طرفيها، بمعنى: أيهما يأتي، في الترتيب، سابقاً على الآخر، أو بالأحرى: أيهما يجب أن يكون المحدد الأول والأساسي: الإسلام أم العروبة(؟!).

وطالما أن التفكير قد انصرف إلى كيفية الترتيب بهذا الشكل، يصبح من المنطقي أن نجد «التشدد» و «الاعتدال» في الأطروحات الخاصة بهذه الإشكالية، التشدد لأحد طرفي الثنائية المشار إليها، والاعتدال كدائرة وسطى تتداخل ـ بالضرورة ـ مع دائرتي الأطراف.

أما أطروحات المتشددين، فلا حاجة بنا إلى عرضها هنا، إذ تكفي الإشارة، بشأنها، إلى أنها تصدر من تصور معين لكل من الدين والقومية: طرف يرى أن القومية تعلو على الدين وأعم منه، بمعنى أن الدين لا يدخل في تكوينها، وبالتالي فالمتبعون لأديان مختلفة يمكن أن يشكلوا «أمة واحدة» (كمثال: في حين يمثل الإسلام علاقة «ولاء» تنشأ بالتمييز فالإدراك فالإيمان، أي: علاقة «اختيارية»، تمثل العروبة علاقة «انتماء» تدرك العربي منذ مولده وتصاحبه حتى وفاته، فهي، إذن، علاقة «موضوعية» نشأت نتيجة تطور تاريخي سبقه ولحقه، فكان عربياً بغير إرادته، أو سبقه ولم يلحقه فلم يكن عربياً ولو أراد، لا حيلة له في الحالتين).

أما الطرف الآخر، فيرى، على العكس من ذلك، أن الدين يعلو على القومية وأعم منها، بمعنى أن الجماعة الدينية، كالجماعة الإسلامية، أو الأمة الإسلامية، أعم وأعلى (كمثال: في حين تمثل العروبة علاقة «انتماء» مقصورة على شعب معين من بين الشعوب ومكان معين من الأرض، يمثل الإسلام علاقة «ولاء» إلى دين خالد في الزمان بحكم أنه خاتم الرسالات والأديان، وخالد في المكان بحكم أنه رسالة إلى كل البشر، فهو، إذن، أشمل وأعم من حيث تجاوزه محدودية العلاقة مع العروبة).

والواقع أن هذا الطرح «الحدّي» للمسألة، والذي يعبر عن نفسه على شكل الاختيار بين الإسلام والعروبة، إنما يأتي كنتيجة للمطابقة بين الثنائية دين/قومية والثنائية إسلام/عروبة. ولا نجاوز الحقيقة، هنا، إذا قلنا: إن هذه المطابقة نفسها قائمة حتى في الطرح الذي يتوخى أصحابه «الاعتدال»، أو قل: «التكامل» بين طرفي الثنائية إياها.

صحيح أن معظم الذين يحاولون الاعتدال ينطلقون في الغالب من أنه «لا تناقض بين العروبة والأسلام»، أو ينتهون إلى النتيجة نفسها إذا هم فضلوا الانطلاق من بعض جوانب المسألة، وصحيح أن هناك من يحاول إيجاد صيغ تعبيرية تبرز التكامل بين العروبة والإسلام، صيغ تبعد من سطح الخطاب معنى التقابل والتعارض، فتؤكد مثلاً أن «العرب مادة الإسلام»، أو أن «الإسلام عربي» بمعنى أنه دين العرب أولاً، باعتبار أن القرآن كتاب عربي، لكن التكامل، الذي تحاول مثل هذه الصيغ التعبيرية إبرازه، لا ينفذ إلى عمق الإشكالية المطروحة.

وعلى ما يبدو، فإن التكامل هنا إنما هو تكامل على صعيد تلطيف العبارة، وتغييب الوجه الحاد من المشكلة، ذلك أن هذه الصيغ «منحازة»، في واقع الأمر، فهي تؤكد إعطاء الأولوية، إن لم يكن للعروبة على الإسلام، فلِما هو «عربي» في الإسلام.

هنا، في دائرة الاعتدال ـ التكامل، أو ما أطلقنا عليها مسمى «دائرة التداخل الوسطى» بين دائرتي الأطراف، أو «التشدد» بالأصح، تكمن المشكلة، بشكل ـ ربما ـ يتجاوز «الأطراف»، إذ إن «التيار العريض» المنضوي في إطار هذه الدائرة ما زال يفتقد المقدرة على تجاوز مستوى الحد الأدنى في أطروحاته، متوهماً بذلك أن هذا هو الطريق لشيوع الاتفاق ونبذ الاختلاف.

افتقاد المقدرة، ولا شك، يعود، من جهة، إلى مجموعة من العوامل التي تساهم في إبقاء أطروحات هذا التيار عند مستوى الحد الأدنى، كما يؤدي، من جهة أخرى، إلى إنجاز أطروحات مفروض عليها محدوديات متعددة. أما العوامل، فأهمها: «تعدد المرجعيات» الحاكمة لرؤى هذا التيار، إضافة إلى ما يتواكب مع ذلك التعدد من «تحيز» في الكيفية التي تتم بها صياغة هذه الرؤى وتلك الأطروحات. وأما المحدوديات المفروضة على هذه الأخيرة، فتتمثل في اثنتين أساسيتين: **الأولى** هي الخلط بين شيئين متقاربين، ولكنهما مختلفان، هما: «التوقع» و«التمني»، و **الثانية** هي الهروب من مواجهة المشكلات الأساسية، والوقوع في فخ المثالية.

قولنا الأخير ـ هذا ليس «اتهاماً»، كما قد يتراءى لبعضهم، أو «صياغة نظرية» لواحدة من أهم إشكاليات تاريخنا الحديث، وأكثرها تأثيراً، كما قد يتراءى لبعضهم الآخر، ولكنه حصيلة قراءة لكثير من نصوص ذلك التيار العريض، تيار الاعتدال.

el-Mustakbelu'l-Arabi, sene: 19, say: 218 (1997)
Beyrut, s. 120-125.

MAYIS 1997

الحركة القومية العربية: أسباب التعثر وسبل النهوض(*)



معن بشور

رئيس المنتدى القومي العربي في لبنان.

أيها الأصدقاء،

حين قرر المنتدى القومي العربي أن تكون الذكرى الـ ٣٩ لميلاد الوحدة المصرية ـ السورية فرصة للإجابة عن سؤال يقلق كثيرين منا حول أسباب تعثر الحركة القومية وسبل نهوضها، حرصت على أن تكون البداية من هنا، من طرابلس والشمال، انطلاقاً من قناعة لي راسخة بأن طرابلس خصوصاً، والشمال عموماً، كانا من أكثر مناطقنا اللبنانية والعربية تفاعلاً مع الحركة القومية في زمن المد، وأكثرها معاناة في زمن الجزر.

بل إن طرابلس بالنسبة إليّ شخصياً ليس مجرد ثغر للدفاع عن هوية الأمة، وقلعة يتحطم على أبوابها كل الطامعين، بل هي فوق هذا كله مدرسة للنضال ومنبع للعطاء في كل معارك الأمة.

بدايةً، لا بد من تسجيل جملة ملاحظات:

الملاحظة الأولى: إن تردّي الواقع العربي الراهن على مختلف المستويات، السياسية والاقتصادية والاجتماعية والأمنية والثقافية، مرتبط إلى حد كبير بتراجع الرابطة القومية في الحياة العربية أمام نعرات وعصبيات إقليمية وجهوية وطائفية ومذهبية لم تُنج من آثارها الدول والحركات الشعبية على حد سواء.

الملاحظة الثانية: إن العالم يشهد في ظل النظام العالمي القائم مفارقة لافتة، وهي أن القوميات التي تتسبب بتفكيك دول قائمة كبرى أو محدودة هي موضع تشجيع من قبل القوى المتحكمة بالمصير العالمي، فيما القوميات التي تسهم في تحقيق تكامل أو توحد بين شعوب تعاني

(*) في الأصل محاضرة ألقيت في جمعية مكارم الأخلاق الإسلامية في طرابلس، في إطار الأنشطة التي نظمها المنتدى القومي العربي في لبنان في الذكرى الـ ٣٩ للوحدة المصرية ـ السورية، وشملت بيروت والشمال والجنوب والبقاع وجبل لبنان.

الضعف والفقر والهيمنة الأجنبية هي موضع حرب مستمرة.

الملاحظة الثالثة: إن الحركة القومية العربية بما هي تمسك بالهوية الحضارية للأمة، تنطوي في طياتها على مشروع للنهوض والتحرر، وهي بالتالي حركة مفتوحة لكل العاملين في إطار هذا المشروع النهضوي التحرري، بغض النظر عن خلفياتهم الفكرية والعقائدية، وبالتالي فهي، بالتعريف، حركة جامعة لأنها تعبير عن هوية جامعة، كما عن مشروع جامع تحمله هذه الهوية، وكل تباين أو اختلاف فكري أو عقائدي أو سياسي يمكن له أن يحسم وفق الخيار الديمقراطي، وفي ضوء مرجعية الاحتكام إلى الأمة.

الملاحظة الرابعة: إن الحركة القومية العربية، بما هي حركة هوية ومشروع نهوض، هي حركة مفتوحة على تراث الأمة الحضاري والروحي، كما على روح العصر وتحدياته العلمية والتقانية.

إنها حركة الأصالة والحداثة معاً، حركة الإيمان والعلم في آن معاً، حركة تحرر وتقدم في الوقت عينه، وبالتالي فأي جدل حول هذه الأمور إنما يتم في رحابها ومن خلال هويتها الجامعة.

الملاحظة الخامسة: والتي تنطلق من الملاحظات الأربع السابقة، هي أن هذه الحركة لا تعني بالضرورة مشروعاً سياسياً محدداً للوحدة، بل إنها دعوة مستمرة إلى التضامن والتكامل اللذين يتقرر مستواهما وصيغتهما ودرجة التعبير السياسي والدستوري عنهما في ضوء إرادة الكيانات كلها التي تتشكل منها الأمة.

كما أن هذه الحركة لا تعني بالضرورة نظاماً اجتماعياً أو فكرياً بعينه، بل هي دعوة إلى احترام مبادئ عامة تقوم على التحرر والحرية، على الشورى والديمقراطية وحقوق الإنسان، على التنمية والعدالة، على الاستقلال السياسي والاقتصادي، وهي مبادئ تحترمها وتسعى لتحقيقها الرسالات الدينية كلها، كما العقائد البشرية المقبولة على المستوى الإنساني.

الملاحظة السادسة: إن الدراسات المستقبلية كلها، العربية والعالمية، وفي مقدمها مشروع استشراف المستقبل العربي الذي أعده على مدى خمس سنوات عشرات الباحثين والمفكرين في إطار جهد مميز أشرف عليه مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، تشير إلى أن حركة التضامن والتكامل والتوحد بين الكيانات الصغرى ليست فقط مسألة ضرورية لاستكمال الأمم، وحتى القارات، لشخصيتها، بل باتت ضرورة لكي تصون أمن هذه الكيانات السياسي والاجتماعي، وتحقيق استقلالها الفعلي، وتنميتها الضرورية.

الملاحظة السابعة والأخيرة: وهي أن الحركة القومية العربية المعاصرة لم تولد، كما يظن كثيرون، في إطار مواجهة الدولة العثمانية وتفكيكها، بل ولدت في إطار بناء خط دفاع ثانٍ عن هوية المنطقة ووحدتها في وقت بدت فيه واضحة مظاهر الضعف والانحلال على السلطنة واضطرارها إلى التسليم بأجزاء كبيرة منها للقوى الأوروبية الاستعمارية الصاعدة.

والميلاد الحقيقي لهذه الحركة كان في دمشق عام ١٨٧٦ على يد حركة الوجهاء[١] بقيادة

(١) شارك في الاجتماعات حوالى الثلاثين شخصاً من صيدا وبيروت ودمشق وحلب وحمص وحماه واللاذقية، ومن حوران وجبل الدروز، ومن بينهم سنّة وشيعة ودروز وعلويون. وممن شارك في الاجتماعات، احمد باشا الصلح (من صيدا)، الذي بلغ مراكز عالية في الإدارة العثمانية، وهو قائد الحركة، والسيد محمد أمين ابن علي الحسيني، المفتي الشيعي لبلاد بشارة (قائمقامية صور)، وعلي عسيران من أعيان الشيعة في صيدا، =

el-Mustakbel al-Arabi, sene: 19, sayi: 218 (1997)
Beyrut, s. 4-13
5 MAYIS 1997

D.375 BSOAS, vol: LXII/2 (1999) London

in English, the subjects of the work can often read the work themselves, or at least have it recounted to them by others. The shrinking of the world into a 'global village' has ended the immunity of orientalists from the views and possibly the reactions of the subjects of their work. I have myself experienced this in writing on the Bedouin of Saudi Arabia in that I have been taken to task by members of communities referred to in the study, not necessarily those central to the account, either for slighting references or for not mentioning them in more detail. This makes the writing of such works a highly sensitive affair and the writer has to weigh the results of his words quite carefully. This is reflected in the story *Laysat minna* ('She isn't one of us', pp. 65–80) where a Syrian woman, not of the élite, who has written a book in English which seems to show her home society in a bad light, is shunned by the ladies of the élite.

The background to these stories is in many cases a sense of injustice shared by the people of the society *vis-à-vis* the political or social conditions under which they live. A young man in *al-Ḥubb al-ḥaqīqī* ('True love') feels he is being pushed into marriage by his sister and ponders on the break up of his relationship with his English girlfriend. In *Mishmish ṭāzah* ('Fresh apricots') a young newly-released political prisoner reflects on the injustices of the political regime. There is also injustice towards a widowed second wife by the first wife in *Buqshah* 1959 ('Bundle 1959'), injustice towards a younger brother in *Shakhākhat al-Zab'ah* ('The Staling of the female hyena') where a young man's plans to marry are ridiculed and thwarted by the elder brother and in '*al-Ḥilmāt al-Laṭīfah*' ('Sweet dreams') the injustice felt by a Syrian man brought up in Saudi Arabia in the restrictions placed on his choice of a wife to share his life there, and again in '*al-Salhafā*' ('The lizard'), the injustice felt by a mother whose husband seems to have grown old and unattractive and whose sons and her daughter-in-law take her very much for granted. In '*Qindīl al-baḥr*' ('The jelly fish') an unmarried woman feels that she is being gossiped about by other women. She reflects on the attitude of married women towards their children: do they really love them or do they only love the status of motherhood? She watches young boys on the beach attacking a stranded jelly fish and they seem to symbolize society attacking her in her lonely position.

The stories are, however, often optimistic in tone. The unmarried woman in 'The jelly fish' has a secret lover, a Christian who is outside her own society. In 'True love' the young man is in the end pleasantly surprised by his sister's final choice of a prospective bride. In 'The lizard' the woman finds a way of escaping the drudgery of her household to watch television with an impoverished widowed neighbour, having bought her the television with money saved from the house keeping.

The story I enjoyed most was *Irs ghāli* ('An expensive wedding') which recounts the catalogue of woes of a girl planning her wedding in the Sheraton Hotel in Damascus. This is seen in the context of the contemporary vogue in Damascus among the élite for fantastic, theatrical wedding receptions with innovative special effects and costumes. The catastrophies begin when the dressmaker's house burns down with her wedding dress in it. From that point she abandons herself to her fate and with great misgivings allows her brother to orchestrate the wedding. His enthusiastic rantings about the shape of the cake and the mechanics and construction of the bride's pallanquin have her envisaging nightmare scenes of the bride being tipped out of the pallanquin and taken to hospital with broken bones. In the end the wedding is a huge success, more fantastic than any seen before. She wears her grandmother's wedding dress thus demonstrating her *iṣālah* 'breeding', bedecked, however, with all the gold they can muster. The wedding ceremony is like a scene from Zenobia's palace with slave boys in bejewelled waistcoats and harem trousers carrying her in to the accompaniment of the theme music from the film 'Rocky I'. The cake is an unprecedented innovation of vertical design in 15 stories and her initial aversion to the whole procedure is swept away in the extraordinary enthusiasm and elation of the moment.

Printing errors are very few. I noticed *jīn* for *hīn* (p. 10), *zahrat* for *zahrah* (p. 15), *tukhayyibah* for *tukhabbīh* (presumably; p. 107), *fas* for *fī* (p. 122), *muthallil* for *mithl* (p. 97), and *hūj* for *hawdaj* (p. 14). A consistent mechanical error was that final *alif maqṣūrah* in *'alā* often appeared as a sequence *yā* or became joined to the following word. This occurred on pp. 34, 47, 77, 78, 85, 96, 98 and 147. I also noticed that the first name of the ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan was rendered Bānazir, while the correct rendering is Bē Naẓīr 'Incomparable'. However this may have been deliberate.

This is a beautiful collection of stories which I, as a non-Arab, found interesting and easy to read. The subject-matter and the underlying questions evoked by the tales were thought-provoking and the work represents a courageous step by an anthropologist both in breaking new ground in the medium used and in having the work translated into the language of the subjects of the stories.

BRUCE INGHAM

GERSHONI, ISRAEL and JAMES JANKOWSKI (ed.): *Rethinking nationalism in the Arab Middle East*. xxvi, 372 pp. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. $49.50 (paper $18.50).

This is an extremely useful and interesting collection of essays taking as its theme the character, political and social functions and historical role of nationalism in the Arab Middle East. As its title indicates, the collection aims at looking anew at various aspects of nationalism in the Arab world in the light of the new theoretical approaches which have been developed largely in relation to other, non-Middle Eastern, countries and regions. As Jankowski and Gershoni point out, although in the last two decades there has been an explosion of new theoretical writing on the topic of nationalism which has vastly expanded the analytical framework within which the topic is considered, this new scholarship has largely neglected the Arab world. Similarly work on modern Arab history has often failed to take full account of the insights offered by the general theoretical advances in broader fields. The volume under review is an attempt to fill this gap, to provide a work of synthesis in which the new theoretical analyses are applied to the broad range of Arab nationalisms as they developed from the period of the Great War onwards.

The book is divided into five parts, each concerned with a major theme. The first part, containing essays by Israel Gershoni, Fred Halliday and Gabriel Piterberg, looks at historiography and the scholarly interpretation of Arab nationalisms. Gershoni puts forward a comprehensive survey of the two successive narrative approaches prevailing in Western scholarship about the Arab world, the first in the 1950s and 1960s, the second from the 1970s onwards. He clearly shows how the political fortunes of Arab nationalism impinged on its conceptualization by academics and calls for greater awareness by researchers regarding their own susceptibility to how contemporary currents can influence their reading of the past. Halliday provides an analysis of nationalism in Yemen within the framework of 'comparative contingency', a concept he has employed elsewhere to analyse Eritrean nationalism. He defines his aim as being to show not how a Yemeni 'nation' has existed for centuries or millennia, or how such a pre-existing 'nation' has 'arisen' or 'woken up' but, rather, how a set of recent processes, some international, some within Yemen, have combined to produce a nationalist movement and discourse and to give them their particular content. The final essay in this section is Piterberg's discussion of the presence of the Orientalist discourse in non-European nationalist historiographies, with modern Egyptian historiography as a case-study.

The second major theme with which the volume is concerned is that of the modes of presentation employed by nationalists to portray history in their own image. This section begins with William Cleveland's reconsideration of the foundational text for the study of Arab nationalism, George Antonious's *The Arab awakening*, in terms of recent analyses of nationalist narrative, imagery and symbolism. There then follows an account by Reeva Simon of the efforts made by the monarchical regime in Iraq in the inter-war years to impose the ideological dominance of a unitary Arab nationalism over an ethnically diverse Iraqi population, and a discussion by Beth Baron of the employment by nationalist iconography in Egypt of the image of the woman to symbolize the Egyptian nation, and the significance of this for both nationalism and the position of women in Egypt.

The third section of the book examines the coexistence and competition of alternative understandings of communal identity in the modern Arab world, and contains a fascinating study by Donald Reid of early twentieth-century Egyptology and the struggles of indigenous students of ancient Egypt to find a place for themselves in this scholarly field, and a discussion by James Jankowski of the different national orientations competing in the Egypt of the 1950s. The book's fourth theme is polycentrism, and essays by Rashid Khalidi, Musa Budeiri and Emmanuel Sivan examine the simultaneous presence of various national, and other, identities in both individuals and communities. The final section, containing contributions from Philip Khoury, James Gelvin and Zachary Lockman, focuses on the role played by subaltern groups in the construction and diffusion of the nationalist discourse.

Each of these essays stands alone as a study of a specific facet of nationalism in the Arab world and each possesses considerable intrinsic merit. Furthermore the collection as a whole demonstrates an unusual degree of thematic coherence, and displays to full advantage the rich and varied scholarship currently being undertaken in this field.

STEPHANIE CRONIN

PAUL STARKEY and JANET STARKEY (ed.): *Travellers in Egypt*. 319 pp. London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1998. £25.

This interesting and informative selection of essays began as a long-planned conference about travellers in Egypt which brought together some 80 participants at the Oriental Museum, Durham, in July 1995. The publication of the book, within three years and to a high standard of editing, is in itself a feat worthy of praise.

The volume approaches the whole question of the quest of the oriental traveller from many angles and in many aspects, and the style is inviting with not a dull page anywhere. A number of the contributors break new ground with the information they provide, the approach to the topic they adopt and the little known, sometimes all but unknown, travellers, both men and women, they bring to our attention. One section of the book (pp. 120–78) is devoted entirely to travellers in Egypt who were artists, including photographers, and one's sole regret here is that there are no illustrations to represent their achievements. The curious will need to consult the footnote references, or the lavish reproductions in Alastair Hamilton's, *Europe and the Arab world* (1994; revd. *BSOAS*, 59/1, 1996) where examples of the work of a few of the artists who feature here are to be found, along with that of others who receive little or no mention in the book under review.

