

34. Buchak (2018), 117. We'll focus on the later theory as presented in Buchak (2018), but compare her account of what it is for an act to be an act of faith in Buchak (2017a), 115.
35. Buchak (2018), 121–122, 124; see also 'act faithfully' (*ibid.*, 118) and 'faithful person' (*ibid.*, 128).
36. This addition first appears in Buchak (2014), 53: a person has faith that *p* only if they 'have a positive attitude towards the truth of the proposition'. However, there the positive attitude requirement *supplements* the caring requirement: someone has faith that *p* only if they 'care whether or not the proposition is true' (*ibid.*). By Buchak (2018), these distinct requirements appear to collapse into one, which seems sensible.
37. As we pointed out earlier, the last two additions were present in the commentary in Buchak (2012), but they were omitted from the 'final analysis', quoted above as Buchak's early theory.
38. Cf. Howard-Snyder (2017), 36–47; *Idem* (2019), 450; Kvanvig (2018), 17; Matheson (2018), *passim*; McKaughan (2018), 202; McKaughan & Howard-Snyder (forthcoming).
39. Lewis (1942/2015), 38–40.
40. Buchak might be sympathetic to this idea; see Buchak (2017a), 120 n. 14.
41. Buchak (2018), 117, emphasis added.
42. *Ibid.*, emphasis added; cf. Buchak (2017a), 114.
43. Buchak (2017a), 114, emphasis added; Buchak (2017a), 113, emphasis added; Buchak (2014), 54, emphasis added; cf. Buchak (2017a), 115.
44. Buchak (2017a), 115.
45. Buchak (2014), 54 n. 5.
46. Buchak (2012), 227; cf. Buchak (2014), 53.
47. Grice (1975).
48. Buchak (2012), 232–233.
49. Buchak (2014), 49.
50. Buchak (2017b), 58.
51. Buchak (2012), 233.
52. For *Envelope* in film, with a cellphone instead of an envelope, see *False Flag*, Season 1, Episode 3, 26:40ff.
53. Buchak says that what we envision here is not a way of expressing faith:

consider the person who intends to open the private investigator's envelope publicly, precisely to show that he has faith in his spouse's constancy. On the current analysis, neither of these acts can be acts of faith: indeed, performing them entails that the agent does not have faith in the proposition in question. (Buchak (2012), 234)

Dormandy (2018), 414–422, agrees with us and makes a similar point to ours, although much more thoroughly, with an extensive analysis of Job.

54. Buchak (2017a), 129, emphasis added.
55. Buchak (2014), 49–50; 72 n. 1.
56. *Ibid.*, 50.
57. Hacking (2006).
58. Cf. Alston (1996), 4.
59. Swinburne (2005), 5–7.
60. Cf. Stump (2010).
61. On the faith of Mother Teresa, see McKaughan (2018).
62. Cf. McKaughan (2016).
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## On the incompatibility of God's knowledge of particulars and the doctrine of divine immutability: towards a reform in Islamic theology

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**Abstract:** Affirming that divine knowledge of occurrent changes among particulars is incompatible with the doctrine of divine immutability, this article seeks to resolve this tension by denying the latter. Reviewing this long-running debate, I first formalize the exchange between al-Ghazālī and Avicenna on this topic, and then set out the ways in which contemporary Sadrāean philosophers have tried to resolve the incompatibility. I argue that none of the cited Sadrāean attempts to resolve the incompatibility between divine omniscience and immutability is successful. Then, by reference to certain principles drawn from Shia theology, I indicate how one might seek to reject the dogma of divine immutability. I conclude that by emancipating ourselves from that dogma, new horizons could be opened for Islamic philosophy, free from traditional Hellenistic constraints.

### On the incompatibility between divine immutability and divine knowledge of particulars

According to Avicenna, the idea of divine immutability is inconsistent with the claim that God has knowledge of occurrent changes among particulars; philosophers, therefore, have no choice but to deny that God possesses one of these attributes. Favouring the former attribute, Avicenna thus denies the latter.

If, then, the knowledge of the Necessary Being had been temporal, I mean a time referred to it, so that He knows such-and such an object does not exist at this time and exists tomorrow,