Early travellers figure little. They are represented by Professor Holt's account and assessment of the travels in Egypt in the Ottoman age (1615–16) by Pietro Della Valle, and by Rosemarie Said Zahlan's portrait of the enigmatic George Baldwin during the latter part of the century which followed (pp. 24–38). It is unfortunate that the most important Western traveller in Egypt and Arabia at that time, Carsten Niebuhr (1733–1815), is entirely neglected. If one turns to *Den Arabiske Rejse*, ed. Stig T. Rasmussen (Copenhagen, 1992; revd. *BSOAS*, 57/3, 1994), 20–38 and 348–66, the unique contribution made by this traveller and his expedition's companions, ill-fated though it was, is only too obvious.

Egypt and Nubia were (and still are) a writers' and artists' oriental dream country. Over the archaeologist (who as traveller and Egyptologist both, is represented here by Belzoni, for example, pp. 41–50) searching the unsealed chambers for the mummy and its tomb treasures, hover the phantom figures of opera like Aida and Rádames. We have here a good cross-section of artists and men of letters,

23 KASIM 1999

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العرب والترك
في العهد الدستوري العثماني
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توفيق علي برو

للحصول على درجة الماجستير

في التاريخ العربي الحديث

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Pan-Arabism

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بحوث ومناقشات الندوة الفكرية
التي نظمها
مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية

بالاشتراك مع

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JOSEPH HAJJAR

L'EUROPE ET LES DESTINÉES DU PROCHE — ORIENT
VOL. IV

LE NATIONALISME ARABE SYRIEN ENTRE LA JEUNE-TURQUIE ET LES PUISSANCES (1908-1914)

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PAN-ARABISM AND BRITISH POLICY

by ÉLIE KEDOURIE

PAN-ARABISM AND EGYPT

IN THE YEARS following the First World War, pan-Arabism was the only political doctrine to make headway and to exert a powerful appeal in the Arab-speaking lands. The nature of the war settlement itself and the political power which some of its leading votaries acquired in consequence of this settlement contributed alike to such a result. The situation developed suddenly, with revolutionary abruptness. Men who, before the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, were quite obscure, emerged all at once after 1919, not only to preach a doctrine which got the Arab East into its grip, but actually to exercise political power in one of the former provinces of the Empire. In 1914 such a state of affairs was impossible to imagine. It is true that there were then murmurings in Beirut, and that Syrian *émigrés* in Cairo were demanding a decrease in meddling from Constantinople and the enlargement of local initiative. But these grievances were local and specific; they related to the quality of government services, or to the financial relations between the centre and the provinces, or to the proper scope of local administration; and those who sought redress for such grievances were mostly men well known in their communities, able perhaps to conduct a sober constitutional opposition, but not to entertain grandiose, limitless ambitions. How they would have fared under imperial rule, where their opposition would have taken them, how the Arab provinces would have developed under their leadership, it is now impossible to say. The war made England and the Ottoman Empire enemies; England fomented a revolt in the Hijaz against the Turks, and to this revolt gravitated a number of disaffected Ottoman officers who,

20 ARALIK 1996

when the war ended with the triumph of their patron, claimed the leadership of the Arab movement and were eventually enabled, by devious and complicated means, to obtain political control of Mesopotamia, where they set up government as the Kingdom of Iraq.

The new leaders thrown up by the war were pan-Arab by nature. They came to politics not through consideration of concrete difficulties or the grind of pressing affairs or daily responsibility, but by way of a doctrine. Their doctrine was compounded of certain European principles which made language and nationality synonymous, of a faith in sedition and violence, and of contempt for moderation. They believed that the Arabs, because they spoke Arabic, a language different from Turkish, were *ipso facto* entitled to secede from the Ottoman Empire and to form a state where everybody who spoke Arabic would be included. They were not ambitious for the community they knew, or the locality where they were born and reared. The European doctrine of linguistic nationalism with which they were imbued, the oecumenical claims of the Arabian Caliphate the glories of which they aspired to revive, the impetuosity of their youth, and the insignificance of their origins and their prospects alike combined to help them nurse ambitions to which only their dreams could set a bound. As one sympathizer with Arab nationalism, Professor Sir Hamilton Gibb, put it: 'The Arab nation . . . like all other nations, is not an entity delimited by ethnographical data, nor the fortuitous result of geographical or historical association, but the function of an act of will.'[1]

The will of these young officers willed an Arab nation, and ethnography, geography, or history were of consequence only as they offered sustenance to their imagination. When, therefore, the miraculous circumstances gave them suddenly a country to govern, it was not gratitude to fate and their patrons that they felt, but rather that they were cheated of their dream. They had desired an Arab nation and an Arab state, and they got Iraq, a specific country with specific frontiers. They denounced the imperialist dismemberment of the Arab nation, and called the boundaries drawn up at the peace settlement arbitrary and artificial. This was indeed true, for what otherwise can boundaries be when they spring up where none had existed before? These officers, of course, did not think to blame themselves for having, by their disaffection, helped the Powers they were now denouncing to defeat the Ottoman Empire, and thus to erect these hated boundaries. With the establishment of these men in the government of Iraq, therefore, pan-Arabism itself was endowed with a political base from which to prepare future incursions.

[1] *The Near East: Problems and Prospects*, P. W. Ireland, editor (Chicago, 1942), p. 70.

a few hairs of his beard and the maintenance of the holy places, are not considered by the Moslem *ulema* to be a strong reason. Besides, it is not easy to believe the story about the mantle of the Prophet or the hairs of his beard.

The difficulty in the question of the khalifate is not limited to the question of his being a Koreishi or not, but the most difficult problem as far as we know is confined to the agreement of all the Mohammedans in the choice of the right man, who could be entrusted to take over the responsibility of this most dignified post, when the question of choosing a khalifa is brought under discussion.

It is not very easy to unite the various ambitions which disagree with each other. If one begins to consider these difficulties he is bound to fall into despair. In the presence of all these difficulties, if a man could be found who is well known and highly respected and honoured by Mohammedans, who could claim special qualifications and capacity, these difficulties may be surmounted.

A glance at the history of the khalifate since its existence up till the present time is sufficient to prove that this matter stands in importance far above any other question in the eyes of the Mohammedans. It is not a general question which is definitely explained by religion, nor is it a question of worship connected between man and his Creator. It is simply a worldly question which has been most intimately connected with the Mohammedan faith. Such questions have always given rise to great and serious disagreement and ambitions. I sincerely hope that the Moslems will be able, in the face of all these difficulties, to wake up and consider their interests first when the time comes for them to decide for themselves.

Please accept my heartiest respects.

(Sf.) *Mohd. Mustafa*

Elie Kedourie
The Chatham House Version
and other Middle-Eastern Studies,
London-1970, s. 213-235.
DN: 58373. 956.3 KED-C

09 KISAN 1999

8

Pan-Arabism and British Policy

In the years following the first world war, pan-Arabism was the only political doctrine to make headway and to exert a powerful appeal in the Arabic-speaking lands. The nature of the war settlement itself and the political power which some of the leading votaries of this doctrine acquired in consequence of the settlement contributed alike to such a result. The situation developed suddenly, with revolutionary abruptness. Men who before the destruction of the Ottoman empire were quite obscure, emerged all at once after 1919, not only to preach a doctrine which got the Arab east into its grip, but actually to exercise political power in one of the former provinces of the empire. In 1914 such a state of affairs was impossible to imagine. It is true that there were then murmurings in Beirut, and that Syrian *émigrés* in Cairo were demanding a decrease in meddling from Istanbul and the enlargement of local initiative. But these grievances were local and specific; they related to the quality of government services or to the proper scope of local administration; and those who sought redress for such grievances were mostly men well known in their communities, able perhaps to conduct a sober constitutional opposition but not to entertain grandiose, limitless ambitions. How they would have fared under imperial rule, where their opposition would have taken them, how the Arabic-speaking provinces would have developed under their leadership, it is now impossible to say. The war made Britain and the Ottoman empire enemies; Britain fomented a revolt in the Hijaz against the Ottomans, and to this revolt gravitated a number of disaffected Ottoman officers who, when the war ended with the triumph of their patron, claimed the leadership of the Arab movement and were eventually enabled, by devious and complicated means, to obtain political control of Mesopotamia, where they set up government as the kingdom of Iraq.

The new leaders thrown up by the war were pan-Arab by nature.

...Araştırmaları Mer...

THE ARAB AWAKENING

THE STORY OF THE ARAB NATIONAL MOVEMENT

by

GEORGE ANTONIUS

Pan-Arabism

قد هبوا واستفيقوا أيها العرب

Arise, ye Arabs and awake !
Ode by Ibrahim Yazeji.

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı
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26 ARALIK 1995

Suleiman Mousa

The Rise of Arab Nationalism and the Emergence of Transjordan

THE OTTOMAN STATE AND THE ARABS

Early in the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Turks seized control of the Arabic-speaking lands that had been ruled by the Egyptian Mamlukes. For four centuries the Ottomans remained in control of the ʿAsian Arab lands. This control might well have lasted longer had it not been for the fact that the Ottomans took the side of Germany in World War I.

The ties of Islam had, all along, considerably influenced the Arabs in their acceptance of Ottoman rule and, vice versa, in the attitude of the Muslim Ottomans toward their Arab subjects. Religious fervor was then much stronger than national consciousness. No doubt the Arabs were regarded with special consideration because they were the first Muslim nation, the one into which the Prophet Muhammad was born and which included his descendants and the great caliphs of Islam. However, that consideration never amounted to entrusting them with real responsibilities in the central

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Ann Lesch

The Origins of Palestine Arab Nationalism

Nationalism emerged as a major political force in the Palestine Arab community in the 1920s and 1930s in reaction to the growing strength of the Jewish community and the British denial of the Arabs' aspiration for independence. The Palestine Arabs made invidious comparisons between their deteriorating political position and the gradual acquisition of self-government by the neighboring Arab communities. Although relatively late in its development and ultimately unsuccessful, the Palestine Arab national movement was vigorous at its height, not only organizing political parties and delegations to London, but also fanning mass demonstrations and a three-year uprising.[1] The roots of this movement may be traced to the period before World War I, when the area comprising Palestine was ruled from Istanbul. Although the movement was then only at an incipient stage, the outline of its aspirations and methods is discernible.[2] Moreover, the Arab community was already subject to some of the external pressures from European powers and the Zionist movement that were to influence its development in later years.

8. The Impact of the Young Turk Revolution on the Arabic-speaking Provinces of the Ottoman Empire

The *coup d'état* of July 1908, known as the Young Turk Revolution, has an archetypal significance in subsequent Arab politics, and its consequences and reverberations are, even today, far from being exhausted. It is thus of some interest to know what the immediate impact of this *coup d'état* was in the Arabic-speaking provinces of the Ottoman empire. The most cursory investigation will immediately serve to increase our interest for—as is shown below—the reaction in these provinces to the events in Macedonia and Constantinople are intriguingly similar. The similarity is intriguing because it could not have been manufactured or evoked by a 'communications industry' which did not exist then, and because these provinces were anyway more or less isolated from one another.

At the accession of Abd al-Hamid, the Arabic-speaking provinces, particularly Syria and Palestine like so many other parts of the Ottoman empire, were in a state of disorder and discontent which made them almost ripe for rebellion. There were many reasons for this state of affairs, the remote ones having to do with the very character and functioning of the *Tanzimat*, while the proximate ones were related to the war of 1876–8, and the scarcities, and the burdens of taxation and conscription which were its consequence. But the end of the emergency brought an immediate amelioration and in the years following the Treaty of Berlin Abd al-Hamid seems to have effectively re-established the authority of his government in the provinces. In Syria, as the perspicacious and learned Hogarth observed, Abd al-Hamid 'took in hand, in the early eighties, the public insecurity of northern Syria and southern Palestine, multiplying guards and increasing garrisons, and paying particular attention then and later to both the Kurds of Amanus and the robber Armenians of Zeitun. Improved communications, however, he knew, or soon learned, would provide the most effective means to his end. In the year 1885, when the Jaffa—Jerusalem track was improved into a metal chaussee, began an era of road-building throughout Syria, and in 1886 it was followed by one of railway construction. This was destined, in the course of the next thirty years to give Syria through-connection with Constantinople, a railway from Aleppo to Bir es-Seba linked to five ports, and trunk

lines to Arabia on the one hand and Mesopotamia on the other. When it is remembered, further, that such harbour structures as exist in Syria, and the equipment of principal cities like Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut and Jerusalem with broad ways, modern buildings, electric lighting, tramways, and other convenient apparatus, are also of Abdul Hamid's time, one is bound to admit that a good deal of beneficent construction—almost all in fact, that makes Syria as a whole the most civilized province of Turkey at this day—stands to the credit of a Sultan whose energies are popularly supposed to have been uniformly destructive and sinister.' Hogarth goes on to point out that all these activities were supplemented by a deliberate effort to diminish nomadism, by means of free or favourable grants of land, by opening local markets, increasing the number of police stations, garrisons and administrative posts in areas like Trans-Jordan, hitherto very imperfectly policed.[1] Thus, by the end of the first decade of Hamidian rule, the Arabic-speaking provinces became tranquil and contented, not to say docile, and must be presumed to have known that happiness which is said to be the lot of countries with no history.

Four regions are an exception to this state of affairs, namely the Hauran, southern Kurdistan, lower Mesopotamia and the Yemen. In all these regions, roads were poor or non-existent, and large groups of nomads and semi-nomads were able to resist control by the central government. But this state of affairs was, so to speak, traditional and endemic, and by no means indicated new or increasing disaffection towards the government. On the contrary, the settled population themselves generally considered these turbulent nomads a threat to their property and sometimes to their very existence, and were not sorry to see the authorities mount successive expeditions against these predatory hordes.

But the very success of Hamidian policies: the more orderly administration, the improved communications, the increasing number of schools, the slowly rising and spreading prosperity, itself worked gradually to undermine Hamidian rule. Professor Bernard Lewis has pointed out that it was in the field of educational reform that the Hamidian régime made its first and greatest effort.[2] The Young Turk conspirators were the outcome of Abd al-Hamid's educational enterprise: so, in the Arabic-speaking provinces, the civil and military high schools produced a steady, and a steadily broadening, stream of young men with vaguely 'enlightened' attitudes, who were secretly Young Turk in sympathy—and some of whom came after 1913 (when the empire experienced disaster and stress similar to that of 1876–8) to be in greater or lesser sympathy with a more or less vague Arab nationalism. But these 'enlightened'

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Studies in Arab History,
Bristol-Great Britain, 1990,
s. 21-40. IRCICA: 22799

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The Arab Awakening Forty Years After

Albert Hourani

GEORGE Antonius was born in 1891 of Lebanese Christian parents who had settled in Alexandria. He studied at Victoria College, the English school in Alexandria, and then at King's College, Cambridge, where he obtained first-class honours in the Mechanical Sciences Tripos. After working during World War I in the censorship department of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, he served in the British Mandatory Administration in Palestine, in the Education Department, 1921–7 and the Secretariat, 1927–30. He then left official service and began a new career as Middle Eastern associate of the Institute of Current World Affairs, an American organisation of which the aim was to spread understanding of what was happening in the outside world by the circulation to subscribers of confidential newsletters; it had been founded by Charles Crane, a Chicago business man who had himself played some part in the Middle East as a member of the King–Crane Commission, sent to the region by President Wilson in 1919. In 1938 he published his only book, *The Arab Awakening: the Story of the Arab Nationalist Movement*, and dedicated it to Mr Crane. He died in 1942.[1]

Why, it may be asked, should a book published forty years ago, and dealing with an early phase in the history of a national movement which has taken more than one new direction since then be taken seriously enough for a study to be devoted to it? There must be some intrinsic merit or significance in it to make it still deserving of serious study and consideration. In answer to such a question, at least three claims may be made for the book without much fear of contradiction.

First of all, most readers would agree that *The Arab Awakening* has literary merit of a high order. It is written in an excellent narrative style, precise, vivid, highly coloured, at times moving, carrying the reader easily and swiftly from one episode to another, and compelling belief as he reads it, even if some doubts may come later; its explanations are clear even if not always profound or sufficient. There is no extended analysis of ideas, but there are sharply expressed depictions of human personalities. Here is what he says of Mark Sykes:

> His mind was both perceptive and quick, and at the same time strangely inattentive and undiscerning; and, in his nature, he had something of the improvidence as well as all the warmth of the enthusiast. He knew a good deal about the Arabs at first hand, but his knowledge was as remarkable for its gaps as for its range, and his judgments alternated between perspicacity and incomprehension, as though his mental vision were patterened like a chess-board . . . This placed him at a disadvantage in the game of diplomatic bargaining . . .[2]

ba'da l-ḥāriṯi ... dī l-qibābi; 2) Index t.2/II, p.308, l.9 *ṯummata* (ثمة) *ǧi'ta...* — Text t.2/I, p.422, l.12 *ṯummata* (ثمت) *ǧi'ta...*; 3) Index t.2/II, p.360, l.4 v.u. ... *'arāhā šaǧīyah* — Text t.I, p.544, l.13 ... *'arāhā šiǧīyah*. Etwas verwirrend ist auch der Umstand, daß *Makka* t.2/I, p.395, l.15 im Index der Ortsnamen fehlt und nur unter *fatḥ Makka* bei den Schlachten genannt ist.

Neben diesen Mängeln weist das vorliegende Buch aber auch eine Reihe von Vorzügen auf. Denn es bietet neben einem äußerst ansprechenden und übersichtlichen Layout (Verse des Gedichtes in großen Typen, der Kommentar des Ibn Hišām fett, Text des al-Baġdādī in gut leserlicher Normalschrift, Anmerkungen in Kleinschrift) durch die zahlreichen Indices ein wertvolles Hilfsmittel zur Erschließung einer sonst aufgrund ihres Umfangs und ihrer Unübersichtlichkeit nur mühsam auszuwertenden Quelle. Dafür sei Herausgeber und Überarbeiter herzlich gedankt.

Stephan Procházka (Wien)

Strohmeier, Martin: al-Kulliya aṣ-Ṣalāḥiya in Jerusalem: Arabismus, Osmanismus und Panislamismus im Ersten Weltkrieg. Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Bd. XLIX, 4. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1991. VIII + 88 S., 14 Abb., 8°, DM 38,-, ISBN 3-515-05395-6.

Das vorliegende Werk beschreibt das Schicksal der osmanisch-arabischen Hochschule *al-Kulliya aṣ-Ṣalāḥiya* (im weiteren *Ṣal.*), die nur kurz, und zwar während der unruhigen Zeit des 1.Weltkrieges, Bestand hatte. Als Quellen dienten Verf. neben einigen Berichten in zeitgenössischen Publikationen vor allem die dreißig Seiten umfassenden Statuten der *Ṣal.* sowie Interviews mit zwei ehemaligen Schülern.

Als Gründungsdatum der *Ṣal.* (S.5-7) ist der 28. Jänner 1915 anzusetzen, an dem der Lehrbetrieb in den Gebäuden des ehemaligen Priesterseminars der *Weißen Väter* aufgenommen wurde. Der Name *aṣ-Ṣalāḥiya* war in zweifacher Hinsicht bewußt gewählt: Denn einmal wurde die zum Seminar gehörige Kirche St. Anna von Ṣalāḥaddin 1192 in eine *Madrasa* umgewandelt, und zweitens war es Aufgabe der Schule, jenen Geist zu vermitteln, der es — gleich dem Namensgeber — ermöglichen sollte, die Ungläubigen aus dem Gebiet des Islam (insbes. die Engländer aus Ägypten) zu vertreiben.

Nach einem Exkurs (S.8-13) über die nie in Betrieb gegangene Hochschule in Medina legt Verf. ausführlich Funktion und Alltagsleben in der *Ṣal.* dar (S.14-34). Interessant ist vor allem, daß in der vom türkisch-osmanischen Staat gegründeten Schule das Arabische Unterrichtssprache war. Das Studium an der *Ṣal.* sollte zehn Jahre dauern und bot den Schülern eine große Zahl von Fächern (insgesamt 85, gemäß der Liste S.18-20), die weite Gebiete abdeckten (koranische Wissenschaften, Philosophie, Recht, Sprachen, Naturwissenschaften).

Anschließend (S.35-48) werden einige mit der *Ṣal.* in Verbindung stehende

WZKM, Band.83. WIEN-1993, s.330-331

Personen (Lehrer, Schüler) vorgestellt, darunter der Gründungsrektor 'Abdal'azīz Šāwīš (1876-1929), ein begeisterter Verfechter der osmanischen Sache (obwohl er kaum Türkisch konnte (S.36)). Näher charakterisiert (S.38-40) wird auch Rustum Ḥaidar (1886-1940), der einen nachhaltigen Einfluß auf die Schule hatte und später unter König Faiṣal im Irak Karriere machte. Im übrigen ist es auffallend, wie viele Personen, die mit der *Ṣal.* in Verbindung gestanden hatten, später zu einflußreichen Posten gelangten.

Sehr informativ ist auch das Kapitel über den historischen Hintergrund, vor dem die kurze Geschichte der *Ṣal.* ablief (S.49-66). Verf. skizziert hier die Intentionen des despotischen Cemâl Paşa (des eigentlichen Initiators der Schule), vor allem aber die verschiedenen anti-osmanischen Strömungen, die in diesem Gebiet während des Krieges aufkamen und deren Protagonisten nicht selten in enger Beziehung zur *Ṣal.* standen. Daraus ergibt sich, daß die *Ṣal.* zwar den osmanischen Staatsgedanken durch Rückgriff auf panislamische Ideen stärken sollte, andererseits aber eben durch ihre arabische Unterrichtssprache ein Zugeständnis an die gemäßigten Nationalisten war. Von letzteren wurde sie dann jedoch als Ort der Propaganda für die arabische Sache genutzt, womit sich ihre urprüngliche Funktion ins Gegenteil verkehrte (S.71).

Das Ende der *Ṣal.* (S.67-69) kam mit der englischen Besetzung Jerusalems im Dez. 1917. Im Herbst 1918 war bereits wieder das Priesterseminar in Betrieb und heutzutage erinnert nichts mehr an die einstige osmanische Hochschule (S.73f.).

Das vorliegende Werk zeichnet sich durch sorgfältige Recherchen und viel Liebe zum Detail aus. Auch an Druckfehlern ist nur sehr wenig stehengeblieben, was angesichts der Verwendung zweier unterschiedlicher Transkriptionssysteme (für osmanische und arabische Termini bzw. Eigennamen) keine Selbstverständlichkeit ist. Aufgefallen sind Rez. lediglich (nach dem Schrägstrich jeweils die richtige Schreibung) S.15 *ḳâdı/ḳâḍı*, S.18 *tâli/tâlî* und *'âli/'âlî*, S.25 und 27 *nizâmnâmesi/niẓâmnâmesi*, S.27 *müteḫaṣṣıṣîn/müteḫaṣṣiṣîn*, S.60 *rauḍat muṭahhara/rauḍa m.* Da bei einigen Eigennamen (ohne dem Rez. ersichtlichen Grund) die moderntürkische Schreibweise gewählt wurde, wäre es u. E. angebracht gewesen, diese auch konsequent zu übernehmen, also etwa S.62 statt Edib und Ahmed, Edip bzw. Ahmet. Die auf S.83 abgebildete Inschrift enthält noch den Zusatz *al-Ayyūbī*, welcher in der darunterstehenden Erklärung fehlt. Aus Sicht des Rez. wünschenswert gewesen wäre eventuell noch ein Index, da ohne einen solchen das reichhaltige Material zu verschiedenen Personen für zukünftige Forschungen leider nur schwer greifbar ist.

Alles in allem liegt hier jedenfalls ein durchaus gelungenes Werk vor, das nicht nur über das Bildungswesen im zu Ende gehenden Osmanischen Reich, sondern auch über den erstarkenden arabischen Nationalismus während des 1. Weltkrieges einige neue Aufschlüsse gibt.

Stephan Procházka (Wien)

0 8 TEMMUZ 19

Dirasatu Tarihiyye, sayı: 15-16 (1984) Lem s. 173-206. D.1376

29 — Cosmas, 119.

30 — C. Stornajolo, la Miniatura de la topografia Christiana, codex Vaticanus 699, Millano, 1908.

٣١ ـ ي.ي. سريزنفسكي ، معلومات وملاحظات حول المصادر المجهولة أو المعروفة قليلا ، بطرسبورغ ١٨٦٧ ، ص ٥ .

٣٢ ـ نينا بيفوليفسكايا ، بيزنطة على طرق الهند ، موسكو ١٩٥١ ، ص ٨٦ .

ـ هـ ـ

« صناعة الحرير وتجارته في مدن بلاد الشام »

33 — Procopius Caesarensis : Anecdota (Hitoria Arcana), Cap. 25, ed. Haury, Berlin, 1905, V. III. P. 115.

34 — Procopius, Anecdota, Cap. 25, P. 157.

٣٥ ـ نينا بيفوليفسكايا ، بيزنطة على طرق الهند، ص ٩٤ ـ ٩٥ .

٣٦ ـ نينابيغوليفسكايا ، بيزنطة على طرق الهند، ص ٩٥ .

* * *

صفحات من تاريخ الجمعيات في بلاد الشام
١٩٠٨ ـ ١٩١٨
حزب اللامركزية الإدارية العثماني

د. سهيلة الريماوي

الجامعة الاردنية

أولا : البعد التنظيمي الداخلي للحزب :

حزب اللامركزية الادارية العثماني ، تنظيم سياسي علني ، اقامه السوريون خارج سورية ، وبالتحديد في مصر أواخر سنة ١٩١٢ أو أوائل سنة ١٩١٣ ، ويرجح التاريخ الاول ، استنادا الى وثيقة حصلت عليها من مكتبة محب الدين الخطيب في القاهرة تحدد تاريخ ١٢ يناير « كانون الثاني » سنة ١٩١٣ يوم اجتماع اللجنة العليا للحزب وانتخاب محب الدين الخطيب في هذه الجلسة مساعدا للسكرتارية ، اي سكرتيراً ثانياً (١) .

وعلى العموم فان مسالة « التنظيم السياسي » ، على صعيدي النظرية والتطبيق هي واحدة من اهم المسائل التي تواجه الفكر والحركات السياسية المعاصرة في امم العالم كله ، وهي من اهم المسائل التي واجهت العرب العثمانيين بعد اعلان المشروطية سنة ١٩٠٨ .

واذا كانت ضرورة « التنظيم السياسي » امرا مسلما به ، ولم تثر كثيرا من النقاش او الجدل حولها عند العرب العثمانيين في مطلع القرن العشرين ، فمما لاشك فيه أن « صيغة » التنظيم السياسي ومقوماته ، امور اثارت نقاشا واسعا وجدلا حادا بين الشبيبة العرب في الاستانة حول مسائل كثيرة منها : هل الاحزاب والحزبية هما الصيغة المثلى للتنظيم والنشاط السياسيين ؟ أم تراهما غير ذلك ؟

هل الاحزاب السرية ، أم الاحزاب العلنية ، أم الجمعيات القومية ، أم جمعيات الاخاء والائتلاف ، افضل من غيرها في ذلك الوقت ؟

Arabs and Young Turks

Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918

Hasan Kayalı

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سلسلة التراث القومي

قراءات في الفكر القومي

الكتاب الثاني

الوحدة العربية

مجموعة من المؤلفين

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مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية

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قراءات في الفكر القومي

الكتاب الأول

القومية العربية : فكرتها ومقوماتها

مجموعة من المؤلفين

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على ان اول مظهر جماعي للوحدة السلافية ، كان المؤتمر السلافي الذي انعقد في براغ في حزيران ـ يونيو سنة ١٨٤٨ برئاسة « بالاكي Palacky » . وقد انقسم المجتمعون : فالليبراليون كانوا يكرهون استبداد القيصر بقدر كرههم لآل هابسبورغ في النمسا ؛ بينما كان السلافيون الخاضعون للنمسا يعتقدون ان بإمكانهم تحقيق سيادتهم واستقلالهم الذاتي الى جانب الالمان والنمساويين اذا اقيمت دولة نمساوية متعددة القوميات . لذلك فقد فشل هذا المؤتمر في دفع الوحدة السلافية قدماً . ثم جاءت المعاهدة النمساوية ـ الهنغارية سنة ١٨٦٧ ، والتي دعت الى تقسيم اوروبا في ما بينها ، لتبدد آمال السلافيين ـ النمساويين الذين بدأوا يتجهون بأفكارهم نحو روسيا ، حيث ان جماعة من المثقفين الروس كدستوفسكي دعوا بلادهم الى تحقيق مهمتها التاريخية التي تتلخص بجمع الدول السلافية في اتحاد كونفدرالي واسع يمتد من الألب Elbe حتى الادرياتيك . ومن اجل تحقيق هذه الأفكار عقد سنة ١٨٦٧ في موسكو مؤتمر عرقي سلافي ضم جميع الدول السلافية (ما عدا بولونيا) وسيطرت عليه روح الحرب الدينية التي كانت مقدمة للحروب الروسية ـ التركية سنة ١٨٧٨ .

لكن الاهتمامات الاجتماعية ما لبثت ان طغت على الأحلام السلافية ؛ فالمفكرون السلافيون رأوا في تحوّل طموحاتهم الى مجرد أداة تستخدم لمصلحة استبداد القيصر وتوسعه ، شيئاً مقلقاً ، بالاضافة الى ان المثقفين السلافيين الخاضعين للنمسا رفضوا فكرة الانضمام الى روسيا بعد ان بدأوا يتمتعون بحرية نسبية في البلاد التي يشكلون فيها أقلية .

وهكذا فقد ظهرت في أوائل القرن العشرين « وحدة سلافية جديدة » كان مؤسسها التشيكي كارل كرامر «Karl Kramar» وعقدت مؤتمراً في براغ في سنة ١٩٠٨ دون ان يحقق نجاحاً كبيراً .

بعد الحرب العالمية الأولى ، وانهيار الامبراطورية العثمانية ، بدأت عداوة من نوع جديد تظهر في المناطق السلافية التي كانت خاضعة لهذه الامبراطورية ، فنشبت الحرب بين البلغار والصرب منذ ١٩١٣ واستمرت طيلة الحرب العالمية . ثم في سنة ١٩١٨ مزقت الحرب ايضاً الدول السلافية الجديدة تشيكوسلوفاكيا ويوغسلافيا بسبب العداوة بين التشيك والسلاف والصرب والكرواتيين . . .

منذ ثورة ١٩١٧ ، بدت روسيا وكأنها تتنكر للدعوة الى « الوحدة السلافية » ولكن الهجوم الالماني على روسيا في حزيران ـ يونيو ١٩٤١ دفع ستالين الى احياء الوحدة السلافية مما ادى الى خلق « لجنة سلافية » في موسكو . وفي سنة ١٩٤٥ بعد انتصار روسيا في الحرب بدا وكأن حلم المثقفين الروس قد تحقق اذ اصبحت روسيا محاطة بمجموعة من الدول السلافية التي تدور في فلكها والتي تمتد من الألب حتى الادرياتيك .

وقد عقدت عدة مؤتمرات بعد قيام هذا النظام الجديد كان اولها في موسكو ١٩٤٣ ثم في صوفيا ١٩٤٥ وبلغراد ١٩٤٦ . ولكن تخلي يوغسلافيا عن هذه الأفكار في ١٩٤٨ وضع حداً للمحاولة السوفييتية التي رمت الى بعث الوحدة السلافية .

الوحدة العربية

Pan-Arabism. Arab Unity

Pan-Arabisme. Unité Arabe

كانت فكرة الوحدة الإسلامية أسبق إلى الظهور في الامبراطورية العثمانية المتداعية من فكرة الوحدة العربية التي لقيت تجاوباً عميقاً في صفوف السياسيين العرب في المناطق العربية التابعة للامبراطورية العثمانية على أساس أنها الطريق إلى تحقيق نهضة العرب وعودتهم الى مسرح الحضارة العالمية . والواقع أن الجيش المصري الذي استولى بقيادة ابراهيم باشا نجل محمد علي باشا على سوريا وفلسطين ولبنان وانتزعها من الحكم العثماني في القرن التاسع عشر إنما فعل ذلك تحت راية العروبة . ومع ان هذه الحملة انتهت بالفشل إلا أنها نجحت في غرس بذور الخلاف بين العرب والأتراك معاً ، الأمر الذي ظل ينمو

The Origins of Arab Nationalism

Edited by

Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon

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شعر الثورات الداخلية في العهد العثماني

89501

د. زينب محمد صبري بيره جكلي

مُدرسة الأدب العربي في جامعة الشارقة

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نظرة تاريخية

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LES PRÉMICES DU NATIONALISME ARABE : LA SOCIÉTÉ RÉVOLUTIONNAIRE ARABE (1913-1914), SON CONTEXTE HISTORIQUE ET IDÉOLOGIQUE, ET LA RHÉTORIQUE SÉDITIEUSE DE SIX FACTUMS SUBVERSIFS

Stéphane VALTER [1]
Université du Havre

INTRODUCTION : UNE APPROCHE PLURIELLE POUR UNE QUESTION AUX RAMIFICATIONS MULTIPLES ET COMPLEXES

La rhétorique anti-ottomane et nationaliste arabe de la Société révolutionnaire arabe (*al-Ğam'iyya al-ṯawriyya al-'arabiyya*, 1913-1914), créée en Égypte et dont la figure de proue était un haut officier ottoman déchu et Égyptien d'origine circassienne ('Azīz 'Alī al-Miṣrī), constitue un cas digne d'intérêt.

Pour appréhender la spécificité (qui renvoie à des questions plus vastes) de ce groupuscule activiste, ce travail tourne autour de deux axes : premièrement, une présentation du cadre dans lequel naquit le nationalisme arabe à travers le parcours exemplaire de 'Azīz 'Alī al-Miṣrī. La genèse du nationalisme arabe s'exprima essentiellement, à la veille de la première guerre mondiale, à travers la formation de sociétés et partis publics (légalistes), d'un côté, et de sociétés et partis secrets (séparatistes), de l'autre. L'abondance de dates et noms cités ne doit pas faire accroire que l'approche est événementielle : le dessein n'est de définir précisément le contexte historique et idéologique que pour mieux comprendre la formation du nationalisme arabe, à travers le prisme de l'une de ses expressions les plus virulentes.

Vient en second lieu la traduction de six manifestes datant de cette période troublée, composés en partie par la Société révolutionnaire arabe. Ce travail propose une traduction française fidèle, et en contexte, de documents traduits partiellement et de surcroît en langue étrangère. Choisis en fonction de leur indéniable valeur littéraire et de leur contenu idéologique

1. Maître de conférences (langue et civilisation arabes) à l'Université du Havre, Faculté des affaires internationales, Institut des langues et civilisations orientales (ILCO). L'auteur remercie Christian Cantuel, spécialiste de littérature et passionné de belles-lettres, qui a bien voulu relire le manuscrit et laisser sa muse embellir le style des passages traduits. L'auteur exprime également sa reconnaissance au professeur Walīd al-Ḥāfiẓ de l'Institut Français d'Études Arabes de Damas (IFEAD) pour sa maîtrise de la poésie arabe classique et son aide généreusement prodiguée.

16 EKİM 2003

To
Albert Hourani
with all best wishes
and with warmest greetings
from N. Zeine
Zeine

Beirut, March 31, 1958.

ARAB-TURKISH RELATIONS AND THE EMERGENCE OF ARAB NATIONALISM

by

ZEINE N. ZEINE, M.A., Ph.D. (Lond.)

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

Kütüphanesi
İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi
24 SUBAT

NATIONALISM AND REVOLUTION IN THE ARAB WORLD

(The Middle East and North Africa)

by
HISHAM SHARABI
Georgetown University

Pan-arabism

NEW PERSPECTIVES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı
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and Yūsuf Bānāja died in exile. The qadi 'Abd al-Qādir, 'Umar Bā Darb, Sa'īd Baghlaf, Bakrī al-Shāmī, and Ṣāliḥ Jawhar of the *Irani* dispute eventually returned to the Hijaz.[1] The last three named came to Jidda in 1866 with a vizierial letter ordering them to live in Mecca or Taif. Ṣāliḥ Jawhar returned to India. The returned men enjoyed great popularity in Jidda and Mecca.[2] Popular opinion in Mecca had declared the muhtasib and the Shaykh al-'Amūdī to be martyrs for the faith when they had been executed in 1859.[3] 'Abdullah Bāhārūn was on the Administrative Council of Jidda in 1879. The son of the muhtasib, Muḥammad b. 'Abdullah, received a medal from the Ottoman government in 1882.

It is in the relationship between Christians and Muslims that the events of 1858 had their greatest impact. The great Indian mutiny was being crushed in early 1858. The risings against Christians and Jews in Damascus and the Lebanon in 1860 were to happen two years later. In all these cases an initial deep religious resentment was intensified by political and economic rivalry between elite Muslim or Druze circles versus foreigners and their protégés. Violence by Muslims was followed by even greater retributive violence by the European Powers. The idea of successful, direct, violent destruction of the European presence was tried out and discredited. With the partial exception of an incident in 1895 there were no similar riots, murders, or large-scale anti-foreign incidents in Jidda after 1858. The memory of the Jidda bombardment was widespread. Charles Doughty found it one of his chief protections in 1877 as he explored the northern Hijaz.[4]

Even though with the opening of the Suez Canal the foreign community in Jidda increased they did so in peace. For many Muslims the possibilty of eventual Christian incursions inland and their growing economic strength on the coast remained a source of fear. For Europeans the slightly open door to the Hijaz remained open.



[1] Dahlān, *Khulāṣa*, p. 323.

[2] F.O. 195/879 de Gaspary (Jidda) to de Moustier, 24 Aug. 1866.

[3] F.O. 881/848 Walne to Malmesbury, 19 Jan. 1859.

[4] Charles M. Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1936), I, 208 and II, 104, and 520.

William OCHSENWALD
RELIGION, ECONOMY, AND STATE IN OTTOMAN-ARAB HISTORY
The Isis Press, Istanbul 1998, s. 111 - 124.

İSAM. Ktp.

IRONIC ORIGINS: ARAB NATIONALISM IN THE HIJAZ, 1882-1914

The most significant expression of early Arab nationalism was the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman empire. Sharif Husayn of Mecca announced the revolt on June 10, 1916. This revolt became the key starting point not only for the independence of the short-lived kingdom founded by Husayn but also for the history of independent Iraq and Syria. The Hashemite kingdom of Jordan continues today as the direct heir of Husayn's action. The Arab Revolt of 1916 that began in the Hijaz (Hejaz) also involved promises of support made by the British to Husayn before June 1916. In these promises, according to the interpretation placed upon them by Arab nationalists, the British made commitments to Husayn that included, among other things, Arab control over Palestine. For all of these reasons, the Arab Revolt of 1916 was vitally important for Arab nationalism. It marked the end point of the beginning phase of Arab nationalist intellectual thought and development, and it was the only concrete result of the secret societies that had planned Arab independence since before World War I began. The revolt also signaled the second phase of Arab nationalism — a phase that involved independent or semi-independent Arab governments struggling to secure full control over their own destinies while at the same time spreading nationalist consciousness to the masses of Arab society.

Yet the Arab Revolt was in many ways an ironic beginning for secular Arab nationalism and independence. The revolt was formed by and took place in a province of the Ottoman empire that was not at all nationalistic, and the first leader of the revolt, Sharif Husayn, was a very late recruit to the cause of Arab nationalism. The political, economic, military, and intellectual prerequisites for the emergence of nationalism among the elite were singularly lacking in the Hijaz during the period leading up to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Moreover, in the first declaration outlining the reasons for the revolt, Husayn said that the chief causes were religious rather than nationalistic. Thus, if one considers the initial impetus and place of origin, the Arab Revolt and its leaders developed a more nationalistic overtone only after 1916.

BRITISH IMPERIALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST OF WORLD WAR ONE: A PSYCHOSOCIAL HISTORY OF THE ARAB REVOLT

by

Donald Harvey, B.A.

DISSERTATION

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

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for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Unequal Development: Social Formations at the Periphery of the Capitalist System, (Monthly Review, 1976)
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

23 KASIM

The Arab Nation

Samir Amin

Translated by Michael Pallis

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THE STRUGGLE FOR ARAB INDEPENDENCE

Western Diplomacy
& the Rise and Fall of
Faisal's Kingdom in Syria

by
ZEINE N. ZEINE

To
Albert Hourani,
With
my best wishes and
warmest greetings
Zeine N. Zeine

Beirut, July 21, 1960.

Beirut
1960

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mitted me to reproduce texts. Dr. Barbara Stowasser skillfully transliterated and clarified Arabic terms and nomenclature and established the basis for an index. The editors at Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., rendered various gallant services. Whatever errors occur—despite all this competent assistance—are entirely my own.

K. H. K.

December, 1967

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

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الثورة العربية والاحتلال الانجليزي

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case of Mutran's Syrian Central Committee showed. The Arabs demanded the regulation of administration, the expansion of state education, and the strengthening of the security apparatus: measures that called for an even greater role for the central government in the provinces.

Hasan KAYALI
Arabs and Young Turks
Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918
Berkeley, 1997, s. 81-115.
ON: 52148



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Pan-Arabism

3

The Opposition and the Arabs, 1910–1911

The army's successful suppression of the counterrevolution of April 1909 arrested both the anticonstitutionalist (pro-Hamidian) and the Liberal (decentralist) opposition to the CUP and left the Committee, though weakened, as the only viable political group. As the Committee struggled to consolidate its position, so did its opponents. Its determination to establish itself as the paramount arbiter in the government of the empire sharpened the differences between the Committee and the decentralists. By the end of 1911 the opposition dealt a critical blow to the CUP in a by-election in İstanbul, compelling it to go to early parliamentary elections.

The division between the centralists and the decentralists did not crystallize along strict socioeconomic lines. Allegiances remained fluid and frequently changed depending on perceptions of personal advantage. In general, the centralists drew their support from the lesser Muslim officialdom and lower-middle-class elements who were averse to European economic domination. Such domination had reinforced political tutelage over the empire and constituted a threat to the integrity of the Ottoman state, which the centralist Unionists, many of them members of the civil service and military establishment, were committed to preserve.[1] Many older bureaucrats and officers who had acquired wealth or high positions prior to 1908 and sought to maintain their social and political predominance gravitated toward the opposition. As the battle lines gradually crystallized, two groups of provincial notables also identified with the opposition: those who were passed over in the distribution of favors to the advantage of other contenders and those

- Milliyetçilik.

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C. ERNEST DAWN

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From Ottomanism to Arabism

ESSAYS ON THE ORIGINS OF ARAB NATIONALISM

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GREAT BRITAIN AND ARAB NATIONALISM, 1943

A. H. HOURANI

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who meet occasionally and reprint his writings for distribution. These call themselves patriots, and they seek the salvation of their country in the purification of Islam and the establishment of true constitutionalism. Feudalism and imperialism are not so much the problems as are the superstitions and false faiths of imamism, sufism, impractical philosophical speculation, interpretations of the Persian poets, and the study of allegorical exegetics. Obviously, the work of Kasravi was largely negative, in that it shook the foundations of tradition for his young readers. His own "religion of purity" and his constitutionalism did not replace that tradition, but the way was opened for new secular ideologies.

At least one other group of a more exclusive and aristocratic membership considers itself to be nationalist. Its aims seem to be centered on improving the government of Iran by increasing efficiency and giving important positions to those who, like themselves, deserve to be so honored.

. . .

5

NASROLLAH S. FATEMI

The Roots of Arab Nationalism

The importance of Arab nationalism in the contemporary Middle East cannot be overemphasized. No other issue or appeal holds the attraction of nationalism. In this selection Professor Fatemi discusses the background of Arab nationalism, showing the impact of Western ideas and the growth of particular nationalisms in Egypt. He evaluates developments since World War I and assesses the role that Nasser occupies today as the foremost exponent of the nationalist ideology.

From Nasrollah S. Fatemi, "The Roots of Arab Nationalism," *Orbis*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Winter 1959), published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania. By permission of the editor.

1999

MODERN Arab nationalism dates to the beginning of the nineteenth century. Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1797 was the herald of this new era. Some Arab writers cavil at contentions that the national movement in the Arab world is an innovation, a borrowed concept or an alien ideology. They believe, on the contrary, that it is the recreation of the creative, dynamic and constructive social orders of old. "Arab nationalism," writes Nejla Izzeddin, "aims at the realization of social solidarity and political stability, and the reestablishment, through moral rebirth, of the place and mission of the Arabs in the family of nations."[1] This movement is not a recent development or the work of one leader; its roots lie in the history of the Arab people.

Muhammed Ali, the founder of modern Egypt, coveted an Arab Empire under the leadership of Egypt. But the great Khedive and organizer of modern Egypt probably would have been mystified had he been called an Arab nationalist. His son called himself an Arab and tried to take away Syria from the Turks and to build for himself an empire—a feat in which he would have succeeded had Britain not intervened to save the Ottoman Sultan. This failure opened an ideological rift between the Asian and African parts of the Arab world. "This divergence had far-reaching consequences because it came about at a time when the Arabs were in a most impressionable stage of development, when values and beliefs, morals, and loyalties, were all in a melting pot, when the whole fabric of society was undergoing reconstruction."[2]

After Muhammed Ali, the various movements in different parts of the Arab world were shaped both by inner ideological forces and external factors. During this period, the idea of Muslim nationalism was resuscitated by Jamal Ud-Din Afghani, who is regarded as the awakener of modern political consciousness in the Islamic world.

Afghani's principal aim was to strengthen and reform one of the Islamic States so that it could reach the level of a strong and progressive power and blaze a trail for the rest of the Muslim world to follow. Afghani opposed the despotic rulers of Iran and Turkey. He openly advocated tyrannicide. One of his disciples assassinated the despotic Shah of Iran in 1896. Afghani was an impatient and fervent champion of reform through revolution. He believed in propaganda and political agitation. For forty years, he was behind most patriotic movements, revolts and demonstrations in Egypt, Turkey and Iran. While he detested autocratic rulers, he was not opposed to benevolent despotism whenever the pressure of events proved too great a strain upon democracy. He was ejected from India, exiled from Iran, banished from Egypt, jailed and finally poisoned in Turkey.

President Nasser of Egypt and other nationalists in the Middle East have been strongly influenced by Afghani's prescription of first eliminating the corrupt kings, their courtiers and the hand-picked assemblies packed with feudal lords, and then establishing a benevolent dictatorship until the prerequisites for the success of a multi-party representative government

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Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée.
Say: 95-98 (2002) s. 71-93.
D. 368

21 EKIM 200

Anne-Claire de Gayffier-Bonneville

Renaissance arabe et solidarité musulmane dans La Nation arabe

Abstract: Published in Geneva from 1930 to 1938, the journal, *La Nation arabe*, first addressed European intellectuals. Points of view developed by the two editors, Chekib Arslan and Ihsan al-Djabri, show on the other hand that the readership was especially Arab and Muslim. Arslan and Djabri are convinced of the renaissance of the Arab nation which they largely attribute to the politics of the European powers in Arab lands. Signs of this awakening are reported, in particular, the mutual interest that Arabs show for one another, the solidarity of people who are suffering and the emergence of uncommon personalities. The journal had an activist stance which was original for that time: it intended to mobilize Arabs and Muslims not only towards fighting the occupying powers but also towards fighting against the Zionist project which threatened the territorial integrity of Palestine and which symbolised the Arab nation.

Résumé : Publiée à Genève de 1930 à 1938, la revue *La Nation arabe* voulait initialement s'adresser aux intellectuels européens. Les points de vue développés par les deux rédacteurs, Chekib Arslan et Ihsan al-Djabri, montrent toutefois que le lectorat visé était surtout arabe et musulman. Arslan et Djabri sont convaincus de la renaissance de la nation arabe, qu'ils attribuent en grande partie à la politique des puissances européennes dans les États arabes. Les signes de ce réveil sont rapportés, notamment l'intérêt mutuel que les Arabes se portent, la communion des peuples dans la souffrance, l'émergence de personnalités hors du commun. La revue avait une intention militante originale pour l'époque : elle entendait mobiliser les esprits en vue de mener le combat de la renaissance, arabe et musulmane, non seulement

Faysal b. al-Husayn As A Diplomat of the Arab Nationalist Movement: December, 1918 - July, 1920

by

Eisuke Naramoto

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presented to Princeton University
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
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in
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Princeton, New Jersey, October, 1984

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11. On this issue, see the writings of Maxime Rodinson, *Islam and Capitalism* (Austin, TX and London: University of Texas Press, 1978), pp. 148–152; Alvin W. Goulder, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (New York: Avon Books, 1970), pp. 178–183; and Bryan Turner, *Weber and Islam* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), esp. pp. 151–70.

12. See my study, "Ideology, Social Class and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt," in S. Arjomand (ed.), *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam* (London and Albany, NY: Macmillan and State University of New York Press, 1983), pp. 142–43, which presents data on the social bases of the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots between the early 1930s and the 1970s.

13. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam*, pp. 109, 119–20.

14. See, for example, 'Abd al-Halim Khafaji, *Hiwar ma'a al-shuyu'iyyin fi aqbiyat al-sujun* (Kuwait: Maktabat al-Falah, 1979).

15. Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), P. 328.

16. Of course, this social dynamic underscores the dependent political and economic status of urban lower middle class women in contemporary Egypt.

17. Increased mosque attendance represents yet another of those categories that fails to place Islam in its social context. Have, for example, more upper class Egyptians been attending mosques? The answer is obvious; it is the more economically vulnerable Egyptians who have manifested this behavior.

18. While prospects for upward mobility were enhanced somewhat during the 1970s by the employment of urban lower middle class Egyptians in Libya and the Gulf, the recent decline in oil prices setting in motion a "reverse migration" indicates that the "oil boom" was a temporary phenomenon.

19. Gilsenan, *Recognizing Islam*, pp. 221, 226–28.

20. One example of such a synthesis can be found in the Egyptian journal, *Al-yasar al-Islami* (The Islamic Left), published by the religious and social thinker, Dr. Hasan Hanafi. See also the incipient socialist thinking in Ahmad Shukri Mustafa's critique of contemporary Egyptian society in Keppel, *The Prophet & Pharaoh*, pp. 78–90.

21. See, for example, the distinction between "elitist institutional" and "alternative Islam" in Fadwa El Guindi, "Veiling Infitah with Muslim Ethic: Egypt's Contemporary Islamic Movement," *Social Problems*, vol. 28, no. 4 (April 1981): 465, 473.

22. Among those who have "rediscovered Islam" are such prominent Egyptian leftist intellectuals as 'Adil Husayn, Tariq al-Bishri, and Saad Eddin Ibrahim. Conversation with El Sayed Yassin, Princeton University, May 1983.

23. Even in Iran, which is perhaps the closest approximation of such a model, the bourgeoisie was not unified, being divided between the royalists and the national front; the middle and working classes contained large numbers of secularists and Marxists, and socialist ideologies had strong roots among sectors of the industrial working class, especially the oil workers.

24. Antonio Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), pp. 5–23, 25–43, 125–205, 210–18.

25. Christine Buci-Glucksmann, *Gramsci and the State* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1980), pp. 23–24, 56–58; Martin Carnoy, *The State and Political Theory* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 74–75.

Edited by Barbara Freyer Stowasser
THE ISLAMIC IMPULSE
London - 1987, s. 59 - 74.
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4 ISLAM AND ARAB NATIONALISM

Bassam Tibi

Throughout the modern era, the Middle East has been confronted with two compelling ideas: secular nationalism and the Islamic precept calling for the creation of the universal *umma* (community) of the faithful.[1] A study of this encounter between Islam and secular ideologies leads automatically to an inquiry into the major concerns of modern Islam — something which cannot be understood through an approach based exclusively on a textual analysis of dogmatic Islamic writings.[2] To be sure, traditional Orientalist scholars and Islamic fundamentalists would contest the preceding statement by appealing to the notion of "Islamic essence." They deny the necessity of studying the historical context in which the Islamic faith emerged and developed. To Islamic fundamentalists any difference between the realities of Islam and the contents of traditional or traditionalist writings is merely a deviation or falling away from the aforementioned essence,[3] while to some German Orientalist scholars the study of reality is considered to be the job of social scientists, of whom these Orientalists habitually speak with contempt. But since our present purpose in studying the relationship between Islam and secular ideologies[4] is not exegetic, the focus here will be on sociopolitical realities. In particular, one should note that the traditionalist assumption of Islam's immutability and monolithic universality does not hold up under scrutiny, for the story of Islam has been marked by both cultural diversity[5] and historical variation.[6] These characteristics enrich Islam, and should not be dismissed as deviations from an Islamic essence that exists only in dogmatic literature.

Our point of departure since the nineteenth century is the assumption that global interdependence has maintained in existence a world society linking all nations. This world society is the end result of the spread of European influence and technology during the period of colonialism. In the course of this process, the European market turned into the world market and bourgeois society into world society. The political units of interaction in this new setting are the nation-states. The Islamic peoples have been incorporated (or more precisely forcibly integrated) into this new

A.A. DURI
THE HISTORICAL FORMATION OF THE ARAB NATION
(Translated by Lawrence I. Conrad)
London - 1987, s. 238 - 246
DS 7912

their nationality or act to cause them injury by encroaching on their rights'. This attitude is in his view an appropriate one. He has no regard for labels; to him, what is important is to emphasise the Arab bond. 'Let them say that they are Arabs first and Ottomans second', for attachment to the principle of nationalisms has been manifest in civilised lands among the most ancient of nations.

Beyond this, al-Qāsimī holds that the very least benefit to be derived from the principle of nationalisms is that it teaches people the merit of self-reliance. The Constitution may have enjoined equality among the subject nationalities, but that was not a sufficient basis for national awakening, for there is no progress for a people 'that does not make use of its own power'. He therefore considers that 'the nationalist uproar is legitimate so long as the man engaged in it, motivated by the driving force of genuine patriotism, is trying to defend the rights of his nation'. This is a view indicative of a certain degree of understanding of the difference between various forms of nationalism, and reveals an appreciation for pure nationalism.[88]

It is thus that al-Qāsimī discusses the concept of Arab nationalism. Although he does make incidental reference to the factor of race, he regards language and literature as its fundamental bond. And in a period of ascendant nationalism in Europe, he considers it a factor behind the emergence of modern states and the basis for progress and national awakening. He calls upon the Arabs to adopt this idea, as the Turks have done: 'nationalism is both essential and legitimate, for it aims to protect the rights of the Arab nation and its national awakening'. It is also worth bearing in mind that al-Qāsimī grew up in a learned family and received a modern education.

'Abd al-Ghanī al-'Uraysī

The nationalist perspective was also represented by 'Abd al-Ghanī al-'Uraysī (executed in 1916),[89] who wrote articles in *Al-Mufīd* on the Arab role in history, the Arab nation and the elements that had given rise to it, and Arab-Turkish relations. Al-'Uraysī studied in indigenous Islamic schools, which took an interest in promoting Arab consciousness and in the Islamic reformist perspective. His Arab nationalist viewpoint thus took shape in his own land,[90] although his familiarity with Western thought, after his trip to Paris in 1912–13,[91] probably made it possible for him to articulate his

nationalist ideas more clearly.

Al-'Uraysī stressed the idea of the Arab nation and discussed it in a number of articles in which he spoke in glowing terms of its historical role and eminence.[92] Sufficient cause for taking pride in it is provided by the fact 'that God produced from this nation a man whose sacred law spread over the earth'. It was worthy of such pride, since 'the Arabs are the nation of noblest stock and the people of most outstanding nature'. This distinction he associates with Islam: the noble Prophet came and brought them out of the snare of delusions to the ethereal expanse of the truth, from the worship of created beings to worship of the true God, from the bonds of ignominy to the spacious domains of exalted renown, from the confines of unquestioning adherence to tradition to absolute freedom.[93] He also takes up the historical role of the Arabs. It was they who conquered and subjugated the regions of the earth, who transmitted the sciences of the Greeks, which were borrowed by the West from the Arabs. The Arabs are possessed of pre-eminent skill in science and civilisation, and the Europeans were their pupils and benefited from them in their own national awakening. God endowed the Arabs with inexhaustible vitality, a vitality which would make it possible for them in practically no time to restore splendour and glory to the Islamic nation.[94] He goes on to state that the Arab prophet of Quraysh confirmed this Arab eminence, associated their glory with that of Islam, bid that they be held in high regard, and warned against doing harm to them and to the Arabic language. 'For I am an Arab', Muḥammad had said, 'and God has sent me as a prophet from among them . . . Grief and destruction upon those who wrong them, and woe and suffering upon those who cause harm to my language and sacred law.'[95]

Al-'Uraysī points out that despite circumstances of invasion and conquest the Arab nation had preserved its qualities and distinctive features: many nations in such a situation have faded into oblivion 'and lost their national qualities', but the Arab nation has not. He takes notice of a unique point: 'that every conquered nation has taken on the qualities of the conqueror, except in the case of this nation, where the conquerors have taken on the qualities of the conquered'. He explains this by the fact that the Arab nation, whether in the role of conqueror or conquered, is possessed of constitutive elements that preserve its essence and characteristics; hence, the nation 'brings together among its people elements of civilisation and agreeable life'.[96]

In discussing these formative elements of the nation and the

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وزارة الثقافة

القومية العربية

ودور التربية في تحقيقها

تأليف

الدكتور يوسف خليل يوسف

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وزارة الثقافة

المؤسسة المصرية العامة للتأليف والنشر

بالاشتراك مع

المجلس الأعلى لرعاية الفنون والآداب والعلوم الاجتماعية

Diss. Abs. v. 30/1969

the Anglo-French war resumed in mid-1803, Franco-American relations were more amicable than they had been in a decade. The undeclared naval war of the Adams Administration was past history while Jeffersonian America had just secured the vast Louisiana region. Instead of capitalizing on the consequent reservoir of friendship, at Napoleon's behest France alienated the United States by exerting pressure to have the lucrative American trade with San Domingo halted. Similarly, the French lost more friends when they temporarily thwarted Jefferson's drive to acquire West Florida. These events, important as they were, paled in comparison to the harsh commercial measures adopted by France.

When war came in 1812, it was in spite of, not because of Napoleonic actions. British impressment, arrogance, alleged complicity with Indians on the American frontier, and the seeming vulnerability of Canada all conspired to spur an Anglo-American rather than a Franco-American war. Americans were determined to punish France, however, if circumstances permitted. But international events and the peace settlements of 1814-1815 coupled with Napoleon's final removal precluded this.

Franco-American relations must also be examined against the background of the American scene. National solidarity had not been achieved, vociferous Federalists refused to credit Jeffersonian Republicanism's lofty aims and verged on sedition. Moreover, Jefferson and Madison recognized that peace was necessarily America's passion because of the sparse population which inhabited the enormous land mass. They felt too that party ideology dictated American neutrality. Thus they made their futile attempts to preserve neutrality through a succession of acts from the embargo to non-importation against Britain alone.

America learned from her humbling experiences. Citizens insisted that the United States remain neutral when Napoleon returned from Elba. Yet they asserted that the national honor forbade any meek surrender to the European power brokers. Luckily the struggle lasted but briefly and American determination was not tested. Nevertheless, the United States adhered to the policy for the rest of the century. And a hundred year quiescence enabled the nation peacefully to develop her resources as Jefferson and Madison had wished.

M $4.70; X $16.45. 365 pages.

THE EVANGELICAL PROTESTANT DEFENSE OF AMERICANISM 1945–1960.

(Order No. 69-13,247)

Macel D. Ezell, Ph.D.
Texas Christian University, 1969

Adviser: Ben H. Procter

This study concerns evangelical Protestants' concept of the American way of life and their anxieties over their culture from 1945 to 1960. Believing that the Protestant ethos was responsible for the distinctive features of American democracy, they feared that non-Protestant peoples and ideologies were antithetical to Americanism. They were particularly fearful of communism and Catholicism. While most evangelicals did not become involved in discussions of immigration, a minority opposed immigrants on the same grounds as earlier nativist groups. No issue provided a stronger bond for evangelical Protestants than their fears of Catholicism. In this regard three issues evoked widespread alarm: an ambassador to the Vatican, a Catholic president, and state aid to parochial schools. Concerning Marxism they were primarily concerned with internal security and an ideological drift toward socialistic attitudes. They opposed ecumenicism and internationalism because both these movements were too soft on Catholicism and communism.

The main sources for this study include publications of the National Association of Evangelicals and member groups, nondenominational periodicals which identify themselves as evangelical, and journals of independent denominations which profess evangelical faith (especially the Southern Baptist Convention and Churches of Christ). The three major periodicals are the Baptist Standard (published by the Baptist General Convention of Texas), United Evangelical Action (National Association of Evangelicals), and Christianity Today (independent evangelical journal).

M $3.00; X $9.70. 212 pages.

ARAB–TURKISH RELATIONS FROM THE EMERGENCE OF ARAB NATIONALISM TO THE ARAB REVOLT, 1848–1916.

(Order No. 69-10,620)

Mumtaz Ayoub Fargo, Ph.D.
University of Utah, 1969

Chairman: Dr. A. S. Atiya

The sixteenth century witnessed the ascendancy of Ottoman expansion in the Middle East including the Arab territories which seemed to accept Ottoman domination without resistance. In fact, the amity of Arabs and Turks at that time, was intensified by two main factors. One was the common bond of Islam. Religion was, therefore, the cardinal element. The Arabs even took pride in Turkish expansion in Europe which meant the spread of Islam. Another potent was the influence of the doctrine of the Caliphate, which the Turks resuscitated and consequently, claimed the allegiance of all Muslims, including the Arab subjects. These two factors induced the Arabs to remain four centuries under Ottoman domination.

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, expansion of the Ottoman Empire was halted by superior European Powers. Under a series of incompetent sultans, the Ottoman administration deteriorated. The administration realized that the general weakness and decline of the Empire stemmed also from the degeneration and inferiority of the Ottoman army. It was for this reason that the Ottoman administration subscribed to the idea of reform. The major objective was to halt European intrusion. A period of reaction, however, followed the promulgation of reforms. It was motivated by the Muslim 'Ulama' and various opportunists who were able to convince the Sultan that the reforms were borrowed from the West; were anti-Islamic; and would curtail the absolute power of the Sultan-Caliph. The Western Powers who maintained a substantial influence following the Crimean War insisted on constitutional reforms to protect the rights of the Christian minorities in the Empire. Thus, the movement for reform initiated by the Ottoman administration reached its peak at the promulgation of the Midhat Constitution and exercised significant influence on the people of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman exposure to Western institutions and ideologies contributed to the rise of Turkish and Arab national consciousness resulting in Arab-Turkish estrangement and affecting the relations between the two elements.

Arab-Turkish relations remained amicable, however, until the Revolution of 1908. Following the Revolution, the Young Turks of the Committee of Union and Progress gained the ascendancy and introduced a despotic rule. The Turkish nationalists controlled the Ottoman administration and attempted to Turkify all elements in the Empire. This move, coupled with the attempt to impose rigid centralization, alarmed the Arabs. They were concerned about their language, heritage, and identity.

OCAA 1097

Proceedings of the 2nd International Meeting on Modern Ottoman Studies and the Turkish Republic (Leiden 21-26 April 1987). Edit: E. van Donzel. Leiden 1989, s. 139-150 . DİA Kütp. 39 067.

25 MART 1996

LA REACTION POLITIQUE ET INTELLECTUELLE ARABE ENVERS L'EMPIRE OTTOMAN A L'AUBE DU XXe SIECLE: QUELQUES CAS

par Randi Deguilhem

Pan-Arabism

Introduction

Lorsqu'on étudie la réaction arabe envers l'empire ottoman dans la seconde moitié du XIXe et au début du XXe siècle, il est essentiel de ne pas entremêler les idées et les mouvements arabes de cette époque qui furent très variés, aussi bien en substance qu'en zone géographique. Cependant, les relations entre provinces arabes étaient fréquentes et régulières grâce aux voyageurs. Sur le plan culturel et politique, les élèves et les enseignants qui se déplaçaient d'un centre d'enseignement à l'autre jouaient un rôle très significatif dans la diffusion et l'homogénéisation des idées à travers les provinces arabes. Mais d'autres voyageurs, tels que les commerçants, exerçaient eux aussi un rôle non-négligeable dans ce domaine.

Le sujet est trop vaste pour être traité à fond dans une brève communication, mais il est possible d'exposer certaines idées, réactions, et mouvements de l'époque, notamment les réactions des Damascains, et plus particulièrement des notables vis-à-vis de la politique ottomane. Les Damascains, bien sûr, ne réagissaient pas dans le vide, il y avait des contacts à tous les niveaux entre les communautés arabes dans l'empire ottoman. Il est donc évident que d'autres capitales et centres arabes entrent en cause eux aussi.

En dehors d'un certain nombre d'intellectuels et de notables arabes qui souhaitait une autonomie politique et culturelle à l'intérieur de l'empire ottoman, la majorité des Arabes ne s'imaginait pas des états arabes à l'extérieur de l'empire ottoman musulman. La plupart de la population arabe, depuis l'intellegentsia jusqu'aux paysans et petits ouvriers, considérait l'empire comme le leur. Cette identification devint plus intense à mesure que l'Europe chrétienne empiétait économiquement et politiquement sur les territoires arabes. De ce fait, malgré certaines différences avec les Turcs ottomans, les Arabes, surtout les musulmans, s'accrochaient à l'empire ottoman comme protecteur définitif.

BSOAS, vol: LVIII / 3, London (1995) s. 556-557.

relatively homogeneous dialect area as the urban Levant and Egypt. Because of the way Watson organizes her material, comparative information on this point for Ṣan'ānī is only recoverable by a patient trawl through the index, at the end of which one discovers that there are six other major references in the book to participial usage. More difficult still is arriving at a complete picture of the division of 'semantic labour' between the verb forms as a whole, which is, again, an area of subtle differences between dialects. It is not that the information is not there, it is just that the book's overarching organizing principles sometimes get in the way of recovering it. The non-linguistician user, on the other hand, even if he already knows some Arabic, is likely to be simply confused by some of the terminology.

Pace the above minor criticism (and no one has yet devised a system of description and organization which satisfies everyone), the great joy of this book is in the huge quantity of sentence examples extracted from natural speech data. There is a wealth of material covering every aspect of the dialect which will prove of inestimable worth to other dialectologists. Some of the examples give tantalizing glimpses of a women's world which is rarely exposed in data-based dialectology, in which the informants tend overwhelmingly to be men. It is a pity that the book's already considerable length presumably left no room for some sample texts.

This excellent study is unhesitatingly recommended to all in the field of Arabic dialectology, and provides a long overdue syntactic complement to the essentially phonological and morphological study done by Rossi more than 50 years ago. Dialectologists will look forward to the author's pedagogical grammar of Ṣan'ānī which will be its companion volume in the 'Semitica Didactica' series.

CLIVE HOLES

THOMAS NAFF (ed.): *Paths to the Middle East: ten scholars look back.* xix, 360 pp. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993. $16.95.

One might divide the history of academic studies of the Middle East into that of three generations. The first generation, born in the nineteenth century, was that of the founders, the true Orientalists, men (mainly) whose training was usually in classical philology and whose interest in the Middle East often came from an interest in the classical civilizations and religions. The second generation, born during and after the First World War, might be called the teachers, if for no better reason than that unlike the founders they spent a good deal of their time teaching in higher education. Often under the umbrella of area studies, they bridged the divide between the broad brush, all-inclusive incursions of the Orientalist and the specialized approach of the various academic disciplines. Most of them turned their attention from the classical civilizations towards the modern societies and states of the Middle East and they oversaw the expansion of their studies from a situation in which they were the preserve and solace of the few to one in which they were the full-time occupation of the many. The third generation we might call the students and it is now coming to dominate the field. Their characteristic is that they were usually trained in the various academic disciplines which they subsequently applied to the Middle East.

This collection of autobiographical essays describes the lives and academic odysseys of ten of the teachers: Pierre Cachia, Albert Hourani, J. C. Hurewitz, Halil Inalcik, Charles Issawi, Ernest N. McCarus, George Makdisi, Don Peretz, Dankwart A. Rustow and Farhat Ziadeh. Between them they provide an excellent picture of the growth of Middle Eastern studies during the last 50 years from a position when, as Peretz remarks, 'the number of books available was so small that a professor could ask an advanced student to become familiar with most works dealing with the contemporary Middle East', to the present situation when no one can do more than try to keep up with the flood of publications in their shrinking specialisms.

A most valuable feature of the book is the account of the ideas and influences which shaped the intellectual and academic development of the teachers: the inspiring (and occasionally uninspiring) teachers whom they encountered, the historical events, (especially the Second World War), the burgeoning institutional structures, the improved access to archives and materials of study, and the odd chances which change a life, such as the casual suggestion which turned Charles Issawi from economics to economic history. One of the best ways in which a teacher can introduce a student to a problem is to place it in an historical perspective showing how it was identified and tackled in the past. There is no shortage of examples here.

One notes several characteristics of the teacher generation. Most of them had some non-academic link with the Middle East, notably that their parents came from the region if they did not do so themselves. Nearly all grew up with some facility in the regional languages (and often several others); indeed, it is doubtful whether any future generation will rival the teachers in linguistic proficiency. Although nearly all were to settle in one discipline (four historians, three political scientists, one language, one literature and one who successfully combined law and language to the end), one notes that their original training was in more than one discipline and often they spent some time investigating other approaches before choosing the one in which they were to make their greatest mark. As well as institutional and financial pressures, this circumstance may have influenced their readiness to adopt and promote the area studies approach which became the distinctive feature of the years when their influence was at its height. Whether the area studies approach will survive the advent of 'purer' disciples of the disciplines or whether the various branches of Middle Eastern studies will eventually be separated and each annexed as an integral part of the various academic disciplines and of new non-regional branches of study remains to be seen.

In conclusion one should add that much of the pleasure of this book, at least for one aging member of the student generation, is nostalgia. It is good to be reminded of the great names and events of the past, of the scholarly milestones and of the accomplishments of some very notable men who in the natural course of events cannot be with us much longer. The teachers did well and one hopes that when the time comes for a new generation to remodel the system of knowledge and ideas that they built up it will be done with as much humility and as much grace as the teachers brought to the task of rebuilding the structures left by the Orientalists.

M. E. YAPP

ELIEZER TAUBER: *The emergence of the Arab movements.* ix, 406 pp. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1993. £35, $40 (paper £16.95, $20). Idem: *The Arab movements in World War I.* xii, 322 pp. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1993. £35, $37.50 (paper £16.50, $20).

The two works under review are the first of a projected series of books by Eliezer Tauber on the origins of Arab nationalism in the Fertile Crescent and the Arabian peninsula in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Both studies examine Arab political developments from an Arab, not European or Ottoman, perspective. *The emergence of the Arab movements* focuses on the Arab political societies established in the Ottoman empire and elsewhere between 1908 and the outbreak of the First World War. The subject of this book is the beginning of pan-Arab and local nationalisms in the Arab world, excluding Egypt and North Africa. One of Tauber's objectives in writing the book was to refute the traditional view of the pre-First World War Arab societies as presented in George Antonius's influential work, *The Arab awakening.* Because of Antonius, it has long been supposed that these societies were all part of a unified Arab nationalist movement that strove to realize Arab independence from the Ottoman Empire. Tauber demonstrates convincingly that political developments in the Arab East between 1908 and 1914 were far more complicated than Antonius's version of them. Twenty Arab societies were founded during that period to provide political solutions to the problems of the Arabs in the Ottoman empire. Tauber divides these societies into four ideological categories: Arabism, Lebanonism, Syrianism, and Iraqism. He shows that only a small minority of them developed a pan-Arab ideology that called for the secession of the Arabs from the Ottoman empire and the creation of an independent Arab state embracing the entirety of the Arab East.

The Arab movements in World War I examines the role of Arab separatist movements in the Ottoman empire, Egypt, Europe and the Americas during the First World War. Tauber devotes a large part of the work to the activities of Arab secret political societies before and during the Arab revolt led by Sharif Husayn of Mecca and his sons. Tauber makes an excellent contribution to knowledge of the part these societies played in the Arab revolt. Some of the most interesting chapters concern relations between the Iraqis, Syrians, Egyptians, Hijazis, and Europeans who took part in the revolt. Tauber's research reveals that relations were often tense between the Hashimites and the members of the Arab societies who joined the revolt. He also sheds much new light on the little-known political activities of Lebanese and Syrian émigrés in Egypt, Europe and the Americas.

Tauber concludes that by the end of the war, four ideological trends had emerged among the Arabs of the Fertile Crescent. One favoured the establishment of a single Arab state embracing the entirety of the Fertile Crescent and much of the Arabian peninsula. Another called for the creation of a Syrian state including all of present-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine and Israel. A third called for the establishment of an independent Mount Lebanon. The fourth was the first stirrings of an Iraqi independence movement. The pan-Arab movement led by the Hashimites became the dominant trend during the war. However, by the end of the war Syrian and Lebanese movements had begun to gather strength.

Both studies are based on a combination of published primary sources in Arabic, mainly memoirs and contemporary newspapers, British and French archival sources, and secondary literature in Arabic, English, French and German. Tauber has made an extremely thorough and painstakingly detailed examination of the sources with which no other study can begin to compare for thoroughness. His industriousness has brought to light a wealth of new information about the societies and their members, and resulted in the most comprehensive studies to date of the history of Arab nationalism between 1908 and 1918. For this reason alone, both books are essential reading for students of this period.

However, Tauber's thoroughness is both the strength and weakness of the two books under review. In his zeal to unearth and record nearly every fact he could find, however minor, Tauber swamps his readers with an avalanche of detail that detracts from the interest and importance of his subject. This kind of writing makes for very tedious reading. Amidst the sea of unsynthesized detail it is often difficult to discern the larger sweep of political trends in the Arab and Ottoman arenas to which the detail relates. Even in the analytical sections of both books, Tauber has more of a tendency to recount facts than to analyse. This weakness is particularly apparent in *The emergence of the Arab movements.*

Both studies implicitly purport to present a new interpretation of the events they describe. But, except for a few brief footnotes and a handful at most of remarks scattered throughout the text, Tauber never explains the views of other writers or how his interpretation of the events and personalities he has studied

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

New Haven, 1966. s. 237-310. DN: 71975

EARLY ISLAM

Julian Obermann

I. RESISTANCE TO REFORM

II. ARABISM

1. PREOCCUPATION WITH THE PAST. TRIBAL AND INTERTRIBAL GENEALOGY
2. BLOOD REVENGE. RECORDS OF THE "DAYS." ʿAṢABĪYA

III. THE GREAT TURNING POINT

1. MONOTHEISM AND WORLD HISTORY
2. ARABISM AND ISLAMISM. FUSION OF IDEOLOGIES

IV. THE TEMPER OF THE ERA

1. REMEMBRANCE OF THE ANCESTORS. TOTAL JIHĀD
2. REMEMBRANCE OF ALLAH
3. A NEW KIND OF GENEALOGY

V. SCOPE OF INQUIRY

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ISRAEL GERSHONI

THE EMERGENCE OF PAN-NATIONALISM IN EGYPT: PAN-ISLAMISM AND PAN-ARABISM IN THE 1930s

Kitap / Kitap
Kütüphanesi'ne Mevcuttur

Introduction

In August 1930, immediately after his defense of the Palestinian Arabs before the League of Nations Commission of Inquiry into the rights of the Jews and Muslims at the Wailing Wall,[1] Muḥammad ʿAlī ʿAllūba issued a public call to Egypt to cease alienating itself from the Arab world and to take its place at the head of the movement for Arab unity. 'The first means for strengthening the ties among the sister Arab countries,' ʿAllūba declared, 'is to take radical measures to extirpate the pharaonic concept (*al-fikra al-fir'awniyya*) from Egypt for the simple reason that this is a sterile idea which cannot be realized.'[2] Egypt's national, cultural, and political identity is Arab-Muslim, and not pharaonic at all. ʿAllūba was convinced that the Egyptians were charged with the duty of emphasizing and fostering their 'true' and 'natural' Arab Muslim identity — their 'living,' 'breathing,' 'humanistic' identity which is embodied in the Arabic language and their Arab-Islamic historical cultural heritage.[3] Hence the mission of modern Egypt, contended ʿAllūba, was not 'unhealthy provincialism' and isolation within the 'narrow boundaries' of the Nile Valley, but rather 'the carrying out of its mission in the Arab world,' namely, the realization of Arab unity by means of the creation of a single economic, cultural, social, and eventually, political all-Arab framework. 'He who wishes to deflect Egypt from

1 *Filasṭīn*, 20 July 1930, 5 August 1930; *al-Fatḥ*, 5 Rabī' al-Awwal 1349: 8–13; Muḥammad ʿAlī ʿAllūba, *Filasṭīn wa-jārātuhā — asbāb wa-natā'ij*, Cairo 1954, pp. 5–6.

2 *Al-Siyāsa al-Usbū'iyya*, 9 August 1930: 11. See also *al-Muqaṭṭam*, 5 August 1930: 5; *al-Fatḥ*, 19 Rabī' al-Awwal 1349: 8.

3 Muḥammad ʿAlī ʿAllūba, 'Fī sabīl al-wahda al-'Arabiyya,' *al-Siyāsa al-Usbū'iyya*, 18 October 1930: 7, 25.

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- Panarabizm
- Milliyetcilik

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Nationalisms in the Middle East
The Case of Pan-Arabism

YOUSSEF M. CHOUEIRI

In the first half of the twentieth century, Middle Eastern nationalisms were lumped together and treated as part of an undifferentiated phenomenon sweeping across the entire length of the continents of Asia, Latin America and Africa. More importantly, these nationalisms were seen to be no more than political responses of western-educated elites to European expansionism and colonialism.

Moreover, French and British colonial scholarship tended to frown upon such nationalisms, deeming their emergence to be either unfortunate, or undesirable in both their aims and methods. By contrast, American scholarship tended, at least in the initial stages of its development, to be more charitable, assigning to nationalism positive cultural connotations and political significance, thereby holding it to denote an earnest desire to join the modern world of independent nations. The subtle, but problematic, European differentiations of various types of nationalisms, often introduced for purely political purposes, tended to be blurred or assigned no particular importance. Thus, the distinctions between liberal patriotism, territorial nationalism and ethnic allegiances were all placed along the same spectrum of positive human loyalties. However, by the early 1930s a more nuanced approach began to be deployed in order to account for the apparent persistence and growth of a number of Middle Eastern nationalist movements, be they Turkish, Iranian or Arab.

These movements centred on defined territories, and while addressing themselves to particular ethnic communities, desired to fashion modern nation-states out of countries that had been for centuries part of wider imperial domains. Moreover, their territorial and political spaces were also home to sizeable minorities with a different national agenda.

The Turkish heartland, for example, had been incorporated in the structures of the Saljukid and Ottoman empires before it was reconfigured to form a national territory in its own right. Persia – later to be designated Iran – had always formed, prior to its emergence as a national entity, the nucleus of an imperial structure, such as the Safavid imperial state, or an integral part of other empires, including the 'Abbasid or the Umayyad. As for the Arabs, their territorial fatherland did not become clearly delineated until the first half of the twentieth century. Moreover, this fatherland in its modern history, unlike Turkey or Iran, has never been unified into a single state with the result that it has had to satisfy itself with a dual identity almost equally shared by a particular state and the entire Arab homeland at the same time.

بحوث تاريخية

بحوث علمية محكمه حصيلة اللقاءين العلميين الأول والثاني
اللذين عقدا في شهري شوال ١٤٠٩ هـ وشوال ١٤١٠ هـ

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı
İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi
Kütüphanesi
Dem. No: 165187
Tas. No:

اصدار الجمعية التاريخية السعودية
1413/1993 Riyad

سمات الحكم العثماني وأسباب قيام الحركات الاستقلالية في الولايات العربية العثمانية في القرن الثامن عشر

الدكتور علي إبراهيم الخليف
الأستاذ المساعد في قسم التاريخ
جامعة الملك سعود

Dar-Arabiam (160202)

هذه المقالة أو المبحث الصغير هو في واقع الأمر دراسة نقدية أولية (محدودة) حول الحركات الاستقلالية في الولايات العربية ــ العثمانية في القرن الثامن عشر مثل تلك التي قامت في مصر والشام في النصف الأخير من القرن الثامن عشر ..

ولكي نقدم صورة أكثر وضوحا عن الحركات الاستقلالية لا بد لنا أن نعطي مقدمة تحليلية عن سمات الحكم العثماني بصفة عامة ، وفي العالم العربي مشرقه ومغربه على وجه الخصوص ..

وبدون فهم بعض سمات (Characteristics) الحكم العثماني وطبيعته بشكل صحيح وضمن سياق تاريخي يأخذ في اعتباره الظروف التاريخية الخاصة بالدولة العثمانية ، وفي مرحلة تاريخية معينة .. بدون ذلك يصعب علينا استخلاص الأسباب الحقيقية لقيام الحركات الاستقلالية في الولايات العربية ــ العثمانية في القرن الثامن عشر وفهمها في اطارها التاريخي الحقيقي .

أولا : الحكم العثماني في المشرق :

وبادىء ذي بدء يجب الاشارة إلى أن سيطرة العثمانيين على البلدان العربية حدثت بعد مضي أكثر من قرنين على نشوء دولتهم . وهذا يعني أن الدولة العثمانية

سليمان موسى

Pre-emption

الحركة العربية

سيرة المرحلة الاولى للنهضة العربية الحديثة

١٩٠٨ - ١٩٢٤

دار النهار للنشر ش.م.ل
بيروت لبنان
1970

09 HASAN 1995

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı
Kütüphanesi
İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi

زين نور الدين زين

نشوء القوميّة العربيّة

مع دراسة تاريخية في العلاقات العربية التركية

الطبعة الرابعة

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı
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Kütüphanesi
Demirbaş No: 05566
Sınıf No: 956.3 ZEY.N

دار النهار للنشر
Beyrut
1986

Kapak Sayfası

Pan-Arabism

26 MAYIS 1994

Yürükan-i Behram) paid 3564 akça sheep tax and personal (**bennak**) tax in the same period (one akça for two sheep). Apparently, Turcoman Yürüks from the Saruhan area (the Gediz River valley) migrated into the Çanakkale peninsula and the Marmara basin as far as Koca-eli before the sixteeth century (57). The Yürük groups of Kubaslar, for example, or Saruhanlu were found in the **nahiyet** of Kizilca-Tuzla as well as in the Saruhan province (58 a). In the Marmara area, **Kubaslar** had their summer pastureland in the **kadilik** of Manyas, and their taxes were included as those of the Behram Yürüks in the endowment of Medina (58 b). Their move in this area from Saruhan apparently dated back to the establishment of the pious foundation by Bayezid I (1389-1402) or even to an earlier date.

In later periods Kizilkeçili settlements were found in the area (two villages bore the name).

In the Ottoman fiscal surveys mostly of the sixteenth century, Faruk Sümer (60) found Turcoman groups of Çepni (in the nahiyet of Behram) in our area, Afsar (in the Ayazmend and Kepsut areas), Karkin (in Ezine), Eymir (Eymür) (in the Behram and Edremit areas), Kinik, Bügdüz and Igdir (in the Çan area). Apparently, camel driving Yürüks existed among the Yürüks of Karaca-Dag in the sandjak of Kayseri. The government tried to keep them as a separate group from ary peasant population. (61)

of the settlements in the area reflected a rather transitory the process from nomadic to the sedentary life as they were **karye** or **köy** but simply **oba** which means a nomadic clan ureland (62).

e **obas** population is found settled in **bölüks,** a term also used small tribal groups. It appears that most of the Turcoman rrived in our area from Aydin and Saruhan. But at the same nadic groups from eastern Anatolia too were encountered in according to the early Ottoman surveys. For example, the our area must have migrated from eastern Asia Minor. of Abi-Safi Kurds arrived in Geyve in 1487 and then, were into the Balkans and dispersed (63). Thus mobile elements, s, Kurds and Arabs could migrate to western Asia Minor tern Anatolia or the Syrian desert without great difficulty, when there were some economic attractions on this side.

Halil INALCIK
University of Chicago

lu village near Yalova; Başvekâlet Archives, **Defter-i Mufaṣṣal-i Kocaeli**, dated 1034, p. 20; I have not seen Kemal Özer, **Balikesirde Yürük ve ürkleri, Bursa 1948**; and Kâmil Su, **Balikesir Civarinda Yürük ve Türk-** Istanbul, 1938.
:gen, **op. cit., 97.**
endigâr **Evḳâf Defteri** (see note 14), 5 b.
26.
(Türkmenler) - Tarihleri - Teşkilâti - Destanlari, Ankara 1967, 424, 428, 443, 445, 447.
kan, **Kanunlar**, 22, dated 1576.
(in Mongol **obak**) in other Central Asiatic groups see : L. Krader, **Social ation of the Mongol - Turkish Pastoral Nomads.** The Hague 1963, 323; cent bibliography on the Yürük see Ingvar Svanberg, **A bibliography of dish-Speaking Tribal Yürüks.** Urpsala : Etnologiska Institutionen, 1982. let Archives, **Hüdâvendigâr Defteri**, no. 3, dated 892/1487, p. 676.

09 AGUSTOS 1997

منشورات المجلة التاريخية المغربية
بحوث المؤتمر الخامس للجنة العالمية للدراسات ما قبل العصر العثماني والفترة العثمانية
تونس 13-18 سبتمبر 1982
IRCICA 25510
الولايات العربية ومصادر وثائقها في العصر العثماني
تقديم سيادة الوزير الأول الأستاذ محمد مزالي
IRCICA LIBRARY ISTANBUL 1990
1984 تونس

THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT : THE INTELLECTUAL ROOTS OF ARAB NATIONALISM

By T. Y. Ismaîl

Arab nationalism is a « loose » or « contestable » social concept in that it has no fixed content. It is embodied in the writings, orations, assumptions, beliefs, deeds, debates, learned tracts of those who have regarded themselves as partisans of the Arab Nation. Like many other social concepts, it is useful insofar as its very vagueness enables it to be applied to a wide range of phenomena. Arab nationalism may be understood for most purposes to be **the Arab people's aspiration for the realization of their political, cultural and historical identity in a territorially defined national state in which they are free to shape their own destiny and influence their environment.** Nationalism in this sense derives from the unity of the wataniyah and qawmiyah ; it refers both to the territory and culture of the people. Arab nationalism is more than a mere chaotic phenomenon with no inner logic and no gradations within ; it is best regarded as a continuous dynamic process, a living mosaic of themes, beliefs and actions, and not as a definite and rigid creed expounded by theorists or politicians in words or deeds in a certain era.

This definition has several advantages : it is free from the connotations of territorial self-aggrandizement and imperialism which are often an integral part of traditional European formulations of the term, rendering them useless for the purpose of studying nationalism in the context of the underdeveloped countries. Secondly, it draws attention to the theme of national emancipation (which is so prominent in the nationalisms of emergent peoples) and so comparatively neglected in Western nationalisms, or in theoretical definitions of nationalism which draw heavily on their experience of the West (1). It is noteworthy that the above definition is formal, as opposed to substantive : we could apply it with equal justification to the nationalism of almost any emergent people, for it does not specify any beliefs or doctrines to distinguish Arab nationalism from the nationalisms of other peoples. It asserts the simple fact that like others, the contemporary Arab people **do** believe in national unity and freedom, a belief which has not always existed, has been expressed in many different ways and with varying degrees of conviction and admixture with other beliefs, and may not last forever. No one has yet attempted to provide a substantive definition of Arab nationalism, a task which would prove not only tedious and laborious, but also quite likely misleading, fitting into a rigid conceptual mould something that is quite indeterminate, displaying many variable and contradictory elements at the same time. It is, therefore, best to forego such a catalogue definition and by limiting ourselves at first to a skeletal understanding of Arab Nationalism, attempt to give it flesh by an historical exposition.

(1) For an excellent, systematic and critical survey of leading formulations of the concept, and an original attempt to provide a universally applicable definition and categorization, see A. D. Smith, **Theories of Nationalism** (London : Duckworth and Co. Ltd., 1971), pp. 153-210. For a useful, but far from exhaustive account of the definitional problem, see Boyd C. Shaefer, **Faces of Nationalism** (New York : Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1972) « Problems of Meaning », pp. 3-21; for an alternative definition of Arab Nationalism, see S. Haim, ed., **Arab Nationalism : An Anthology** 2nd ed. (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1976).

Akil Muhammed Akil el-Perber
el-Alakatü'l-Arabiyyetü't-Türkiye, Trablus-198
DN: 83676

الحواشي

(1) علي التريكي ، رئيس وفد الجمهورية العربية الليبية في المؤتمر الصحفي المنعقد بأنقرة بصالة فندق انتركونتنتال — اسطنبول ، 1977/5/17 .

(2) تقرير بإدارة الأمم المتحدة بأمانة الخارجية .

(3) مقابلة صحفية للعقيد معمر القذافي نشرتها « ريزر سباستر » وأجراها يتى بوتسيفاليس في 18 يوليو 1981 م .
السجل القومي بيانات وخطب وأحاديث — المجلد السنوي الثاني عشر 1980-1981 م . اللجنة الادارية للاعلام الثوري — الشئون الثقافية ص 1328 .

(4) كلمة الرئيس التركي كنعان إيفرن — ترجمة نص الكلمة بأمانة الخارجية — الادارة الاسلامية (بدون تاريخ) .

(5) نفس المصدر السابق .

(6) الصحافة التركية تقول قادة ج . ع . ل . يعملون بنشاط لبناء ليبيا الثورة تحت أضواء وأصداء سياسية بجريدة الفجر الجديدة ، 1975/2/9 — رقم 758 طرابلس .

(7) سعد الدين بوشويرب — سفيرنا بتركيا يتحدث عن تطوير العلاقات العربية الليبية — التركية بالفجر الجديد تحت أضواء وأصداء سياسية ، 1975/11/17 م ، العدد رقم 999 ص 5 .
أيضاً بأمانة الخارجية — إدارة التعاون الفني ..

(8) الصحافة التركية تقول : قادة ج . ع . ل . بقيادة الأخ العقيد القذافي يعملون بنشاط لبناء ليبيا الثورة — التعاون مع الجماهيرية بداية لتطوير العلاقات مع الدول العربية وفقاً لمبادىء العالم الثالث : جريدة الفجر الجديد 1975/2/9 ، طرابلس .

(9) أمانة التخطيط — إدارة القوى العاملة .

(10) تقرير بالمصرف العربي الليبي الخارجي بشأن المصرف العربي الليبي التركي .

(11) أمانة الخارجية — إدارة التعاون الفني ..

(12) نبذة مختصرة أعدتها الشركة العربية الليبية للاستثمارات الخارجية تفضلت بها علي للاستفادة منها في هذا البحث .

(13) أمانة الخارجية — إدارة التعاون الفني .

(14) نبذة مختصرة أعدتها الشركة العربية الليبية للاستثمارات الخارجية تفضلت بها علي للاستفادة منها في هذا البحث .

(15) سعد الدين بوشويرب سفيرنا في تركيا يتحدث عن تطوير العلاقات العربية التركية بالفجر الجديد تحت أضواء وأصداء سياسية ، 1975/11/17 م ، العدد رقم 999 ص 5 .

(16) أمانة الخارجية — إدارة التعاون الفني ..

(17) المجموعة الاحصائية للتجارة الخارجية منذ 1969 حتى 1980 م ، أمانة الاقتصاد .

11 KASIM 2002

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In this chapter I have argued that the modern Arab world has been passing through an age of ideology due to the depth and breadth of social, economic, political, and cultural change. I have also tried to show how psychological strain can provide an appetite for ideological formulations. Finally, I discussed a number of variables that could help us in understanding the rise and fall of ideologies. In the chapters that follow I will draw on the various arguments presented here as well as the historical record to try to provide a more meaningful understanding of the different ideologies and ideological movements of the Arab Middle East than can be provided by only one approach or one mode of explanation. I do not claim to have provided a model for predicting ideological change but only a framework within which to search for questions and answers having to do with the content and appeal of different ideologies.

PAUL SALEM
Bitter Legacy
Ideology and Politics in the
Arab World, New York - 1994,
s. 31-88. ON:48547

320.9563
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CHAPTER TWO

Arab Nationalism

The History of Arab Nationalism

Early Origins

Before the nineteenth century, politics in Arab-Islamic society was largely a matter of religion and dynasties. The political system "made political rather than cultural claims on the subjects. Loyalty to the Sultan, payment of the tribute, and respect for peace and order were the main demands of the state, any infringement of which would incur its anger and rectification by force" (Harik 1972, 305). Increasingly intimidated by and impressed with the West, however, several Western-influenced Arab and Turkish writers became convinced that national patriotism was the secret of Europe's success. They sought to convince their audiences that national patriotism was the crucial missing ingredient in the political attitudes of the Islamic world.

Rifaʿa Rafiʿ al-Tahtawi, for example, was among the first group of students sent to France by the progressive Egyptian Khedive, Muhammad Ali, and after spending the years 1826–1831 in Paris, he returned enamored of the civilizational advances of Europe and dismayed at the relative backwardness of Muslim lands. In a collection of reflections on Europe published in 1834, he insisted that Muslims had much to learn from the Europeans even though Muslims still had the upper hand in matters of religion because they followed the true religion of God's final Prophet. He sought to spread the sentiment of national patriotism that he felt underlay the vigor and dynamism of European societies and directed this patriotism toward Egypt as a na-

4 MAYIS 1997

Dirasatu Tarihiyye, sayı: 1 (1400/1980)
Şam, s. 96-114.

الحركة العربية
خلال الحرب العالمية الثانية وفي أعقابها
١٩٣٩ ـ ١٩٥٢

د. خيرية قاسمية

أستاذة مساعدة في قسم التاريخ بجامعة دمشق

لقد كان للاحداث التي تلت الحرب العالمية الاولى في المنطقة العربية، من اجراء التقسيمات السياسية ورسم الحدود وعدم تحقيق الاستقلال واطماع بريطانيا وفرنسا والصهيونية اثرها الفعال على مجرى الحياة السياسية وعلى اهداف الحركة العربية طيلة الفترة بين الحربين ، كما اثرت على صياغة اوضاعنا الحاضرة . ذلك ان تسويات مابعد الحرب التي جرت بطريقة مغايرة لما قطع للعرب من تعهدات قد هددت الفكرة القومية التي انتشرت قبل الحرب العالمية الاولى ، التي تؤمن بوجود امة عربية ترتكز على لغة وتراث وتاريخ وتطلعات ومطالب مشتركة ، ونشأت نظم سياسية مختلفة كان من شأنها ان تؤدي الى تجزئة الحركة العربية . وشجع هذا الاتجاه الحكم الاجنبي وبعض القيادات المحلية . وكافحت الفكرةالقومية لتتجاوز الحدود الضيقة ، وتحاول الابقاء على فكرة الوحدة حية ، وشغل هذا السعي الجماهير وقادة الفكر وزعماء النضال القومي رغم انصراف اجزاء الوطن العربي المتعددة الى قضايا استقلالها الوطني الذي هو وليد ظروفها الخاصة .

ويمكن القول اجمالا ان الحركة العربية في الفترة بين الحربين ، ورغم ماتعرضت له من نكسات وتراجعات استطاعت ان تفرض نفسها كحقيقة واقعة فوضعت نظريتها القومية ، وواجهت خطرين مترابطين ؛ التجزئة والاحتلال وحققت عددا من المكاسب على الصعيدين النضالي والقومي

D. 1376

الى ان اندلعت الحرب العالمية الثانية لتوجه الحركة العربية نحو مسار جديد تبعا للتغيرات المستجدة .

١ ـ سنوات الحرب العالمية الثانية وأثرها على الحركة العربية :

لم تكن الاوضاع العربية عشية اندلاع الحرب العالمية الثانية توحي بالتفاؤل للفئات الوطنية ، اذ بعد ربع قرن من الكفاح من اجل الاستقلال والوحدة ، كانت القوات الاجنبية لاتزال تسيطر على المنطقة العربية بأسرها اما مباشرة او من خلال معاهدات تضمن مصالحها الحيوية خلف واجهة الحكومات المحلية . ورفضت بريطانيا تقديم أي تنازلات بشأن فلسطين ، رغم توقف اعمال الثورة بعد اعلان الحرب ، واثار وصول تشرشل للرئاسة مخاوف العرب لانه معروف بميوله الصهيونية، واستمر اليهود في تعزيز مواقعهم في فلسطين عن طريق الهجرة غير المشروعة والتدريب العسكري . ووجدت فرنسا في ازدياد التوتر العالمي فرصة التقوية قبضتها على مناطق احتلالها في سورية ولبنان وحتى بعد اجتياح المانيا لاراضيها في حزيران ١٩٤٠ ظلت تسيطر عسكريا بقواتها الموالية لحكومة فيشي التي قامت في ظل الاحتلال النازي . واعلنت السلطات الفرنسية في سوريا ولبنان انها مصممة على « حمل رسالتها في شرقي المتوسط » ، وكذلك فقد حذرت بريطانيا من ان تستخدم سورية ولبنان قاعدة لأية دولة معادية .

وكان اهتمام بريطانيا بتأمين وجودها في المشرق العربي بالغا وقررت في منتصف عام ١٩٤٠ ان يكون الدفاع عن قواعدها في المنطقة تاليا في الاهمية للدفاع عن الجزر البريطانية ، وتحولت المنطقة العربية الى ميدان لحرب لامصلحة لشعوبها فيها وتمركزت فيها جيوش الحلفاء بحيث جعل انتفاضها امرا اقرب الى المغامرة ،كما وضع اقتصادها وطرق مواصلاتها وخدماتها تحت تصرف قوات الحلفاء .

وقد اتخذ العرب موقفا سلبيا من مجهود الحلفاء الحربي ، كما ان الضائقة الاقتصادية زادت من مخاوفهم ، بالاضافة الى عدم ثقتهم بأن انتصار الحلفاء كفيل بتحقيق اماني العرب القومية ، وكان عدد المستعدين للوثوق بوعود الحلفاء قليلا ، وزادهم استياءً ما عانوه خلال

el-Müstakbeliü'l-Arabi, c.I/s.3(1978)Beyrut, s.86-97.

شكل الفكر القومي العربي في القرن التاسع عشر

Türkiye ... Kütüphanesi ... Örnekleri Merkezi

الدكتور فيصل دراج

شارك الكاتب في العدد الثاني من « المستقبل العربي » في مناقشة اغتراب المثقف العربي .
وسيصدر له « الاغتراب والاغتراب الديني عند كارل ماركس »
وصدر له « الماركسية والدين »
وكتب في « شؤون فلسطينية » و « الطريق » و « المعرفة » و « الموقف الادبي » .

لم يمتلك الفكر القومي العربي **شكله النظري** دفعة واحدة ، بل ولد ونما ، ولا يزال ، في عملية النضال المستمرة التي خاضتها وتخوضها الشعوب العربية ضد الهيمنة الاجنبية ، من اجل بلوغ الاستقلال وحق تقرير المصير . واذا كان « الوعي » العربي لشخصيته الثقافية المتميزة موجودا منذ زمن طويل فان **الوعي النظري ـ المفهومي** الموازي له والمعبر عنه لم يكن موجودا ، بل مر في اطوار متعاقبة ـ متفاوتة . ويتفق المؤرخون على اعتبار منتصف القرن التاسع عشر البداية التاريخية لظهور الوعي القومي العربي .

الشروط الاقتصادية ـ الاجتماعية :

يتحدد كل فكر ، في التعيين الاخير ، بالشروط المادية التي انتجته في مجتمع معطى اقتصاديا في فترة تاريخية محددة ، ويرتبط شكل هذا الفكر ومضمونه بالبنيان الاقتصادي والاجتماعي الذي شكل ارضية لانبثاقه . فشكل الفكر هو شكل الواقع الذي انتجه على الرغم من اللاتناظر الذي يحكم هذه العلاقة احيانا . ومهما يكن حيز الاستقلال الذاتي النسبي الذي يمور فيه فكر ما فان هذا الفكر يبقى مشروطا في التعيين الاخير بنمط الانتاج الذي هو قاعدته المادية . ان ربط الفكر بواقعه التاريخي يسمح بدراسة علمية له حيث لا يتقدم الفكر ككيان مستقل او بنية فكرانية *idéelle* بل كنتاج شرط تاريخي محدد ، اي ان فهم الفكر لا يتم بتشريح مركباته الداخلية ولا بتحليل « وعيه لذاته » بل يتم بفهم التناقضات المادية للتشكيلة الاجتماعية ـ الاقتصادية التي ولدته .

فما هو شكل الشرط التاريخي الذي حكم بدايات الفكر القومي العربي ؟

ظهر الفكر القومي العربي في حقل الدولة العثمانية الاقطاعية ، حيث كانت « الارض عامة ملكية للسلطان وحاشيته وضباطه وكبار موظفيه والاقطاعيين » (١) . اخذت ملكية هذه الارض اربعة اشكال :

ـ اراضي الدولة ومالكها الاعلى هو السلطان ، « وتقسم هذه الاراضي بدورها الى صنفين رئيسيين : « الخاصات » والاقطاعيات العسكرية . اما « الخاصات » فهي اقطاعات مترامية الاطراف كان يتصرف بها السلطان شخصيا هو وافراد اسرته وينتفع منها مؤقتا الوزراء وكبار الموظفين الآخرين عند توليهم لمناصبهم . اما الاقطاعات العسكرية فتعهد الى الفرسان مدى العمر »(٢).

(١) الدكتور منير موسى الفكر العربي في العصر الحديث ـ دار الحقيقة ، ص ٩ ـ ١٠ .

(٢) لوتسكي : تاريخ الاقطار العربية الحديث ـ موسكو ، ص ١١

US ARMY 1995

ـ اراضي الاوقاف : وتعود الى المؤسسات الدينية ، وتتألف من اراض واسعة مصدرها « التبرعات » وهي معفاة من الضرائب ، وكان كبار الاقطاعيين يهبون العقارات الكبيرة الى المؤسسات الاسلامية ـ اي الى المساجد والمدارس الملحقة بالمساجد والتكايا والزوايا وغير ذلك ، لدعم النظام الاقطاعي .

ـ الملكيات الاقطاعية الخاصة : وتعود الى الاقطاعيين وكبار الملاك الذين لهم كامل الحرية في التصرف باراضيهم ، « ولم تكن الدولة تتقاضى عن هذه الاراضي الا ضريبة الارض وهي العشر او الخراج ، الذي كان يبلغ احيانا نصف غلة الارض » (٣) .

ـ الاراضي المشاعية : كانت موجودة في بعض المناطق وخاصة في المناطق التي يقطنها الرحالة في شمال افريقيا والعراق والجزيرة العربية ، « اما في المناطق الزراعية الحضرية فكانت المشاعيات الفلاحية لا تزال توزع دوريا بين الاسر الكبيرة » . وقد مارست الدولة العثمانية سياسة انتزاع هذه الاراضي بشكل مستمر وضمها الى الاراضي الاميرية ، ازاضي السلطان .

اننا لا نريد هنا تحديد نمط الانتاج في الدولة العثمانية الا بالقدر الذي يسمح لنا بمعرفة سماته السياسية والايدولوجية . ونجد هنا موقفين ، الموقف الاول يصنف المجتمع العثماني في المجتمعات الاقطاعية ، اما الموقف الثاني فيعتبر المجتمع العثماني نموذجا لنمط الانتاج الآسيوي (٤) .

وسواء قبلنا بموقف الفريق الاول او الفريق الثاني فاننا نلمس السمات التالية التي ميزت الدولة العثمانية : ملكية الارض هي الشكل الاساسي للملكية ـ مركزية الدولة ـ الصفة الاستبدادية لممارسات الدولة (الاستبداد الآسيوي) (٥) .

تظهر القراءة التاريخية لنا الدولة العثمانية دولة قمعية تقوم على الجيش والدين ، حيث يرفض الدين كل احتجاج اجتماعي وكل حركة اصلاحية او استقلالية باسم الزندقة ، اما الجيش فيشكل الاداة الفعلية للقمع ، والذراع الذي يرفع راية السلطان من حيث هو « خليفة المؤمنين » و « ظل الله على الارض » . لذلك شكل رجال الجيش ورجال الدين دعامتين اساسيتين في المجتمع العثماني .

ان الشكل السياسي الموائم للمجتمع الاقطاعي هو الدولة الاستبدادية اما المعادل الايدولوجي فهو الايدولوجية الدينية كموجه نظري وعملي اي اساس وحيد لمفهوم العالم .

في هذه الشروط ولد الفكر القومي وبدأ مخاضه ، أي انه ولد في شرط اقطاعي اقتصاديا ومستبد سياسيا ودِيني ايدولوجيا ، لذلك كان من الضروري ان يحمل سمات الشرط الذي انتجه : حمولة دينية ومناهضة للاستبداد . اذا كانت هذه سمة الفكر القومي ، فما هي جملة الاسباب التي دمغت حركته التاريخية ؟

الفكر امام الواقع العثماني

لم يكن الفكر القومي انعكاسا سلبيا ـ مرآويا ـ لواقعه ، بل جاء انعكاسا فاعلا ، يبدأ من الواقع ويتشكل حسب منطق فاعل « يفهم » الواقع ويتمرد عليه ، يترجم الواقع فكرا وينزع الى ترجمته عملا ، اي كان الفكر انعكاسا ـ سيرورة . وقف الفكر امام الواقع العثماني محللا ، محرضا ، وناقدا . كان حجم الانحطاط يفرض الاسئلة ويستحث الاجابة ويدفع العقول للبحث عن الحل في الماضي « الذهبي » وفي « اصول الاسلام » وفي « حضارة الغرب » . وعلى الرغم من اجتهادات الفكر وتعدد نزوعاته فان اجاباته على اسئلة الواقع كانت « غالبا » ناقصة وغائمة وبعيدة عن التحديد .

(٣) المرجع السابق ، ص ١٠ .

(٤) عبد الله حنا : القضية الزراعية والحركات الفلاحية في سوريا ولبنان (١٨٢٠ ـ ١٩٢٠) ، القسم الاول ـ دار الفارابي ، ص ٩١ ـ ٩٦ .

(٥) *La pensée* No 186 Avril 1976

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı
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İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi

The Soviet Union and Arab Nationalism, 1917–1966

Hashim S. H. Behbehani

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı
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Michael Eppel

THE ELITE, THE *EFFENDIYYA*, AND THE GROWTH OF NATIONALISM AND PAN-ARABISM IN HASHEMITE IRAQ, 1921–1958

One of the basic characteristics of the social conditions that marked political life in the Arab states in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s was the complex relationship between the politicians from among the elites of traditional notables of the Fertile Crescent cities and the *effendiyya*, or Westernized middle stratum. These elites consisted not only of traditional notable families, but also of families newly risen since the Tanzimat reforms in the 19th-century Ottoman Empire. Since the end of World War I, these elites had stood at the center of the new states established by the Western powers—Great Britain and France—and it was now the politicians from within those elites who headed the struggle of those states for independence. This relationship, as well as the character of the elite of notables and the *effendiyya*, constituted an important element in the social conditions characterizing the political and ideological environment in which the Iraqi politicians from the elite of notables had operated, and in which Arab nationalism and Pan-Arab ideology became a highly influential factor.

The traditional elite of notables, or *aʿyān*, have been discussed in the works of Albert Hourani, Ernest Dawn, Ruth Roded, Moshe Maoz, Ehud Toledano, and other scholars.[1] Hanna Batatu,[2] in his monumental study of Iraq, made a vast contribution to the description and analysis both of the elite in Hashemite Iraq and of the new political forces that arose in it. David Pool studied the development of the conservative elite that ruled Hashemite Iraq into a class. Philip Khoury's studies shed light on some important facets of the structure and socio-historical development of Syria under the French Mandate.[3] Daniel Lerner contributed to the characterization of the *effendiyya* in Syria during the 1950s.[4]

The *effendiyya* and its place in modern history is discussed in studies by scholars of modern Egypt: ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Ramadan, in his book about the development of the national movement in Egypt; Haggai Erlich in his work on the students in Egypt; Israel Gershoni, who studied the intellectual history and the development of national consciousness in Egypt; Marius Deeb in his book on the Wafd Party in Egypt; and Richard P. Mitchell in his book about the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.[5]

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ARAB-TURKISH RELATIONS FROM THE EMERGENCE OF ARAB NATIONALISM TO THE ARAB REVOLT, 1848-1916

by

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- Panarabizm

The Making of

AN ARAB NATIONALIST

OTTOMANISM AND ARABISM IN THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF

SATI' AL-HUSRI

By William L. Cleveland

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were published almost daily on page 3 of the *Egyptian Standard* beginning 18 September 1907, and ending 29 September 1907.

10. *Egyptian Standard*, 10 October 1907, p. 1; *Egyptian Gazette*, 11 October 1907, p. 5.
11. *Egyptian Gazette*, 2 March 1909, p. 3.
12. Ibid., 22 May 1909, p. 2.
13. Ahmad Shafiq, *Mudhakirati fi nisf qarn*, (Cairo, 1934), vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 172–73.
14. *Egyptian Gazette*, 8 March 1909, p. 3.
15. Shafiq, op. cit., pp. 173–77.
16. *Egyptian Gazette*, 6 July 1909, p. 2.
17. Shafiq, *op. cit.*, pp. 186–87.
18. *Egyptian Gazette*, 12 February 1910, p. 3.
19. Mansfield, op. cit., p. 187.
20. *Egyptian Gazette*, 8 April 1910, p. 3.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 13 April 1910, p. 3.
23. F.O. 800/47/299, Gorst to Grey, 10 April 1908.
24. *Egyptian Gazette*, 13 September 1910, p. 3.

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NATIONALISM IN A NON-NATIONAL STATE
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Ohio-1977, s. 207-237.
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Rashid Khalidi

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Arab Nationalism in Syria
The Formative Years, 1908–1914

It is generally agreed that modern Arab nationalism first developed as a significant political movement in Syria in the opening years of this century. Although the influence of Syrian émigrés in Cairo on the rise of Arab nationalism cannot be ignored, there can be little question that Syria was the first scene of the expression of Arab nationalism as a mass movement, with a considerable political impact, rather than just a developing intellectual current.[1] For Syria (defined in the context of this article as including modern Syria, Palestine, Jordan, and Lebanon) during the years from 1908 until World War I witnessed the growth of a political movement without parallel until that time in the politics of the region. This movement can, of course, be dismissed as a collection of disgruntled members of the upper classes without any clear political ideology, and with little popular support, particularly in view of its ineffectiveness in opposing the Turks during the opening stages of the war.[2] Nevertheless, as will be seen, this movement for local reforms, for decentralization, for resistance to the "Turkifying" Committee of Union and Progress

نشأة
الحركة العربية الحديثة

انبعاثها ومظاهرها وسيرها في زمن الدولة العثمانية
إلى أوائل الحرب العالمية الأولى

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منشورات المكتبة العصرية
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

Arab Nationalism

AN ANTHOLOGY

Selected and Edited, with
an Introduction, by Sylvia G. Haim

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1 The Historical Roots of Arab Nationalism

'ABD AL-'AZIZ AL-DURI

If we examine the beginnings of Arab consciousness, we find that the first vague stirrings occurred prior to the rise of Islam. During that pre-Islamic period, the Arabian Peninsula was threatened by two powers, the Sassanians in the east and Byzantium in the west, each of which tried to dominate the civilized borders of the Peninsula.

The civilized principates and other states collapsed one after another and either came under direct foreign domination (as in Iraq, Syria, and the Yemen) or relapsed into tribal chaos. This wave of tribalism spread into the more civilized regions. The Peninsula suffered from internal conflicts and fragmentation and passed through a period of religious anarchy.

Amid this total chaos, Arab consciousness first appeared. It made its presence felt in politics, society, and culture and prepared the way for a total renaissance. Here, we are concerned with only a few of these aspects.

Arab consciousness began with the move toward replacing the many dialects with a unified literary language—a language that appeared first in poetry and crystallized in the Qur'an. Historically, therefore, the Arabic language was the first common denominator.

Arab consciousness also coincided with a kind of political renaissance, which originated when tribes living on the edges of the Peninsula began individually to fight with the Eastern and Western powers. (The Battle of Dhu Qar[1] and its consequences in the northern part of the Peninsula are an example.) This renaissance was further manifested in the attempts to create a limited political sovereignty—as, for instance, in the principality of Kinda.[2]

Commercial activities, which involved a certain measure of independence, enhanced the development of this social [i.e., national] consciousness. This in turn produced a certain degree of unity and the diffusion of common social norms and conventions. This consciousness was also apparent in a religious tension, religion being an important social and ideological substructure. The Arab worship of individual tribal gods was transformed into the worship of more universal gods and into communal prayers at holy sites. With the development in the Yemen and Hijaz of a form of early monotheism, there also arose a type of monotheism that was connected neither with Byzantine-supported Christianity nor with Judaism, which enjoyed some protection from the Sassanians. The believers in this creed looked

Reprinted by permission from Kemal H. Karpat, ed., *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East* (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp.33-37. Originally in *Al-Judhur at-tarikhiyya lil-qawmiyya al-'arabiyya* (Beirut: Dar al-'ilm lil malayin, 1960), pp.10-14, 41-42, 85, 91-92. Al-Duri is an Iraqi historian who taught for many years in Jordan.

DN:41077

toward a sublime God transcending the local deities and called Allah in the western Peninsula. They considered the various deities as intermediaries between the people and Allah, and regarded the Ka'ba, to which pilgrimage was made from all parts of the Peninsula, as the House of Allah. Thus, the pilgrimage was another unifying factor among the Arabs.

Hence, we observe a renaissance, not devoid of anxiety, but containing a common consciousness and a new self-awareness—an awareness that lacked clarity, organization, and guidance.

With the appearance of the Prophet and Islam, the Arab spirit burst forth and the common consciousness reached its climax. The Prophet provided the leadership and the total framework for this consciousness, and Islam furnished Arab consciousness with a clear content and a well-defined direction. The movement was therefore Arabic in language, habitat, and message-bearers. In essence, it expressed a comprehensive Arab spirit. It rejected tribalism and all its attendant values and ideals, and it provided a barrier against social and ideological anarchy. It sought political unity, rejected fragmentation and servility, tended to evolve unified values and ideals, and adopted a secular attitude toward life.

The Qur'an was revealed in Arabic. It struck a blow at all other dialects and provided the Arabs with one language, the language of the Qur'an. This important foundation of the nation was fixed. We can go even further and say that this new movement guaranteed the perpetuation of linguistic unity when it added a new and common dimension to the Arabic language. Arabic became the greatest denominator and [those who spoke it had] the proof of belonging to the Arab race. The Arabs did entertain certain vague notions about a common stock and descent, and this feeling of a unified origin crystallized in the well-known distinction between Bedouin Arabs, genuine Arabs, and naturalized Arabs. But the new movement did not encourage the perpetuation of vague lineage to old ancestors. It emphasized the language, considering it as a total framework within which people might truly belong. Thus, the Arab came to be distinguished from the non-Arab, and the most Arab of all peoples were regarded as those whose language most closely resembled that of the Qur'an. Coming out into the world [i.e., out of the Peninsula], the Arabs carried this distinction with them.

The Arabs were unified through the Islamic movement and became "one nation". Although the term "nation" in this context may possess a religious connotation, in fact it included only Arabs. Thus, we can say that in that period the nation was an Arab nation. Islam provided this Arab nation with a humanistic message that it carried throughout the world, and it gave the Arabs a comprehensive foundation for the creation of a new society and a new civilization.

Thus, Arab consciousness and the Arab renaissance acquired significance through Islam: one nation, one language, a historic message, and a common density. For the first time, the Arabs emerged united onto the stage of history out of chaos, fragmentation, and the conflict between the Sassanian East and the Byzantine West....

We are concerned here with understanding how the Arabs met the challenge to Arab consciousness and the Arab idea.

The attacks [of the Shu'ubiyya] against the Arab heritage caused the Arabs all the more tenaciously to embrace this heritage of wisdom in prose and poetry.[3] They

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Shu'ubiyya ended with a compromise by which Arabs borrowed forms, expressions, ideas, and approaches, mainly from Persian, and in exchange assured respect for Arabic as the language of the Qur'an. In later days, the term implied divisive tendencies. See H.A.R. Gibb, *Studies on the Civilization of Islam,* ed. William R. Polk and Stanford Shaw (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), pp. 12-13, 66-72; and R.A. Nicholson, *A Literary History of the Arabs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962). For other forms of the Shu'ubiyya see Sami A. Hanna and George H. Gardner, "Al-Shu'ubiyyah Up-Dated," *Middle East Journal,* XX (Summer, 1966), 335-51. See also 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Duri, *al-Judhur al-tarikhiyya fi al-shu'ubiyya (The Historical Roots of the Shu'ubiyya Movement)* (Beirut: Dar al-tali'a, 1962), and pp. 80-86, below.

4. The title bears the name of the compiler, Mufaddal al-Dabbi (d. 786). The original title was *al-Mukhtarat (Selections).*

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2

The Historical Foundations of Arab Nationalism

SAMIR AMIN

1. Prologue

Arab public opinion is very sensitive to everything that happens in Palestine. How could that not be so? From the Atlantic shores of Morocco to the Persian Gulf, from the Mediterranean to the middle of the Sahara and the Upper Nile, one hundred million speak the same language, listen to the same radio broadcasts, read the same books, watch the same films. They were all oppressed by the same European imperialism in the recent past. Nevertheless, when one asks of them, "What is your nationality?", not one answers spontaneously "Arab", but rather "Moroccan", "Egyptian" or "Yemeni". Do they form one nation, the Arab nation, as the ideologists of contemporary Arab nationalism suggest—even if that nation is only in the process of being formed—or fifteen different, though related, nations, as orthodox communism maintained for many years? Is the attachment to Palestine only of a sentimental nature, or is it based on an awareness of a political solidarity in the face of imperialism and Israel?

The problem of the nation in the Arab world is not a question of dogma—bourgeois or marxist; nor is it a question without significance which serves only to disguise the fundamental problems of liberation from imperialist exploitation. For the framework within which class struggle occurs is a national framework and the oppression of the peoples of the region is not only economic, but national.

For a long time we have had the habit of confusing the national experience with one of its expressions, that which resulted in European history, where relatively homogeneous nation-states gradually formed. These states were administratively and politically centralized, and were economically unified by the development of capitalism. The bourgeoisie played a decisive role of unifier in the historical emergence of these nations, of ruling class and of ideological production. The definition which Stalin gave of the five conditions of the nation sums up this historical experience.

When one leaves Europe, one recognizes the inappropriateness of the concepts on which the Stalinian theory of the nation was based. This theory presumes that the nation is a social phenomenon produced by capitalism, or even more precisely by local capitalism, in the sense that it is the local bourgeoisie that founds the nation. Thus there would be no nations outside the center of the world capitalist system, where the bourgeois revolution has established the national power of the local

From Samir Amin, *La nation arabe: nationalisme et luttes de classes,* Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1976, pp.11-38. Reprinted by permission. Translated from the French by N.S.Hopkins. Samir Amin is a French-trained Egyptian economist, now director of the African Institute for Economic Development and Planning, Dakar, Senegal.

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Ulrich W. Haarmann

IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY, IDENTITY AND ALTERITY: THE ARAB IMAGE OF THE TURK FROM THE ʿABBASIDS TO MODERN EGYPT

This article is dedicated to the memory of Alexander Schölch, who is remembered by his friends and colleagues as a man of rare quality and exemplary scholarship.

> A "nation" has been cynically but not inaptly defined as a society united by a common error as to its origin and a common aversion to its neighbors.[1]

I

At the end of the 1950s Khālid Muḥammad Khālid, whose importance for the history of modern Islamic thought and sentiment can hardly be overestimated, propagated the rather preposterous thesis that the terms "tyrant" (derived from Greek *tyrannos*) and "Tūrān," the customary (Persian) word used for the homeland of the Turks, were etymologically and, as a corollary, also semantically akin.[2] What was so irritating about this anti-Turkish libel was not so much its insipidity as the reaction or, more to the point, absence of a reaction to such and similar statements in the Arab public. The lonely voices of historians such as Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Munajjid[3] and Abdallah Laroui,[4] who from very different ideological vantage points chided their Arab audience in the late 1960s for foolishly blaming all their troubles on the Turks, remained unheeded for a very long time.[5]

Only in the last ten to fifteen years has this situation changed. Turks and Arabs are gradually beginning to realize that mutual feelings of hatred and inferiority are products of the past and that a serious occupation with this common past is required if a new beginning in the relations between these two peoples is to be successful, not only on the economic and political but also on the emotional plane. Turks tend to be particularly sensitive to criticism of their role in Arab history. And many Arab intellectuals persistently refuse to see the elements of prejudice and exaggeration in their own traditional attitudes toward the Turks.

The subject of the following paper will be the image of the Turk as it developed among the Arabs through the centuries and the effects this image had, and continues to have, on the self-image of both peoples even today. My arguments will be restricted to the realm of ideology. My contention is that in this sphere of transferring, and rationalizing, historical experience into attitudes,

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نشأتها وتطورها عبر وثائقها

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الكتاب الأول ١٩٥١ - ١٩٦١

الجزء الأول

تحرير

هاني الهندي عبد الإله النصراوي

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı
İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi
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Panarabism

02 ARA 2006

2001 Beyrut

مؤسسة الأبحاث العربية

العثمانيون
وتكوين العرب الحديث

مِن أجلِ بحث رؤيوي مُعاصِر

الدكتور سيّار الجميل

مؤسسة الأبحاث العربية

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Panarabism

02 MAYIS 1995

(stands in relation to) its shadow: How (do we expect) the shadow to be straight if the pole is crooked?[1]

The giant mind of al-Ghazāli dominated the course of orthodox thought for centuries after his death, in education no less than in theology. His insight into the theory and practice of education is that of one who himself was a great teacher besides being a great thinker. Practically all the literature on education that was written after his death down to the period of modern revival is either derived from or inspired by his writings.[2] It is therefore unnecessary to parade the same ideas of guidance expressed in different, and often less eloquent language.

1 Ibid., p. 63.
2 See the writer's article 'Arab Education under the Caliphate' in the *Islamic Review*, June 1954, p. 18.

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A.L. TIBAWI
Arabic and Islamic Themes
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5

FROM ISLAM TO ARAB NATIONALISM

with special reference to Egypt and Syria

I

The co-existence today of Judaism, Christianity and Islam in the lands of their origin is due in no small measure to a tolerant Islam. As the last and most militant of the three it did not seek, in an age of intolerance, to eliminate its predecessors and rivals. Not only had it no positive policy of suppression when it was at the height of its political power, it had in fact a positive one of co-existence.

From the beginning caliphs and military commanders made special allowance for the protection of their Jewish and Christian subjects, and contrary to popular belief Islam was not imposed upon them at the point of the sword or indeed by any systematic means. On the contrary, Jews and Christians were immediately recognized as *ahl al-kitāb* (the people of the book), to whom earlier divine messages had been sent through God's prophets. Although according to the Muslim view these messages had been corrupted, there was still a residue of truth which deserved respect.

But as the final divine message to mankind, Islam came to correct and perfect these previous messages. Hence there was no question of absolute equality with its predecessors. At any rate the notion of religious equality is of fairly recent origin, and even in our own times it is still an ideal which is seldom attained. But barring concession of equality to other religions Islam was tolerant of them, both in theory and in practice. It is true that practice had occasionally fallen below the standards of theory, but its validity was irrevocable because it is enshrined in the divine revelation itself.

It is clear then that the doctrine of religious tolerance in Islam has an idealistic origin. When it was first proclaimed and practised in the seventh century A.D. it must have appeared in sharp contrast to the contemporary fanaticism, interdenominational strife and persecution amongst the Christians themselves in the Byzantine Empire. As a measure of practical politics the Islamic doctrine of religious tolerance was amply vindicated by the ready welcome of the Muslim armies by the Christians and Jews in Syria and elsewhere in the Near East.

Hence it is fallacious to allege, as it has recently become fashionable to allege, that 'the people of the book' were treated by the

FBIS, 20 Nov. 1992, p.42.
62. *FBIS*, 16 Nov. 1992, pp.25–6.
63. *FBIS*, 25 Nov. 1992, pp.42–4.
64. See Sami Kohen in *Milliyet*,12 Oct. 1995, p.16.
65. See, *FBIS*, 13 June 1991, p.38; *Hürriyet*, 29 Dec. 1993, p.28.
66. *FBIS*, 17 March 1993, p.58.
67. *FBIS*, 7 Oct. 1992, p.42. Following a considerable and steady decline from $445 in 1989 to $215 in 1990 and $122 in 1991, Turkey's total exports to Iraq rose to $212 in 1992. *Statistical Yearbook of Turkey* (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, Printing Division, Nov. 1993), p.546.
68. See the statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister Mümtaz Soysal to that effect in *Cumhuriyet*, 1 Oct. 1994, p.8.
69. *Hürriyet*, 28 June 1992, p.15; *FBIS*, 2 July 1992, pp.43–4. Ibid.; 23 March 1993, p.51.
70. See Premier Demirel's 'Fourteenth Press Meeting on Jan. 31, 1993' in *XIV. Basin Toplantisi (Fourteenth Press meeting)* (Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi, 1993), pp.26–29; 52–4. See the statement made by Premier Demirel in *FBIS*, 29 Jan. 1993, pp.50–1; ibid., 2 Aug. 1991, pp.28–9; ibid., 14 Nov. 1991, p.43.
71. For details on Turkey's carrot and stick policy towards Barzani and Talabani see *Cumhuriyet*, 26 Dec. 1995, p.12; and *Milliyet*, 9 April 1995, p.20.
72. See *FBIS*, 10 Feb. 1993, pp.59–60.
73. See statement made by Jalal Talabani to that effect in *FBIS*, 23 Nov. 1992, p.46.
74. See Michael Gunter, 'A de facto Kurdish State in northern Iraq', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.14, No.2, 1993, pp.295–319.
75. See *FBIS*, 11 Dec. 1992, pp.54–5.
76. Ibid. See also *Milliyet*, 12 Aug. 1995, p.17; *Milliyet*, 12 Oct. 1995, p.16; and *Cumhuriyet*, 4 Dec. 1995, p.8.
77. See *Milliyet*, 15 Nov. 1995, p.17; and *Milliyet*, 24 Nov. 1995, p.21.
78. See Yalçin Doğan in *Milliyet*, 6 Aug. 1994, p.11.
79. See the text of the Iraqi National Assembly's Statement on Recognition of Kuwait and following developments in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, Middle East, 11 Nov. 1994, pp.1–3.
80. See the views of the Iraqi opponents of Saddam Hussein to that effect in *Hürriyet*, 29 Nov. 1993, p.14. For arguments to the effect that Saddam Hussein has both the intention and the potential to pursue his prewar confrontationist policies, See Thomas Mattair and Stephen Brannon, 'The UN Sanctions Against Iraq: Issues Influencing Continuation or Removal', *Middle East Policy*, No.1, Vol.III, 1994, pp.30–1. See also Anthony Cordesman. 'Symposium on Dual Containment: US Policy Toward Iran and Iraq', in ibid., pp.11–12.
81. See, for example, Turkish Foreign Policy concerning the Hostage Crisis of Nov. 1979 in Iran and the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988 in Mahmut Bali Aykan, 'Türkiye'nin Basra Körfezi Güvenliği Politikası:1979–1988' –Turkey's Persian Gulf Security Policy: 1979–1988, *METU Studies in Development*, 21, 1994, pp.28–31, 47.
82. See *Cumhuriyet*, 14 Oct. 1995, p.9; *Milliyet*, 20 Aug. 1995, p.17; and *Milliyet*, 21 Aug. 1995, p.17.
83. See *Cumhuriyet*, 18 July 1993, p.7. See also ibid., 14 July 1993, p.6.

Problem

Reflections on Arab Nationalism

EFRAIM and INARI KARSH

Arab nationalism, namely the idea that the 'Arab world' is a 'single homogeneous whole [stretching] from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf' and that Arabs constitute 'a single nation bound by the common ties of language, religion and history', has dominated the Middle Eastern political discourse for the most part of this century.[1] The notion of the territorial nation-state, of one's loyalty to a sovereign state, has been given but a short shrift as a temporary aberration destined to be redressed before long. As Walid Khalidi summed it up some two decades ago:

> The Arab states' system is first and foremost a 'Pan' system. It postulates the existence of a single Arab Nation behind the facade of a multiplicity of sovereign states. In pan-Arab ideology, this Nation is actual, not potential. The manifest failure even to approximate unity does not negate the empirical reality of the Arab Nation. It merely adds normative and prescriptive dimensions to the ideology of pan-Arabism. The Arab Nation both *is*, and *should be*, one.
> From this perspective the individual Arab states are deviant and transient entities; their frontiers illusory; their rulers interim caretakers or obstacles to be removed. Champions of pan-Arabism speak in the name of *vox populi*. Their mandate is from the entire Arab Nation. Before such super-legitimacy, the legitimacy of the individual state shrinks into irrelevance...explicit or transparent *raison d'état* is heresy.[2]

Nevertheless, despite a century of sustained intellectual and political efforts, Arab nationalism has made precious little headway towards its ultimate goal of unifying the 'Arab nation', generating a plethora of explanations by both critics and apologists of the idea. Some have attributed this failure to the incompatibility of the Western concepts of statehood and nationalism with the Middle Eastern reality;[3] others, to the machinations of Western imperialism which (allegedly) carved the Middle East in the wake of the First World War into artificial entities in accordance with its self-serving interests and in complete disregard of the wishes and needs of the 'Arab nation';[4] still others, to the selfish narrow-mindedness of the individual Arab regimes; to the lack of social, economic, political, and at times religious self-awareness among the Arab elites and masses alike; or to the transformation of the Middle Eastern international system over the past few

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

Arab Nationalism

AN ANTHOLOGY

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Pan-Arabism

From Ottomanism to Arabism: The Origin of an Ideology

C. ERNEST DAWN

Since 1918 the doctrine that the Arabs are a nation and that nationality is the basis of politics has come to be accepted by a very large majority of Arab political leaders and of at least the lay intellectuals. The espousal of this doctrine by a people who are predominantly Muslim in religion is a development of revolutionary significance, since for many centuries Muslims viewed the state in terms of religion and dynasty. Muslims have recognized the existence of distinct peoples or nations since the time of Muhammad. Indeed, Islam in its first century or so was the peculiar religion of the Arab nation, and to become a Muslim was to join the Arab nation as a dependent person. This system proved unworkable, however, and in the end Islam became the supreme bond which superseded nationality.[1]

The state in Muslim theory existed to enforce the *sharī'ah*, the law which God had sent to man through His messenger, Muhammad. Originally, it was held, the totality of the Muslims constituted a congregation, who ought to be joined together under the rule of one monarch, the caliph, or successor to the Prophet Muhammad, who was God's first viceroy on earth under Islam. After some centuries during which actuality was close to theory, the caliphate broke up, leaving the Muslims governed by a variety of dynasts or sultans. In theory, the *sharī'ah* remained to give unity to the Muslim congregation, and any ruler who enforced the *sharī'ah* was a legitimate ruler, regardless of how he had attained power.

Such was the nature (in theory) of the Ottoman Empire, the state sovereign in most of the Arab lands after 1517. The Arabs of southwestern Asia and of Egypt accepted the rule of the Turkish Ottomans, at least nominally, for four centuries. But by the end of the nineteenth century a few Ottoman Arab

lay all the blame upon men who are suffering the common fate of all revolutionaries when they confront the actual necessities of the exercise of power. It may well seem, indeed, that in the present state of affairs and of ideas in the Middle East, the army remains the only instrument of popular aspiration that is capable of bringing about a social democracy. For the efforts of eminent civilians to promote political democracy have almost everywhere, and particularly in Egypt, been scattered in a defeat which is also, in some measure, that of the liberal West.

June, 1957

Postscript. This paper was not intended for publication. It took shape as a working memorandum, prepared, with the help of our colleagues of the Centre for Documentation and Synthesis, for use at a seminary held at St. Anthony's College, Oxford. It was written in view of the participation, in that interesting meeting, of the Study Centre for Foreign Politics.

That is the reason for the somewhat elliptical character of the exposition, which was meant to raise questions and serve as a basis for discussion, rather than to formulate any judgments of value.

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The Middle East in Transition, New York
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20 ARALIK 199[illegible]

ARAB NATIONALISM

In Search of an Ideology

by NISSIM REJWAN

I

WRITING IN 1942, Professor H. A. R. Gibb lamented the fact that he had not yet seen a single book written by an Arab of any country, in any Western language, that made it possible for a Western student to understand the roots of Arab culture. More than that, he said he had 'not seen any book written in Arabic for Arabs themselves which has clearly analysed what Arab culture means to the Arabs'. In 1956, another prominent Arabist, Professor G. E. von Grunebaum, of Chicago University, deplored the fact that the Arab-speaking world of today had not been able to develop 'an adequate self-image—adequate in the sense that it could reconcile emotional purposiveness with a reasonable respect for facts'.

There is no doubt that these statements still remain largely true, though not altogether so. It is true that no Arab has yet analysed the meaning of Arab culture to Arabs themselves, and that a balance between Arab emotional purposiveness and a sufficient respect for the facts is yet far to seek. Yet the student of Arab culture today cannot help being impressed by a new phenomenon. For to the contemporary Arab intellectual, Arab culture has become epitomized in one comprehensive concept—that of Arab nationalism. And within the limits of that notion there are fairly sincere attempts to pay attention to facts. No Arab today gives a thought to defining the meaning or analysing the content of Arab culture because he sees no reason for doing so. The unity of Arab culture, its content and principles, are taken for granted. The controversies which raged, only a decade ago, about what constitutes Arab culture, whether the Arabs

Ankara Üni., Siyasal Bilgiler Fak. Der., cilt:56, sayı:2, yıl:2001, Ankara, 158-172.

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Arap Milliyetçiliği

Panorama

MADDE YAYIMLANDIKTAN SONRA GELEN OLKUMAN

Giriş

Kasım 2000'de Beyrut'ta sergilenen "Arap Rüyası" adlı müzikalin, organizatörleri dahi şaşırtacak derecede ilgi görmesi (MUSTAFA, 2000: 1), Arap milliyetçiliği konusu üzerindeki tartışmalara hız kazandırdı. Arap dünyasında başlayan ve "yeniden dirilmeyi" gündeme getiren bu tartışmaların slogan düzeyinde kalmasının ve geçmişin Arap entellektüellerinin görüşlerinin akademik çevrelerde hiçbir katkı olmadan canlandırılmasının nedenleri konusunda düşünmek, Arap milliyetçiliği açısından gelinen noktayı tespit etmek açısından oldukça önemlidir.

Gelinen noktayı, gelişim sürecini incelemeden anlamak mümkün olmadığı düşünüldüğünde ve teorik bir çerçevenin de zorunluluğu dikkate alındığında, bu çalışmanın birkaç bölümden oluşması kaçınılmazdı. Elbette temel amaç, Arap milliyetçiliği kavramının süreç ve bugün itibariyle içeriksel belirlenimidir. Bunun yanında, Batı deneyiminde "millet" ve "milliyetçilik" kavramlarının incelenmesi ve bu çerçevede, sözü geçen kavramların Arap dünyası açısından öneminin ihmal edilmesi de mümkün değildi.

1. Millet ve Milliyetçilik Kavramları Üzerine Kısa Bir Değerlendirme

"Millet" kavramını açıklama çabalarından elde edilen, üzerinde anlaşma sağlanabilmiş ortak bir tanımlamaya gidilemediği sonucu olmuştur. Daha doğru bir ifadeyle, farklı ülkelerde farklı pratiklerle içeriğinin belirlendiği dikkate alındığında millet; W. Connor için ortak ideoloji, ortak müesseseler ve adetlerin yanında toprak unsurunun da ön plana çıktığı bir kavram iken (CONNOR, 1994: 37), E. Gellner ise kültür ve hissin önemine işaret etmektedir. Buna göre, "düşünceler, işaretler ve çağrışımlar, davranış ve iletişim biçimleri sistemi" anlamına gelen kültürün paylaşımı ve aynı millete mensubiyet hissinin varlığı yeterlidir (GELLNER, 1992: 28). Ya da millet, "hayal edilmiş bir siyasal topluluktur" (ANDERSON, 1995: 20) veya E. Hobsbawm'ın yaklaşımı doğrultusunda, nesnel ve öznel tanımlar tatmin edici olmadığı için bu alanda benimsenecek en iyi tutum bilinemezciliktir ve *a priori* bir tanımda

2 MAR 2010

bulunmaktansa bir başlangıç varsayımı olarak "kendilerini bir milletin üyeleri gören yeterli büyüklükteki insan toplulukları bu halleriyle millet" olarak kabul edileceklerdir (HOBSBAWM, 1995: 23-24).

Tanımlama girişimlerinde ortaya çıkan farklılıklar, milleti oluşturan unsurların belirlenmesinde de söz konusu olmaktadır. Üzerinde en çok durulan unsur olan dil, M. Guibernau'ya göre milli bilincin oluşmasında en önemli faktörlerden biridir. Zira, bir milletin içinde kalabilmenin temel ölçütü dildir. Çünkü, "anlamama" veya "anlaşılmama", yani "yabancı" olmanın temel sorunu iletişim kurma yetersizliğidir ve bu durum bir milletin dışında kalmak için yeterlidir (GUIBERNAU, 1997: 120). Benzer şekilde E. Balibar ve I. Wallerstein'a göre de dil, bireyleri her an fiili hale gelebilecek bir kökene bağlama fonksiyonu ile etnikliğin üretilmesinde önemli bir etkendir (BALIBAR / WALLERSTEIN, 1993: 122). Oysa, milliyetçilik konulu akademik çalışmaların kurucularından biri olarak kabul edilen H. Kohn'a göre milletin oluşumunda dil, Herder ve Fichte tarafından öne sürüldüğü kadar önemli değildir. Çünkü, İsviçre ve Latin Amerika ülkeleri dikkate alındığında farklı dilleri konuşan topluluklardan teşekkül etmiş milli devletlerin bulunduğu görülecektir (KOHN, 1969: 14).

Kültür ve tarih birliğini de milletin temel unsurları arasında değerlendiren görüşler mevcut olsa bile, sözü geçen kavramların içeriğinin geriye dönük bir edimle ve belirli bir siyasi amaç çerçevesinde belirlenebilir olduğu dikkatten kaçmamalıdır (ERÖZDEN, 1997: 110). Ayrıca, E. Gellner'in de belirttiği gibi, kültürel farklılıkların insanlık tarihinde çok fazla yer edindiği, bu farklılıkların sürdüğü ve kültürel sınırların çok zaman belirginsizleştiği de göz önüne alınmalıdır. Yaygınlaşmış eğitim ve iletişim sistemleri sayesinde standartlaşmış üst kültürlerin, milli kimliği ortak bir kültürle tanımladığı söylenebilir veya bireylerin ancak ortak bir kültürle tanımlanan birimlerde yaşayabilir oldukları ve kültürel çoğulculuğun güncel koşullarda geçerli olmadığı ileri sürülebilirse de, bunun her zaman böyle olduğunu söylemek bir hayli güçtür (GELLNER, 1992: 103-104).

Benzer şekilde soy birliğinin de milleti meydan getirmede ne derece etkili olduğu tartışmalıdır. Zira, modern hayatın mobilizasyonu ve tarihin büyük göçleri sayesinde soy birliği kalmamıştır (KOHN, 1969: 14). Ayrıca, ırk bakımından homojen millet tanımlaması, çağdaş devletlerin çoğunluğunun etnik homojenliğe sahip olmadıkları dikkate alındığında, uygun bir niteleme değildir (PFAFF, 1994: 16).

Son olarak din kurumunu ele almak mümkündür. Ancak, E. Erözden'in de belirttiği gibi, özellikle büyük dinlerin evrensel mesajları millet ve milli devlet gibi kavramları dışlamaktadır. Üstelik millet, modernleşme süreci ile birlikte ortaya çıkmış ve modernleşmenin temel dinamiklerinden biri olan dünyevileşmeyi içselleştirmiştir. Yine de, dinin kimi milletleşme süreçlerinde yadsınamayacak bir öneme sahip olduğu gözden kaçırılmamalıdır (ERÖZDEN,

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Arab Nationalism and Islam

(Djamāl ʿAbd-an Nāṣir and His Attitude to Islam)

Josef Muzikář, Praha

The incorporation of Islam into political programmes and doctrines as an important factor is characteristic of the majority of tendencies and trends having to do with Arab nationalism. Some theoreticians even list religion as a constitutive and determining factor, while most theoreticians include it in the category of traditions, Arab culture or the Arab mission.

At the time when nationalism was turning into an important political and social factor in western Europe, religion there was weakened by the development of towns, commerce and industry. Nationalism in that region became the political movement of the emerging bourgeois class, whereas in the Arab countries the bourgeoisie, which was concentrated for all practical purposes almost exclusively in the arts and crafts and in trade, was relatively weak and also had to face the intrusion of the colonial powers, which led not only to economic exploitation but, gradually, through the disruption of those countries' feudal structure, to a deep crisis in Islam as well. There appeared increasing doubts concerning the correctness of its basic dogmas. The first reaction to colonialism was a call for better morality and the explanation of the decay of the Arab countries was generally sought in a decay of morals. This was quite natural, considering the fact that the ruling social ideology was a religious one. And because efforts toward a reform and renascence of Islam were proceeding parallel with a growth of nationalistic tendencies, ethnical and psychological aspects often played a foremost role in the nationalism of the Arab countries of the Middle East. Many Arab nationalists, and later also the advocates of so-called Arab socialism, often presented themselves as heralds of a higher morality and they considered moral consciousness as the only correct path toward national awakening. This emphasis on ethics, faith, consciousness and moral re-education of the people as the basis of their ideology will undoubtedly for a long time remain symptomatic of both these trends.

One of the first theoreticians of Arab nationalism, Kusṭāntīn Zurayq considered religion the most important force inherited from the past.[1] Edmond Rabbāt identifies himself with the concept of a nation outlined by Renan: "a nation is a soul, a spiritual principle ... to share the common glories of the past, to have a common will in the present, to have done great things together, to want to go on doing them, such are the

[1] Sylvia G. Haim (ed.), *Arab Nationalism* (An anthology selected and edited with an introduction by Sylvia G. Haim, University of California Press), Los Angeles 1962, p. 167.

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SOPRA GELEN DOKÜMAN

Arab Nationalism and Islam (Part II)

Josef Muzikář, Praha

5. Nasser's Views on Socialism and Their Relation to Islamic Socialism

Whereas the proponents of Islamic socialism have strived to make modern society adapt itself as much as possible to the traditional ideas contained in the Koran, Nasser used Islam as the form for expressing the requirements and needs of contemporary society. Let us compare, in this connection, the views of Muṣṭafā as-Sibāʿī and the Libyan leader, Muʿammar al-Qadhdhāfī, with Djamāl ʿAbd-an-Nāṣir's ideas.

The basic work by Muṣṭafā as-Sibāʿī, 'Islamic Socialism'[68] was published in a great number of copies, with Nasser's portrait, and the idea was spread that the opinions in it were in principle Nasser's own.

Muṣṭafā as-Sibāʿī further developes and comments on the ideas of Djamāl al-Afghānī for whom 'socialism is part and parcel of the religion of Islam'.[69] For Nasser, on the other hand, Islam is a part of the structure of modern society which is mainly characterized by a socialist system of distribution, while its profile consists of a large number of other factors which are at least on the same level with Islam. The most convincing proof of this is the Charter in which the necessity of revolution, true democracy, industrialization, production, the significance of human labour, Arab unity, the class character of the Egyptian society and the indispensable need for acquiring other nations' and societies' experiences are discussed. Nasser adopted, on the whole, the idea of social development in modern history. For Muṣṭafā as-Sibāʿī, nothing basically new exists in history. All that takes place in history are only movements closer to or farther away from the values of the original Islam. Even communism is, according to him, an adaptation of the early Islamic Ismaili heresy against the orhodox creed.

In some of Nasser's statements, science comes out as the basic factor and driving-force of historical development. "Knowledge is the driving-force in the forthcoming epoch; it is in fact the true liberty."[70]

He incessantly emphasized the need for linking Islam with the experience and findings of the contemporary era. 'A mind open to all human experience', on which it draws to its benefit, is described in the Charter as a guarantee of an essential source of revolutionary accomplishments[71] and the basic motto of Nasser's political orientation.

Nasser's conception of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism is much less ethicized. He highly appraised spiritual and ethical values and principles, but at the same time he did not fail to emphasize the significance of science, technology and revolutionary practice. For Nasser, Islam played a decisive role with regard to the formation of the style of living of the individual, whereas the social sphere, economy and social relations were as a rule guided and directed by him according to methods which were either strongly influenced by or adopted from technologically and economically advanced countries.

A highly important difference was that Nasser judged the society of Egypt and the other Arab countries not only according to the criteria of Islam but mainly according to their attitude to the twentieth century and to industrially advanced countries. A task for the Arabs which was given prominence in his considerations was the need to catch up with era of steam and electricity, which they had missed.[72]

He also never linked his conception of socialism so closely to Islam as has Muʿammar al-Qadhdhāfī who has most recently presented himself as the only safeguard of Nässerism. It is sufficient to quote his following statement: "We say our nation is proud of being the first to introduce a sound socialism to the world because the Holy Koran laid down the principles of social justice, which are adopted by the Federal State. The Holy Koran advocated Socialism long before Marx and Lenin ... We were the first to establish human norms. We were the pioneers of astronomy, medicine, education, humanities and human ideals. It was Islam that has established a social and economic system that is far better than anything else that has been or will be advocated by philosophers and scientists until doomsday."[73]

Nasser, too, sometimes linked closely with Islam, but never to such an extent, and he usually did so on special occasions — when addressing Moslem organizations or the Yemenites during that country's civil war.

For Muʿammar al-Qadhdhāfī, Islam is the mould in which science and culture are shaped, whereas for Nasser, science and modern culture were the moulds of Islam. In the course of the so-called cultural revolution in Libya, a purge of libraries was started and all books which

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[68] The work of Muṣṭafā as-Sibāʿī, *Ishtirākīyat al-Islām,* Al-Qāhira 1962 was in only four months sold out in 120,000 copies which represents one third of the press production of the Egyptian Arab Republic at that time. Cit. according to Anouar Abdel Malek, *Égypte, société militaire,* p. 296, Paris 1962.

[69] Sami Hanna, G. H. Gardner, *op. cit.,* p. 52.

[70] *President G. Abdel Nasser's Speeches, 1958.* Address at Cairo University, December 21, 1958, p. 337.

[71] Al-Mīthāq, *op. cit.,* Chapter 1, General View, p. 13.

[72] *President G. Abdel Nasser's speeches and press interview, 1958.* Address at Cairo University, December 21, 1958, p. 336. ["In fact, our Arab people have missed two of the most important developments that affected the whole of mankind, I mean development in the fields of steam and electric power. At the time the world was entering upon the steam age, we were still dominated by Mediaeval Ages phantasms, while on the advent of the electric age we had hardly begun taking the first steps away from those illusions. Thus we have missed much of the great advantages obtained by the nations which had preceded us on the road to civilisation and been able to enjoy all the benefits derived from these two momentous developments."]

[73] The speech of Colonel Muammar el Qathafi, On the Second Anniversary of the September 1st Revolution. Tripoli 1971, p. 13—14.

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5. BİLGE, Mustafa Lütfi (Dr.)

06 OCAK 1994

İstanbul Üniv. Edb. Fak. İstanbul 1982, 1 c, 180 s, eb: 23x18 cm.

Doçenetlik tezinin adı :

" XIX ve XX. Asırlarda Türk-Arap Münâsebetleri Işığında Arap Milliyetçilik Hareketi. "

Bir giriş ve altı ana bölümden meydana gelmiş olan tez, sekiz vesîka ve eklerle tamamlanmaktadır. Giriş bölümünde, bibliografya ve batıda yapılan çalışmalara kaynak teşkil etmiş olan eserler tanıtılmıştır. I. bölümde, Osmanlı devletinde Türk-Arap ve diğer unsurların aralarındaki münâsebetlerin temelleri üzerinde durulmuştur. II. bölümde ise, XIX. asrın sonlarında Arap ülkelerinde milliyetçilik cereyanı ve adem-i merkeziyetçilik sisteminin faaliyetleri ele alınmıştır. Diğer bölümlerde ise, Arap ülkelerine karşı değişik bir sistemin tatbik edilmesi Osmanlı devletinin bölgedeki otoritesinin zayıflamasının sebepleri ile aradaki münasebetlerin kopması ve Osmanlı idaresine karşı Arapların askerî harekâtı ele alınmıştır.

فاطمة عباس عبدالرحمن مها أحمد علام, دليل الرسائل الماجستير و الدكتوراه التي نوقشت في كلية دار العلوم منذ عام 1985 و حتى نهاية فبراير 1997, القاهرة 1418 – 1999: (جامعة القاهرة) . İSAM KTP 88569

0 6 AGUSTOS 2005

[٣٦٦] محمد الصادق عفيفي

الاتجاهات الوطنية في الشعر الليبي الحديث ؛ إشراف عمر الدسوقي،

١٩٦٢ . – ٣٥٦ ورقة . – ماجستير

16 KASIM 1996

ARAP - MİLLİYETÇİLİK
- MEŞRUTİYET

119- Arap Milliyetçiliği ve İkinci Meşrutiyet. 177 s. Yüksek Lisans

Zekeriya KURŞUN
Tezi Yön.: Doç.Dr. Cevdet KÜÇÜK
Kabul Tarihi: 16.9.1987
(Yakınçağ Tarihi) M.Ü

Osmanlı Devleti hakimiyeti altında yaşayan etnik gruplar, özellikle son devir tarihimizde önemli rol oynamışlardır. Bu tezin konusunu oluşturan etnik grup Arapların devlet kurucuları olan Türkler ile münasebetleri de o dönemin önemli olaylarındandır.

Araştırmanın birinci bölümünde, Arap milliyetçiliğinin doğuşu, Meşrutiyet dönemindeki durumu verilmektedir. İkinci bölümde ise, bu hareketin oluşma ve teşkilatlanma dönemi olan 1908-1914 yılları arasındaki olaylar esas alınarak İttihat ve Terakki'nin Araplara karşı tutumu anlatılmaktadır. Son bölümde, Arapların milliyetçi amaçlarla teşkilatlanmaları, bu teşkilatların önemi ve Araplar üzerindeki etkileri incelenmektedir.

فاطمة عباس عبدالرحمن مها أحمد علام, دليل الرسائل الماجستير و الدكتوراه التي نوقشت في كلية دار العلوم منذ عام 1985 و حتى نهاية فبراير 1997, القاهرة 1418 – 1999: (جامعة القاهرة) . İSAM KTP 88569

[١٦٤] عبدالعال محمد عبدالعال الجبري

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17 MARS 2001

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و مج ٣٨ (١٩٣٠ م) ، ص ٣٦٩ .

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حولية المؤرخ

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د. نويصر مصطفى

أستاذ محاضر

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karta or Surakarta (Javanese names, both meaning "victorious and prosperous" and of Sanskrit—not Arabic—etymology).

Javanese legends ascribe the conquest of Sunda Kalapa to Sunan Gunungjati, one of the Nine Saints *(wali sanga)* who are traditionally said to have brought Islam to Java. Portuguese sources refer to a person whom they call Falatehan, Faletehan, or Tegaril—clearly clumsy representations of some indigenous name or names. Aspects of the Portuguese information resemble the Javanese legends regarding Gunungjati.

There have been several attempts to unravel the confusion of names here, notably by Hoesein Djajadiningrat, and by H. J. de Graaf and Th. G. Th. Pigeaud. It is possible that this Falatehan was actually named Fadlillah Khan or Fatahillah. With no scholarly resolution of the matter being possible, the latter name has been rendered effectively the official version by Indonesian authorities. Hence, the historic centre of old Batavia, with its restored eighteenth-century Dutch town hall, is now known as Fatahillah Park (Taman Fatahillah). A Javanese text entitled *Purwaka Caruban Nagari* distinguishes between Fatahillah and Gunungjati; it purports to have been written in 1720, but the text is almost surely a modern forgery and, even if it were genuine, would still have been written two centuries after the events.

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M. C. RICKLEFS

al-Fatāt

Al-Fatāt was a secret organisation established by Arab students in 1909, in Paris, and active in Syria until the French occupation of Syria in July 1920. The first Arab clandestine society formed during the Young Turk period, it took the name Jam'iyyat al-Umma al-'Arabiyya al-Fatāt (Society of the Young Arab Nation). Confronting the Turkification policies of the Young Turks, the society strived to protect the "natural rights" of the Arab nation within the Ottoman Empire. Numbering about forty members, the society maintained high standards of secrecy, including the use of codes. Its most significant venture before World War I was the convening of the First Arab Congress in Paris in June 1913, in which twenty-odd representatives of most of the Arab organisations existing at the time participated. Al-Fatāt itself retained its policy of secrecy and did not openly participate in the congress.

At the beginning of World War I, the society's headquarters moved to Damascus, and in early 1915 it decided to combine efforts with the officers' secret society al-'Ahd (The Covenant), with the intention of starting a general revolt against the Ottomans. A messenger was sent to Sharīf Ḥusayn b. 'Alī (c. 1853–1931) of Mecca to gain his collaboration, following

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